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MILITARY 1112 CENTURY

B.E. VPYTIKOV

TROTSKY AND THE RED STATE CONSPIRACY

"Veche" 2009

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Special thanks to Ph.D. S.V. Karpenko, Doctor of History A.A. Zdanovich

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The book is dedicated to one of the most mysterious episodes in Soviet history — the “case” of a conspiracy in the Field Headquarters (Red Headquarters) of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. In early July 1919, the Special Department of the Cheka, on charges of “participation in a conspiratorial counter-revolutionary organization and preparing a coup,” arrested the current Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Republic, former colonel of the tsarist army I.I. Vatsetis. His inner circle was also arrested.

One of the first “bulldog fights under the carpet” unfolded with the active participation of Lenin and Trotsky.

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Introduction

THE MOST MYSTERIOUS EPISODE OF SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENT

Literature

On September 3, 1927, at a joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the "Red Bonaparte" – Leon Trotsky – who had already completely lost the struggle for power, and his winner, Joseph Stalin, recalled past mistakes and disagreements to each other. In particular, they talked about the strategic plans of the Red Army in the summer of 1919:

"[I.V.] Stalin: I affirm, I stated this in the press and no one (L.D. Trotsky. - S.V.) denied that in the most important cases of the Civil War, when it was a question of the main enemies, about Denikin and Kolchak, the main military issues were resolved here without Trotsky.

[L.D. Trotsky: How can I refute all the slander against me? Where? Which way? We will publish all the correspondence with Lenin, I have picked it up. ...

[I.V.] Stalin: ... The question stood in the Politburo as follows: should we move on to Ufa, driving Kolchak beyond the Urals and leaving the Urals behind us, or stop on the Ufa line, leaving the Urals in the hands of Kolchak, and transfer troops to south. Trotsky spoke in favor of suspending the offensive in the Ufa region and, therefore, for leaving the Urals in the hands of Kolchak. The Politburo opposed this plan, believing that Trotsky's plan would mean helping Kolchak, and decided to continue the offensive against Kolchak, driving him beyond the Urals. In this regard, the Politburo decided to replace Commander-in-Chief [I.I.] Vatsetis, who was then a supporter of Trotsky's plan, with another Commander-in-Chief - [S.S.] Kamenev - and send new workers to the front. Since that time, Trotsky was completely "rejected" from the Eastern Front. Vatsetis

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replaced by Kamenev, sent new people to the Eastern Front and thus liquidated Kolchak against [the will of] Trotsky.

In this context, I.V. Stalin presented the events connected with one of the most mysterious episodes of the Civil War - "a conspiracy in the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic."

What is known about him? — As established by Ya.Yu. Tinchenko, on charges of treason, they arrested the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Republic, former Colonel I.I. Vatsetis, [acting] Chief of the Field Staff, former General F.V. Kostyaev, a number of their employees - several graduates of the 6-month courses of the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff in 1918. The arrest was followed by a hunt for the entire graduation. Neither Vatsetis, nor Kostyaev, nor the General Staff officers were seriously injured, although the latter were kept in prison for six months or more. Based on the later testimony of one of the General Staff officers, Ya.Yu. Tinchenko dated the arrest of Vatsetis on June 25, 1919. Knowing that officially the Commander-in-Chief was removed only on July 8, Ya.Yu. Tinchenko probably considered the story of M.D. Bonch-Bruевич (in whose memoirs, by the way, there is a lot of distortion of facts) about the alleged conversation between the general and Vatsetis, at which the latter allegedly stated that he continued to lead the troops in prison. "However, from a letter from Vatsetis to Lenin dated October 21, 192 | g. it turns out that the Commander-in-Chief was arrested on July 8 and immediately completely isolated. Consequently, even the dating of the main events needs some adjustment. Also Ya.Yu. Tinchenko, announcing the arrest of a significant part of the release - about 80 people - does not take into account the fact that the General Staff officers were taken on various cases. Thus, from the response of the Department of Affairs of the Special Department of the Cheka, it turns out, for example, that the former head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 7th Army, General Staff Officer Tarasov, was arrested as a friend and closest colleague of the executed active participants in the case of the Petrograd conspiracy of Avenarius and Lundekvist. Tarasov "lived with Avenarius; knew about Lundekvist's sympathies for the whites and himself showed sympathy for the whites (Lundekvist's testimony).

Not earlier than July 23, 1919, one of the leaders of the Special Department of the Cheka, I.P. Pavlunovsky "concocted" (as the authors of the "GRU Empire" put it?) and introduced V.I. Lenin "Report on the case of the White Guard organization in the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military

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veto of the Republic". Pavlunovsky reported that the group of persons, consisting of 4 General Staff officers, as established by the investigation, set itself the following tasks: establishing communication with the headquarters of Denikin and Kolchak; the overthrow of Soviet power through an internal coup; seizing the army command and control apparatus under the guise of recreating the General Staff. Pavlunovsky reported that the group was at the initial stage of formation and managed to "only partially begin" the implementation of the planned tasks, and therefore its activities did not affect the fighting of the Red Army; with the establishment of the connection of the group with the headquarters of Kolchak and Denikin, which, judging by the obtained (or knocked out) from the arrested teacher of the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army Yu.I. Grigoriev's testimony, it was supposed to establish "in two weeks", the situation could change °. During the preliminary investigation, the involvement of Vatsetis in the White Guard organization was not established, and the case about him was transferred to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. On October 7, 1919, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee recognized Vatsetis as an "extremely unbalanced, illegible in his connections" person, surrounded by elements compromising him. Recognizing the guilt of Vatsetis as unproven, and the merits of the first Commander-in-Chief "undoubtedly great", the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee placed him at the disposal of the military department. Such a chronology is established according to the collection "V.I. Lenin and the Cheka" 1987, on which the researchers mainly rely.

The gravestone on the events related to the conspiracy in the Field Headquarters was laid by reports at the 1st Congress of the Special Departments of I.P. Pavlunovsky and the head of the Cheka G.G. Berries of December 22, 1919 and January 3, 1920 \* The field headquarters is not named in any of them, but it is said that the counter-revolutionary organization "National Center" used for its purposes the apparatus of the State Higher Educational Institution, State Higher Educational Institution, TsUS, Headquarters of the Railway . troops; had strong connections in the VZS, VGSh and "some central offices and centers"; "Almost all the bodies of [military] administration were White Guards" (Pavlunovsky). The explanation is simple: the arrest of several dozen people, whose counter-revolutionary attitude is very doubtful, was easier to file in the context of a prominent case - and this was the case of the "National Center". Historians only in the early 2000s. they began to understand that the corps of the General Staff officers was by no means united! In 1918, for any party worker, all military specialists of the highest qualification and even more so were "the same person." Therefore, in the report of F.E. Dzerzhinsky at a meeting of the Moscow

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of the RCP(b) meeting of September 24, 1919, the issue of preparing a military coup at Headquarters was not even mentioned in the context of the arrests of members of the "National Center" and employees of the headquarters of the Volunteer Army of the Moscow Region (doc. 3.7). The special department of the Cheka and its leaders were severely criticized by the head of the military department, they had a chance to take revenge on Trotsky personally and raise their significance - if there were enemies everywhere in the army (according to Pavlunovsky, at the end of 1918, "counter-revolutionary organization [in the army] ... has completed its construction"; Yagody - "the large White Guard organizations that have been revealed, the National Center, etc., show to what extent the counter-revolution has infiltrated our military apparatus"), then the significance of special departments should grow - before them "there is a triple task. Firstly, the fight against personal betrayal, secondly, the front-line counter-revolution and, thirdly, the technical counter-revolution." From the point of view of the "communication" of the "National Center" and the "conspiracy in the Field Headquarters", the observation of N.S. Kirmel: "The available materials do not allow us to speak unambiguously about the connection between the intelligence agencies of A.I. Denikina, A.V. Kolchak, N.N. Yudenich and the anti-Soviet underground in Moscow, Petrograd and other cities!\*. What connection is there between the Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff officers - with Denikin's agents?

The biographers of Trotsky V.G. puzzled over the background of these events in the post-Soviet period. Krasnov and V.O. Daines, military personnel researchers (S.T. Minakov, Ya.Yu. Titchenko) and specialists in the history of intelligence (V. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov), etc. They believe that a "conspiracy" took place, S. Ostryakov, E.I. Belov and I.A. Doroshenko, publicist L. Mlechin, N. Cherushev and S.T. Minakov. Researcher A.A. Zdanovich in the historiographical part of his article on the "conspiracy" gives an assessment of the works of S. Ostryakov, E.I. Belova and I.A. Doroshenko, L. Mlechin and N. Cherusheva. According to the researcher, "S. Ostryakov not only confirms the existence of a conspiracy, but also points out the connection of the conspiratorial group with the French and Polish missions, as well as

anti-Soviet underground in Moscow. Consequently, the "officer organization" can be safely called a spy organization, which was done" E.I. Belov and I.A. Doroshenko in the article "The creator of the Soviet military counterintelligence". Leonid Mlechin in the book "The Russian Army between Trotsky and Stalin" was looking for facts about the confrontation

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these leaders of the RCP(b). Naturally, according to A.A. Zdanovich, "the episode with the arrests at Headquarters in the summer of 1919 was the best fit for solving the task." Nikolai Cherushev, having devoted 18 pages of his book "Military conspiracies in Soviet Russia: real and imaginary" and without introducing new facts into scientific circulation, made an odious conclusion: "... the competent authorities already in those years took measures to show their usefulness to the cause of the revolution, where it is necessary and not necessary, brandishing a punishing sword.

In the paragraph "Rumors of a military conspiracy in the Red Army" in a study on the Soviet military leadership of the 1920s, Sergei Minakov confines himself to retelling 3 documents from the 1975 collection "V.I. Lenin and the Cheka" and Trotsky's later memoirs. The link to a single document is extremely inaccurate: RGVA, f. 33987 (in the fund of the Secretariat of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic 3 inventories, thousands of files and millions of documents). S.T. Minakov writes that one of the members of the counter-revolutionary group (most likely, he means E.I. Isaev, who was assigned to the Commander-in-Chief) stated that the group planned to "create a strong" General Staff, which influences all sectors of the country's life for the purposes of its military power, regardless of who is at the head of the board," by entering into contact with the graduates of the Imperial Nikolaev Military Academy who served under Denikin and Kolchak'. S.T. Minakov considers the July arrests to be the culmination of events that began in May 1919, connected with the White Guard organization in Petrograd, the betrayals of a number of military specialists and the surrender of several forts on the outskirts of Petrograd.

The rest of the researchers (I. Deutscher, V. Krasnov and V. Daines, A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov, Y. Tinchenko, A. Ganin) consider the accusations of the Commander-in-Chief and his associates to be falsification, but differ in determining its causes.

It seemed to the apologist of the head of the military department, Leon Trotsky, Isaac Deutscher, that the arrest of I.I. Vatsetis (and, accordingly, his employees) was the idea of the main opponent of L.D. Trotsky - I.V. Stalin. The arrest of the Commander-in-Chief, Deutscher suggested, was supposed to once again humiliate Trotsky!\*. In our opinion, such an explanation is the result of Trotsky's late (1929) positive assessment of Vatsetis in his memoirs. I. Deutscher's version seems unconvincing: the relationship between Vatsetis and Trotsky was strained. Bye-

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a telegram from the Chairman of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Ya.M. Sverdlova L.D. Trotsky of December 2, 1918, from which it follows that the latter humiliated Vatsetis in front of his subordinates. The Commander-in-Chief even resigned, telling his colleagues that he would not remain in his post - even under the threat of arrest for sabotage. Vatsetis' colleagues who informed Sverdlov about this feared that the Commander-in-Chief would commit suicide. The chairman of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense, Lenin and Sverdlov, considered Vatsetis's departure inexpedient and instructed Trotsky to "eliminate the conflict so that not a trace of it remains"?. Vatsetis himself later described this episode differently: "L. Trotsky filed a complaint against me with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. What he complained about, I don't know. I told ... Aralov that without due independence I do not consider it possible to continue working as Commander-in-Chief until the incident with L. Trotsky is resolved. I stopped visiting the headquarters, and sent my explanations and all correspondence to Comrade Lenin, Chairman of the Defense Council. In connection with ... the incident, a funny thing happened. L. Trotsky's telegram was sent in unencrypted form and became known at the headquarters, where it caused various rumors. By the way, information reached me that L. Trotsky was looking for another Commander-in-Chief. I decided to leave the post of Commander-in-Chief and sent a telegram to the People's Commissariat for Soviet Latvia comrade. Peterson K.A. with a request to give me a place

regiment commander in the Latvian Rifle Division. Peterson showed this telegram of mine to Lenin, which caused him to intervene in the incident. Trotsky was extremely dissatisfied with my telegram to Peterson and decided to vent his anger on Commissar of Staff Comrade. Hirshfelde, who handed over the aforementioned telegram of mine to the apparatus, and put him in the guardhouse. As for the position of Isaac Deutscher, it is unlikely that the removal of such an employee would be a humiliation for Trotsky, although (let's give him his due) I. Deutscher's assumption about Trotsky's intercession for Vatsetis is fully confirmed sources??, The fact that Stalin skillfully took advantage of the situation does not mean that it was he who was behind the "conspiracy"?\* Trotsky himself in his memoirs made 2 assumptions about the possible reasons for the arrest of Vatsetis these accusations were not covered): careless conversations with "two or three young officers" and reading the biography of Napoleon Bonaparte "for sleep

coming"? (Trotsky's "suggestions" are a deliberate distortion of facts).

Ya.Yu. Tinchenko put forward, at first glance, a fairly well-reasoned version of the background of the arrest of the employees of the Field Headquarters - the need to find those responsible for the failures of the Red Army in the summer of 1919 2°. By the way, it is this version that can be called "official": even in 1922, at the "trial of the organizers of the Don Insurgent Army", Assistant Commissioner of the Headquarters of the Red Army A.R. Orlinsky (representative of the public prosecution at the trial) mentioned "the era of 1919, when our Southern Front was opened to the enemies." And in development he added: "The importance of the case is not only in what the defendants have achieved and actually accomplished, but in the atmosphere that they have created"? Probably, the "conspiracy in the Field Headquarters" became something of a "judicial precedent."

A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov connected the events of the "conspiracy" (according to the collection "V.I. Lenin and the Cheka") and the arrest of the founder of Soviet intelligence and military counterintelligence, consultant of the Registration Department of the General Staff Officer G.I. Theodori. The authors of the GRU Empire put forward 2 versions. The second is simpler: Dzerzhinsky himself, emboldened by the ease with which he succeeded at the beginning of 1919 in stealing counterintelligence from the military department,<sup>7</sup> decided to repeat this trick with intelligence. Unfortunately, the authors of the GRU Empire did not take into account the statement of M. Alekseev, who considered the July events in the context of the history of the Soviet intelligence management bodies: the arrests in the Field Headquarters led "to the creation of a special commission to carry out a purge of the intelligence agencies." Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov, thus, changed the cause with the effect. The first version of these researchers is more complex and somewhat closer to reality: the death of Ya.M. Sverdlov in early 1919 destroyed the balance of power in the Bolshevik Party. So far, everything is logical. Then fiction begins: in the end, according to A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov, "Little authority in the party elite", but L.D. Trotsky, who held a key post during the Civil War, actually took the place of Sverdlov, which caused "jealousy" To him the Bolshevik leaders G.E. Zinoviev and I.V. Stalin. They used Dzerzhinsky to persecute Trotsky: on the one hand, Vatsetis, "close" to Trotsky, was under arrest, and on the other hand, military intelligence was transferred from the military department to VChK? This is where logic goes against facts. First, practically

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sky weight Ya.M. Sverdlov in the ranks of party organizers was slightly lower than that of Lenin: after the death of Yakov Mikhailovich, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars admitted that the leadership of the Soviet and party apparatus was concentrated in the hands of Sverdlov. Secondly, the researchers took as a basis (naturally, without reference) the following passage from the monograph by M.A. Molodtsov: Trotsky, in a statement of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (March 1919), emphasized that "the Communist Party is not a monolith, first of all, in its leadership. If everyone recognized Lenin as the leader, then for the second place there was a struggle between Trotsky, Zinoviev and Stalin. The leader skillfully used this, acting as a mediator, a fighter for unity. Is this a statement by Leon Trotsky in a document carefully edited by him?! - must be handled with extreme caution. Trotsky, who was never considered one of his own in the party, by definition could not take his place. Stalin and Zinoviev wanted to destroy him as a stranger and an upstart, and Lenin in every possible way kindled passions to destroy the center of power, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, led by Trotsky, an alternative to the Council of People's Commissars. Until 1922, Lenin strengthened Stalin's positions precisely to contain

Trotsky's power ambitions?°. It is not at all clear what benefit in the summer of 1919 G.E. Zinoviev: not a single one of his supporters was brought into the Revolutionary Military Council. Regarding military counterintelligence, the issue was resolved even before the death of Ya.M. Sverdlov - at the beginning of February 1919. Indeed, this issue was a stumbling block between the departments of Trotsky and Dzerzhinsky. At the end of January 1919, a meeting was held on the issue of merging the two bodies of military counterintelligence - the department of military control (OVK) of the Registration Directorate of the PS (in the structure of the military department) and the army and front-line Cheka (in the department of the Cheka). To resolve the issue, Dzerzhinsky personally insisted on December 31, 1918 that Trotsky come to Moscow. At the end of January 1919, a joint meeting of the leadership of the PSh (the head of the Bolshevik S.I. Aralov and the consultant General Staff Officer G.I. Teodori), the OVK (deputy head of the Bolshevik V.Kh. Steingard) and the Cheka (F.E. Dzerzhinsky and M.S. Kedrov, head of the Special Department, Bolshevik M.S. Kedrov) - Dzerzhinsky presided, Trotsky was not at the meeting. The OVK was heavily criticized by Kedrov, who did not want to share military counterintelligence with the military department. Steingard was not even able to object to Kedrov's remark:

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there are "very few" Bolsheviks in the military control department. By the end of January 1919, the RVSR agreed to cede military counterintelligence to the Cheka: the corresponding resolution was approved by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on February 6°. In February, the military counterintelligence of the Field Headquarters suffered a powerful blow: the OVK, which was still at the stage of formation, was seized by the Chekists into their department and received the name of the Special Department (OO VChK).° As you can see, to the death of Ya.M. The described events have nothing to do with Sverdlov and the conspiracy in PSh.

V.G. Krasnov and V.O. Daines went further than the rest: they first linked the disputes in the highest political and military leadership over strategic plans in the summer of 1919 with the arrest of Vatsetis and several of his employees. The researchers introduced into scientific circulation a number of Trotsky's documents and a fragment of the testimonies of the arrested General Staff officers that they discovered. At the same time, the sources available to the researchers only partially illuminate one of several reasons for the arrest of the Commander-in-Chief - namely, the strategic disagreements between Vatsetis and a number of political leaders of that time. In addition, it is not always clear on what the researchers based themselves and what specific documents they cited?'. Book by V.G. Krasnov and V.O. Daines is actually an annotated publication of the documents of the RGVA and RGASPI. Difficulties in working with it are created by the fact that archival documents are published without control and reference information, and the literature is used without footnotes. Thus, mentioning the collection "Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic", the authors limited themselves to some lyrical digressions on the historiography of the study. In particular, when talking about the activities of the RVSR, the researchers did not even consider it necessary to mention the preface to the collection of protocols of the Revolutionary Military Council and the corresponding monograph by M.A. Molodtsygin, although both were actively used.

A.V. Ganin, in a very recent article on the General Staff and Chekists during the Civil War, reveals ignorance even of the existing literature. The researcher writes: "It is often difficult to find any logic or necessity in arrests. In 1918, one of the largest Soviet military experts, F.V. Kostyaev, arrested for no reason and without charges"; "It is not clear why he was imprisoned for 97 days in the summer of autumn 1919, and the commander-in-chief I.I. Vatsetis, who did a lot for the victory of the Bolsheviks.

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All these "unreasonable repressions" are explained by A.V. Ganin, in fact, by the arbitrariness of the Cheka: "the repressive apparatus created by the Bolsheviks began to work on its own""; however, the researcher makes an assumption: "The analysis of the complex mechanisms of interaction between the Cheka and the RCP(b) explains a lot (it is extremely difficult to find such an "analysis" in A.V. Ganin's article. - S.V.) ... the work of the Special Department of the Cheka from the Bolshevik party was supervised by Stalin, who was an ardent opponent of Trotsky, including in the matter of attracting military experts. It can be assumed that the policy of arresting military specialists was carried out with the sanction of Stalin in order to discredit his opponent. Direct evidence...of course not." As you can see, in this A.V. Ganin is quite

I agree with A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov. However, we cannot but agree with the content of the last paragraph quoted above by Andrei Ganin - there is no direct evidence of "Stalin's sanction" and cannot be: at least it has nothing to do with the opening of the investigation in the case of the Field Headquarters. Further, the text of the article by A.V. Ganina: "It is believed that the Cheka was under the personal subordination of V.I. Lenin and could ignore the instructions of others, even the most senior Bolshevik leaders. However, the facts testify to the ambiguity of this situation. So, on December 29, 1918, Lenin asked the chairman of the Petrograd Cheka (italics mine. — S.V.) to release the former General Staff, Major General L.I. Savchenko-Matsenko and former General Staff Colonel B.P. Polyakov, however, the first was released in January 1919, and the second - on February 1. Unfortunately, the facts "testify" to A.V. Ganin's historiography of the issue of the crisis of the Cheka in late 1918 — early 1919. A simple introduction to the article by D.S. Novoselov, and not with his publication" would allow A.V. Ganin to understand that the Petrograd Cheka should not be confused with the All-Russian Cheka. If A.V. Ganin was seriously concerned about getting acquainted with the literature and at least some of the unpublished sources about the "difficult mechanisms of interaction between the Cheka and the RCP (b)", he would have understood that the "Stavka" case was not promoted by Stalin at all and had specific goals.

A.A. Zdanovich in the article "Was there a conspiracy at the Field Headquarters?" For the first time, he introduced into scientific circulation previously unknown documents of the criminal case of Georgy Teodori and the archival and investigative case "Stavka" of 1919 (CA FSB of Russia), as well as several documents of the RGVA. A.A. Building-

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Vich showed for the first time that the initiators of the case were by no means the Chekists, but completely different people who were not part of the punitive system of the regime; The Chekists had a number of subjective (the hatred of the head of the Special Department of the Cheka, Mikhail Kedrov, for the General Staff Officer of the Field Headquarters Georgy Teodori) and objective (the formation of a group of General Staff officers who dreamed of "creating a young General Staff ... as opposed to the old one") reasons, and Zdanovich concluded: "everything that happened at the Headquarters, including the arrest of Vatsetis, was a lesson taught by Lenin to his opponent Trotsky." At the same time, A.A. Zdanovich did not fully recreate the situation at the Headquarters and the reasons for the arrests there (the volume of the article did not allow)." Unfortunately, A.A. Zdanovich failed to identify the case of Fyodor Kostyaev, the head of the Field Staff, in the Central FSB. In addition, the following statement of the researcher is alarming: "There is no point in analyzing the protocols before the interrogations of the defendants in the Stavka case: they informed the Chekists of the essence of their conversations, which contained, among other things, options for pressuring Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis in order to promote their fellow students at the Academy of the General Staff (graduation of 1917) to high command positions in the Red Army to replace the old general staff officers, who were allegedly incapable of leading the troops, as well as forecasts about their fate in the event of the victory of the White Guards "" . It is alarming in the sense that, according to a statement during the interrogation of General Staff Officer Nikolai Domozhirov, "preparations have begun to establish ... a connection that, it must be said, has been and has been conducted for a long time (since the beginning of 1918) with Kolchak and Denikin, with those political parties that exist underground in Moscow, with the clergy (Patriarch Tikhon and Metropolitan Arseniy of Novgorod), with almost all underground foreign consulates existing in Moscow. The question is why not one of those with whom the General Staff officers met was convicted in the Stavka case? In particular, interrogating Patriarch Tikhon would not have been difficult for the Chekists... |

In this monograph, in the context of the Bonapartist plans of Leon Trotsky (Chapter 1), the following are recreated: the personality of the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Republic, Joachim Vatsetis, and the "collective portrait" of the employees of the Field Headquarters in November 1918 - July 1919 (Chapter 2); the mechanism for the decision by the top Bolshevik leadership to purge the Red Headquarters and the course of the arrests (Chapter 3); confrontation between Politburo members Vladimir Lenin and

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Leon Trotsky on matters of strategy (chapter 4); the fate of the arrested General Staff officers (Chapter 5); the reaction of Leon Trotsky to the arrests of his subordinates and the influence of the "case" on the balance of power in

Politburo of the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (Chapter 6); afterword summarizing research.

The historical context of the relationship between the Chekists and employees of the military department is recreated by the works of specialists in the history of domestic counterintelligence I.I. Vasilyeva<sup>oo</sup>, A.A. Zdanovich<sup>oo</sup>, S.V. Leonova<sup>oo</sup>, D.S. Novoselov<sup>oo</sup> and etc.

## Sources

Published sources are represented by memoirs, collections of documents, materials of periodicals (newspapers Pravda and Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee).

The only memoir evidence, in which the context of the case of the Commander-in-Chief is given in sufficient detail, was left by the brother of the Executive Director of the Council of People's Commissars V.D. Bonch-Bruevich General M.D. Bonch Bruevich. The memoirs contain a lot of misinformation and directed information, which greatly complicates the work with them. Thus, the first meeting with I.I. Vatsetis, however, the description of the Commander-in-Chief's entourage is interesting: "numerous "guarantors" who replaced the former adjutants, are as fidgety and impudent as their predecessors; well-fed orderlies with the dull faces of former batmen...; the merchant's luxury of the living room, turned into the reception room of the Commander-in-Chief; a suspicious number of empty bottles in the hallway." These empty bottles wandered from one legend about the Commander-in-Chief to another. This story is very reminiscent of the "case" in which commander Dumenko was repressed a year later. Valuable information about the strategic differences associated with the change of the Commander-in-Chief is contained in the essays by S.I. Gusev<sup>oo</sup>, memoirs of I.I. Vatsetis, K.Kh. Danishevsky, S.S. Kamenev<sup>oo</sup> and L.D. Trotsky. Gusev, Danishevsky and Kamenev, complementing each other, describe the conflict through the eyes of Trotsky's opponents and the strategy adopted by him and Vatsetis. Trotsky, being a politician, draws the reader's attention to the position of the members of the Central Committee on this issue. Naturally, all memoirists pursued 2 goals: to show their own correctness and not to say anything superfluous. Therefore, their writings should be treated with extreme caution.

believing facts by documentary evidence. First of all, by the protocols of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, "Joachim Vatsetis left two versions of his memoirs - written in August-October 1919 in conclusion and a much later version. It is published by about a third", therefore, the original from the personal fund of the first Soviet Commander-in-Chief is much more valuable. The second version of the memories is more complete, but also less objective; it appeared no earlier than 1927 and has a clear anti-Trotskyist orientation.

Documentary collections in which the historical context of the events of the "conspiracy" is given are, first of all, the mentioned "V.I. Lenin and the Cheka", as well as recently published collections about the chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky, "Archive of the Cheka", correspondence of the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, minutes of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and transcripts of Politburo meetings, at which Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky recalled past sins to each other<sup>oo</sup>.

Previously unknown documents from the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) and the Central Archive of Socio-Political History of Moscow (CAOPIM) shed light on the background of the Conspiracy at the Field Headquarters.

Unpublished sources are divided into 4 large groups: KGB documents (interrogation protocols, reports of the leaders of the Cheka and its Special Department), documents of the top leadership of the party and the state (statements, reports and resolutions on them by V.I. Lenin, L.D. Trotsky), organizational and administrative documents and correspondence of the heads of the military department and the Field Headquarters, investigation files of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal of the Republic - RVTR.

Testimony of the person under investigation - General Staff Officer N.N. Domozhirov - in the case of the Conspiracy in the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of June 8. 1919 are a valuable source of sentiment in the high command of the Red Army. At the same time, the veracity of the "Evidence" raises serious doubts: the description of an attempt to persuade the drunken Commander-in-Chief to a conspiracy does not look very good.



convincingly, and in the episode when F.V. Kostyaev allegedly explains to Domozhirev, appointed commander of the 15th Army, that he will be able to raise the army, there is a very doubtful moment. For this, it is necessary to "appoint and appoint a member of the army"

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on the RVS of the army such that would act in a certain direction. It was assumed that the nephew of the Commander-in-Chief Ernest Vatsetis® could become such. However, Kostyaev could not guess who would be appointed: the RVSR usually appointed leaders of this level, in the extreme case (from the realm of fantasy) this could be done by the PUR, which was in no way subordinate to Kostyaev.

The key point of the testimony was the "drunkenness" of the Commander-in-Chief! This legend originates from the spring investigation on the accusation of General Staff officers E.I. Vatsetis and E.I. Isaev in speculation. The documents on this case also confirm the fact of extreme mistrust towards the Commander-in-Chief K.Kh. Danishevsky - it was he who initiated the investigation of Ernest Vatsetis and Isaev. April 30 I.I. Vatsetis in a statement to a member of the RVTR S.I. Aralova asked to reclaim all the stocks of wine received from the Soviet government of Latvia, which were kept on the account of the quartermaster of the Latvian army. We do not have information about whether the wine was at the disposal of the PS or not, but this was quite enough for the birth of the legend about empty bottles. Also noteworthy is the fact that the "Achilles heel" of the Commander-in-Chief — his nephew — was hurt back in the spring of 1918. Let us note that the purchase of wine by the Commander-in-Chief was organized to at least partially make up for the lack of medicines in the Field Headquarters: the Spaniard was raging." Although we do not have information confirming the spread of influenza, the fact of the spread of epidemics in Serpukhov is obvious: on January 12, 1919, Kostyaev and Aralov signed an order for the PS to take a number of measures "in view of the appearance in the city of Serpukhov of epidemics of typhus and relapsing fever and smallpox." Even the RVSR, in an order dated January 15, 1919, specifically dwelt on this fact: "In view of the outbreak of typhus and smallpox in the military units and institutions of the Serpukhov garrison, as a result of a strong epidemic of these infectious diseases that developed among the workers and the population, and taking into account attention that the local civil authorities are unable to cope with the epidemic without a military department, to declare the city of Serpukhov and its factory district under martial law." Applications for dismissal on sick leave by April 1919 were accepted, according to F.V. Kostyaev, "mass character" - the general was forced to introduce a 5% rate for such holidays. As of June 2, as F.V. Kostyaev, at the headquarters "is currently quite healthy

[staff] no; weakness. neurasthenia, anemia are common phenomena in almost all staff members, which is why I again instruct the medical committees of the staff to determine the need for long-term absences (two or three months. - S.V.) only in absolutely necessary cases "(when the state of health" is greatly reduced compared to the state of health of other employees)" \*. At the same time, the spread of epidemics in the Field Headquarters was largely associated with unsanitary conditions: on December 29, 1919, the head of the PS stated that "some of the employees ... apparently are still not familiar enough with the basic rules of cleanliness and tidiness, as a result of which they extremely pollute the premises, scattering cigarette butts everywhere and spitting on the floors and walls, and most importantly, they pollute the latrines. This violates "public cleanliness" and threatens security "in the sense of infection"®.

The story received by the Chekists from N.N. Domozhirev, who later retold Bonch-Bruевич in his "memoirs", can be easily refuted by the materials of the collection about I.I. Vatsetis, from which it follows that the Commander-in-Chief had ... a categorical rejection of alcohol!

Organizational and administrative documents and correspondence of the heads of the military department and the Field Headquarters make it possible to clarify the personal composition of those arrested in the conspiracy case; dating of the events and the existence of the arrested General Staff officers. Postponed in the affairs of the chairman of the RVSR L.D. Trotsky and his deputy E.M. Sklyansky, the materials also contain information about the situation of prisoners and petitions for their family members, reactions to the arrests of prominent leaders of Soviet Russia - in particular, the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee M.I. Kalinin. |

Of particular note are 2 reports on the situation at the Field Headquarters of A.A. Antonova. If his first report was compiled after a fairly cursory acquaintance with the affairs of the Field Headquarters, then the second gives an analysis of the situation. If you do not regard the document as an "order" from Lenin, then the atmosphere in the Field Headquarters could not but disturb the Bolsheviks. The factor of fear of a military coup is quite fully disclosed in the document.

The investigation files of the RVTR are not directly related to the conspiracy, but they provide important information about the emergencies that took place in the Field Headquarters at the time the case was unfolded.

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In particular, it is from the documents of the tribunal that the background of the "drunkenness" of the Commander-in-Chief I.I. Vatsetis.

Separate provisions of the monograph are published in the author's article "The idea of military dictatorship and its practical implementation in 1918 (from the history of the formation of the Soviet political system)" (Russian political mentality: The image of power in the eyes of society in the 20th century: Materials of the XI All-Russian scientific. -practical conference May 18-19, 2007 M.: RUDN, 2007. S. 56-63).

As appendices to each chapter, the overwhelming majority of the documents RGASPI, RGVA, and CAOPIM first identified by the author for this book (62 in total) are offered.

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Chapter 1.

## THE "WAR CAMP" OF LEO TROTSKY, OR THE IDEA OF A MILITARY DICTATORY AND ITS PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION IN 1918

As researcher Mark von Hagen noted, the Soviet political system was based on 4 key political institutions: the Bolshevik Party, the bureaucracy, the "secret police" (VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD) and the Red Army." In the summer of 1918, when the party held power for less than a year and only in July 1918 got rid of its temporary "fellow travelers" - the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Cheka took its first steps, and the many thousands of civil servants were still searching for apartments in Moscow, the army and more than 2,000-strong central military apparatus, headed since March 1918 by the People's Commissar for Military Affairs (People's Commissar for Military Affairs) and Chairman of the Supreme Military Council L.D. Trotsky, occupied an extremely important place.

On August 30, 1918, V.I. was wounded. Lenin, and Trotsky had the opportunity to establish a military dictatorship - on September 2, a powerful emergency body, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR), appeared. Its creation was the quintessence of Trotsky's vision of an instrument of political power. The RVSR personified the army as a political institution, so it is important to understand the underlying principles. To do this, it is necessary to consider the development among the leaders of the RSDLP (b) - RCP (b) of the idea of a military dictatorship.

The February and October revolutions divided the military dictatorship into 2 types: the general's proper, known before (Napoleon remains the most striking example of it in world history to this day), and a new, original one - the party one. At the same time, during the February Revolution, generals were predicted to become military dictators, and the Bolsheviks who came to power predicted (primarily

but) themselves.

After the incapacitated Provisional Government came to power, practically immediately firmly set on a "course" for the complete disintegration of Russian statehood, the Cadets began to look for a possible military dictator. Until July 1917, they managed to visit the candidates for Napoleon: Minister of War A.A. Polivanov, the largest specialist in combat supply of the army, General of Artillery A.A. Manikovsky, Supreme Commander A.A. Brusilov, General D.I. Gurko, Admiral A.V. Kolchak, former chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief M.V. Alekseev and others. In mid-July 1917, the Cadets settled on General L.G. Kornilov". In the summer of 1917, political and financial centers were formed that prepared the ground for a military coup, and the ideological preparations for the rebellion were carried out." As you know, the attempt to seize power, undertaken by Kornilov, was not crowned with success.

In July-August 1917, a mass of military and paramilitary counter-revolutionary organizations were created: the All-Russian Military Union, the All-Russian Union of Cossack Troops, the Cossack Congress, the Freedom Battalion, the Military League, the League Salvation of Russia", "Officers' Union of Volunteers of People's Freedom", "Unity", "Honor of Motherland and Freedom", "Union of Personal Example", "Union of Crippled Warriors", "Union of Military Duty", "Union of Freedom and Order", "Union for the Salvation of Russia", "Union of Honor of the Motherland", "Union of Escaped Captives", etc. Behind many of them was the so-called Republican Center, created in May 1917 to establish reliable ties with the command staff of Petrograd and seizing power in the capital. The center was headed by chief officers of the War Ministry, the organization was supported by the bourgeoisie and representatives of the Entente.

July 13, 1917 A.A. Brusilov gave the order to form volunteer units. At the Headquarters, the Central Executive Committee was established to form "shock revolutionary battalions" from volunteers in the rear (Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff V.K. Manakin became the chairman, SR Captain M.A. committees, in the capital - the Organizational Bureau for the recruitment of volunteers, which included representatives of the Black Sea delegation and individual officer organizations. Parts of the "drummers" were staffed with volunteers from the ships of the Black Sea Fleet and the coast, the remnants of the disbanded Black Sea Airborne Division,

young students, cadets, officers of reserve regiments. According to B.A. Engelhardt, the future Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front M.A. Muravyov then claimed that these ("his") units were formed primarily for the purpose of "reprisal" against the Bolsheviks.

After the Bolsheviks came to power, individual generals continued to aim for Napoleons: Artillery General A.A. Manikovsky, who organized the so-called "counter-revolutionary sabotage in the Military Ministry", 1st rank captain A.M. Shchastny, shot by the verdict of an illegitimate court with the prosecutor and judge Trotsky rolled into one (the Bolsheviks decided not to wait until the popular naval commander and savior of the Black Sea Fleet wanted to overthrow them); Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front M.A. Muravyov was the organizer of a miraculously suppressed military revolt against Soviet power in July 1918. But

along with the professional military, the Bolsheviks also "climbed" into the Napoleons. The first in this glorious cohort were Glavkoverkh N.V. Krylenko and one of the members of the Committee for Military and Naval Affairs, V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko. These personalities lacked the scale: no one from the collegium of the People's Commissariat of War followed them, and they were not able to create any worthwhile armed force. Then masters of the highest class entered the game.

Trotsky was the first of the Bolshevik leaders to seek a military dictatorship. Trotsky's later statements that Lenin and Sverdlov persuaded him to head the military department" do not correspond to reality: he longed for an appointment to the military department, criticizing the initial leadership of the People's Commissar for Military Affairs of the RSFSR (Narkomvoen) already from November 19, 1917 and even proposing on November 21 to replace the members of the board of the people's commissariat with himself and two people who could hardly have seriously opposed his aspirations for hegemony\*. Trotsky calmed down when he was sent to the epicenter of the then foreign (and military) policy - to Brest ...

At that time, the idea of creating the first military-political body (a kind of "party" version of the body of the military dictatorship) came up with another Bolshevik leader - Chairman of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Ya.M. Sverdlov. Not later than February 21, 1918, he outlined the competence of the "Committee for the Revolutionary Defense of the Country", in the complete subordination of which (Sverdlov planned) "all military institutions" would pass. According to Sverdlov's plan, the Committee will consist of 5 members: one will perform the "duties of the Commander-in-Chief", two -

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"to represent the control commission over operational actions", two to control and regulate "all practical work on defense". In fact, Yakov Mikhailovich planned to combine under the auspices of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee the front-line (Stavka of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief) and the rear apparatus (Narkomvoen) of the armed forces. However, the plans of the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee were not destined to come true. The Committee for the Revolutionary Defense of Petrograd (and not the country), which was created as a result, could not become an alternative center of power to the Council of People's Commissars. On March 4, one of the committee members gave an operational (and therefore of particular value) assessment of its activities. Let us quote it in full: "At a meeting of representatives of the district headquarters, it was recognized that the emergency headquarters in the form in which it exists now is useless, when one person (Lashevich) was entrusted with the entire task of forming all types of weapons and [thus] was shot down and confused the work of established organizations. The same thing was recognized, and this is even more significant, by the Defense Committee itself, which learned from experience the stupidity of an institution where five or six people work, hundreds jostle, and the members of the bureau on duty have to deal with everything, up to signing orders for the issuance of food for employees of the Smolny except for the work assigned to them. The formation department in room No. 85 has already been abolished by the committee... Bureau meetings are reduced in general to Bonch's regular operational report\*, and not on a local, but on an All-Russian scale, with progressively decreasing attendance at meetings, even by members of the bureau, and not only Committee """.

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the history of the Great French Revolution (and other revolutions) and understood that during periods of political destabilization, having an army means having power; at the end of revolutions, the Williams of Orange, Olivers Cromwells and Napoleons Bonapartes come to power. Therefore, V.I. Lenin appointed quite loyal people to the highest leadership positions in the military department who had nothing to do with the army (N.I. Podvoisky) or who were on trial on charges of treason (V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko, P.E. Dybenko and N. .V. Krylenko) and not seven spans in the forehead. Moreover, in the first case (in October 1917), instead of the sole military leader, Lenin appointed a whole Committee of three people; and when the collegium of the People's Commissariat of War, which took shape on its basis, revealed its complete incapacity - the Supreme Military Council of

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three "members", one of whom is a professional military man and the brother of the Head of Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars V.D. Bonch-Bruевич (General M.D. Bonch-Bruевич), the second devoted, but narrow-minded party functionary (K.I. Shutko), who did not even understand what considerations Lenin was guided by when creating the council and appointing Shutko himself a member of it, the third - Left Social Revolutionary P.P. Proshyan, temporarily introduced to demonstrate the control of the leadership of "temporary fellow travelers in power" over military development. It seems that the appointment of people from the 2nd or even 3rd "echelon" of the party elite to leading positions in the military department was aimed at opposing the establishment of a military dictatorship, even under the threat of a strong weakening of the army. The fact that Trotsky was appointed head of the military department was no exception: the new People's Commissar for Military Affairs was furnished by Lenin with a whole system of "checks and balances", which were the military leader and a member of the Supreme Military Council, General M.D. Bonch Bruевич and a whole cohort of second-rate leaders (N.I. Podvoisky, K.A. Mekhonoshin, V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko, who at this stage had not yet become a "Trotskyist"), who were introduced to the council in the spring of 1918 precisely for the destruction Trotsky's threat to seize power. K.Kh. Danishevsky, according to his memoirs, in the summer of 1918, before being sent to the Eastern Front, talked with Lenin about Trotsky. The chairman of the Soviet government declared: "Trotsky is a big man, energetic, he did a lot to attract the old officers to the Red Army, Trotsky did a lot to organize the Red Army. But he is not ours, he cannot be completely trusted: what he can do tomorrow is impossible to say. We need to take a closer look at him. Let's not recall it for now. Come, find out, look and report in detail. Then we'll decide. Maybe for such correspondence to establish a special cipher. Write to me personally..." And the cipher was installed."

Although Trotsky, who never suffered from an excess of modesty, proposed to the Council of People's Commissars to voluntarily make himself a military dictator as early as March 1918, the specific parameters of the future dictatorship based on the leadership of a super-centralized military apparatus were not determined by the People's Commissariat of War by the beginning of March, but at least in the summer of 1918. This is evidenced by the collection "How the Revolution Armed" (1923) and documents from the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA).

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On March 19, 1918, Trotsky proclaimed in his speech "We need an army" at a meeting of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies: "We ... at the first wave of the world revolution must be ready to bring military assistance to our rebellious foreign brothers"\*°. Here Trotsky was not original: about the necessity of waging a Civil War (initially on the scale of Soviet Russia, then - of the whole world during this period, V.I. Lenin also repeatedly spoke out)".

In his report "To All Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies of the RSFSR" ([March] 1918), the People's Commissariat of War declared: "in the current difficult situation, when enemies from all sides threaten the very existence of Russia, the only salvation is the immediate formation of a new army, not numerous, but strong in spirit, well-armed and equipped, and therefore quite combat-ready" \*. |

On March 22, Trotsky, in his speech "The New Army", defined the primary task of the republic as follows: "... organizing the defense of the country, mobilizing all its forces and means" for an armed rebuff to the enemy, external and internal. Concrete measures for the time being were supposed to be universal military training and the mobilization of officers of the old army to form volunteer detachments. Immediately after the end of the field work, Trotsky already then planned to create a mass army on the basis of general mobilization.

The People's Commissariat for Military Affairs devoted the first part of the report (conditional division) "Labour, discipline, order" at the Moscow City Conference of the RCP(b) on March 28 to the need for centralization of military administration.

"Difficulties of an objective nature <...>," reported Trotsky, "consist in the very fact of general ruin, in the fact that our lines of communication are disrupted; our wagons are tattered and loose; we have a huge percentage of sick locomotives; healthy steam locomotives do not move along the rails as they should (the war unsettled everything); our factories and plants are disorganized <...> we have the greatest food difficulties - partly because we have become poor in general, partly because we have a breakdown in all means and ways of transport, accounting and control. These are the colossal difficulties that we face and which we must overcome at all costs"?!; revolution in Russia as a factor and an integral part of the world revolution, care must be taken

about being strong, in particular, armed with such an army that "would correspond to the character and spirit of the Soviet regime" and at the same time be able to "defend it and promote the world revolution."

On April 21 in Moscow, in a lecture entitled "The Internal and External Tasks of Soviet Power", the People's Commissariat of War declared: the working class needs "firm tempering, intransigence, a deep conviction that without fighting for every step, for every inch on the way to improving their destiny, that without constant irreconcilable struggle and without organization (! — S.V.) there can be no salvation and liberation"". Having described the extremely difficult situation on the railroads," Trotsky moved on to the main question — food, openly admitting that the Bolsheviks consider "the food question <...> as a question of an armed struggle for the life of the workers and peasants, it is necessary to make "a choice, and the essence of the choice is the Civil War." Further: "And our party is for a civil war. The civil war rested on bread. In response to the indignation of some of the audience, expressed in a caustic cry: "Long live the Civil War!" Trotsky calmly finished: "Yes, long live the Civil War!" — "in the name of bread for children, old people, workers and the Red Army." And finally, about the final goal: "And when the workers of Europe call out a call to us, we will go to their aid, all as one man, with rifles in our hands and with red banners, let's go to meet them - in the name of the brotherhood of peoples, in the name of socialism! The socialist system "takes everything into account, keeps an accounting record and accounts for everything. That's when we establish such a real working and labor order and the discipline necessary for it, then we will be able to set prices for all items, regulate production in such a way that each item has proportionately according to need.

So - the following are necessary: 1) food detachments and the elimination of hunger; 2) Combating railway sabotage (priority tasks); 3) Civil war with the enemies of the proletariat; 4) Export Revolution (successively); 5) Total accounting (permanently) up to the establishment of a world socialist order.

On April 22, at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Trotsky emphasized the need to create a professional, and "not amateurish, not improvised" army - with the involvement of "all valuable" military specialists, imposing responsibility on them and instructing them

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organizational, in his words - the "main" work" (in terms of personnel, Trotsky was a pragmatist).

Trotsky called the immediate task of the People's Commissariat of War the reorganization of "the military apparatus of the past, disorganized, disorganized, not powerful in terms of the number of persons, values that it embraces." This apparatus was supposed to be taken into account, organized and adapted to the army that we now want to form"? (i.e. mass regular).

On May 13, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) adopted Lenin's Theses on the Present Political Situation by a majority of votes, which were later joined by the majority of the members of the Central Committee living in Petrograd. The main problem in the theses is organizational - backwardness in the military

training (problems of food supply, lack of martial law on railway transport and lack of discipline in general) 19).

The principles of building an army on the basis of universal military service after the defeat of the Left SRs were approved by the Congress of Soviets. Trotsky defined the army as "a strictly centralized apparatus, closely connected by threads with its center", and pointed out the need to establish strict subordination and a harmonious system of local military organs!

On July 29, at a joint meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Council, Lenin delivered a speech "On the situation in the Soviet Republic", and Trotsky made a report "The socialist fatherland is in danger". Lenin proclaimed for the first time that the words "Everything for the front" should become the alpha and omega for everyone.

In the fund of the secretariat of the chairman of the RVSR, in the file "Verbatim Speeches and Reports of the People's Commissar for Military Affairs", many combined clippings from ROSTA were deposited. At the top of the document, Trotsky's handwriting reads: "World fire!?. Revolution in Germany. In this kind of filing, the articles were combined:

- "Rebellion among the German troops";

- "People's unrest";

- "German soldiers-Bolsheviks";

- "Question about the world";

- "They make concessions";

- "To battle!";

In the same case, articles are filed:

"What will Germany say?"

- "The Twilight of Imperialism" ("Following Bulgaria, Türkiye")

- "Revolution in Austria"

- "Revolution in Bulgaria"

- "Revolution in Serbia" (notes made by Trotsky's hand): "Revolution in Turkey", etc.

All clippings say one thing: Trotsky directly connected his activities in the military department with the world revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat as a non-national group. Here is what a document titled "The log of the world revolution is flaring up" and edited by the hand of the pre-revolutionary military council says about this:

"A revolution broke out in Berlin. The revolutionary movement in the German troops is growing. German soldiers sent from Kharkov to the Western Front have killed their officers and are returning from Kharkov with red banners. A joint manifestation of the German and Red Army units has been scheduled.

In Austria, not today, tomorrow, together with the Prussian military, the old bureaucracy will collapse.

Bulgaria has a peasant republic. In Serbia, the revolution has engulfed the army... If the imperialists conspire to stifle the international revolution, it can be said with even greater certainty that the workers of all countries will rise up for the last just war for their liberation and no force will crush the uprising of the world proletariat.

Our great leaders of the revolution and our ... government are right in issuing an open appeal to the workers of Germany: "... take power into your own hands." And we Russian workers have already conquered our capital. Our army in battles proved that it is strong. Together with you we will go hand in hand against everyone who tries to crush you and crush us."

The Russian insurgent people will gather all their forces. The valiant Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will multiply its might tenfold. The peasantry will gather grain so that we can hold out until the day of the victory of the proletariat and help the workers of other countries.

Subsequently, in 1922, Trotsky delivered a speech "The Path of the Red Army", in which he declared the enormous importance for the communist parties of all countries of issues related to the creation of armed forces.

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of the power of the revolution: "Who wants the end, he must want the means. Revolutionary violence is the means to the emancipation of the working people. From the moment of the conquest of power, revolutionary violence takes the form of an organized army.

By August 1918, Trotsky had already drawn certain conclusions from the practical leadership of the military department. On August 23, relying on the unanimity of senior officials of the military department — both military specialists and party workers — in recognizing the need to appoint a Supreme Commander-in-Chief responsible to the Council of People's Commissars and to unite in his headquarters the organs of operational command and control of troops (the Operations Department of the People's Commissariat of Military and the Headquarters of the Supreme Military Council), responded to Lenin's request about the importance of "unifying the command ... after the first [same] victory" and "compressing the entire military elite." Lenin did not have time to react.

As early as August 1, Sverdlov spoke in the same vein: for the "final establishment of the iron dictatorship, we created a regular army" 9.

The nuances of the program for the establishment of a military dictatorship were nurtured by Trotsky in the spring and summer of 1918, which were greatly facilitated by: 1) Trotsky's practical activities to rationalize the apparatus of military administration; 2) Approval by the Congress of "one-party" Soviets of Trotsky's main provisions and the victory of the idea of centralization command and control; 3) Expanding the competence of the military department and increasing its share in the system of the state apparatus; 4) The foreign political situation, which gave hope for the implementation of large-scale plans to export the revolution.

In the summer of 1918, the position of the Bolsheviks was critical: the number of party members was reduced to 150 thousand people; peasant revolts accompanied military failures. The number of Bolsheviks in local soviets in the summer decreased by 21.2% compared to March (44.8 instead of 66). The Bolshevik leaders tried to rectify the situation. They begin an active struggle with the opposition, forbidding the Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries to participate in the work of the Soviets (June), cracking down on temporary "fellow travelers in power" - the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (July). It seems that Trotsky even confessed to Mirbach that the Soviet power is dead, but its gravedigger has not yet been found! At the same time, the influence of Sverdlov is increasing with a simultaneous fall in authori

Aunt Lenin. According to A.L. Litvin, "by the summer of 1918, Sverdlov had all the party and Soviet power in his hands." The researcher showed that it was the chairman of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee who benefited from the elimination of Lenin", and suggested that the wounding of Lenin was intended to remove him from power for some time and raised before him "the question of the honorable departure from life by the death of Marat" ! :?.

The employees of the German embassy wrote. that in August 1918 "panic moods" were discovered in Moscow. | On August 18, it was reported to Berlin that the leadership of Soviet Russia was transferring "significant funds" to Swiss banks, [August 4 — that they were asking for foreign passports: "the air of Moscow is saturated with assassination as never before"! °.



Finally, Trotsky had the opportunity to take power into his own hands and establish a military dictatorship in the form of an organ for managing the world revolution, whose apparatus would be able to control the entire national economic mechanism.

August 30 V.I. Lenin was seriously wounded, the occasion for the establishment of a military dictatorship presented itself - supported by Sverdlov "", Trotsky did not miss his chance. On September 2, he spoke at an emergency meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, in which he expressed hope for the leader's recovery! °; stated a slight improvement affairs in the field of command as a result of "the heroic work to strengthen all the military frontiers of the Soviet Republic""°; called "under the conditions in which we now face the concentrated frenzy of world imperialism... Turn the Soviet Republic into a military camp and that's all our means, all the forces, all the property of the country, the personal property of the citizens and of each citizen individually... directly put to the defense of the Soviet Republic." For this, according to Trotsky, the following were necessary: centralization of the supply of the army""; "mobilization of people, soldiers", "property", "spirit, all the material and ideological forces of the country (...)" ; liquidation of "the duality of the front — one departing and the other created"; placing "at the head of all the armed forces and means of the country" one leading body "represented by the revolutionary council" and one commander in chief; subordination of all central military organs to "this revolutionary military council".

Trotsky noted that these measures would ensure "unity in the disposal of all the armed forces and means of the country in their

throws from one part of the front to another with supplies, equipment, which must be provided in the shortest possible time, "and also called for the continuation of agitation and organizational work," which is being done and has been done here in the rear!

Following the meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, in response to an attempt to eliminate Lenin, a massive red terror was proclaimed "against the bourgeoisie and its agents"! Soviet Russia was declared a "military camp"; at the head of all fronts and military institutions, as Trotsky suggested, was the Revolutionary Military Council [of the Republic] with one Commander-in-Chief, at whose disposal "all the forces and means" of the RSFSR were placed; it was fixed that "all citizens, regardless of occupation and age, must unquestioningly fulfill those duties for the defense of the country that will be assigned to them by the Soviet government ..." in the person of the RVSR'°. The solution of the issue at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was not an accident: the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was created as the highest extraordinary (ie, extra-constitutional) body. The decision to create it in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee meant legitimization!

In fact, it was a super-powerful body, the true purpose of which was not to lead the defense of the Republic "in the ring of fronts", but to advance the fronts far beyond the borders of the Republic, with the prospect of leading the world revolution. In terms of the scale of activity, the RVSR was to take the same place in Soviet Russia in 1918 that the State Defense Committee (GKO) would take in 1941. Trotsky and Sverdlov actually got the opportunity to rule, hiding behind the Extraordinary Council as a screen.

As noted in the literature, from September 1918, in fact, Trotsky's influence in the party began to compete with the influence of Lenin. However, Lenin's recovery brought to naught all the plans of the two Bolshevik leaders.

On September 18 (already 2 days after Lenin returned to politics), one of the members of the RVSR P.A. Kobozev of the RVSR drew the attention of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to the fact that Trotsky and Sverdlov, "having no right to do so, issue a mandate on behalf of the council"; and decided to withdraw the mandate. The next day, the RVSR proposed a new, seriously edited text of the "Draft Constitution of the RVSR," essentially a document fixing the internal distribution of forces and roles, and submitted the draft for approval to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The phrase "to report amendments to L.D. Trotsky" indicates that the Revolutionary Military Council corrected (!)

its chairman." Such actions of the RVSR testify that he did not want to become a "screen" for the realization of the power ambitions of Trotsky and Sverdlov. The withdrawal mechanism

Yakov Sverdlov's power is the subject of independent research.

With Trotsky the question is clearer. Already in September, in response to Lenin's actions, he had to aggravate the situation. Trotsky worked out a draft regulation on the RVSR' and submitted it to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for approval. On September 30, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted the Regulations on the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, according to which the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR was declared the highest military authority in the country. For the needs of the defense of the borders of the RSFSR, "all the forces and means of the people" were placed at the disposal of the Revolutionary Military Council, and all Soviet institutions were obliged to "consider and satisfy [the requirements of the RVSR] in the first place." The Revolutionary Military Council formally absorbed the rights and cadres of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of War. All military institutions were subordinate to the RVSR and were obliged to carry out its tasks. "Point 4 confirmed that L.D. Trotsky was the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. The position of the chairman of the RVSR was determined equal to the position of the chairman in relations with the collegium! \* This is the key point of the decision ( if we compare the decisions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of September 2 and 30): according to Article 45 of the Constitution of the RSFSR: "The People's Commissar has the right to single-handedly make decisions on all issues that are subject to the jurisdiction of the relevant people's commissariat, bringing them to the attention of the collegium. In case of disagreement of the collegium with By this or that decision of the people's commissar, the collegium, without suspending the execution of the decision, may appeal it" to the Council of People's Commissars or the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee." Thus, the position secured for Trotsky the right to single-handedly resolve issues - now he could dictate his will without asking for the opinions of the members of the Revolutionary Military Council K.Kh. Danishevsky and P.A. Kobozeva associates. Centralization and the achievement of a new level of military leadership actually resulted in an increase in the status of Trotsky, who did not really need any advice, controlled military bodies and addressed non-military bodies in a directive manner through telegrams from his own "flying control apparatus" (N. S. Tarkhova) - formed on the night of August 8, the train of the chairman of the RVSR!? \*. It was with these actions, legalized on September 30, that Trotsky supervisor's dissatisfaction

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for Vatsetis K.Kh. Danishevsky: according to his memoirs, Trotsky "often did not inform about his orders and actions ... the Revolutionary Military Council":? °, i.e. gave individual orders instead of their implementation through the RVSR.

The RVSR and its chairman strove to focus on the most important problems, entrusting the solution of specific tasks to the relevant subordinate bodies, but nevertheless actually "drowned" in numerous organizational issues, which led to the creation on November 30 of a new military-political body with the founder of the RSDLP (b) and the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lenin at the head - the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense (later - the Council of Labor and Defense; hereinafter - STO). In one of the draft projects for the creation of a service station, there was only the name of the chairman of the council - V.I. Lenin (Doc. No. 1.2). Moreover, in the military department, Joachim Vatsetis has so far clearly sided with the founder of the Bolshevik Party - this is evidenced by his report on the need to centralize "economic and administrative life", made approximately 3-4 days before the creation of the Defense Council (Doc. No. 1.3 ). In fact, the functions of the failed GKO were divided: the issues of the military economy and the general leadership of the belligerent country were transferred to the STO, and the military organizational issues were left to the Revolutionary Military Council! .

Trotsky could not accept another political defeat and stubbornly ignored the meetings of the Defense Council, leaving Sklyansky to work in this body. The results are deplorable: in 1924, responding to Sklyansky's remark that the military department did not have enough money for the reform, G.K. Ordzhonikidze stated: "If military issues have never been raised in the SRT and no one has defended these issues, then it is clear that you will not get anything. ... one must also agree with Comrade Sklyansky that if Comrade Trotsky spoke in the SRT in defense of his budget, he would carry it out with incomparably greater success than if Comrade Trotsky had spoken. Sklyansky plus all members of the Revolutionary Military Council of armies and fronts. Naturally, during the Civil War, all military issues were resolved in the first place, but the removal of Trotsky from this work is an absolute fact.

On June 2, 1937, at a meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin recalled the "incident that Ilyich had with Trotsky" during the creation of the Defense Council: the latter "came to complain - letters are received from the Communists in the Central Committee, sometimes copies are sent to him as a people's commissar, and sometimes even copies are not sent.

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barks, and letters are received at the Central Committee through his head. "It's no good." Lenin asks why? "How is it, I'm a people's commissar, then I can't answer." Lenin shaved him off like a boy and said: "Don't think that you alone care about military affairs. War is the business of the whole country, of the whole party.

The founder of the Bolshevik Party was able to finally put the chairman of the RVSR in his place only following the results of the UNI Congress of the RCP (b). On March 25, 1919, at a meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee, one of its members and main opponents of Trotsky, G.E. Zinoviev stated that, in fact, Trotsky remained in the leadership of the military department with 3 conditions: on the reorganization of the Field Headquarters, on the All-Russian General Staff, and most importantly, on the obligatory monthly meeting of Trotsky with party workers. On March 26, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) actually ordered Trotsky to "dismiss and transfer communist military workers only through the party organization" - Organizing Bureau; "as soon as possible" to carry out the decisions of the military section of the congress on the military question. In addition, the Central Committee pointed out to Trotsky the "need for the most attentive attitude towards communist workers at the front", complete "comradely solidarity" with them "", In fact, this was a logical continuation of Lenin's policy to legalize the appeals of the communists to the party apparatus on issues Trotsky meticulously edited his reply to the Central Committee in 1937. In a draft, he noted that Lenin skillfully took advantage of the struggle for second place in the party between Trotsky, Zinoviev and Stalin, "acting in the role of conciliator, fighter for unity" (quoted by M.A. Molodtsgin) 15. It is from the Eighth Party Congress "that one can start counting the subordination of the army to the highest party bodies, without which there could not be the omnipotence of the RCP (b)" '°.

Researcher S.A. Pavlyuchenkov figuratively noted that "in the post-October 'partnership' of leaders, Lenin's decisiveness and ruthlessness had no equal." Let's talk about two other qualities of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars - cunning and far-sightedness. In fact, all these qualities were recognized by the comrades-in-arms by the spring of 1919, when the Defense Council firmly subdued the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, and Ya.M. Sverdlov, who shot Fanny Kaplan before the investigation after Lenin was wounded in August 1918 and prepared the most skillful trap for the leader of the world proletariat for the US Congress of the RCP (b), did not

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unexpectedly - on the eve of this very congress - died from a Spanish flu, during which he was visited by the "compassionate" Ilyich, who (as it turned out) was so careless about his health. However, Lenin gradually nullified his Bonapartist manners. As a "counterweight" to the chairman of the RVSR, Lenin constantly sent I.V. Stalin to the military department! Trotsky, as a person capable of leading the military department, but at the same time not giving him the opportunity to widely use the army in conducting his own political game. Therefore, Lenin actually inspired Stalin to organize the so-called "military opposition"! Trotsky received at the Eighth Congress Fortunately, during this period Lenin did not see an alternative to Trotsky as the head of the military department and limited himself to nullifying the aspirations of "Red Bonaparte" for political leadership. The military dictatorship did not take place.

Face to face with the imperialist predators who seek to strangle the Soviet Republic and tear its corpse apart, face to face with the Russian bourgeoisie, which has raised the yellow banner of treason, and is betraying the workers' and peasants' country to the jackals of foreign imperialism, the Central Executive Committee of the Workers' Soviets, peasant, Red Army and Cossack deputies decides: |

The Soviet Republic turns into a military camp.

At the head of all fronts and all military establishments of the Republic is placed the Revolutionary Military Council! with a single Commander-in-Chief!.

All forces and means of the Socialist Republic are placed at the disposal of the sacred cause of armed struggle against violence.

All citizens, regardless of occupation and age, must unquestioningly fulfill those duties for the defense of the country that will be assigned to them by the Soviet government.

Supported by the entire working population of the country, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will crush and drive back the imperialist predators who trample the soil of the Soviet Republic.

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee decides to convey its present decision to the widest masses of workers and peasants, obliging all rural, volost and city Soviets, all Soviet institutions to post it in prominent places.

The decision was adopted at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on September 2.

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Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. 1918-1919. M, 1997. S. 14.

No. 1.2 Draft Regulations on the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic

Not later than September 30, 1916

1.a) The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic is the highest military authority in the country; b) in the interests of active defense of the borders of the Soviet Republic and ensuring the Soviet power of the RVSR, in military matters, all civilian institutions of the country are also subordinate; c) Roar | elution | the military[council] of the Republic absorbs all the rights of the collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, which are subordinate to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

2. All military forces and means of the Soviet Republic are subordinate to the Rev | rational | military council. All military institutions of the Republic work according to his instructions.

3. The All-Russian General Staff, the Main Supply Directorate, the Military Legislative Council, the Higher Military Inspectorate report directly to the Council.

4. Orders of the Revolutionary Military Council, having organizational and legislative significance, introducing new institutions or changing old ones, must have the signatures of at least three members of the Revolutionary Military Council. eta], and if these

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orders are of a strategic or operational nature, then one of these signatures must be the signature of the Commander-in-Chief (...]

8. The Chairman, members of the Revolutionary Military Council and the Commander-in-Chief are appointed and dismissed by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets.

9. The seat of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic is the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

RGVA.F. 10. Op. 2. D. 93. L. 1—1 rev. Typewritten text;

RGVA.F. 10. Op. 2. D. 93. L. 2 with ob-3. Handwritten copy.

No. 1.3

Report by I.I. Vatsetis "The role of political and economic-administrative centralization in the modern state environment"

Around November 27, 1918 2"

The state life of our Republic is based on political decentralization and complete economic and administrative centralization.

According to this scheme, state life was built from the beginning of 1918, and many outstanding minds of the social order of our country worked on the construction of this life. All political power in the localities—this is the motto that underlies the formation of the Soviet Republic.

As for the economic and administrative power, from the very first days of this year, the opposite phenomenon has been noticed and the stages through which our Republic intends to go in order to create complete centralization, both in terms of initiative administrative and economic - productive.

The bearers of the functions of decentralized power were local councils of deputies, while the functions of the centralized economic and administrative life of the country were concentrated in the person of institutions that had the value of, as it were, small trusts on a democratic basis. These trusts are known to us under the names: Center fabric,

\* Dated according to surrounding documents.

Centrosugar, Glavmatchka, Glavtabak, Centrotextile, Centroryba, Centrokozha, etc. etc. without end.

There is no doubt that if the state building of our country took place in peacetime, and not in an atmosphere of struggle, then all the planned changes would be carried out calmly, thoughtfully and, undoubtedly, would give excellent results.

What could be better than the dispersion of political power under the slogan "local power". This slogan is especially important for our Republic, because it consists of a mass of all kinds of provinces, which have their own special cultural characteristics and their own way of life.

Centralization of the economic-administrative aspect of the life of the state on democratic principles is the ideal to which our state-building on the basis of the power of the working people corresponds. With the complete centralization of the economic and administrative life of the state, the distribution of wealth in the country will be even, there will be no concentration of capital in one hand, there will be no millionaires who do not know where to put their wealth, and there will be no poor people who do not know how to cover themselves. and his family from the cold and what to feed them from hunger. It would be as it was said above, if our state building proceeded in an absolutely peaceful time, if neither inside nor outside there was a hostile force, ready at any moment to prevent such a socialization of the entire state life of our Republic.

But, as we know, we are building on new principles in stopping the most ferocious struggle, both against internal enemies and against pressure from outside. Our current position is

compare with the position of Germany before the beginning of our Revolution. Then the whole world turned its bayonets on Germany, considering her to be the culprit of some special inclinations, some special desire to build or become the master of some new imperialist civilization. Now, after the capitulation of Germany, the whole world seemed to agree on one thing and concentrated all its weapons against our Socialist Republic. More numerous enemies are advancing on us than at that time on Germany. Undoubtedly, it is more difficult for us to carry on our struggle than it was for Germany, because at the same time as external enemies we must wage a struggle within, suppressing constant rebellions. In a word, we must frankly admit that we live in

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conditions of the most ferocious relentless struggle against us all over the world.

In such a situation of war, our state building takes on a special character, for the entire state life should be directed to serving the war, i.e. to the creation of an army and to the achievement of this army of everything necessary for the conduct of war. Thus, we see that since the beginning of this year, our Republic has been built on the foundations of striving for peace and in the hope that there will be peace. Suddenly there has been a complete change in the situation; instead of a peaceful life, we must again wage the most ferocious war.

For anyone who followed the life of our Republic, it became clear that as the war developed, the slogan "all power in the localities" turned out to be unsuitable, because one will, one aspiration, one power, namely, central power, is necessary for waging war. Only under this condition can all the manpower of the country be turned into military weapons aimed at achieving a single goals.

So, the wartime situation made it necessary to amend the formula "all local power" and restructure all state power on the principle "All power to the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee."

At the present time, as we know, we have a completely centralized power, but in the localities the power has been left to the Soviets of Deputies insofar as this is allowed by state interests.

As for the idea of the complete centralization of economic and administrative life, which is the basis of state building, the question here is more than unfavorable. The complete centralization of the economic and administrative life of the country on socialist foundations, possible and permissible in a peaceful situation, turned out to be completely inapplicable to life in a situation of war. The social scheme of the economic and administrative life of the country in peacetime is aimed at serving the working masses, while wartime requires that the economic and administrative life of the country be directed exclusively to serve the Red Army. Under other conditions, no war can end victoriously.

This cruel condition, dictated by the god of war Mars, is still disputed. Many in their worldview still remain only admirers of those theories that have been developed in an indifferent way.

personal setting outside of time and occasions. These are the romantics of socialism, who have no possibility in their mental outlook to rise to the level of the demands of practical life. Obviously, they have not yet thought deeply enough about the role that socialism as a state power should play, it is also obvious that they are stuck in the stage of understanding socialism as the engine of social civilization. Practical life has already given innumerable examples of the fact that, in order to successfully conduct our struggle, sufficient decentralization of the economic and administrative life of the country is necessary, leaving the dominant role in matters of state economy to the central state institutions.

At the present time, as we know, numerous voices are being heard from the localities, from the military districts, that they should be given sufficient economic independence precisely for

so that our army would not be undressed, undressed and would not be without ammunition. There are numerous examples of local central collegiums holding colossal military property at their disposal and not handing it over to army supply representatives.

There are numerous examples of the Red Army not being able to get what it needs from local warehouses. In order to get a simple plank for bunks, you need to go through a mass of authorities, not being sure of the positive result of all these efforts.

With the current hype of Centrifuges, Centrodosok, Centronails, a completely curious phenomenon has turned out - centrocollegia confiscate property from private owners, as if nationalizing it, i.e. make it state property, but meanwhile, when, under the influence of state necessity, representatives of the army apply to the central collegiums for the necessary materials, the central collegiums answer: "Pay us, then we will give you." This is no longer centralization, but an outrage, an outrage that was the product of the wartime situation.

At present, it is extremely necessary to reconsider the question of centralizing the economic and administrative life of the Republic, for its entire life should be directed to serving the Red Army. Our country has been declared a military camp, and all living forces

\* So in the text. That's right: "worldviews".

country, all its wealth, all its property must be directed to the service of this manpower, which is fighting against numerous enemies for the existence of our Socialist Republic.

If we serve our Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army "in so far as", then there is not the slightest certainty that we will withstand this incredible struggle, unheard of in world history.

The commissariats of our military districts are exhausted in order to dress and put on our Red Army in time, to supply it with baggage and everything necessary, but in this they do not meet with sufficient support from the country.

We are waging war in the same way as it was under the tsarist regime, when the War Ministry was at war, and the rest of the ministries lived in their own way, as they pleased. As a result of all this, all the wars of old Russia were lost, it won only in those cases when the question was only about crushing some insignificant people, which had almost no resistance forces. At present, only the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs is also waging war; the former War Ministry, the rest of the commissariats are not only indifferent to the war, but even partly hostile. There are countless examples of hostility, some kind of hissing directed towards the Red Army, sometimes contemptuous of it.

relationship.

Our Red Army soldier fights in conditions much worse than the soldier of the old army fought, the Red Army soldier receives less bread and less food than the soldier of the old army, our Red Army soldier is worse dressed, dressed "in so far as", there are numerous reports from the commanders of the armies that that the units are completely barefoot, that there are no overcoats, that the soldiers are freezing. Society treated the wounded and sick soldiers of the old army with touching tenderness and unanimity, but look at what is done with the wounded and sick soldiers of the Red Army. We have seen wounded Red Army soldiers brought from their positions in such a state that there were already worms in the wounds. All the hospitals are overflowing with Red Army soldiers, their care is much worse than before, there are no those richly furnished Red Cross communities.

\* So in the text.

More and more random. Sometimes seriously wounded Red Army soldiers die on the battlefield, abandoned like dogs. To top off our misfortunes, even here, in the matter of military health, it was necessary for some bunch of romantics to experiment and state their claim to military health at a time when they themselves had not the slightest idea of what to do. We mean the People's Commissariat of Health. From a conversation with representatives of this commissariat, it turned out that the initial thought that made them turn their attention to the military department was precisely the desire to look into the pharmacies and medical warehouses of the military department, i.e. a purely selfish idea, and not at all with the goal of organizing assistance to the Red Army on a nationwide scale. At the present time, the medical care of the Red Army is out of hand, carelessly carried out to the point of crime, and we do not know the time when the military-sanitary business was put in the army as badly as it is now. Complaints from all sides about the lack of hospitals, about poor evacuation, about poor care, about the shortcomings of doctors, about the shortcomings of medicines, etc. etc.

Let's take at least another department - the Commissariat of Food. Again, for the purpose of centralization, the People's Commissariat of Food expressed a desire, expressed an irresistible claim to take over the supply of food to the army. The military department was deprived of any opportunity to supply military units, the soldiers' rations were reduced by the People's Commissariat of Food to the size capable of causing only an armed rebellion on hungry soil. We know that even before the beginning of the struggle against the Czechoslovaks, the military formations of the first period failed, the soldiers gathered in the barracks fled under the impression of hunger. Often there were cases when the regiments did not go out to classes because they were hungry and had to go to the city to get their own food.

Relatively recently, already during the war, the Commissariat of Food vetoed any opportunity in the army to conduct independent procurement ""?. As a result, it turned out that the Commissariat of Food did not fulfill any of the requirements that he swore and swore to fulfill. , new formations could not be carried out in time, because food was not delivered.

This is no longer an accident or stupidity, but simply a state crime, for which the perpetrators must bear severe punishment.

To the insistent demands of the military department for granting the right to it itself to procure food for the army

The food commander stubbornly refused, threatening, if the insistence of the military department was satisfied, to resign. It happened to us to see leaders of the Commissariat of Food - Communists, who did not agree to transfer the food supply of the army into the hands of the military department for other reasons, because of the groundless romanticism that overwhelmed them. One of them said that there should be a common cauldron, that everyone should eat as if from a common cauldron. These romantics, assigned by misunderstanding to practical matters, did not understand that no one argues that there should be a common cauldron in our Republic, since we are surrounded on all sides by enemies, but it is necessary to understand and admit it as an indisputable truth. that from this cauldron, first of all, the Red Army soldiers should get plenty of food. These romantics said that it was all the same to them whether it was a soldier or a worker: that the measure of justice was the same for all. However, speaking in this way, these persons were not at all inclined to join the ranks of the Red Army themselves and equate their combat labor, associated with self-sacrifice of life and health, with the labor of those who work in the rear and enjoy peace and quiet. 8 hour work day. In a word, supporting the idea of a common cauldron, these romantics did not understand that from this cauldron, first of all, it was necessary to satisfy the Red Army.

There were those who understood this, but at the same time, no one wanted to rise to the height of the state understanding of this issue, namely, that since it is necessary to satisfy, first of all, the Red Army with food, then it is necessary to entrust this to the military department. .

Only relatively recently, after a whole series of experiments carried out by the Commissariat for Food, experiments that ended in complete failure for him, failure to fulfill the orders of the military department, the inability to fulfill them and a lack of understanding of this matter, only after that



The food commander stepped aside, the military department achieved the right to independent procurement. It is quite clear to us and we believe that if the question of decentralization of the economic and administrative life of the country were to be approached impartially, then this question would be resolved in the way it should be resolved, and centralization in matters of economic and administrative life would be resolved. go over to centralization, which is caused by necessity in a military situation.

I repeat that without this condition, our Red Army will not give the maximum of combat work, because we will not be able to dress,

feed her and prepare her combat ammunition. Maybe all this will be understood later, but then it will be too late. We are already late with the resolution of this issue, we are still pushing towards it. Although we understand each other, we do not want to give in, realizing that the Red Army is not an organ of oppression of the working masses, but is an anchor of salvation for our Socialist Republic from those numerous enemies that have fallen upon it from all sides. Vatsetis

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 2. D. 1. L. 244-251. Transcript (corrected version) - typewritten text with av

tographer.

No. 1.4 Draft resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the creation of the "Council of Defense of the Country"

Not later than November 30, 1916

In its meeting [September 2, 1918] the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to declare the entire Soviet Republic a military camp. Much has been done since then to create a powerful Workers' and Peasants' Army, but far from enough has been done. Meanwhile, never before has the Soviet Republic experienced such a critical situation. It is necessary to intensify the work of all organs of Soviet power for the needs of the war. It is necessary to coordinate the activities of the various organs connected with the armament, supply, formation, movement and food supply of the army. Only in such a coordinated, energetic work of all institutions for the needs of the war is the guarantee of our success.

For these purposes, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decides to form the Council of the Country's Defense, which should include representatives of the Revolutionary Military Council, Comput, Commissariat of Food, Extraordinary Committee | these officers for equipping and supplying the army and a representative of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Comrade Lenin is appointed Chairman of the National Defense Council.

All orders and resolutions of the Council of Defense of the Country are unconditionally binding on all institutions, both military and civilian. The National Defense Council has as its task the translation

\* So in the text.

on the martial law of all institutions whose activities are in contact with the needs of the army. <Council[of] Defense] of St[rans] has the right to summon to its meetings> Council[of Defense] of St[rans] has the right to appoint audits, controls, etc.!??

RGVA.F. 1. Op. 3. D. 58. L. 19--20v. Handwritten copy. on a notebook sheet.

No. 1.5

Statement by I.T. Smilga to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with a protest against the militia system of recruiting troops and a proposal to reorganize the military administration apparatus

March 17, 1919 Comrade Lenin - copy

In the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party

For the successful conduct of the war, I consider it necessary:

1) Not in words, but in deeds, refuse to form territorial troops. It is necessary to completely forbid the formation of mobilized in their province.

2) To streamline the system of replenishment of units by constantly strengthening them, which should not exceed 20-30% of the number of people in the unit. Lack of replenishment leads to the destruction of personnel, and excessive piling up. in turn, leads to the liquefaction of the old strong army core.

3) Units destined for the front must be placed under the supervision of the front for their preliminary training.

4) All rear formations larger than a regiment must be stopped (margarine).

5) Communist workers mobilized for the war must be immediately sent to military schools and courses. The front needs a lower command staff, and not young comrades who vaguely understand their role.

6) The strength of our army is directly dependent on the mood of the middle peasant, to whom the most serious attention should be directed.

7) A shaky restless rear is as dangerous as an enemy. One of the members of the Revolutionary Council [council] of the front is entrusted by the Council of People's Commissars

and the Central Committee of the Party general supervision and control over all Soviet institutions.

8) Political work in the army requires that: a) the All-Byurkom-military"\* be dissolved, and the Political Department of the Republic organized in its place, for the active armies - the Political Department at the Main Staff; b) The Political Department of the Republic must be a powerful distributive body, supplying the armies (and not the front) with literature and newspapers He must study the development of our army, collect statistical materials, give a picture of the general organizational and political state of the army c) The political departments of the fronts and armies consist of 3-4 old workers and the necessary the number of technical personnel; d) the concentration of all the main work should be the division, where to send comrades.

17/111.1191 19 (Signed Smilga).

RGASPI.F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 2. Certified typewritten copy.

No. 1.6 Statement by L.D. Trotsky to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on the decision of the Central Committee of March 22, 1919.

Not earlier than March 25, 1919

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RKP

Dear comrades!

I received the decision of the Central Committee on March 22" on the basis of Comrade Zinoviev's written report. On this occasion, I consider it necessary to state the following considerations.

In practice, the provisions formulated by the congress commission do not contain anything contrary to the policy of the military department, as it has been carried out up to now with the approval of the Central Committee. It is only necessary to say that the propositions are formulated in an extremely general, vague manner, and some of them are based on a misunderstanding.

1. It is not indicated at all in what direction to reorganize the Field Headquarters and in what sense a closer connection with the fronts is supposed. Until now, complaints from the fronts

\* So in the text. Decision of March 25, 1919

mainly boiled down to the fact that the central command intervenes in too much detail in the operations of the fronts.

2. The regulation of the work of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which is required by the following paragraph, is also indefinite. The comrades, who aroused criticism in this sense, more than once demanded that I personally, as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, should not travel around the fronts, but sit in the center. Did the congress committee have this method of settlement in mind? Is this how the Central Committee understands the question?

3. Streamlining the work of the All-Glavshstab and strengthening the representation of the Party in it is undoubtedly a desirable measure. On this issue, Comrade Sverdlov and I had repeated negotiations. Unfortunately, we could not find suitable party workers for this work. As candidates comrade. Sverdlov sometimes called comrade. Smilgu and tov. Lashevich.

4. Convening periodic conferences of responsible party workers of the front is, of course, a useful measure, although it is hardly possible to recall the most responsible party workers from the front at the same time, and yet the meetings presuppose precisely the simultaneous absence of the most responsible workers—conferences of a different type. unlikely to be practical.

5. "Survey of party workers of the front on how satisfactorily the issue of the uniform and insignia of the command staff was resolved." This item is based on a misunderstanding. We have no insignia of the commanding staff at all. We have insignia in general. The same badge for a Red Army soldier, commissar, commander. Is it necessary to understand paragraph 5 in such a way that the insignia are now preserved only for officers, or is the commission simply not aware of the purpose of the insignia.

Despite these ambiguities and obvious misunderstandings, the 5 points I have listed do not contain anything that would run counter to the established military policy. The same must be said about the 12 points of practical measures before. additional resolution of the congress. All of these points are either a mere underlining of measures already taken or in progress,

\* Here and throughout the document, the words in italics are written in black ink by L.D. Trotsky. \*\* Word underlined by L.D. Trotsky.

or proposals for organizational changes that are by no means of a fundamental nature.

But all these practical proposals were presented by the Central Committee in the light of Comrade Zinoviev's report. This report establishes a special point of view on the above practical proposals and should, as it were, define some new line of conduct.

Comrade Zinoviev assesses the opposition as consisting of two "groups: one is an offended and low-value public; the other is a very serious group which is in complete agreement with us on the question of partisanship and military specialists, but is extremely dissatisfied with my attitude towards Communists working in the army" Comrade Zinoviev demands some kind of radical change in attitude towards communists working in the army, and says bluntly that "without this, things will not go forward." He ends his report with the words: "the sympathy that report to the Central Committee, gives me confidence that we will soon rectify the matter.

I consider the report of comrade. Zinoviev is completely wrong, and if this report is a real justification for "some" new line of conduct, I am forced to admit

Comrade Zinoviev's tendency is extremely dangerous and is simply a weakened reflection of the very opposition, the meaning and content of which Comrade Zinoviev has not correctly assessed.

It is absolutely correct that the opposition consists of two groups: Comrade Obolensky is the spokesman for one. This is a pretentious party intelligentsia, largely composed of resentful Soviet officials and nervous, tired people.

For the second part of the opposition, for example, Maksimov and other prominent workers could be called typical, rather stubborn, independent, but inclined to simplify all issues in order to bring these issues closer to the level of political and other development they have already achieved. The opposition of such elements is caused not by a class proletarian, but by a plebeian protest against the "courtship" of military specialists, against the privileged position of all academicians, etc., etc. This is a political opposition.

\* Originally stood: "small". Correction L.D. Trotsky.

\*\* Here and below, the highlighted text is underlined in red pencil, presumably by L.D. Trotsky.

\*\*\* Originally stood: "workers." Correction L.D. Trotsky.

the structure not of a victorious class, master and builder, but a regurgitation of the former independence <slavery> and instinctive hostility towards the stratum that formerly occupied a leading social "position and acquired through this knowledge and skills that the majority of the representatives of the working class are deprived of" .

Here are the two real components of the opposition. Of course, the attitude towards them cannot be the same. The systematic ideological struggle against the historically conditioned prejudices of a certain section of worker-simplifiers is a task of tremendous importance, while the re-education of the Obolenskys and Smirnovs is of no importance from the point of view of the further development of the socialist revolution. If Comrade Zinoviev is correct in groping for the very fact of the existence of two currents of opposition, then he is clearly mistaken when he considers the voice of the second group to be the voice of the truth itself and proposes, in fact, to be equal on this question. The opposition of the simplifier workers morally does not contain anything repulsive, but theoretically it is just as erroneous, practically even more dangerous than the hysterical opposition of offended Soviet officials. Zinoviev calls Voroshilov. I will not engage in individual psychological investigations as to which of the groups Voroshilov should be assigned to, but I will note that the only thing I can blame myself in relation to him is too long (namely, two or three months) attempts to act through negotiations, exhortations, personal combinations where a firm, organizational decision was needed in the interests of the cause. For, after all, the task in relation to the 10th Army was to achieve military successes in the shortest possible time. The opposition in general, at its best as well as its worst wing, reflects the terrible difficulties of the dictatorship of a hungry "" internally tormented working class with an unconscious, discontented and rebellious

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peasantry"""" . We see these difficulties everywhere. In the military field

\* Originally stood: "military". Correction L.D. Trotsky.

\*\* Originally stood: "the current dominant." Correction L.D. Trotsky.

\*\*\* Originally stood: "extreme". Correction L.D. Trotsky.

\*\*\*\* Originally stood: "or". Correction L.D. Trotsky.

\*\*\*\*\* Originally stood: "urban". Correction L.D. Trotsky.

\*\*\*\*\* The punctuation of the document has been preserved in the sentence.

they get the most focused. All shortages, discrepancies, all the shortcomings of Soviet work, all the slovenliness of Soviet workers—find their most concentrated expression in the organism of the army. And any discontent in the army is discontent with arms in hand. The army is an organism in the highest degree artificial, which always develops enormous centrifugal tendencies. If the party, as such, can afford a certain limit in internal disagreements, beyond which it crumbles; if this limit of disagreements acceptable to revolutionary parties is extremely narrowed in the epoch of revolution, when the party is not preparing for action, but is acting, then these allowable disagreements in the army of the revolutionary class, under the conditions of a tense, merciless civil war, are reduced to the final minimum. The army is an artificial organism, and the unity of thoughts and plans, which holds back this artificial organism, must be maintained with firmness, the more irreconcilable, the more, the more varied, the more severe are the objective conditions that undermine the army. It is better to have 10 communists delegated by the party than 100 who look at the army as an arena for discussions and for all sorts of group elements.

The path from order to execution under our conditions is an extremely long and painful path. A strictly formal discipline must be established here, which in its outward expression seems to Comrade Zinoviev as if not comradely <precisely> because it does not allow any discussions, discussions, persuasion and does not take into account any extenuating circumstances.

Precisely because I have observed too closely the difficult, even tragic episodes in active armies, I know very well how great is the temptation to replace formal discipline with so-called "comradely" discipline, i.e. homemade, but at the same time I was only too well convinced that such a replacement would mean the complete disintegration of the army. I think that it is the party connection of Communists with each other in the military field that is being translated into unconditional and unconditional discipline.

There was a case in the 9th Army when two revolutionary commanders - Huzarsky and Sluvis - arbitrarily violated the order and disorganized

\* Originally stood: "At the same time, I dare to think." Correction

L.D. Trotsky.

they called for a well-conceived operation and, in their defense, they began to accuse the army command of treason at meetings ([they accused] the army commander Knyagnitsky; a communist, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council, Sokolnikov, Baryshnikov, Dashkevich). I arrested <them> both divisional commanders. 5 communist commissars came to me to explain and defend. I put them on trial for leaving their posts without permission. Guzarsky was shot" by order of the tribunal to which he was betrayed by me. After that, the rally of commanders and commissars stopped. The 9th Army immediately went on the offensive. This moment was a turning point in the history of the 9th Army. From the point of view of room discussions and friendly tea parties, my attitude not only towards the division commanders (who acted "probably not for malicious reasons"), but also to the communist commissars was not "comradely". I would consider, however, shameful cowardice and a direct betrayal of the interests of the revolution which require first of all victory at the front, any other behavior in this case. Those commissars who turned out to be the object of such repressive measures, of course, could not help but feel hurt, insulted, offended, although I have no doubt that when our cruel work at the front will be completed, they will meet with me in a comradely manner and retrospectively justify the measures I have taken.

Such were the harsh measures that had to be applied in Kazan at the most difficult moment for the Soviet government. These measures are still being cited in the agitation of Spiridonov's Left S.-R.! Comrade Zinoviev inspires "" in

his report the need for clarification, not disciplinary action. I oppose this with the statement: if there had been one firm comrade in the Revolutionary Military Council of the 5th Army who, at the moment of a turning point, would have shown power instead of scribbling, this army, united with such difficulty, would not have collapsed, and the kindest, gentlest Ivan Nikitich Smirnov would not have had to to apply now those severe repressions to which he was forced to resort, judging by his last telegram. Completely not-

\* Here and throughout the document, highlighted words are underlined in blue ink. Authorship edit not installed.

\*\* Initially it stood: "to the head of the division, who acted. ..". Correction by L.D. Trotsky.

\*\*\* Originally stood: "explains". Correction L.D. Trotsky.

Comrade Zinoviev's assertion is true that there is no group of authoritative communists who would assume responsibility for the policy of the military department. Smilga, Lashevich, Sokolnikov, i.e. those members of the Central Committee who are now working in the military department, Gusev, Geodorovich, Okulov, Aralov, Rozengolts, Kiselshtein, Khodorovsky and dozens of less prominent workers, carry out the policy of the military department entirely and without any ulterior motives. There are no more influential workers in the military department. Rozengolts and Kizelstein went to the front as irreconcilable opponents of our military system—they became its staunch supporters. Six months ago, the ideological opposition was much broader, more numerous, more principled. I do not know of a single case when the supporters of our military system would become its opponents, and I know dozens of opposite cases.

The trouble, of course, is that enormous fatigue, irritability, and nervousness have accumulated during this time. If the food question, and not the military one, had been put on the order of the day, the same sentiments would have shown themselves, perhaps in an even more nervous form. We are moving towards the most difficult months, the pressure of the enemy is intensifying. An army can only be kept in contact with the greatest exertion, maintaining discipline from top to bottom by means of the most rigid and in many cases severe regime. Opposition slogan: "Loosen the screws!" I stand on the point of view that it is necessary to tighten the screws. I have no doubt that the working class and its party are capable of and will withstand this tension. It is only necessary that in the center of the party of the working class they should not become infected with panic and should not be equal in psychological combinations to the Osinskys and the Voroshilovs. Comrade Zinoviev's report inspires the most serious fears that he is looking for a solution to the problem precisely along the path of weakening the regime and adapting certain elements of our Party to the fatigue. Since the bureau of the Central Committee approved the report of Comrade Zinoviev, I want to believe that it did not approve this side of the report, because otherwise I personally would not see for myself "" any possibility of counting on the success of the party in the forthcoming difficult struggle. "Since Comrade Zinoviev's report expresses a definite assessment of the groupings of the Party and outlines, although in an extremely

\* Originally stood: "group". Correction L.D. Trotsky. Originally stood: \*\* Originally stood: "nuts".  
Correction L.D. Trotsky. \*\*\* "I see." Correction L.D. Trotsky.

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indefinite form, a certain attitude towards these groupings, I consider it my duty to present to the Central Committee of the Party in my present statement my understanding of the same questions.>

RGVA.F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 346-353. Draft - typewritten text with L.D. Trotsky.

The original was published: Tgo15Ku" 5 raregv. T. 1. 1917-1919. [..., R, 1964. R 324-334.

"THE OUTSIDE... THEY CALL OUR FIELD HQ 'Red Headquarters'"

On June 15, 1919, the top military leader and member of the Politburo, Lev Trotsky, told the Central Committee of the RCP(b): "We are beginning to experiment - with a touch of mischief - in the area of Headquarters. American wisdom generally recommends not changing from horse to horse when crossing a fast stream. But at the most critical moment, we harness horses that obviously pull apart."\*\*\*@. Leon Trotsky's statement is now translated more simply: "horses are not changed in the middle." How this American wisdom can be used in practice, The American movie "Wag"/"Wag the Dog" vividly tells...

On September 2, 1918, former Colonel Ioakim Ioakimovich Vatsetis became Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Republic.

Vatsetis was born on the estate of Neuhoof in the Goldingen (Kuldīga) district of the Courland province in the family of a laborer - a completely "worker-peasant" origin. Latvian by nationality. He received his education at the Kuldīga County College of the Ministry of Public Education. In 1891, he entered the Riga training non-commissioned officer battalion as a volunteer (experience in 1918 - 27 years). At the end of the course of the training battalion, he was promoted to non-commissioned officer (1893) "and sent to the 105th Orenburg Infantry Regiment (Vilna). He graduated from the Vilna infantry cadet school (1895-1897), the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff (1909, 1st category). He was not included in the corps of officers of the General Staff (in the list of graduates by success, he was listed as 52 out of 53 persons, and 46 officers were included in the General Staff). By the beginning of World War I, commander of the 4th battalion of the 102nd Vyatka Infantry Regiment (26th Infantry Division of the 2nd Army Corps). Member of the campaign in East Prussia, fighting in Poland, where he was seriously wounded. Upon recovery (autumn 1915) he was appointed commander of the 5th Zemgale

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the Latvian rifle battalion, which in October 1916 was deployed to the regiment. In the battles near Mitava he was shell-shocked (1916/1917). Member of the battles near Riga (near Maza-Jugla, in August 1917). In 1917 - commander of the 2nd Latvian Rifle Brigade. After the October Revolution, a rapid rise began - in December 1917, Vatsetis became the head of the operational department of the Revolutionary Field Headquarters at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in January 1918 he led the fight against units of the Polish corps of General Dobor-Musnitsky. Since 1918 St. Red Army - Commander of the Latvian Rifle Division (since April 1918). During the revolt of the Left SRs in Moscow, one of the saviors of V.I. Lenin. At the insistence of the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, he was the commander of the Eastern Front after the failure of the military coup attempt undertaken by M.A. Muraviev (since July 1918)".

The personality of the Commander-in-Chief is very ambiguous: on the one hand, it would be a strong exaggeration to call him a brilliant strategist (and his biography does not indicate outstanding abilities), on the other hand, judging by the operational documentation, the Commander-in-Chief is a competent strategist. His political views can be called naive: he was sincerely convinced that the army was outside politics, although such a prominent military theorist as K. Clausewitz in his main work "On War" (1832-1834) formulated a position on the connection between war and politics, and a graduate of the Academy of the General Staff "I. Vatsetis must have known this. As a man, Vatsetis was noted for his pedantry!" and extreme decency. In this regard, the General Staff officers who served in the Red Headquarters were lucky - Vatsetis always protected them from the Bolshevik commissars. But it happened that the Commander-in-Chief followed the lead of his chief of staff, General F.V. Kostyaev. Then Vatsetis stood up for the old generals covered by Kostyaev and contributed to the "zeal" of the generals to each other.

After Lenin and Sverdlov asked Trotsky in December 1918 to improve relations with Vatsetis, the head of the military department changed tactics in relation to his main subordinate. | In January 1919, Trotsky "urgently, out of turn" telegraphed the curator Vatsetis S.I. Aralov: "I consider it necessary to remind you that [you] are obliged to sign

operational orders of the Commander-in-Chief, without entering into reasoning and expediency. As for his administrative orders, suggestions and reprimands, you bear the same responsibility as the Commander-in-Chief; meanwhile, some written suggestions

Commander-in-Chief are completely unacceptable. Such are the telegrams to Antonov, the completely unfair [and] formally incorrect telegram to Altvater. I suggest that you do not sign documents written in such a tone in the future, and in the same way I ask you to ensure that my requests are answered by those persons to whom they apply, so that there is a strict order of responsibility! ". In April 1919, already in an extremely tactful form, Trotsky instructed A.I. Akulov, a member of the RVSR, to draw the "attention" of Vatsetis to the need, while remaining in the interests of the Headquarters, to take into account "the rights and interests of other institutions and persons". With the proviso: "I highly appreciate the work of the Commander-in-Chief and consider it necessary to eliminate completely superfluous and harmful moments, which, as was said, threaten to make work extremely difficult"???. Nevertheless, in 1919, Vatsetis described his position as Commander-in-Chief: "I do not have any full power over the functions that a strategist should have. In a word, I do not have full power in the Commander-in-Chief, about which one of the most brilliant commanders in the world, namely Suvorov, speaks. Like he did in his time, I complained that he was hampered by various Austrian gof- and kriegs-rats (gof-kriegs-rat - court military councils. - S.V.), which did not give him the opportunity to wage war in the way he found it useful from the point of view of the situation, so I also have to note that in my actions I am oppressed by our own gof- and kriegs rats like the Revolutionary Military Councils and the persons placed over me.

Joachim Vatsetis was a poor diplomat and therefore regularly caused trouble for Trotsky. On March 11, 1919, A. Galkin, a member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of State Control, complained to him about Vatsetis. According to him, the district head of the emergency audit of the South-Western region said that during the examination of the railway station 'Serpukhov "slow loading of firewood onto steam locomotives" was discovered, one of the reasons for which was the "occupation of a track specially designed for loading firewood" by the train of Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis. Vatsetis Galkin refused the request to move the train to the Garden Dead End, explaining that "it is more convenient to drive here by car", and when setting the train to the Garden Dead End, you would have to walk a distance of about 30 sazhen from the car to the train." Having received the complaint, Sklyansky sent the document secretly, into Aralov's own hands "for consideration." Aralov reported the decision to Sklyansky the next day.

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The field headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (PSh RVSR) was formed on the basis of the Headquarters of the Supreme Military Council - RVSR and the Operational Department of the People's Commissariat of War (Operoda) in the autumn of 1917 under the leadership of General Staff Officer Georgy Ivanovich Teodori.

Teodori was born on October 18, 1887 in Evpatoria, a Greek by nationality. He was educated at the Nikolaev Cadet Corps (1904), the Mikhailovsky Artillery School (1906). Since 1904, he was in military service. An officer of the 2nd Finnish Rifle Artillery Battalion. Member of the war in Galicia on the Southwestern Front, shell-shocked in the back!; in 1917 - chief officer for the instructions of the headquarters of the 46th corps, 4th Finnish rifle park and artillery division, staff captain; senior adjutant in the General Staff.

According to the memoirs of Lieutenant General A.S. Lukomsky, in the conditions of the beginning of the collapse of the old army, "in Petrograd, in the Military Ministry, from the very first days of the revolution, a group of young officers of the General Staff (nicknamed "Young Turks") stood out, who, wanting to stand out and advance during the period of the revolution, began to preach to be in charge of the need to break the "old, obsolete and revolutionary" relations between officers and soldiers; they demanded the introduction of commissars and committees everywhere, the abolition of shoulder straps, etc.""". Under Kerensky, Teodori got into 3-month preparatory courses of the second stage of wartime at the Imperial Nikolaev Military Academy (graduation took place in May 1917, Teodori took about 61 positions out of 233 in terms of academic performance, i.e. he finished 1-mu category, although it did not hit the marble board)! \*. After completing the course, Teodori was appointed head of the operations department of the headquarters of the Petrogradsky district. Occupied in 1917-19



Petrograd VO F.I. Balabin, during an interrogation at the OGPU in 1931, testified: "I personally left the headquarters [of the Petrograd Military District] after a nuisance with my assistant, on the basis of personal relations. My assistants, officers of the 6-month course of the General Staff, reprimanded me for my arrogant treatment, saying that behind my back I called them noobs, and so on. The conditions of service were created very painful ... "!. This assistant was George Teodori. At the next interrogation, Balabin described the issue of 1917 in more detail. Here he gave a biased, but rather accurate description of Georgy Ivanovich: "P.A. May, Teodori, Kolesnikov and several other employees of my

of the operational department, all the young general staff officers who graduated from the accelerated course of the academy in 1917, little knowledge (? - S.V.), inexperienced, [with] a highly developed spirit of criticism against the old general staff officers - especially Teodori, whose demagogic attacks clearly showed ... the desire to make a fast career; proud, persistent, he was the unconditional ideologist of a close-knit group of his comrades, emphasized this solidarity and, when he considered it necessary, protested from the closed front of his like-minded comrades! 9, In the spring of 1918, as A.G. Kavtaradze, revealed "an acute conflict between the General Staff officers who graduated from the academy in peacetime and graduates of accelerated courses. Some of the old General Staff officers treated the graduates of accelerated courses with disdain...»!%. A number of general staff officers who held high army posts emphasized the lack of experience of graduates of preparatory courses and the senior course of the academy, who were assigned to the corps of officers of the General Staff as early as September 1917. For the General Staff officers T.O. Kosacha and V.F. Tarasov stood up for Teodori, who was dismissed from the service for this. The key event was the meeting on April 30, 1918, of employees of the Northern Sector and the Petrogradsky District of Zavesa, assigned to the General Staff, at which the participants decided to firmly defend their rights, recognizing the "case with Teodori" as a "common cause"!% - this is the moment of self-identification issue, the leader (or "ideologist", in the words of F.I. Balabin) of which was Teodori.

On February 15, 1919, Teodori told his boss Semyon Aralov: "With difficulty and great effort, I kept the issue in February and March 1918, soldered it over the summer." At the same time, the general staff officers of the accelerated courses came into conflict with the old military specialists (including the general staff officers), but won the trust of the Commander-in-Chief Joachim Vatsetis, as a result, representatives of the 1917 graduation took responsible positions at the fronts, but the old generals managed to remove one Teodori cadets "from the main departments" of the military department, i.e. from the central military apparatus! °?.

On May 27, at the invitation of the head of the Operod, the Moscow Bolshevik Semyon Ivanovich Aralov, Teodori came to Moscow and became a consultant (in fact, the creator) of the Operod. According to the observations of Vatsetis, "Comrade. Teodori was a very knowledgeable man and enjoyed great confidence in his superiors. Relationship

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between Chief of Staff Operod Teodori and military head of the Supreme Military Council M.D. Bonch-Bruevich were very hostile. Teodori and M.D. Bonch-Bruevich worked, as it were, on the opposite slopes of some psychologically insurmountable volcano. In addition, there was another, very good reason for their mutual personal hostility. M.D. Bonch Bruevich, according to his position, was a representative of the old General Staff that remained within the RSFSR, which he assembled as part of the People's Army, thanks to which the old General Staff, having lost the world war, managed to seize the initiative in the military development of Soviet Russia and found himself at the head of this business. Tov. Teodori stood at the head of the young academicians who had not yet been transferred to the General Staff. There were few of them - about 130 people graduated in 1917. It must be said that the graduation of 1917 consisted of the best former officers of the old army, from people who distinguished themselves in battles and managed to gain a lot of combat experience! ®.

Georgy Teodori had a fixed idea - the Great General Staff, i.e. such a General Staff that will play a significant role in politics and influence the economy. Once in Operod, Teodori

began to win over faithful classmates and associates and place them in key positions in the department. Earlier than the others, Georgy Ottovich Mattis (consultant of the organizational and accounting department from June 23 to July 8, Operod consultant no later than July 9%) and I.D. Chintulov (June 26) 9. The rest came later: consultant of the Intelligence Department B.I. Kuznetsov - no later than August 1! G.Ya. Kutyrev and I.D. Modenov became a consultant and assistant consultant of the Operations Department on August 1!\*, T.S. Kosach was a consultant at the Operations Department on 7 August. On August 15, Modenov became the second consultant of the Operations Department. V.A. Sryvalin was appointed assistant consultant of the Communications Department on September 7!", V.Yu. Stulba - assistant consultant of the Operations Department since August 13! ". It is curious that Chintulov was appointed on the basis of the telegram of Leon Trotsky dated June 13 No. 0729/591. This indicates that individual General Staff officers have already come to the attention of the head of the military department. From July 6 to July 15, Yu.I. Grigoriev, consultant of the intelligence department of the Operod, was on a business trip "on business to the cities of the Russian Soviet Federative Republic"!

in such a short time). On July 15, Operod's consultant G.V. Semenov, "who is on a business trip as an employee of the Higher Military Inspectorate"! ". Not later than October 3 A.V. Girshfeld, B.I. Kuznetsov and T.S. Kosach were sent on a business trip with L.D. Trotsky: "". On October 24, the consultants of the Communications Department G.Ya. Kutyrev and V.A. Sryvalin were transferred to the Intelligence Department for the position of consultants, and the latter was assigned the temporary duties of a consultant of the Communications Department!

On June 27, 1918, all the General Staff officers of the accelerated release were assigned to the corps of officers of the General Staff! According to the memoirs of Joachim Vatsetis, "young academicians willingly went to the war that began in the east. There was, therefore, no reason to refuse to transfer them to the General Staff. Theodori took care of this matter. From the very first steps, he met with strong resistance in the person of representatives of the tops of the old General Staff, grouped around the Supreme Military Council and the All-Glavshstab. Having close contact with the Military Commissariat (People's Commissariat for Military Affairs - S.V.), the old people managed to convince those on whom the solution of the issue depended that the graduation of 1917 were dropouts, that they should first command a company, and then return again to the academic bench and write 3 military scientific reports, as they once did - the old General Staff officers. Theodori's application was denied. Then Theodori turned to me for assistance and asked me to intercede with L. Trotsky. I took from Theodori the prepared draft order for the transfer of young academicians to the General Staff of the year 1917 and the list of this issue and came to L. Trotsky. I gave a number of motives that spoke in favor of this revolutionary issue. L. Trotsky respected my arguments and immediately wrote an order in my presence to transfer the entire issue of 1917 to the General Staff. Tov. Teodori repaid me by the fact that at this difficult moment for me (appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front. - S.V.) he frankly and truthfully described to me the military situation of the RSFSR and unfolded before me the whole picture of the organizational and operational nonsense, which was engaged in M.D. Bonch-Bruevich! In fact, in Theodori and his classmates, Joachim Vatsetis saw those people who could be relied on.

Vatsetis described the process of creating the Field Headquarters as follows: as a result of the replenishment of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on September 30, 1918, its "independence turned out to be very constrained. Some projects are not

could even be put on the table, because they were in danger of failure. In order to get out of this situation, I had to break away from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic]. I decided to use the power given to me and ordered the temporary chief of staff comrade. Mayguru to prepare the formation of a special headquarters for the Commander-in-Chief in Serpukhov. This headquarters was called the Field Headquarters, where part of the workers from the RVSR Headquarters transferred, and this latter was liquidated. The field headquarters was directly subordinate to me and was my working body. The composition of the Field Headquarters was rather limited, but it represented all the directorates necessary for the enormous creative work that lay before us.

execute. It is with great regret that I must note that my chief of staff of the Eastern Front, Com. Maigur, out of his modesty, refused to take the post of Chief of the Field Staff - Kostyaev F.V. was appointed to this post! Maigur did not head the headquarters not because of his "modesty".

Attacks on future employees of the Field Headquarters began as early as the spring-summer of 1918 by the General Staff officers of 1917, who occupied key posts in Operoda, and then quite serious posts in the Field Headquarters and at the fronts. feared a number of prominent Bolshevik organizers who were on military work and were afraid of a military coup (member of the board of the People's Commissariat of War M.S. Kedrov, military commissar of the Northern Front L.M. Glezarov, etc.). In the summer of 1918 in Petrograd, the future chief of the Field Staff, General F.V. Kostyaev was "treacherously", "without [about] any reason" arrested by the Bolshevik L.M. Glezarov and released "only at the insistence of the central government"! ".

Formally, the Bolshevik commissars were untied by the announcement of the massive "Red Terror" on September 2, 1918. Already on September 4, an order on hostages was published, sent to all councils by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs G.I. Petrovsky, which states: "The rear of our armies must finally be completely cleared of all White Guards and all vile conspirators ... not the slightest indecision in the application of mass terror." In early September, Operod's consultant and future organizer of the Field Headquarters G.I. Teodori interceded with the actual head of the central military apparatus, E.M. Sklyansky about the urgent assignment of General Staff Officer N.N. Domozhirev, who was detained for 3 months in Petrograd. 11 Sep

In October, Sklyansky informed Teodory that Domozhirev was "under suspicion." Teodori appealed to the Commander-in-Chief I.I. Vatsetis, who highly valued the General Staff officers of 1917 and personally the consultant of Operod" Georgy Ivanovich "categorically" vouched for his colleagues - General Staff officers Domozhirev, B.I. Kuznetsova, G.Ya. Kutyreva, I.D. Chintulov and others, referring to the trust of L.D. Trotsky, who "protected" them.

In addition, after the creation in September 1918 of a new supreme military body—the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic—headed by Leon Trotsky, a shake-up of the military administration apparatus began. In particular, the top military leadership planned to merge the Operational Department of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs into the All-Russian Main Headquarters (Vseroglavshtab). In the event of such a reorganization, the General Staff officers of 1918 would fall under the control of those old General Staff officers with whom they had been fighting fiercely for about half a year now. On September 11, Teodori declared to the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces, I.I. Vatsetis: "I ask you categorically not to agree to the influx of the Operations Department into the All-Russian General Headquarters, because this is tantamount to the destruction of the initiative group of workers, which will dissolve in the mass of saboteurs", and then we will be gradually dispersed or arrested ... Especially acute in the case of the transfer of the Operations Department the issue of intelligence, military control, operational and accounting departments will be brought to the All-Russian General Headquarters ... If all the intrigues and efforts of individual groups are crowned with success, then, of course, we will not work in the All-Russian General Headquarters, so as not to bear moral responsibility for that the nature of the work that is going on there and will go on. We prefer then to get away from work, because then it will actually become clear how necessary the productive work of the department was, that energy and ability for creativity and creative work, which in these 2-3 months could already go over to the fulfillment of elementary military requirements. Teodori's story was fully confirmed by A.A. Svechin in "Autobiography". The general in 1935 (!) pointed out that until March 1918 he was "hostile to the October Revolution." In March, he attended a meeting at Smolny, after which he entered the service of the Soviet military department. When Svechin held positions in the Smolensk region of the Veil, he encountered "local communists who did not follow the orders of the center, which I obediently carried out. The tension of these relations made me agree to the

Trotsky's position is to accept the post of chief of the All-Russian General Staff. This position was held by me from March to November 1918. I held on all issues a diametrically opposed opinion compared to the Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis. Trotsky always supported the latter. This circumstance convinced me of the hopelessness of my work and forced me to ask to replace me with another, more suitable and accommodating person "!" ". Here a comment is needed: I.I. on the Eastern Front "the fate of the revolution was decided) in July 1918, and during this period Trotsky himself called his candidacy for the post of Commander-in-Chief "ridiculous." The fact is that the "genius" of Vatsetis was well known to Trotsky: back in: early July 1918 d at a secret meeting about the fate of the department of universal military training, he appeared in all its glory. Contrary to the general decision to leave the department in the structure of the All-Russian General Staff, the head of the department, L.E. Maryasin, I.I. Vatsetis and Gurovsky, remained with a dissenting opinion: At the same time, Maryasin and Gurovsky, defending their interests, proposed to directly subordinate the department to the People's Commissar for Military Affairs, and Joachim Vatsetis, according to the good-natured statement of Lev Maryasin, "insisted even on the formation of a special people's commissariat." Naturally, in characterizing the candidacy of the Commander-in-Chief as ridiculous, Trotsky did not prevaricate: firstly, the position speaks of the naivety of Vatsetis, and secondly, it is completely obvious. misunderstanding of the people's commissar's line - on the maximum centralization of the state (in particular, military) apparatus. Consequently, the situation described by Svechin most likely developed after the creation of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. The merger of Operod with the All-Glavshstab did not take place. Teodori associates managed to defend their

position in the Soviet military department.

In the late summer and early autumn of 1918, large numbers of officers and military officials from the central military apparatus were sent to the front. It would seem that the cup should not have bypassed the Red Headquarters. But bureaucratic logic turned out to be stronger than the orders of the military-political leadership. On September 30, by order of the Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic - one of the two components of the future Field Headquarters - 9 personnel were sent to the front (in ranks from ensign to captain, including the nephew of the Manager

Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars Vladimir Bonch-Bruевич, Lieutenant Konstantin Mikhailovich Bonch Bruевич) and "wartime" officers, 12 clerks, 2 non-commissioned officers and 1 "completely unserved" (total 33 people) `\*. But at the same time, they stipulated that according to the state it is supposed to have 211 people at the headquarters and therefore it is possible "to send 24 former officers and officials and 24 former non-commissioned officers and persons of other categories back to the Headquarters", and therefore all those called up on the basis of paragraph 1 of the order "to be returned to service in. Headquarters, since the departure of these persons may adversely affect the work of ... Headquarters """. The order was executed, but the pe  
in their places.

On October 14, the Revolutionary Military Council telegraphed L.D. Trotsky, that due to the ill state of the captain, a graduate of the accelerated 6-month courses of the General Staff in 1918, Parthenius Maigur, his inexperience and lack of knowledge, Joachim Vatsetis elected General Fyodor Kostyaev to the responsible position of the Chief of Staff of the RVSR. The latter was urgently summoned to Arzamas (place of deployment of the RVSR) to receive instructions. The RVSR discussed Kostyaev's candidacy and "entirely" agreed to his appointment, "pursuing the benefit of the cause." The Revolutionary Military Council asked Trotsky to give his consent to the appointment!" and received in response: "I pointed out Maigur's low readiness for the post of chief of the All-Russian Field Headquarters," but did not want to constrain the Commander-in-Chief in choosing the closest employees. I keep the same rule ] and now. Against Kostyaev I have no objection. His political physiognomy is unknown to me, and from this side the responsibility lies with comrades Danishevsky, Kobozev and Smirnov. ", signed in the first place by the Commander-in-Chief. I propose to eliminate. The direct responsibility for the commissars lies with Comrade [IN] Smirnov as head of the Political Department. He should be the first [to sign such telegrams]. I draw further attention to the fact that that Aralov was appointed commissar of the Field Headquarters and the question of the head of the Intelligence [Department] remained open. Sklyansky. Meanwhile, everywhere and everywhere the head and for the head of the Department of Affairs

Aralov, Pavulan, Girshfeld, and anyone who is not lazy are signing. I propose to stop this[t] masquerade, compromising the highest military institution in the Soviet Republic»'®. Thus, the selection and placement

Headquarters The rates took place in conditions when the main heads of the apparatus of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic had not yet been identified.

So, the 40-year-old Major General of the old army F.V. Kostyaev - from the nobility. A graduate of the Orenburg Neplyuevsk Cadet Corps, the Nikolaev Engineering School (1899) and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff in the first category (1905), who has been in military service since 1896 (experience - 22 years). Member of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. He voluntarily joined the Red Army in March 1918, most likely counting on the resumption of the war with Germany - the chief of staff of the Pskov region, then the head of the 2nd Petrograd division (May-June 1918), the inspector for the formation and assistant military commander of the Petrograd region ( June - September 1918), before being appointed chief of the PS - chief of staff of the Northern Front "" "!.

George Teodori started organizing the Field Headquarters on October 16, 1918\*?

The Bolsheviks knew the history of the French Revolution very well and always feared a military dictatorship. Therefore, it was decided to relocate the headquarters to Serpukhov: not very far from Moscow (less than 100 kilometers), there was a 5-kilowatt radio station in the city (transmission range up to 500 miles)". On October 20, active preparations began for the deployment of the Field Headquarters in the city of Serpukhov The first employees arrived on November 28. On the night of November, the inspections of the Supreme Military Council (now the PSh inspections) left for the new location, the rest of the departments after November 3. Commandant of the headquarters A.V. General F.V. Kostyaev and Commissar of Staff Semyon Aralov issued such a deliberately impracticable order." On November 8, the leadership of the RVSR Headquarters informed N.I. the building of the former Solodovnikov clinic on Moskovsky Street, from November 9. Communication with the headquarters in Moscow in Granatny Lane (where the Headquarters of the RVSR was originally stationed) stopped on November 9 at 24. Communication issues were prescribed in detail: telegrams were to be sent through the Central Telegraph to Serpukhov "Headquarters", packages - to Prechistenka, 37 to the post office (from there by courier sent to Serpukhov). V.L. remained the representative of the RVSR Headquarters for communications in Moscow. Plotnikov. It turns out that the central switch

on Prechistenka, 37 was connected to the Headquarters in Serpukhov by a direct wire, and the office of the Chief of Staff of the RVSR in Serpukhov was "connected by a direct telephone wire to the upper switchboard in the Kremlin (*italics mine. — S.V.*)". It was stipulated that in addition to direct telephone communication of the RVSR Headquarters in Serpukhov with Moscow, negotiations could be conducted "in the usual way through the city telephone exchange"; telegraph communication "should be carried out through the Central Moscow station, in the usual way requiring a wire to Serpukhov - Headquarters in the south". The organization of the Field Headquarters was complicated by a quarrel between Teodori and Kostyaev: the general changed the organization of the Headquarters, in the opinion of the General Staff Officer, "contrary to elementary military requirements" and the experience of the First World War and the Civil War! In principle, this complication of relations did not prevent the organization of work: unlike the other departments of the Field Headquarters of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the TsUPVOSO were stationed not in Serpukhov, but in Moscow! - 26-year-old military specialist A.V. Remer) stated in relation to the Khamovniki District Housing Commission that the latter evicted the Stavka employees from the occupied apartments and this phenomenon acquired an "epidemic character". Aralov demanded that the commission stop the illegal eviction of employees, in fact, threatening to take the case to the State Audit Office!"\*". In response, V. Yaremov, a member of the Presidium of the Khamovniki Council, and members of the district housing commission not only sent a sharp response to Aralov "", but also asked for a call "to the order of representatives of the central departments" directly to the Central Committee of the RCP (b), referring to the circumstance that the "systematic patronage" of the leadership of the Field Headquarters to the resettlement of their employees in the workers' homes "contradicts the interests" of the latter and, most importantly, "is not necessary, because Soviet employees

are not relocated to worse conditions." And in Serpukhov A.V. Roemer had a serious quarrel with the local council, which was slowing down the requisition of the premises. As a result of the haste with the deployment of the Field Headquarters and its employees, a case arose on charges of the staff of the Stavka "in the illegal requisition of furniture from the citizens of the city of Serpukhov". The investigation divided the blame between the employees of the headquarters, the housing department of the Serpukhov Council and the policemen who "helped" to make requisitions?'. The Serpukhov Council harbored in their hearts the employees of the headquarters, as they say, "some rudeness." Subsequently, the Serpukhov party organization complained about the Field Headquarters.

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zation, which could not but affect the position of the headquarters. Yes, and the inhabitants of the city were sharply negative about PSh: "Serpukhov is a small town, everyone knows how the employees of the Field Headquarters live" (A.A. Antonova, January 3, 1919). I was struck by the difference both in the housing conditions of the staff and workers, and - especially - in their food supply? The workers with whom Antonov communicated with the General Staff officers of the Field Headquarters were distrustful, if not completely "hostile". Some even stated that all the General Staff officers who receive Red Army rations in the deep rear and the same rations for family members" were "White Guard officers who would subsequently shoot the workers, and now they are fattening them up." January 3, 1919 A.A. Antonov made a reservation according to Freud: "maybe all this is gossip, but there is no doubt that the reason for this is given by the specialists themselves, who tend to consider themselves like a privileged officer class." Even in June 1919, Aralov had to defend the headquarters from the pressure of the Serpukhov Council and the Moscow Council standing behind it in the Central Committee of the party. To the credit of the commissar of the Field Headquarters, he resolutely rejected the slanders and covered up his employees, specifying with the utmost tact: "the very appeal to the RVSR and the Central Committee seems to me superfluous and little substantiated,"

According to G.I. Theodori, under his leadership in 24 days - by November 11, 1918 - the PS was formed. The data given by the General Staff officer are confirmed by sources: | On November 11, 2010, to receive the property and funds of the Field Headquarters (the former Supreme Military Council and Operod), the leadership of the Field Headquarters appointed a commission chaired by the head of the Organizational Directorate of the Field Headquarters V.V. Daller, consisting of members Reiter (Operod) and Berzin (commander of a separate security platoon). The commission undertook to complete the check by November 7 and report on the execution."\* And on November 11 (the end date of the reorganization) by order No. daily from 09:00 to 14:00 and from 16:00 to 20:00 During the break from 14:00 to 16:00, in addition to those on duty, one of the responsible employees and one clerk must remain in all departments of the headquarters.

But was the work of the headquarters immediately established? No - according to the testimony of the military commissar under the assistant chief of the PSh G.L. Preisman, he

came to work at the Field Headquarters in mid-November 1918. At that time, "the work was not carried out in full, because for the activities of the departments of the headquarters there was not enough technical equipment and necessary furniture, and there were no apartments for employees. Most of the employees walked around the city, invaded apartments and occupied them without any permission from the authorities. There was no assistance from the Serpukhov Council, the housing department had only 2 agents. There were no vacant rooms. The commandant failed to establish relations with the council. The situation was intolerable. Before S.I. Aralov and Kostyaev raised the question of taking some kind of emergency measures, but nevertheless decided to establish contact with the local authorities"?! We already know what kind of "contact" was established...

On December 25, 1918, for the registration of former officers who served in the Field Headquarters, by order of S.I. Aralov, not later than December 28, the heads of the units of the Field Headquarters undertook to deliver sheets of papers against former officers in two copies! By December 28, Aralov, of course, had not received anything: the lists of former officers of the Field Headquarters (as well as the Revolutionary Military Tribunal) were compiled and sent to the Special Department of the Cheka only on January 17, 1919. By this

At the moment, the Special Department requested more detailed information, but Aralov allowed to postpone the fulfillment of the requirement of military counterintelligence "in order to avoid confusion"???. On March 2, questionnaires for former officers — employees of the Field Headquarters — were received by the head of the Serpukhov department of the Special Department, S.M. Postnov?

What was the Field Headquarters by the end of 1918? On December 12, 1918, an order was issued for the PS, characterizing the situation that had developed over the month in this body of military command. F.V. Kostyaev stated that in a number of departments "negligence and even non-execution of ... orders" were observed (this applied not only to official orders, but also to household ones); violations of subordination became systematic; the signatures of Kostyaev and Aralov were placed under orders that were not actually issued by them. Kostyaev was especially irritated by the fact that without his knowledge a large amount of money was given out, and the expense was not made for its intended purpose (the head of the PS found out about this by accident and was not satisfied with the explanations given to him). The leaders of the Stavka warned that from now on, in each such case, an internal investigation would be carried out, and "the perpetrators would be held accountable."

Describing the work of the headquarters, Kostyaev noted that "some departments suffer from extreme bureaucracy." There were cases when telegrams were submitted "for signature, according to which everything was already done and put into practice," and the persons responsible for this were not even aware of it. The implementation of the simplest orders required from Kostyaev "special orders and efforts" (for example, it took four orders to receive newspapers at the headquarters); reports on major issues were presented, in most cases, "in a raw form without proper references", the resolutions of the chief of staff were not carried out. Kostyaev demanded that all heads of departments and officials of the PS "pay due attention to the work of the headquarters" and submit exhaustive reports "on the most important issues" "with all the information." To destroy bureaucracy, the leadership of the Headquarters sought to appoint persons responsible for the execution of orders in all departments.

Many employees, according to F.V. Kostyaev, were not able to separate issues "important for the organization of our armed forces from ... completely petty", despite the fact that almost any important military issue is extremely neglected. Unprofessionalism is not surprising: according to the general's observations, "by someone's order" "several persons who were completely unsuitable for communications" were seconded to the communications service.

General Kostyaev also noted that outsiders often hang around in some departments and departments?"". This will become one of the factors of extreme pickiness towards the military specialists of the Field Headquarters of their "political controllers" — military commissars — and a REASON FOR PURGERY.

The consequences of the order of F.V. Kostyaev dated December 12, 1918, were obviously very modest: the head of the Field Staff stated this exactly a month later. And there is nothing to be surprised that another reminder was wasted - in the order dated January 12, 1919, Kostyaev threatened not to bring the perpetrators to justice, but, at most, "with dismissal." On January 12, 1919, a new order from the head of the Headquarters followed. It said: "Recently, some irresponsible persons from among the employees of the headquarters allow themselves to criticize the work both in the Field Headquarters and on the fronts, having no grounds for this and absolutely no right. In general, I must note that excessive talkativeness has developed at the headquarters, and mainly among

poorly oriented in the environment, sometimes completely unfamiliar with it and doing little, and during classes strolling from one department to another and sometimes arranging small meetings in the departments. I consider it my duty to warn all employees of the headquarters that in the field headquarters, especially at the main command, any talkativeness, especially still combined with idleness, only harms the combat work of the headquarters, which is especially important at the present moment, when we are moving on to properly organized work on the fronts and to creation of a regular army. Explaining this talkativeness solely by a lack of understanding of the great task to which we are assigned, I warn that henceforth the persons noticed in this will be held legally accountable! In Moscow, in the Registration Department,

things were a little better: on February 2, 1919, the RU consultant Georgy Teodori asked the Commissar of Communications of the Field Headquarters Korostylev to resolve the issue of wires hanging in the RU building on Prechistenka "in a chaotic mess", because, if desired, the enemy could organize listening to the conversations of employees?!".

According to A.A. Antonov dated January 12, 1919, "taking advantage of family relations and connivance", employees walked around the departments, as a result of which "everything that is done in any of the corners of the headquarters" became known to "everyone". And this is contrary to the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of July 17, 1918 "On the prohibition of visiting government institutions by unauthorized persons", adopted, by the way, on the basis of a written report by Leon Trotsky ?!. To top it all off, the political commissars were also far from the "lamb": it happened that they went on dates with the staff members (however, they didn't seem to follow their lead). Of the communists, without prior training, 6-7 people could carry out agitation work. In addition, the Communists of the Field Headquarters did not enjoy authority among the Serpukhov workers, who, due to the half-starvation existence and the peculiarities of the location of the PS in the city, were negatively disposed not only to the headquarters, but also to the Soviet government as a whole. Sent in early January by Lenin to the Field Headquarters to analyze the situation, Antonov reported that "among the employees ... there must be spies" and that the commissars cannot fight them: they are obliged to take care, first of all, not about clearing the Headquarters "from suspicious persons", but about "not to complicate relations with the General Staff." This conclusion Antonov

conducted with a ritual reservation about the need to use military specialists and create a normal working environment for them, in which officers and military officials would not have to break away from "military affairs with trifles, constant nit-picking, etc."?"

According to A.A. Antonov (report dated January 3, 1919), at the Field Headquarters, the decree prohibiting the joint service of relatives was often bypassed - after the military specialist, "his wife, sisters, brothers, daughters, sons, etc." . Local "Soviet bureaucrats" "often went to work themselves in order to 'settle down' and... 'settle down' their relatives." Paradoxically, but highly appreciating the importance of the decree on relatives in relation to specialists, Antonov said: taking into account the small number of communists, "if a real party worker has a capable relative - also a communist, then why not work together" .

For a researcher who carefully worked with the documents of V.I. Lenin and his secretariat (RGASPI, f. 2 and 5, respectively), the love of the head of the Soviet government to send reports to the archive marked "Top Secret" is not a secret. Lenin put such marks so that, if necessary, it was possible to quickly obtain the necessary document. The situation with documents on which Lenin did not leave any marks is more complicated: it is possible that the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars was not interested in the content, but perhaps, on the contrary, he was extremely interested. Judging by the resolution, the report of A.A. Lenin left Antonov for his personal use in order to have compromising evidence both on the Field Headquarters itself and on the head of the military department as a whole, Lev Trotsky. What kind of chairman of the RVSR if he missed (or covers up?) espionage in his own fiefdom?

The already strained relations of F.V. Kostyaeva and other military specialists with military commissars should have deteriorated sharply at the beginning of 1919: a telegram from L.D. Trotsky, who authorized Kostyaev to issue operational orders virtually without control". A.A. Antonov, based on the number of cases that the military commissars had to control, believed that "they hardly have time to follow the internal life of the headquarters" .

According to A.A. Antonov, the employees of the Field Headquarters, at best, felt themselves "out of politics", which had the effect of treating the ruling party as a force that could not be reckoned with??  
3.



At the same time, the military commissars treated "staff specialists with great apprehension" and considered the Field Headquarters "a White Guard nest."

Fortunately for the commissars, the General Staff officers of 1918 did not always act in solidarity: like all people, everyone had their own preferences and differences of opinion on important organizational issues. For example, V.P., an aristocrat by birth, served as a typist. Troitskaya, who, according to A.A. Antonov, on the suspicion of both political staff of the headquarters and "counterintelligence" (in January 1919, military counterintelligence was to be understood as the military control department of the Registration Directorate of the PSh RVSR - OVK RU, headed by the Bolshevik V.Kh. Steingardt). Evidence of Troitskaya's espionage was evident: she, who served in one of the inspection departments, "was found more than once in the operational department, where she examined secret maps and telegrams." According to the observations of the staff commissars, Troitskaya was "in great friendship with the General Staff" (in particular, I.D. Modenov, the husband of her friend, also an employee of the PS), but at the same time, General Staff Officer G.I. did not trust her. Teodori, whose formal reason for arrest was the slander of this very "typist blackmailer"? Thus, in the corps of the General Staff officers of 1917, individual members of the issue adjoined the opinion of the commissars on a number of issues. Soon after the report by A.A. Antonov, interesting details of Troitskaya's activities were revealed: "On January 15 ... at 9 o'clock in the evening, the clerk of the Office of the Inspector of Engineers, V.P. Troitskaya - in order to get her things out of the locked department, she asked the telephone operator Potapov to saw through the ring of the padlock with which the doors of the said department were locked. The telephonist Potapov complied with this request, and thus, after breaking the ring, the indicated employees of the Field Headquarters entered the control room, took Troitskaya's belongings, and then somehow hung the lock back - and the control, which contains secret files, plans and cards, remained virtually unlocked for some time. The order on the PS dated January 17, 1919 on this occasion says: "Such exceptional frivolity, childish misunderstanding of one's actions and their consequences are completely unacceptable and unforgivable for employees of such a high institution as the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Only an accidental integrity of the secret affairs of management, revealed

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after the interrogation, it makes it possible to confine ourselves to the dismissal of Troitskaya and Potapov from service from the Field Headquarters. If such acts are repeated, the perpetrators will be brought to justice in addition to dismissal." It follows from the correction in the text of the order that initially it was supposed to be limited to Troitskaya and Potapov by "announcing a reprimand", but the head of the Field Staff, Kostyaev, to his credit, decided to act tougher?? But the matter did not end there: on January 20 or 21, 1919, apparently, there was a reaction to the report of A.A. Antonov - they arrested the clerks V.P. Troitskaya and N.A. Golubovich. The arrest provoked the fear of a number of employees for their "personal integrity", some employees of the headquarters received "anonymous letters of a clearly provocative nature." On January 23, with a resolution to "immediately announce", Kostyaev and Aralov signed an order for Field Headquarters No. to be dismissed from service and brought before the court of the Revolutionary Tribunal"?\*.

Most likely, not without the participation of V.I. Lenin to the joint opinion of the military commissars of the PS, the leadership of the OVK of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the general staff officer G.I. Teodori was heeded, and Troitskaya was eventually shot." In fact, in January 1919, the first serious intervention of the highest Bolshevik leader in the petty organizational affairs of the PS took place. Council of Labor and Defense, hereinafter STO) immediately began to delve into the analysis of the cases of the arrested General Staff officers: on December 3, the commission of the STO, consisting of V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin and L. B. Krasin, analyzed the work of the Cheka, in particular, with respect to the arrested general staff officers, to the control and revision department of the Cheka, the commission decided to co-opt two party representatives of the special investigation and expedite the examination of the cases of the arrested general staff officers?

materials of the investigation on charges of counter-revolutionary activities of employees of the apparatus of the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front Vatsetis of General Staff L.I., arrested in the middle of the year by the Petrograd Cheka. Savchenko-Matsenko and B.P. Polyakova. IN AND. Lenin, having heeded the petition of I.I. Vatsetis on behalf of the above persons, on December 29 requested information about the charges from PetroChK, presenting

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lenny to the specified persons. The intervention had results - on January 2, 1919, the head of the Special Department, M.S. Kedrov demanded from PetroChK the immediate release of Savchenko Matsenko and Polyakov in the absence of serious charges against them and their transfer to the disposal of the RVSR?\*. On January 8, the STO "offered" the Cheka to report within 3 days what charges were brought against 8 General Staff officers and why those who were not brought against them are still under arrest." The activities of the Defense Council and its commissions had a positive impact on analysis of the cases of arrested officers of the highest operational qualification, although, as researcher A.V. Ganin established, PetroChK was in no hurry to release the General Staff officers." A.V. Ganin did not take into account that in December the Special Department existed only in the decision of the The Central Committee of the RCP(b), its apparatus was formed only in February 1919, and therefore the military control department of the Registration Department of the Field Headquarters had to carry out the decision of the Defense Council. Petrograd Cheka about the decision of the Council of Defense. Moreover, a graduate of six-month courses of the General Staff, Georgy Teodori, who was assigned to the corps, was also partly to blame for the delay. on the investigation of V.P. Pavulan. On January 30, Sklyansky ordered Aralov to report no later than January 31 on the results of sending his representative "to participate in the investigation into the arrest of the General Staff in Petrograd." On January 31, Aralov sent a "very urgent" request to V.P. Pavulan, in which he asked "immediately give an answer for the report of comrade. Sklyansky, what are the results of the participation of the representative sent by you to the investigation in the case of the arrest of persons of the General Staff in Petrograd. On the same day, Pavulan replied: "Urgent current work at the Registration Office has deprived me of the physical ability to fulfill your order. Today I will go on a business trip and will be in Petrograd, after which I will make a detailed report to you. Aralov's answer to Sklyansky is impressive: Pavulan "due to the urgency of the current work on the Registration Department, he was forced to delay his departure to Petrograd." On February 8, Teodori asked Aralov to release V.P. Pavulan from a trip to Petrograd "on the matter of releasing the General Staff officers": they supposedly "have too much work here anyway." Aralov imposed a resolution: "To Pavulan. I ask you to agree on this matter with Sklyansky? Here PetroChK kept the General Staff officers in custody

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nii: no one hurried her with the investigation ... Lenin's task was failed by the Registration Department of the Field Headquarters of the RVSR. And the researcher A.V. Ganin doubted the historiography of the unknown question.

On January 17, 1919, the Moscow Provincial Executive Committee sent Lenin a protest against: the introduction of martial law in Serpukhov, attaching to it an extract from the report of the Prokopovich Council instructor on the relationship between the Serpukhov Executive Committee "and the Revolutionary Military Council." The text of the message to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars: "We decided to protest against pressure, in addition to the Gubernia Executive Committee, on assistance to the local Soviet authorities by the Revolutionary Military Council. Demand the lifting of martial law." Ephraim Sklyansky, having received a copy of the document, imposed a resolution: "Personally. Secret. Into Comrade Aralov's own hands. I propose to submit clarifications and a conclusion within 3 days. Aralov's explanations were not revealed by us, but we found his report to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on the relationship of the Field Headquarters of the RVSR with the Serpukhov Soviet of June 11, in which he resolutely rejected the accusations put forward by the Council, and above all in the defense of the headquarters of the bourgeoisie: "if and there are clinging, which is difficult to avoid, then I have taken measures to remove them; yet newcomers are subject to strict control""",

The state of emergency at the Field Headquarters continued: on February 5, its leadership reprimanded the assistant head of the general department, V.S. Ponichev, who on February 1, being on duty, "having received

the order to send a secret telegram over a direct wire, handed it over to the Central Moscow Telegraph, where its further progress through the hands of irresponsible persons was delayed "by the order of F.V. Kostyaev. Again, the leadership of the PS warned that the repetition of "such an incident will lead to the dismissal ... of the person responsible for such an act." As a conclusion, the leadership of the PSh ordered "from now on" to appoint General Staff officers A.V. Afanasiev, V.E. Volkova, V.K. Tokarevsky, M.N. Zemtsova, A.V. Panova, S.I. Danilova, F.L. Grigorieva, I.D. Modenova, B.I. Kuznetsova, T.S. Kosacha, A.N. Vinogradova, V.V. Trofimova (A.G. Kuzmin crossed out in the original); N.S. became assistants on duty. Bartenev, E.E. Menshov, N.N. Brandt, A.A. Kossovich, V.S. Ponichev, V.D. Stolyarov, S.S. Krasnov, V.A. Semenov, P.K. Udalov, V.Kh. Kirilchuk, F.D. Voronov-Dementiev and G.M. Baryshnikov (crossed out by A.I. Wittenhoven). The duty officers were supposed to change at the end of the morning report of F.V. Kostyaev "of the entire operative

new situation (at 11 o'clock) "?". Lists of duty officers compiled by A.G. Kavtaradze allow us to establish which of the indicated persons belonged to the graduates of accelerated courses of the General Staff - Vinogradov, Kosach, Modenov, Trofimov (4 out of 12-33, 3 90). It is noteworthy that in the fall of 1918 the latter was under investigation by the Petrograd Cheka. On November 28, the deputy chairman of the Petrograd provincial Cheka, a Bolshevik with great experience in the party, V.N. Yakovleva telegraphed S.I. Aralov (copied to K.Kh. Danishevsky): "On the basis of unverified information, Trofimov Vladimir Vladimirovich of the General Staff is suspected of having relations [with] foreign counterintelligence. Arrested [in] the apartment of Hoven, probably an agent of the German counterintelligence. If, on the basis of these data, there are no obstacles [to] his further service, telegraph." On telegraph tape K.Kh. Danishevsky imposed a resolution: send Trofimov to "Serpukhov, [at] the disposal of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic", those. to the field headquarters. S.I. Aralov also put his autograph under the resolution." The question of the legitimacy of PetroChK's actions in this context is questionable: on the one hand, there were grounds for Trofimov's suspicion; on the other hand, Aralov and Danishevsky still sent the General Staff officer to Headquarters, despite that the investigation into his case was not closed.

In 1919, Kostyaev again had to demand discipline from his employees in orders for the Field Headquarters. On February 6, he ordered to reduce the number of business trips of his employees to Moscow, placing responsibility on the heads of departments and inspectors; upon new appointments of employees up to and including the heads of the department, coordinate all candidates with him personally, the rest - after finding out the professional suitability of the candidate with the consent of the relevant commissioner and the future head. On February 11, an order was issued announcing the results of an internal investigation into the transmission of a secret operational telegram on February 5 through the Central Telegraph instead of a direct wire (moreover, Kostyaev received information about the transmission personally from L.D. Trotsky - probably with the corresponding "crowd"). According to the results | man fired, three escaped with reprimands?. On February 22, Kostyaev stated cases of employees being late from vacations, pointing out: "not all employees of the headquarters ... have become imbued with a serious attitude to official duty and do not understand that during their absence the work they carry out in their

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positions, burdensomely falls on their comrades-colleagues". In the future, the perpetrators (warned Kostyaev) "will be held strictly accountable, inclusive, up to and including removal from office"? February 22 (two months after the issuance of order No. 78) F.V. Kostyaev again noted instances when employees of the Field Headquarters, who were not authorized to do so, gave "orders on behalf of the chief and commissar of the Field Headquarters." Those who received orders were obliged to find out from the persons transmitting such orders the surname and position.

During the First World War, according to the memoirs of the military investigator RR. von Raupach, "the entire bourgeoisie had to be sent to the front by force, and there were no means to combat their desertion. She served as watchmen and clerks, got a job in various commissions and organizations "working for defense" and indulged in all sorts of tricks, just to get rid of the tricks and dangers of the front, PSH inherited the "glorious traditions" of the imperial

living organism: according to the observations of A.A. Antonov, in it the positions of registrars and clerks were occupied by officers (captains, lieutenants), hiding in the clerical places from being sent to the front (in total, at the beginning of 1919, more than a thousand people served at the headquarters, of which a little more than 20 - about 5% - were members of the Bolshevik Party). Moreover, the majority of communists completely concentrated on technical work; 6-7 intellectuals "very often" were sent on business trips, which did not contribute to the organization of "regular party work". January 12, 1919 A.A. Antonov suggested a way out of this situation: to leave the head of the PS with the right to appoint only specialists, and to transfer the right to appoint technical positions to the commissar. This will make the composition of the Stavka staff less homogeneous and reduce the possibility of treason: a handful of 50 military specialists "will have no one to rely on, because the cowardly philistine mass will not go on an adventure." V.I. Lenin left unanswered, but Antonov's report was not sent, as he usually did, marked "top secret" to the archive, but he carefully kept it and pulled it out into the light of day only at the beginning of July 1919 for inclusion in the "investigation of Headquarters" (over "the conspirators from the Field Headquarters"). The very fact of sending Antonov to headquarters shows that Lenin took steps to destroy the possibility of overthrowing his power and establishing a military dictatorship.

The facts in the Troitskaya case testify that espionage did take place in the Field Headquarters, but it is not clear from them how rooted it was and how dangerous it was for the Bolshevik authorities. If a leak of information is one thing, if the possibility of a military coup is quite another ... In principle, it does not look like the second, however, at the beginning of 1919, General F.V. Kostyaev refused to fire a staff member who had actually been convicted of espionage, "what were the party workers supposed to think? And what should V.I. Lenin think when on April 17 or 18, 1919 he received a repeated "petition" of the General Staff officers for release. On March 12, 1919, one of Lenin's old comrades-in-arms, M.S. Kedrov, ordered the arrest of Teodori on charges of espionage, based on the testimony of Troitskaya, who had obviously already been shot by that time, and interrogated the General Staff officer 6 times" @. Even in the March telegram of fellow student Teodori Partheny Maigur (as A.A. Zdanovich established), "a certain threat of group actions ... of the General Staff" was read - the graduation of the Academy in 1917. And on April 1, Chekists intercepted a telegram from the Field Headquarters to Teodori's classmates to the fronts with a proposal "to sign a collective petition for Teodori, to consider this as a collective action in defense of the authority of responsible workers." The entire issue twice (March 24 and April 17, 1919) appealed directly to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (!) Vladimir Lenin with a request to appoint an investigation into the case of their leader, and a repeated petition, under the guise of readiness to expel Teodori from the If the accusation was confirmed, it actually contained a warning: a refusal could complicate an already difficult relationship with the military commissars. In fact, 36 people who occupied important posts in the Field Headquarters deliberately went, from the point of view of statutory relations, to their most serious violation. They committed a gross violation of subordination - they filed an application "over the heads" of 3 (!) immediate superiors (Kostyaev, Vatsetis, Trotsky); moreover, their statement was of a collective nature, which is strictly forbidden in the armed forces from the time of Peter the Great to the present day?'. Moreover, they submitted the "collective" directly to Lenin, because they perfectly understood that this would not go further than Kostyaev, and the general himself would probably put them on trial for her. In principle, such a "petition" can be regarded as an ultimatum. It was an all-in game. And such people

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like Lenin, they sometimes put revenge on the back burner, but they never forgot such "petitions."

Vatsetis added fuel to the fire by personally standing up on April 18 for the illegally arrested Teodori, whose "charge" (Vatsetis bluntly stated with reference to Kedrov's deputy A.V. Eiduk) was created on the orders of M.S. Kedrov, and V.V. Khrulev, who was sentenced to 5 years in prison, while "guilty crimes got off with only a reprimand"???. The Commander-in-Chief reported to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars about the shortage in the headquarters of persons with "military scientific training"; full-time

The shortage of General Staff officers was, according to Vatsetis, 70% on average and 82% (!) At the front. In addition, the Bolshevik leadership, according to the Commander-in-Chief, did not always pay "due attention" to the selection and placement of military commissars, many of whom turned control into "annoying pestering"?? All commissars of the Field Headquarters were accused by Vatsetis of inclination to denounce some general staff officer as counter-revolutionary. Vatsetis in his report to Lenin appears in all its glory: as a person, on the one hand, crystal-clearly honest, decent, not betraying people devoted to him, on the other hand, not inclined to observe subordination. Again, the Commander-in-Chief was obliged either to report the question to Trotsky personally and wait for his letter to Lenin, or, in extreme cases, to raise the question at a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and then, on behalf of this body, send a report to the Defense Council, counting on its chairman.

Joachim Vatsetis can be understood. In 1919, he noted "the completely undeserved distrust with which they still treat those former officers of the General Staff who are in the ranks of the Soviet (Red. — S.V.) Army. This lack of confidence affects every step and creates an extremely difficult environment for work. Meanwhile, not all commissars are distinguished by the observance of due tact; Even at the Field Headquarters, there was a case recently that while I myself was sitting ... in the office of the Chief of the Field Headquarters, the Senior Commissar of the Field Headquarters allowed, without saying anything to me and the Head of Headquarters, representatives of the Cheka and in the most rude form, in the headquarters, during work, to arrest a former officer of the General Staff. Such tactlessness produced such a strong disruption in the mood of everyone that no work could be continued ... it later turned out that this former officer of the General Staff was arrested for

but innocent. Moreover, there were clear signs of mockery of the officer of the General Staff, since it turned out that he was only supposed to be a witness in the case of another person and in this role he could safely be summoned to the Cheka in Moscow to testify in an ordinary manner, however, for some reason, the chairman of the Special Department (head of the NGO VChK M.S. Kedrov. - S.V.) ordered that this officer of the General Staff be arrested, imprisoned and interrogated in prison as a witness." Vatsetis explained several cases of the transfer of the General Staff officers to the Whites by the oppression of their commissars: each officer of the General Staff "is in the position of some kind of Valaam donkey, who was beaten solely through the fault of who she carried."

Not earlier than May 14, 1919, one of the leaders of the RCP (b) G.E. complained about the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and its Field Headquarters. Zinoviev, who unsubscribed to V.I. Lenin's response to accusations from the Defense Council of the appointment of an illegal evacuation of Petrograd. In May 1919, the issue of reshuffles in the top military leadership was decided - so far with the active participation of Trotsky. During this period, his (already strained) relations with I.I. Vatsetis. On May 9, the Commander-in-Chief sent a top-secret report "into his own hands" to Lenin, in which he proposed to put the Central Directorate for Supplying the Army and the All-Russian General Staff under the control of the High Command, and most importantly, "to establish periodic meetings of the Soviet defense on matters of principle with my obligatory participation. At the same time, Vatsetis wrote: "Although I have been granted the right to enter [b] with a report to the Defense Council, I have never received a notification with an invitation to be present in the Defense Council when sometimes deciding issues of capital importance for the military department. »?%. In fact, the Commander-in-Chief wanted a representation in the SRT parallel to the chairman of the RVSR. Trotsky's response received by V.I. Lenin: "The TsUS and the All-Glavshstab work only on the instructions of the Revvoens [et]. All decisions are made with the direct participation of Vatsetis. Changes in outfits are always made with his knowledge, but the Commander-in-Chief is inclined to interfere in the editing of newspapers, the internal work of the TsUS and Vseroglavsh[taba], to influence appointments, etc. Meanwhile, he is already too distracted from operational work, which suffers. Questions are submitted to the Defense Council by the military specialist <only> always in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief. No practical differences

I do not remember. The task is to force Vatsetis to move from the rear "game" to purely operational work."

By the summer of 1919, its commissars were talking about the need to purge the PSH. So, in early July, the Commissioner of the Central Directorate of Military Communications (TsUPVOSO) V.V. Fomin wrote to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) E.M. Sklyansky: "Like everywhere in the units of the army, specialists - masters of military affairs in military communications - are split by the revolution into 3 unequal forces. The best, not rich in numbers", works with the revolution for conscience. Works despite hunger, impoverishment, contrast with the past. They, these people, bringing their knowledge to the altar of the liberation of mankind, cannot but be surrounded by love and respect. There are few of these in the apparatus of military communications. But they are.

The second group (the most numerous) are those bearing the "Bolshevik oppression" due to severe material necessity. These people hate the revolution and everyone like it. Disfigured by ... capital, they are cowardly, as on a barometer, fluctuations in political bad weather are noticeable on them; they are passively hostile and (sometimes) cowardly, cautiously, against the calculations of the day, out of class hatred. They are valuable only for their experience, knowledge[s], organizational[s] and skills. They do not create new forms, they carry only traditions with them; they are formally related to work; they are indifferent to its final result. But still they are necessary. There is no one to replace them. And to learn from the class... they still have something.

Third layer. Most are strong, brave, hostile. Cunning. Spies. They work on behalf of enemies that have not yet been defeated. Collect information. Transmit. With the removal of strategic reserves on the fronts and the need to wage war by transferring troops along the so-called internal communication lines? lines - espionage in the organs of military communications has become of paramount importance.

The attitude towards the first two groups on the part of the procurators of the revolution—military commissars—is clear from the very nature of these groups... Spies and traitors stand apart. In the process of current work in the institution, there is no way to catch them, to convict them. Based on the mass of small observations, one can only localize suspicions on a certain group of people. Further, the method of unceremonious [joining] is already necessary; establishing, if possible, all connections and acquaintances, then arrests, then evidence, then merciless reprisals.

There are no military commissars at the disposal of the military commissars to implement this system of combating treason. It is necessary to involve detective agencies, in this case, the Special Department of the Cheka »?°°.

In institutions subordinated to the TsUPVOSE the situation is even more difficult. On March 10, 1919, the People's Commissariat of Railways accused the military department of the "disgracefully" evacuation of Ufa. During the investigation, the interdepartmental commission established that the evacuation "occurred really spontaneously under the influence of the current difficult combat situation" and the "slow" reaction of the head of the UVOSO of the Eastern Front, V.A. Zhygmunt. The latter "in view of the temporary formation of the Special Southern Group of the Eastern Front, whose communication and transportation routes were based on the Samara-Syzran sections, when the situation required especially vigilant leadership ... not only did not consider it necessary to decide the responsible matter of transportation at certain framework by appointing one responsible person or accurately delimiting the rights and obligations of four equivalent FOR and one 3, but on purely business issues that required urgent resolution, or slowed down answers to the extreme or did not give them at all, while at the same time restricting the initiative of an active , who happened to be in Samara, FOR the 4th army of the party comrade [comrade] Goreskul, making unreasonable remarks and reprimands to the latter and often refusing personal negotiations on the apparatus to resolve urgent issues of transportation "?".

According to the results of F.V. Kostyaev appointed for a "comprehensive examination" of the work of the UVOSO of the Eastern Front and, in particular, the head of the department V.A. Zhygmunt, a special commission of specialists from the 4th department of the TsUPVOSO, chaired by the General Staff, Major General V.A. Afanasiev, a participant in the First World War, who in 1917 became the head of the Moscow District Committee of the Ministry of Railways for Transportation, who voluntarily joined the Red Army (in March-April 1918 - acting head of the Northern Front, April-September - the Moscow District means of communication, in September-October 1918 he was for

assignments under the head of the VoSO). During the investigation, it was revealed that the party worker did much more than the future "counter-revolutionaries" of the Field Headquarters to destroy the apparatus entrusted to him. On May 6, Kostyaev reported to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic: Afanasiev's commission, "taking into account the peculiarities of official and political

provisions of V.A. Zhygmunt ... was forced to seek appropriate literary forms in the report in order to soften the harsh reality of the unsatisfactory work of this department in the main features and the true role of the chief ... both in setting the case in the department, and in general in organizing the military communications of the front. It turned out that the work of the departments of the UPVOSO, which was "the least [mostly] led" by Zygmunt, was the best organized. Zygmunt was accused of "completely unacceptable and harmful under modern conditions" activity and "criminal attitude to the orders of the Central government."

Zhygmunt's professional discrepancy was confirmed by: the absence of his instructions to the departments on the conduct of work, both in orders and verbally; misunderstanding of the significance of military secrets and removal, under the pretext of observing it, of the closest assistants from coordinating the work of departments "with the general tasks of command"; introducing disorder into income and expenditure correspondence "by violating one's own orders given in the order": "failure to understand the inadmissibility ... of such measures as the reorganization of railway food points into stages"; ignorance of the rules of conducting a military economy and reporting; misunderstanding of the organization of the service of military roads, the significance of the Inspectorate of Railways under the Chief of Military Communications of the Republic, etc.

Signs of criminal acts V.A. Zhygmunt: "1) Introducing, under the guise of political considerations, such a complete disorganization into the work of 3 and the GC (deliberately frequent, quick moving them from one point to another, appointing persons, not only unprepared, to the most responsible places of the GC, but also ... semi-literate, the lack of verification of Departments 3 and the GC, the incorrect distribution of assistants 3 and the GC, the admission of women to the position of clerks at the GC, etc.), that the apparatus can be considered almost destroyed by this; 2) The absence of any supervision over the work on the head sections of the railway; 3) The absence of any developed transportation plan with the full possibility of its preparation, tk. V.A. Zhygmunt, judging by his words, is always timely aware of the decisions of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front; 4) Lack of any inspections and supervision of the service at the stages in the Departments of H and W, due to which there are promiscuity of departments, inactivity, chaos in office work and careless attitude

to the service ... the disorganization of the control service for the movement of troops on the railway. was noticed by the pre-revolutionary military council Trotsky, who noted this phenomenon in a special dispatch, demanding the appointment of an audit of the UPVOSO Vost.

Such a negative activity of V.A. Zhygmunt. Obviously, it could not help but reflect on the unfavorable outcome of the evacuation of the most important points of the Eastern Front, and in the future could lead to even more serious consequences.

Finally, a deliberate violation of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of July 27, 1918 on the inadmissibility of the joint service of relatives is completely criminal and brings a dangerous temptation to the soul of subordinates and disorder to the work of management. In direct violation of this resolution, ZF Zhygmunt on November 1, 1918 appointed his brother A.A. Zhygmunt to the exclusively responsible position of the head of the 3rd department (transportation) of the military operational department, and his wife E.M. Zygmunt arranged for March 3, 1919, a journalist of the Water and Railway Inspectorate of the same department. In addition, there are 8 more employees in the ZSE Department who have their relatives in the same department. With the closest assistance... A.A. Zygmunt, a complete disorganization was introduced into the most serious branch of the work of the Department of Military Communications - military transportation and the service of Zarm, 3 and ZK. Due to the family relations of the brothers V.A. and A.A. Zygmunt, their roles in administration were sometimes confused and it is difficult to determine exactly how the work of the head of the Military Communications Directorate and the head of the 3rd department was divided between them. In direct violation of the order

management of A.A. Zygmunt took incoming mail up to and including secret correspondence, disposed of it, distributing it among departments and thereby bringing disorder into the work of the 1st department. One secret paper taken by him was not found in the office work.

By the time the inspection commission arrived, A.A. Zygmunt was dismissed on leave by his brother... contrary to the current orders on holidays, allegedly to the party congress of the Polesky Railways." Despite the instructions of V.A. Afanaseva V.A. Zhygmunt about the need to at least postpone his brother's departure "for a couple of days" in order to receive some explanations from him by the commission, A.A. Zhygmunt left even before the scheduled date, which V.A. Zygmunt explained by "party considerations and the uselessness of his presence for the report of the commission,

all explanations of which can be given by V.A. Zhygmunt. "The indicated fact," concluded F.V. Kostyaev - speaks for itself ... ". The Chief of the Field Headquarters requested permission to approve the decision of the Chief of the VOSO of the Republic on the removal of V.A. Zygmunt from his post and bringing him to the court of the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Republic. The proposal to betray V.A. Zhygmunt, the court was dismissed "with replacement by expulsion from office."

The corruption of communist Zygmunt (albeit in an exaggerated form) repeated what was happening in the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

How much has changed in the "Red Headquarters" after the "liquidation" of the "conspiracy" in the Field Headquarters? As before, the PSH was oversaturated with frank ballast: the head of the general department of its Operational Directorate, General Staff Officer I.D. Modenov reported to the head of the department on August 18, 1919: "Despite the large number of clerks ... even after the vacancy of the operational department, the duty of the clerks falls in 12-14 days, and the duty falls mainly on the rest of the departments of the Opera- management, despite the fact that the Operational Department conducts evening classes from 21 to 23 hours. As far as has been noticed over the past 2-3 weeks, the clerks of the General Chancellery are not on duty at all. The order of duty clerks is not announced, and the appointment is made by a message on the telephone of some arbitrary queue, so it is not possible to check the order. Modenov asked for the inclusion in the outfit of "all clerks of the headquarters (except for the operational department) and the announcement of the duty order in advance for any period (1-2 weeks)." Despite the attitude of the head of the Operational Directorate B.M. Shaposhnikov to the head of the Administrative and Accounting Department V.V. Daller with a request to settle the issue?®. And Daller drew up the appropriate order... November 8" (at that time 91 clerks served at the headquarters, of which two were temporarily released "due to eye disease", three were actually in other areas of work). As they say, "but and now there ": immediately went correspondence about exceptions? ®, One of the reports to Daller is just a curiosity: "Which of the clerks of the headquarters corresponds to his appointment - I don't know, - said the head of the Office of the PS S.S. Kharitonov, - since they were accepted at service outside of the Office.

there were clerks who did not know how to write on typewriters - this is the fault of those bosses who hired them. Complaints are now being received that I indiscriminately dress up the clerks on duty and allow incorrect and even offensive expressions, as the assistant head of the intelligence department [A.V.] Wittenhoven allowed himself. Nobody told me that Grizinskaya couldn't type on a typewriter, but there was only a note from the head of the Operations Department [B.M.] Shaposhnikov asking him to release Grizinskaya from duty, since she was temporarily his secretary, so the last part of Wittenhoven's report is his fantasy and complete fiction. I ask you to protect me from this kind of libels in official documents in the future.

After the purge, the cadres of the Field Headquarters became even more variegated (which is quite logical - the arrests were directed against the "caste system"): the Communists could not turn the Stavka into a class-friendly organ - this required party workers with higher military qualifications, but there were none. The military specialists who continued to work at the headquarters, as elsewhere, were different people - honest and corrupt, monarchists and sincerely



sympathizers of the Soviet government... For illustration, let us cite the report of the military commissar of the Administrative and Accounting Department of the PS to the assistant commissar of the PS of the RVSR K.Kh. Danishevsky?" with a description of the personnel of the department for the period from | September to | December 1919 - already after the events associated with the so-called "conspiracy in the field headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic". Why the report was not sent to Sergei Gusev, it is understandable : On July 16, assistant military commissar of the Stavka K.Kh.

Based on the report of military experts, Headquarters can be conditionally divided into 7 (!) Types:

Type 1: Vinogradov, head of the accounting and organizational department, worked "insofar as he was forced by circumstances; on the political side, "an open and ardent counter-revolutionary, a fanatical adherent of the old system and a typhoid old tsarist cadre officer. In the department, sometimes not even embarrassed by the presence of the commissar, he openly conducts malicious agitation against the Soviet government and the Communist Party, ridicules the revolutionary movement, wake

praises the old order, and so on. He does not hide his sympathy for our enemies; he gets along with the commissar like a cat with a dog. All answers are given by gnashing of teeth.

2nd type: Head of department - V.V. Daller worked "like a running machine without interruption", thanks to "mental abilities, good military training (of the General Staff)" and experience in the apparatus of the Supreme Military Council and PS "from the very beginning of their existence". At the same time, Daller did not show "the slightest bit of personal initiative in his work", balancing "so that, on the one hand, he could not be faulted for sabotage, opposition or hostility, and on the other, accused of sympathizing with the Bolsheviks. Daller was accused of corruption. On the political side, he remained "an ideologically convinced reactionary tsarist officer", whom "only the grave will correct"; "he looks at the revolution, socialism, Soviet power and the Communist Party as something absurd, barbaric, illegal, immoral and simply robbery, not counting "civil rights" in the civilized world for them, but with whom, with concealed malice, must be put up with as a victorious force. Daller, in the words of the commissar, tried "with all his might" to "get around and remove the commissar and paralyze his influence in the work"; "to support the influence and power of the military experts and is extremely concerned about 0[6] their interests, "to bring "their own" employees to the headquarters - officer wives, bourgeois sons, servile townsfolk, etc."

3rd type: Head of the general department Makarov: "He outlived his mind, health, and morality in a dissolute officer life ... (similar phenomena were observed in the headquarters of the White armies. - S.V.). In relation to the Soviet power, he tries to cling to himself and shows lackey devotion. He does not show his real feelings, but there is no doubt that he sincerely does not sympathize with the Soviet regime.

Type 4: Acting assistant to the head of department N.G. Semyonov, on the contrary, was characterized as a "capable and diligent worker", although inferior to Daller in terms of training and experience, but proactive, striving to "do everything as best as possible", honest and loyal to the Soviet government.

5th type: Head of the inspection department M.I. Plyuss is "one of those old generals who, working more or less

a long time in Soviet power, trying to forget the good old days. He tries to do his own thing and not get involved in politics. He doesn't even read newspapers, so as not to "get confused; even if there were Bolsheviks, there would be only order"; "God forbid that there were neither red nor white, that there would be some one color." The relations between him and the commissar are the best, downright enviable."

6th type: Colonel Kruglikov, assistant to the head of the accounting and organizational department, too loyal to the Soviet government (although, in the words of the commissar, "sympathetic to the Soviet government and communism"): he knocked the commissar on military specialists.

The 7th type is conditionally made up of: assistants to the head of the general department, Zakharov and Pashkevich, "stupid old men who are just freeloaders."

Employees of "average size" (assistant heads of departments, etc.), the commissioner of administration reported, "everyone is almost the same, in everything they are 'equal to the elders': they do not openly show their political physiognomy, because they, as 'listeners', get silence. Like former junior officers? from a bourgeois environment, they are hostile to the Soviet power, but not as violent as the old people.

In July 1919, intelligence information about the work of the departments of the central military apparatus and the Field Headquarters was collected by the Special Department under the MChK. About the PS Communications Service in a summary of July 14: "The mood is average. The food is good. The work is going well. The political physiognomy of the part is difficult to define." July 19 about TsUPVOSO: in the department "there is a party cell - 58 communists and 25 sympathizers; discipline is weak,

Even after the purge, PSH sacredly kept the traditions of tsarist Russia: as follows from the report to Danishevsky, junior employees remained "with a few exceptions... relatives and acquaintances of 'big' and 'medium' specialists... following in the tail of their superiors" and those who work "only for the sake of material comforts" in order to survive "this difficult time" ("Well, how not to please your dear little man!"). It is worth noting that the entire Soviet bureaucratic apparatus sinned with nepotism, even the head of which, V.I. Did Lenin actively accommodate his relatives and acquaintances?" Fortunately for the Reds, White's apparatus was even worse. So, in the All-Russian Union of Socialist Republics, the Special Meeting and the heads of departments in 1919, as established by the researcher S.V. Karpenko, "sought to build a management apparatus with the expectation of the All-Russian

sky scale. The armies, despite individual failures, moved forward, and the main thing in the work of the departments was the construction, ahead of events, of an apparatus capable of immediately starting to rule the country after the capture of Moscow. The result is clear: a rapid swelling even of the civil apparatus?"

Both middle and junior employees of the Field Staff only worked certain hours. In August 1919, an official investigation was conducted by the inspection department of the Administrative Accounting Department of the manufacture of false documents about Red Army rations for employees of the Field Headquarters. It turned out that the clerk of the organizational and accounting department A.P. Kulakov made 12 forms on a shapirograph in his department in non-attendance and generously distributed them - not only to the employees of his department, but also to the general one. At the same time, "he did not ask anyone for permission to make these forms on a shapirograph and did not receive from anyone." One of the clerks of the general department (K.I. Zubov) managed to sign 3 or 4 such forms at his immediate supervisor Markov, a few more forms were waved by the employees at the head and commissioner of communications and the clerk! 277

In principle, the staff of the Field Headquarters was somewhat reduced in the summer of 1919", during the year the number of communists in the Headquarters was increased", but in reality these changes did not lead to anything",

By the autumn of 1919, the situation in the bodies subordinate to the Field Headquarters had not changed much either. Thus, the work of the military communications departments, disorganized under V.A. Zhygmunte, was not established in the autumn of 1919. In October, the head of the TsUPVOSO M.M. Arzhanov and his deputy military commissar S. Shchukin reported "through the Chief of the Field Staff" to the Commander-in-Chief: "When going around the Turkestan and Eastern Fronts, the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 1st, 5th and 3rd armies unanimously demanded the replacement of the existing commando armies (in most cases from railway workers) or from former officers of the General Staff, or from among the former old experienced

migrants. The reason ... as it turned out on the spot, is the low awareness of the existing commanders in the matter of military communications in general and, in particular, the clearly expressed tendency in the armies to move from handicraft to the systematic construction of all their organs, including military communications. This demand, presented simultaneously by three armies, puts the TsUPVOSO in a very difficult position.

position, because there are no suitable candidates in his reserve, and from among the persons who could take the positions of the chief of the armies, the majority is already in responsible positions for movement. Arzhanov asked to be seconded to his disposal 4 "old migrants" from the Higher Military Inspectorate and one from Tsentropenbez " "".

By the autumn of 1919, in the Field Headquarters itself, they went on some kind of experiment, appointing communists to small leadership positions, but if in the central military apparatus the lack of proper training did not always affect work, things were different at Headquarters: the assistant to the head of the economic department Ivanov of the Administrative and Accounting Department, following the results of a 2-month stay in office, brought an internal investigation into his head in November 1919, stating his absolute inconsistency with his position and quarrelsomeness. Ivanov (it turned out during the investigation) "is little familiar with the business of housekeeping in military units, his work is characterized by lack of system, lack of initiative, ability to manage and organize; among his assistants he is not able to distribute the work and therefore each of them does not know his duties, does not know what to take up; he does not give advice and guidance to his employees, or (if he does), it is so vague and unclear that you have to follow them without being sure that you are fulfilling the will of the boss. Tov. Ivanov is a great formalist, a man of a dry letter, little interested in living things, and all economic questions, even the simplest and most uncomplicated ones, are resolved only on paper. By nature, he is an irritable, nervous, quarrelsome person and does not enter into the situation of others, unrestrained and rude - and these features are constantly manifested in relations with employees. He does not consider it necessary to visit the economic institutions subordinate to his department ... and does not exercise any supervision over them ... as a result of which each of them leads its own independent life without any unifying and guiding principle. He does not enjoy the authority of his comrades in the service and, on the one hand, does not take into account their opinions and views on the matter, and, on the other hand, he does not sufficiently appreciate the work, energy and experience of really useful employees and thereby cools the ardor, zeal and desire for work; he believes that he does all the work alone, and the employees and assistants do nothing, losing sight of the fact that he himself

he does not give them a definite job, as a result of which each of them works according to his own understanding and initiative. Outsiders ... for the most part [their] leave dissatisfied and dissatisfied with those - almost always vague and unclear - answers and explanations that they receive from the head of the department ... In their reports, they declared the impossibility of joint service with him, not only those who were offended by him in one way or another, had reasons not to be impartial enough in assessing his official and moral qualities, but also all colleagues in general, even those who were with him, according to them, on good terms. This is the opinion of him not only of his employees in his present service, but also in his former service in the GUVUZ29 "29,

The work of the Field Headquarters could not be established, if only because in the autumn of 1919 the consequences of the next relocation of the Field Headquarters were felt ... this time to Moscow, in the building of the former Alexander Military School (now the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation) : November 9, 1919 (1!) Head of the Office S.S. Kharitonov complained that the office "is located in a room enclosed by partitions in the neighborhood, on the one hand, with the telegraph office, and on the other hand, with the workshop. The constant noise of machines and the rumble from the Telegraph and the clatter of an ax from the workshop positively do not give the employees of the Chancellery the opportunity to work: there is no opportunity for concentrated work, and the employees ... daily complain of a headache. The office space is too cramped. In addition to employees, there are always a lot of people in the Chancellery,

who comes for various inquiries and for obtaining information." The order of the chief Fyodor Kostyaev dated December 12, 1918 remained an unnecessary waste of paper.

The Commissioner of the Administrative and Accounting Department of the Field Headquarters expressed K.Kh. Danishevsky, his wish that the communists would finally move from talking about revolutionizing the PS (by means of purges, introducing a more revolutionary spirit and order, etc.) to deeds: "uninitiated people call our Field Headquarters "Red Headquarters" (as he, indeed, and should have been called), at a time when, in its composition and spirit, it actually represents itself as a black-and-white Headquarters ". This is exactly what the communists achieved by purging the Stavka of "self-seekers and crooks" (you

I.T. Smilgi) 29,

No. 2.1

Telegram from the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Ya.M. Sverdlov to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic L.D. Trotsky on the need to eliminate the conflict with the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Republic I.I. Vatsetis

No. 18224 December 2, 1916

Dear Lev Davidovich!

I was informed that the telegram made a depressing impression on Vatsetis, especially because the telegram was not encrypted and passed through all his subordinates. Vatsetis intends to retire; says let him be arrested. but he cannot stay. He told all this to those who worked with him. They fear that he will end up committing suicide. We consider it inexpedient to leave Vatsetis - it is necessary to detain him. You must eliminate the conflict so that there is no trace of it left. If it is impossible to eliminate the conflict in Serpukhov, do not make any decisions, but leave for Moscow.

Vladimir Ilyich joins what I have said.

With communist [unist] greetings,

Ya. Sverdlov

RGASPI.F. 86. Op. 1. D. 38. L. 99. Autograph - an imprint of a telegram (vacation).

No. 2.2 Report by S.I. Aralov to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on the relationship between the RVSR Field Headquarters and the Serpukhov Soviet

No. 914 December 22, 1918 Top secret

REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SERPUKHOV PROVINCE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE At present, in Serpukhov, due to the presence of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the center of the country's military life is concentrated in Serpukhov, and in connection with this, the question arises of measures to combat enemy espionage.

Since, for the most rapid transmission of information, the agents of the enemy, no doubt, have to resort to the help of the telegraph, mail and telephone, then, in order to successfully carry out their plans, they can get in touch with some of the employees of the named institutions and win them over to their side. .

According to the information received by the Field Headquarters, it turned out that the composition of the employees at the post office, telegraph and telephone and their political convictions are far from meeting the interests of the Soviet Republic, while some of the employees may be suspected of obvious counterrevolutionaryism.

Based on the foregoing, it follows that the Serpukhov Provincial Executive Committee must appoint two communist commissars to the above-mentioned institutions, one for the post office and telegraph, the other for the telephone.

The commissioners should be entrusted with the duty of strict control over the entire work of the postal and telegraph office and telephone exchange, as well as supervision of employees.

The commissars must be in constant contact with me, the commissar of the Field Headquarters, and report all suspicious cases to me immediately.

Considering that the aforementioned posts can only be filled by comrades who are dedicated and fit for their purpose, I ask the Serpukhov Provincial Executive Committee to urgently inform me of its point of view on this issue, and also indicate whether it has suitable comrades to fill the above posts. If not, then, for my part, I can recommend those.

Since this question is urgent for military reasons, I ask you to clarify it as soon as possible, observing complete secrecy.

Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Aral Republic

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. L. 63-63v. Vacation - autographed typewritten text.

No. 2.3

Order S.I. Aralov of the Serpukhov Cheka on the reorganization of the Extraordinary Commission and the organization of the registration of citizens of Serpukhov and those arriving in the city by rail

No. 915 December 22, 1918 Top secret

TO THE SERPUKHOV EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION

Copy to the Chairman of the Serpukhov Executive Committee

In connection with the presence of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic in the city of Serpukhov, this city is of the greatest interest for enemy counterintelligence and espionage.

There is no doubt that the enemy agents have a base in Serpukhov and, in addition, communications have been established with other cities by rail, telegraph and mail.

Unfortunately. due to the badly placed address desk in Serpukhov, it is not possible to establish the exact location of the new arrivals, which gives the enemy agents ample opportunity to freely engage in their criminal business.

Based on the foregoing, I consider it necessary:

- 1) As a matter of urgency, establish correct and accurate registration of all citizens of the city of Serpukhov;
- 2) Order the commandant of the station [station] Serpukhov to take care of the correct registration and verification of documents at the stations of the railway; |
- 3) Put on the queue, in a hurry, the question of the execution "and the reorganization of the Serpukhov Cheka.

Discuss all of the above in top secret and report the results to me.

Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of RGVA.F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. L. 64.  
Vacation - typewritten text.

No. 2.4

Report of the traffic inspector of the TsUPVOSO K.F. Fominov to the military commissar of the TsUPVOSO A.M. Arnoldov on the organization of work in the Department of Military Communications of the RVSR Field Headquarters"

\* So in the text. \*\* The document is accompanied by a cover letter with an incoming registration stamp: "17.Khl. Incoming number 21075": "December 14, 1918. No. 3047. Moscow. ||

No later than December 14, 1918`

Head of the department of military communications comrade. ARNOLDOV

Traffic Inspector Comrade. KOLOSOVA

Compressed report of comrade. Fominova

For a short period of my stay in the CUVS, it clearly enough shows the far unfavorable state of management in the sense of the atmosphere prevailing in it and its performance, it does not at all satisfy the requirements for managing the current moment.

This is explained by the specific selection of service personnel, especially its upper layers, and the excellent internal reorganization, which does not allow people from outside their camp to penetrate into the administration, which contributes to their covert sabotage.

By November 15, the employees of the department included: party communists 4 people who sympathized with them | and 15 who declared themselves sympathizers, but were not members of sympathizer groups. There are 6 other Soviet parties for a total of 190 employees.

Of the 15 people who declared themselves sympathizers, the majority occupy lower positions.

No less unfavorable in terms of internal organization and the organization of technical work is the incorrect organization of certain bodies—for example, inspections of the PS at the Central Office of the Supreme Court.

Without touching on the general revision of military and other central technical departments and institutions in the sense of great subordination and dependence of technical personnel to the control and supervision of military commissars, I consider it my duty to pay the most serious attention to the urgent need for at least a partial change in the existing provisions of the Central Administration of Internal Affairs, since further preservation conditions are not only dangerous, but also unacceptable, under which all completeness of awareness in matters of paramount state importance is exclusively among persons who should not be allowed even close to them.

Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic comrade. Aralov. in Serpukhov. || At the same time, a condensed report of Comrade. FOMINOVA. || Head of the Department of Military Communications Arnoldov || Clerk [signature] "(RGVA. F. 6. Ol. 2. D. 19. L. 4. Original - typewritten text with autographs).

\* Dated according to accompanying documents and content.

In view of the above brief considerations, for the intensive and conscientious work of the administration and to avoid passing information to the enemies of the Soviet Republic, I find it necessary to immediately implement the following measures:

|. In order to avoid confusion harmful to the work, which invariably accompanies any deep breakdown of existing institutions, without completely violating the organizational structure of the CUVS, nevertheless, as far as possible, bring it closer to a more normal one, corresponding to the interests of the cause and consisting in the exact establishment of this. direct guidance

and the general direction of the activities of the CUVS is carried out by the military commissar of the department, under which the responsible technical manager of the work of the CUVS consists of: the head of the department and his assistant.

2. The current head of the departments, the General Staff of the ZAGYU, as a culprit, together with the former Rattel before him, in the selection of employees and the general state of affairs of the CUVS, as well as the most upholding the obviously unreliable persons of the department, preventing in every possible way, at the same time, the passage of party people - to be removed from service with the appointment of an investigation of his activities in the TsUVS.

3. Gradual filtering of the employees included in the CCVS by removing unreliable and suspicious elements from the department completely, or from responsible and most secret work in it, and replacing them with observance of guarantees of technical equivalence - with party people or with undoubtedly reliable recommendations.

4. In order to eradicate extreme promiscuity in the performance of official duties and covert sabotage by senior officials - to establish a real labor discipline for all employees of the CCVS, regardless of their rank in their positions.

3. In view of the fact that the Inspectorate of the PS under the CCVS is actually isolated from participation in its affairs from the military commissar and due to the obviously counter-revolutionary selection of technical staff, its productivity is almost negative; while it could bring significant benefits in terms of the tasks assigned to it, it is necessary:

a) liquidate the PS inspection in its present form,

0) assign the tasks and rights for inspecting the routes of communication to the CCVS,

c) for the technical implementation of the inspection, to establish, in addition to the staff of the Central Administration of Internal Affairs, a staff of specialist inspectors who are at the direct disposal of the military commissar of the department,

c) at the command and control of the Armed Forces of the fronts, the inspections of the PS are to be maintained with their transfer to the direct disposal of the military commissar of the command,

d) at the command and control of the Armed Forces of the fronts of the inspection of the PS, with their transfer to the direct subordination of the TsUVS as the highest inspection body along all routes of communication.

A deeper and more decisive breakdown may at least temporarily adversely affect the normal course of the work of the CUVS, which is absolutely unacceptable at the moment.

Therefore, I once again emphasize the urgent need, without violating the work of the FACS, to implement the measures I have proposed. |

Motion Inspector

With genuine true: clerk Molchanova

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 2. D. 19. L. 5 with ob-6.

A certified typewritten copy with the original signature of the case maker.

No. 2.5 Note by A.A. Antonov to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) about the atmosphere in the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic

Moscow, ROSTA January 3, 1919

Serpukhov

Within 2-2.5 weeks I visited Serpukhov 3 times: the first time I stayed there for 2 days, the second for 5 days and the last time for 3 days. Of course, in such a short time I could not get acquainted with the state of affairs in all details, I could misunderstand something, but at the same time, my advantage is that I was a fresh person and therefore a lot of things for those who got used to the local situation is not striking, it made a strong impression on me.

#### HEADQUARTERS

The Field Headquarters employs 300-400 people. Of these, 21-22 communists.

Comrades Aralov, Danishevsky and Preisman, who hold the most responsible posts, seem to regard the work of military specialists in approximately the same way as Comrade Trotsky. Other comrades who are part of the Communist faction of the Field Headquarters (as far as I learned from conversations with them) treat the staff specialists with great apprehension and call the Serpukhov Field Headquarters a "White Guard nest".

I personally had little to do with the General Staff officers and therefore would not have taken the liberty of expressing a definite judgment. But the atmosphere in the headquarters is rather depressing. First of all, the bureaucracy seizes. The most trifling demand of one department to another is written on paper, entered in the outgoing journal and in the mailing book, then, with the mailing book, sent to the address (in the next room or through several rooms) and surrendered against receipt. Every 2 weeks, complete lists of employees are compiled with indication of positions, etc. to receive meals, and if it is necessary to distribute cigarettes or some other products (such distributions happen, apparently, 5-6 times a month), then every time new lists are compiled. This, of course, is a trifle, but typical. Is it really impossible to draw up one permanent list and issue everything according to this list, periodically entering into it at the oral request of the heads of departments ("delete Ivanov from the list, he does not serve from such and such a date", "put Petrov on the list, he entered the service from such and such a date") the corresponding changes.

At the Field Headquarters, only two newspapers are received - Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and Izvestia of the Narkomvoen. I turned to the head of the office, military specialist Kharitonov, with a request to write out Pravda, Bednota, and Kommunar for the Military Press Bureau that was being organized. The next day I received a written reply that the Field Headquarters could subscribe only to government publications, while those who wished could buy private newspapers at their own expense. I went to Kharitonov and tried to explain to him that Pravda is not published by any private entrepreneur, but is the central organ of the leading political party, to which I received the following answer: "But for me, Pravda is a completely private publication and people's money for the purchase of any private publications, the Field Headquarters is not entitled."

My impression is that the General Staff officers - at least most of them - are trying hard to emphasize that they serve the government and do not at all want to know about any Bolsheviks or even about any classes. For the General Staff officers, the Soviet government is not a worker-peasant government, but simply a government, that is, the powers that be, which, as you know, every soul must obey.

This feature is characteristic not only of the Field Headquarters, but, as far as I have noticed, in general for the mass of employees of Soviet institutions. Tell some "Soviet" intellectual that he is working with the Bolsheviks - many will be offended: "Nothing like that, we are in the government service and have nothing in common with the Bolsheviks." This is not only "literature", but the very essence of the matter, for the government and the government apparatus are self-sufficient in this understanding. "Not service organs of the proletariat pursuing a proletarian policy, but some kind of extra-class or supra-class institutions. And indeed - that Soviet bureaucracy, about which so much is said, is in complete harmony with such a psychology.

But the Field Headquarters, like the Red Army in general, is a fighting body, and therefore the desire to give it a non-class character is especially unacceptable.



As is known, every department has a commissar, and every order, every telegram, every official paper must be countersigned by this commissar. But, taking into account the number of cases and the very limited number of Communists in the Field Headquarters, the fear arises that the commissars are too overburdened with the technical work of signing and they hardly have time to follow the internal life of the headquarters. I'm not a military man and I don't understand anything in this matter. Therefore, perhaps, my considerations are naive and absurd. But it seems to me like this: suppose that 20-40 people work in the operations department; now they are all military specialists; but why not put in this department several communists (in addition to the commissar), who, working under the guidance of a military specialist, on the one hand, would learn the business and subsequently become specialists themselves, and on the other hand, would be more involved in the internal life of the department, were would be aware of

5 So in the text. Obviously, it means: "self-sufficient".

preparation and development of those projects, assignments, etc., which then come to the commissar in finished form.

There is, as you know, a decree on relatives. I am not a supporter of this decree when it is purely formally applied to communists. We already have few Party workers, and if a real Party worker has a useful relative - also a communist - then why shouldn't [they] work together. But this decree is very good in relation to the Soviet bureaucrats, who often themselves went into the service only to "settle down", and try to "settle down" their relatives. In the Field Headquarters, as it seemed to me, the decree on relatives is often bypassed. But if we put up with a military specialist out of necessity, then it is completely unprofitable for us to create an atmosphere around him that is friendly and devoted to him. Meanwhile, such an atmosphere is created when a military specialist is followed by his wife, sisters, brothers, daughters, sons, etc.

Now about the privileges of the General Staff. All employees of the Field Headquarters receive a Red Army ration; moreover, their families use the same ration. The only restriction is that each employee cannot receive more than 4 rations for himself and his family. Each ration is given out per month: 30 pounds of bread or 22 pounds of flour, 15 cans of canned meat, 7 pounds of various cereals, about 4 pounds of sugar, about 2 and a half pounds of fat (butter and lard), 2.5 salt, about 1/2 lb of dry vegetables and 1/2 lb of tea. Thus, a family using 4 rations will receive per month 3 pounds of bread, 15 pounds of sugar, 10 pounds of butter and bacon, 28 pounds of cereals, etc. Moreover, there are separate distributions, for example, of kerosene at the rate of almost 10-12 pounds, etc.

Serpukhov is a small town, everyone knows how the staff of the Field Headquarters live. And the unevenness of the rations of the employees of the Field Headquarters with the rations of the Serpukhov workers is really great.

General staff officers occupy the best apartments. I haven't been to these apartments and I don't know if the workers' conversations are true that some "higher ranks" occupy almost 2 rooms per person, or even more, and the workers, they say, crowd 4 people in one room. Perhaps all this is gossip, but it is certain that the reason for this is given by the specialists themselves, who tend to consider themselves like a privileged officer class. Even the so-called

the "staff car" that runs between Moscow and Serpukhov (really necessary, because the communication of the headquarters with Moscow would be very difficult) causes irritation among the masses, because in ordinary cars they go almost on top of each other, stand on platforms, hanging on the stairs, and at this time it is relatively spacious in the staff car.

## WORKING

There are several factories in Serpukhov and its environs, employing, as I was told, at least 40,000 workers. The mood of the workers is hostile to the Soviet power.

About 2 weeks ago, party workers tried to organize a series of meetings at which communists from the headquarters spoke. At some rallies they were definitely booed.

As far as I found out from conversations with the workers, the sources of the hostile attitude towards the Soviet power are 2: food difficulties and the Field Headquarters.

They say that when the Field Headquarters moved to Serpukhov, all sorts of seals and requisitions were rather clumsily and rudely carried out, which irritated the population. Beds and featherbeds were taken away from workers for staff officers. Although such cases were isolated, but (as generally happens in the provinces) they immediately became known to the whole city and vented indignation. Now this has been liquidated, requisitions are prohibited, but the sediment remains. As I said, the workers are now outraged by the privileges of the General Staff. I heard such statements from the workers: "We understand when they give increased rations to the Red Army soldiers who are dying at the front. But the employees of the Field Headquarters live in the rear, they do not fight at the front, but are simple officials. Why are they given increased rations, and especially why do the wives and children of specialists get such rations? Some workers add to the address of the General Staff officers that they are all White Guard officers, who later will shoot the workers, and now they are being fattened.

In general, the attitude of the workers towards the General Staff officers is distrustful and hostile. Even party workers are imbued with this feeling.

The mood of the peasantry of the surrounding villages is also hostile to Soviet power. Peasants are especially indignant at the extraordinary tax. I don't know how this tax is conducted and distributed

and I have no doubt that it is mainly the kulaks who are indignant at this tax, but I admit the possibility that there were cases of not quite correct collection of the tax. At least two peasants whom I happened to meet at the station told me that in their village they demand a tax from everyone - both from the rich and the poor.

## PARTY WORK

Neither among the workers, nor among the Red Army soldiers, who are quite numerous in Serpukhov, until recently, no party work has been carried out. There are communist cells, but they are completely insignificant in number, and the communists who are part of these cells only sympathize with communism, but have no theoretical training, they cannot work themselves, but need work to be done among them.

There is no literature in Serpukhov and its environs. Not to mention pamphlets - even newspapers do not work. In the city and at the railway station, with great difficulty and in limited quantities, one can find Izvestia, occasionally Pravda. But the most accessible to the masses - "Poor" and "Kommunar" - are absent. Although Serpukhov is 93 versts from Moscow, even Izvestia sometimes arrives there the next day.

The Serpukhov railway station is crowded with people from morning to night. However, there is no kiosk with popular brochures and newspapers there.

Particular attention should be paid to the delivery of literature, as well as to the distribution of "Poor" and "Kommunar" among the Red Army units. Surrounded by a population that is hostile to Soviet power, deprived of newspapers and all literature in the complete absence of agitation, the Red Army soldiers can succumb to an anti-Soviet mood. Although I do not have definite information, I do not doubt that the White Guard organizations should have paid attention to Serpukhov as a very important point and, probably, are conducting underground work there.

Then, I do not presume to assert that the Field Headquarters is really a "White Guard nest", but I think that care should be taken to create such a mood in Serpukhov and its environs that any White Guard attempt would not find a response in anyone and in

would hang in the air.

The Party Committee in Serpukhov, at whose meetings I attended 2 times, makes a good impression. It consists entirely of workers who at the same time are: the chairman of the local council of deputies, the chairman of the economic council, the commissar of public education, the military commissar, the commissar of social security, the chairman of the Cheka, and so on. Thus, the party committee is at the same time a local government, all questions of local government are considered in advance by the party committee, and then carried out by its members.

However, due to this, the members of the committee are too overburdened with current state work to devote time to purely party work. Moreover, it seems that the majority of the members of the committee do not consider themselves fully qualified to carry out propaganda work. The committee does not even have a library.

There are intelligent party workers in Serpukhov only in the faction of the Field Headquarters (6-7 people can carry out propaganda work and agitation without prior training) and in the faction of the Communists of the Union of Internationalist Teachers (this faction has 2 party members and about a dozen sympathizers). , but I don't know how prepared they are for propaganda and organizational work).

Until recently, the Communist faction of the Field Headquarters, like the city committee, did not conduct any party work. About 2 weeks ago, the faction decided to start party work, but so far this work has been expressed only in speeches at rallies (there were 3 or 4 such rallies, one in each place). In general, the Communists from the headquarters are too involved in technical work. Moreover, it seems to me that fatigue from the strenuous work of the previous years or months is having an effect, and therefore a drop in interest in party work is noticeable. If this is not for everyone, then, in my opinion, for the majority. It must also be taken into account that it is precisely the intelligent forces of the Communist faction of the headquarters that very often are on business trips on special assignments, which also prevents them from devoting themselves to regular party work.

The Union of Internationalist Teachers was organized in Serpukhov relatively recently. On December 29, the union arranged the first public performance, a concert-rally, which was successful. In the foyer, literature (albeit very scarce) was sold and leaflets about

dachas of the new school. Concert numbers were performed by local forces - students and teachers. The repertoire is well chosen. A particularly good impression was made by the schoolchildren's choir, which performed the Internationale, Dubinushka, Boldly, comrades, in step, etc. Internationalist teachers work with enthusiasm, attract older schoolchildren to the union, most of them sympathize with the communists and want to join the party.

About a week ago Serpukhov finally drew the attention of the district committee of the RCI and sent an agitator comrade Antonov. Having learned from posters about the forthcoming performance on December 29 by a member of the district committee of the RCP at a concert-rally of internationalist teachers, delegates came to Serpukhov from one village (30 versts from the city) - an old man and an old woman. They bowed almost at their feet and asked to come - "enlighten". Most importantly, they asked for an explanation of the decree on the separation of church and state. I was told that such delegates sometimes come to the city committee and ask to send a speaker to tell him who the Bolsheviks are and what they want, and so on. However, until recently, due to the absence of party organizers, the city committee had to refuse.

Hence it is obvious that if party work is properly organized, then the population's hostile attitude towards the Soviet government will not be difficult to break.

On December 30, a meeting was held in Serpukhov, in which the city committee was almost in full force, representatives of the Communist faction of the headquarters, 2 communists from the Union of Internationalist Teachers and Comrade Antonov from the District Committee. A decision was made to take up party work seriously. We decided to oblige to work (at least 2 hours a week) the headquarters communists and internationalist teachers. Comrade Anton promised to come weekly."

However, it is undoubtedly necessary for at least one or two Party workers to devote themselves entirely to the cause, to direct and direct the work. Only then will it be possible to use the forces of the headquarters and teachers and members of the committee, to constantly push and drag everyone, because without this everyone will still bury themselves in technical work.

We decided to continue to publish a local newspaper. However, I found that the technical means for this are insufficient. It seems to me that I will have to

\* Obviously, the party pseudonym of the agitator of the Moscow District Komi

theta RCP(b) Antonov.

be considered leaflets or the publication of a leaflet of telegrams with the fact that, in addition to telegrams, one article of 40-50 lines will be placed there every day.

#### MOOD OF THE PARTY COMMITTEE

At one of the meetings of the city committee, a report was heard from a comrade delegated to the district committee. The delegate was not one of the lucky ones: apparently, he himself did not understand the issues discussed in the district committee, and his report was rather confused, but during the debate on the report (as I understood it) there was approximately such an attitude towards the question under consideration about relationships between local councils and central government.

Most members of the city committee talked about the bureaucracy of the central office. It has been said that in many institutions there is not a single communist, and yet these institutions issue decrees and orders. It was said that only decrees and orders signed by vols. Lenin and Sverdlov, and orders without these signatures must be treated with skepticism and executed, since they do not contradict the program and tactics of the RCP. The delegate who presented the confused report claimed that such was the mood of the whole district committee.

It was said that the central institutions were being taken over by the compromising intelligentsia and torn away from the working masses. Dissatisfaction was expressed that the communists of the Red Army were given technical work and were deprived of the opportunity to conduct party work.

I regret that city committees do not keep detailed minutes of their meetings and that these minutes are not sent to the center. However, it would hardly be possible to carry out this: where are the protocols to be kept when there are no people for the current party work. And meanwhile, at least at that meeting, which I am talking about, many interesting facts were cited, which cannot be ignored.

**CONCLUSIONS** The general impression is this: In Serpukhov, a stone's throw from Moscow, at a point very important in view of the presence of the headquarters, there is still absolutely no party work. The attempts that have now begun to establish this work are not known what will result. The impetus for these attempts was the arrival of Comrade Anton, a member of the district committee. City Committee and faction of the Field Headquarters,

Apparently, they strongly expect to use my arrival, but this visit is purely accidental, since I was called to the Field Headquarters to organize the Military Press Bureau. So far, the situation with the press bureau is a slog, because the regulation on it, etc., has not yet been approved. In addition, I am far from convinced that it will be possible to make something living out of the Military Press Bureau, but to set up another worthless departmental bureau (no one needs it, except for those who work in it and receive salaries - I have no desire) . Thus, how long will my stay in Serpukhov - I do not know.

It seemed to me that decisive measures must finally be taken against the absence of party workers in the localities. It would be possible to establish "party service", i.e. oblige every party communist to go to the provinces for at least one month a year to carry

party work. While serving such party service, the communist must receive maintenance from the enterprise in which he works; no enterprise or institution can refuse a communist a month's leave for party work in the provinces under any pretext.

If there is conscription on such grounds, then why not introduce conscription, which is of no less importance, because party work, agitation and propaganda in the provinces serve the same cause - the strengthening of the Soviet system.

Further, the most serious attention must be paid to the distribution of newspapers and literature. If there is absolutely no literature in Serpukhov, then what can be said about more remote and remote areas. It is not enough to bring literature; it must be distributed. Comrades who came from the front told me that it was not uncommon for a wagonload of literature to be delivered somewhere, bales of pamphlets to fall into some warehouse or onto a platform and rot there or tear like boys for cigarettes.

Agitation work among the masses alone is not enough, but organizational work and propaganda in circles must be carried out in order to train new cadres of Party workers. Agitation courses in Moscow give very little. After listening to a series of lectures, comrades soon forget and, at best, receive only a general development. It is necessary, as in previous years, to analyze in detail the topics in circles, to force them to write abstracts, to arrange discussions. In addition, many comrades cannot come to Moscow for agitation courses, and on the spot, without interrupting their current work, they could study in circles.

However, all this, of course, is not America and everything is known - and is not done only because of the lack of people. Against the latter, I think

nothing can be fought, except for the establishment of party service. A. ANTONOV

Address: 1) Serpukhov, Field Headquarters, Military Press Bureau. 2) Moscow, ROSTA. RGASPI.F. 17. Op. 4. D. 48. L. 178-186. Typewritten copy.

No. 2.6 Report by A.A. Antonova V.I. Lenin "On Military Specialists and Political Workers at the Field Headquarters"

January 12, 1919

To the Defense Council Comrade V.I. Lenin"

I have already written about the impressions that I made from my stay at the Field Headquarters in Serpukhov. Another week of work there convinced me even more of the correctness of my observations.

I would like to dwell on one issue—the relationship between military specialists and political workers, or rather on the part of this issue, in my opinion, the most urgent, requiring immediate resolution.

I stipulate in advance that I have no shadow of a doubt about the need to use specialists, and especially in the matter of building a regular army, but I cannot but object to the forms in which the joint work of specialists and political workers has taken shape at the moment.

In total, over a thousand people work at the Field Headquarters (this figure was reported to me by the commissars at the Field Headquarters, comrades Preisman and Vasiliev; the figure indicated by me in the first report "" is 2 times smaller was taken by eye).

\* There are marks on the document: 1) S.I. Gusev with an indelible pencil - "I read. S. Gusev. 2/ UP"; 2) K.Kh. Danishevsky in blue ink "Very] secret"; 3). Clerk with a simple pencil: "Entering No. 17 in | military / s|specialists |".

\*\* Italicized words in the document are written by A.A. Antonov: marked with a wavy line written by V.I. Lenin with a simple pencil.

\*\*\* See previous document.

I do not know whether such a huge number of people is really necessary (I heard that under tsarism there were much fewer): this is not the question that interests me at the moment. It is characteristic that out of a thousand people of real military specialists, i.e. people occupying positions requiring special military training, knowledge and experience, approximately 40-50 people can be counted (this figure was also received by me from the commissar of all inspection departments, comrade Preisman, and the commissar of the operational and naval departments, comrade Vasiliev). The rest, i.e. the vast majority of the staff of the Field Headquarters occupy the positions of clerks, clerks, secretaries, machinists and other clerks.

It would seem, according to sound logic, that only positions that require special military knowledge should be replaced by military specialists, and the rest of the positions by the ordinary democratic philistine public. But in fact, for some reason, almost all positions are filled by former officers or relatives of military specialists.

The question is, what is the difference in this?

And the difference is that just a layman, even if he is a "saboteur", i.e. he simply does not show interest in the matter, works negligently - nevertheless, by nature he is not inclined to conspiracy and conspiracies, he is cowardly and does not have endurance. The military caste, on the contrary, is disciplined, has self-control, knows how to conspire.

Now the entire Field Headquarters (with the exception of a numerically quite insignificant - 20-25 people - a handful of communists) is

a single organism, and this organism is entirely in the hands of a specialist

SHEETS. The right to hire and dismiss\*\* all staff members in fact

belongs to the Chief of the Field Staff. He has the ability to FILL all positions

their proteges and proteges of their

\* To the left of the text, this fragment is marked by S.I. Gusev with an indelible pencil: "They must be replaced by communists and proven non-party people from other commissariats. S. Gusev.

\*\* Underlining S.I. Gusev. To the left of the text of his note in indelible pencil: "After registration, a table of personnel exclusively from the communists will be created, without the approval of which not a single employee will accept

sya. S. Gusev.

friends. Thus, the most fertile ground for all sorts of adventures is created.

I would consider it incomparably more expedient and absolutely necessary politically to divide all positions in the Field Headquarters into special and non-special (clerical). The right of appointment to the first must be reserved to the Chief of Staff; the right to appoint to the second (as well as the right to dismiss) should belong to the commissar of the Field Headquarters. Then there will no longer be a single mass, bound by a common caste spirit, friendship and nepotism, and, most importantly, a common political tradition and mood of the mass, which can be an obedient instrument of any adventure.

Indeed, why should a captain or a colonel be a registrar or clerk? If they want to serve Soviet Russia, let them go to the front, and

do not hide in clerical positions in the rear.

At the same time, with such a reform, the political commissars in the headquarters will play at least some kind of controlling role. Now this is not. Now the commissars at the Field Headquarters are prisoners of the specialists. According to one of Comrade Trotsky's last telegrams to the commissar of headquarters, the commissar of headquarters is obliged to give his signature to all the operational orders of military specialists, without even reasoning (this fact can be confirmed by commissar comrade Preisman). This means that in the field of operational commissar is just a stamping machine.

But here's another area - political.

A certain aristocrat by birth serves in the Field Headquarters, it seems that she is a relative of the former] Count Witte - Troitskaya. She is in great friendship with the General Staff officers, at the same time clings to the commissars, trying to influence them like a woman; in the latter capacity, she is excessively accessible, generally gives the impression of having fallen, drinks and treats her guests with alcohol. However, during her love affairs, she shows great interest in politics and has long been on the strongest suspicion of both political workers and counterintelligence.

And despite this, the commissioners are powerless to fire her. The most they can do is tell the chief of staff. But the chief of staff may find the reasons disrespectful, and if you insist on dismissal, resentment and friction are inevitable, while the commissars

instructions were given - to avoid any friction, not to irritate military specialists, etc.

Troitskaya's friend, also a staff member, Golubovich, during a love meeting with one commissar, asked him for a code. The evidence is undeniable. The commissar immediately informed the faction of the Communists of the headquarters about this. But it also proved impossible to remove Golubovich from headquarters.

Even discarding all the facts and suspicions, it is purely theoretically impossible

not to assume that enemy espionage was supposed to turn

most serious attention to Stavka. Undoubtedly, there must be spies among the staff of the headquarters. But can the commissars fight it,

when should they direct their main concern not to cleaning the headquarters of suspicious persons, but to not complicating relations with the General Staff officers?

The so-called "Staff Diary" is kept day by day at headquarters. All the most important operational orders for each day are entered into it: launch an offensive in such and such a direction, send such and such reinforcements there, remove such and such units from there, etc. This "Staff Diary" is kept by a certain Colonel Modenov, a man who characterizes all commissars" and is unreliable to the last degree; right there in his department is his wife, who is friends with Troitskaya and Golubovich ...

Taking advantage of family relations and connivance, employees roam from department to department, thanks to which everything that happens in any of the corners of the headquarters is known to everyone. If the telegram is sent encrypted, then the cipher guarantees only one thing: that it will not be read by telephone operators. But such staff members as Troitskaya, Golubovich, Modenovs, etc., have the opportunity to get acquainted with it. Troitskaya, who works in one of the inspection departments, was found more than once in the operational department, where she examined secret maps and telegrams.

It may be that the conclusions that suggest themselves will be too hasty and insufficiently substantiated, but work under such conditions, at least with a shadow of suspicion and at the same time

\* Hereinafter, the word "Diary" in Antonov's text is printed in lower case, edited, probably V.I. Lenin.

\*\* The surname was highlighted in bold by A. Antonov and underlined by V.I. Lenin.

\*\*\* A. Antonov entered above the line.

consciousness of complete impotence to fight these abnormal phenomena, it is extremely difficult.

Let's assume for a moment that the General Staff officers decide to change it. It costs them nothing to exterminate a handful of communists without noise - there are a thousand of them, and there are only 20 communists. There will be no betrayal among the General Staff officers themselves: after all, the entire headquarters is a homogeneous mass, a caste, people matched suit to suit. And now the headquarters, having exterminated the communists, will continue to work. Orders will be given by telegraph and radio, which the troops must carry out without reasoning. Need a commissioner's signature? But is it really difficult to put any signature under a telegraph order? Under this assumption, the headquarters, captured by the White Guards, will have time to open all fronts to the enemy and inflict irreparable blows on the Soviet Republic before the betrayal is revealed.

Let this assumption have an insignificant fraction of a percent of probability, but even for the sake of this insignificant fraction of probability, one should seriously think about the situation.

When the composition of the headquarters staff is less homogeneous, not entirely caste, the possibility of treason is significantly reduced. A handful of 50 specialists will have no one to rely on, because the cowardly philistine mass will not go on an adventure.

On the other hand, if the commissars are given the right to accept and dismiss non-specialists (clerks), they will be able to: 1) immediately dismiss all suspicious persons and

how many dedicated party workers to establish real surveillance over specialists and suspicious persons.

Specialists are needed, no one argues about this. It is also true that it is necessary to create an environment in which specialists could work, i.e. not to tear them away from military affairs with trifles, constant nit-picking, etc.

But my project, by clarifying the relationship between specialists and political commissars, by accurately delimiting their rights—in this case, in one narrow area—the hiring and dismissal of staff members—will not increase friction, but, on the contrary, will reduce the reasons for them.

On the other hand, no one seems to object to the need for commissars to supervise military specialists. But if so, then it is impossible to leave only the role of commissioners

dummy

Newly, it is necessary to create conditions under which the commissars will have the right and a real opportunity to exercise control and supervision.

Otherwise, the correct and useful idea of using specialists will turn into its opposite: non-specialists.

STs will be in our hands, we will turn out to be a toy in the hands of specialists.

January 12, 1919

Address: Serpukhov, Field Headquarters

A. Antonov

Moscow, Rosta

Resolution V.I. Lenin: "To Gusev, and then to the Cheka for the investigation of the Headquarters."



Litter K.Kh. Danishevsky: "Make a copy with the resolution of Comrade Lenin, send [it] to Comrade Pavlunovsky.

RGASPI.F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10446. L. 1-5. The original is a typewritten text autographed in red ink. Resolution V.I. Lenin - an autograph with a simple pencil.

No. 2.7 Order for the Field Headquarters on streamlining correspondence

No. 97, Serpukhov January 12, 1919

Order on the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic"

\$ 1. Recently, despite my order No. 78, there have been cases of inattentive execution of the current [headquarters] correspondence: a) several telegrams were not executed in a timely manner, and one urgent order was not even transferred to its intended purpose, and the paper without execution was sewn to the case; 6) several times the telegrams were not sent for execution exactly to the addresses they concerned, as a result there was a long delay, which required correction by a direct conversation on a direct wire.

\* Title of the document.

"Hsh

All this indicates that not in all departments there are responsible persons who would monitor the execution of the work assigned to them, the addresses and ensure that this order really receives practical implementation. It is not enough to send a paper, but it is necessary to push the question into practice - only then can [the matter] be considered completed.

I ask all heads of departments and departments to remember that the heads of departments are responsible for the correctness of certificates, addresses, and for all reported information, for the urgent execution of papers - all instances up to the heads of departments.

In the future, in case of penalties of this kind, I will bring the perpetrators to legal liability up to and including dismissal.

\$ 2. To speed up the passage of correspondence and quick transfer for execution in departments, it is necessary to simplify the procedure for transferring papers and telegrams in the journal part.

Why should attention be paid to a quick entry in the general journal, and then all papers should be immediately transferred to my office, and from there, according to the marks, to the departments.

In all departments, all mail must immediately be sorted by a specially appointed person and all urgent business immediately transferred to the execution of the departments. Telegrams and urgent papers must be executed immediately on the same day. The rest of the papers - no later than the next day. All controversial issues and information, if possible, be resolved by phone or by phone.

\$ 3. Some groups of people from the Field Headquarters and departments, without my permission, issue certificates on behalf of departments for all kinds of purchases in Moscow and outside of Moscow.

In view of the fact that various kinds of misunderstandings and dissatisfaction arise on this basis, I suggest that all heads of departments make such purchases through the head of the general department of the Administration and Accounting Department, Makarov.

Chief of the Field Staff F. Kostyaev

Military commissar, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Aral Republic

Litter F.V. Kostyaeva: "To all responsible employees. 12/1. TO".

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 18-18v. The original is a typewritten text with autographs in pencil.

Litter F.V. Kostyaeva is a simple pencil.

"re

No. 2.8 Order on the Field Headquarters 00 responsibility for the disclosure of military secrets

No. 99, Serpukhov January 16, 1919

Order on the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic"

\$ 1. I noticed that the staff pays little attention to the preservation of military secrets, as a result of which some information, sometimes of a secret nature, becomes the common property.

I order in all departments to pay attention to the storage of secret papers, for which "secret" cabinets and secret boxes should be opened as soon as possible.

The rooms occupied by the Operations Directorate [should] be locked with American keys and be sealed.

It is forbidden to enter the departments, especially the Operational Directorate, as well as to the offices of: the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, for special assignments under the Chief of Staff - it is forbidden to enter without a report to irresponsible persons of the headquarters, as well as those who do not belong to the headquarters, the latter are also prohibited from entering without report and to the secretarial chief of staff.

All employees, up to and including the heads of departments, are responsible for the observance of military secrets.

Each department must appoint a person responsible for keeping secret documents.

The procedure for the general storage of secret papers, on the basis of the foregoing, should be immediately established in all departments under the personal responsibility of the chiefs of the latter.

\$ 2. Headquarters intercom telephones are often busy for long private conversations and conversations, which not only burdens the telephone service, but also interferes with official telephone conversations.

The Head of the Communications Service should ensure that internal communication is not used for private conversations to the detriment of official ones.

Conversation on the direct Kremlin telephone wire without my permission is prohibited.

Chief of the Field Staff

Ha"

\* Title of the document.

Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic F. Kostyaev

Military Commissar of the Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic [signature]

Litter V.V. Daller: "Office. Hastily print. Buy 3-4 iron secret boxes. Daller. 17/1".

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 22-22v. The original is a typewritten text autographed in pencil and purple ink.

No. 2.9 Report of the Moscow Council V.I. Lenin - an extract from the report of instructor Prokopovich on the relationship between the Serpukhov District Executive Committee and the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on January 16, 1919. Very urgent

TO THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONERS. TOV. TO LENIN EXTRACT FROM  
INSTRUCTOR PROKOPOVICH'S REPORT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF SERPUKH[OVSKI]

EXECUTIVE] COMMITTEE] AND REVVOENSKOVET

2. Relations with the Military Headquarters, as far as it was possible to find out, from the very moment of its resettlement in Serpukhov were very strained. The headquarters often demanded horses, demanded cigarettes, demanded premises. The same policy, according to members of the executive committee, is being carried out now, and all this is in the form of almost orders. The slightest non-fulfilment is regarded as unwillingness to help the headquarters and its work, and is explained by ARALOV's deputy, PREISMAN, as the counter-revolutionary nature of the Serpukhov Soviet. Near the Military Headquarters, the local bourgeoisie is gradually attached. Members of the executive committee reported, by the way, such facts. The former house of the factory owner MARAYEV is reserved for VATSETIS and DANISHEVSKY, but they live in one half, the other is occupied by the manufacturer MARAYEV. The demand of the local housing commission for the eviction of MARAEVA was answered that the whole house was under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief - when the mobilization was announced, a number of bourgeois who had managed to get settled at the headquarters were released. So, a certain TURITSIN was declared to be purchasing some paper for the Military Headquarters and therefore released. Some staff members are accused of ugly deeds. So, about REMER, the political commissar of the High

of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Republic, the following case is being considered by the Military Tribunal: a local worker with 5,000 cigarettes was detained by the police. The worker declared that the cigarettes had been given to him by REMER's wife. The police chief found 20,000,000 cigarettes with REMER, and, according to REMER's announcement, they were issued to him from the headquarters for distribution at his own discretion (REMER gave a receipt in this sense). He gave the worker a cigarette, exercising his right. Now this case, at the request of the Military Tribunal, has been transferred there. All minor misunderstandings have resulted in a major conflict over the location of the hospital equipment. Since it was possible to find out, the case is as follows: The military headquarters for the city of Serpukhov procured a hospital with everything. The matter became due to the lack of suitable premises. A special commission was set up from representatives of the headquarters and the executive committee, which was instructed to find premises. The executive committee did not pay due attention to the elections to the commission, and insufficiently far-sighted comrades went there. Representatives Headquarters immediately offered the premises of the council, arguing that it has sewerage and water supply. Representatives of the executive committee agreed and the decision of the commission was made at a meeting of the executive committee. The latter did not give his consent to equipping the hospital in the council house, because, firstly, there is no other large building for the council in Serpukhov; secondly, it will take 1.5 months to relocate the council, install electricity, and arrange things" - in a word, it will take 1.5 months to equip the hospital in the council house; The executive committee proposed to stop at the so-called "German House". It, according to members of the executive committee, can accommodate up to 500 beds and is superbly equipped: there is electricity, running water, a bath, and sewerage. Currently, 10 families are accommodated there, including the chief of the Military Staff and one family of an employee in the Military Staff. The local housing commission promised to give everyone living in this house comfortable apartments and horses to transport property. But the headquarters refused to clear the premises, finding the executive committee's motivation insufficient: in the opinion of the headquarters, all the clubs could be occupied under the council - it doesn't matter that some of them were not even in the city itself.

\* So in the text. \*\* So in the text.

In case of disagreement, they "threatened" the imposition[m] of martial law. However, the Board did not give its consent. Then the chief of staff was asked to inspect the Tretyakov barracks. According to members of the executive committee, these barracks are completely unsuitable for a hospital, since there are not even primitive amenities there, and even soldiers refused to live there at one time. The specialists-engineers who examined these barracks found the premises suitable.

At this stage of development, I left this conflict. Whether it can be eliminated or whether it will grow is difficult to predict. In general, the question of the relationship between the executive committee and the Military Headquarters is not only of local importance and, obviously, it will not be possible for the executive committee alone to resolve it. Communists, according to members of the executive committee, if there are at the Military Headquarters, then they are young and in small numbers. On the other hand, there are many specialists at the headquarters who have retained not only knowledge, but also habits from the old stratum. The question of specialists, of departmental politics, of pompadour, has been put on the order of the day and is demanded for all of Soviet Russia.

Currently, martial law has been introduced in Serpukhov.

January 16, 1919

INSTRUCTOR PROKOPOVICH

True with the original: clerk [clerk] A. Borisovich, 24/1. 1919

RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 14. L. 74 with ob.-75. Certified typewritten copy.

No. 2.10

Report of the Infantry Inspector at the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic A. Anderson to the Assistant Chief of the Field Headquarters G.N. Khvoshchinsky

No. 5, Serpukhov January 22, 1919

Assistant to the Chief of the Field Headquarters at the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic

On January 16, in the city of Moscow, while I was leaving for the Kursk railway station, I was arrested by the Moscow Cheka and taken to Lubyanka 14, where I spent more than two days under arrest, after which, without bringing any charges against me, I was released. As it turned out from the inquiry,

\*This sentence ends.

the motives and circumstances under which the arrest took place are as follows:

Arriving with your permission in Moscow for a few hours shopping and trying on a coat at a tailor, I stopped at Elokhovskaya Street, house No. 1/12, apt. 5 at Shatrov (parents of my former driver, when I served as chief of staff of the 5th Army). The fitting was scheduled by the tailor for 2 o'clock in the afternoon, before that time I did several things, including being with the head of supply of the Republic' I.I. Mezhlauk, whom I asked to accept my acquaintance in the supply department in Moscow, at the request of his mother, whose son and husband are currently serving in the supply department of the 5th Army. I stayed at Mezhlauk until 2.5 in the afternoon, then I went to the mother of my acquaintance, for whom I had applied at Mezhlauk, told her the result, and a few minutes later, boarding the B tram, I went to Elokhovskaya Street. There was no more than 1.5 hours before the train's departure, during which time I expected to have time to visit the tailor, have lunch and catch the train (the tailor lives 75 steps from Shatrov's apartment). On the way, the tram broke down, I had to change to another one. Arriving at the tailor's, having no more than 50 minutes of time before the train's departure, I found out that the tailor would be able to start fitting only in 10 minutes, I almost ran to the Shatrovs' apartment, where dinner was waiting for me, and after 12-15 minutes, taking the cabman had to go to the station already with his things, I decided not to try them on, but only to call on the tailor - to tell him to bring the coat to Serpukhov; driving up to the tailor, I met him already ready to go to me, I put the tailor in a cab, and (since Shatrov's apartment is 75 paces away and on the way to

station) I decided to try on Shatrov. Approaching the apartment, without waiting for the cab to stop completely, I jumped off on the move, ran into the entrance of the house where the Shatrovs live, the tailor ran after me no less hastily - after 5 minutes I was already on the street again, got into the cab, whom I ordered rush to the station. There was still about 20-25 minutes left before the train left. Having traveled 100 steps, I was stopped by a shout: "Stop, don't move"; looking around, I saw a man dressed in a camouflage bekesh, who, holding a revolver pointed at me in one hand, was raising the cavity of the sled with the other, ordering: "Immediately. To the Extraordinary Commission on the Lubyanka

\* So the chief chief of supplies is named.

"P

14" and sat down with me. Guessing that it was an agent of the Moscow Cheka, I assumed that he needed my cab in a hurry, I told him: "I am in a hurry to the station," but the agent repeated the order, after which I asked if he was arresting me, to which the agent replied: "Yes, you"; then I offered to show him my document, warning that he was undoubtedly mistaken, to which the agent replied: "They will sort it out." At Lubyanka 14 in the Moscow Cheka, all my belongings and documents were taken from me and looked through by the duty officer. Things, with the exception of kid gloves, a razor, a frame for a photographic card and yeast, were returned to me, money was also returned and part of the papers, everything left was handed over to the commandant, then to the investigator on duty Kogan. All this went on from 5 o'clock to 9 o'clock in the evening, at 9 o'clock in the evening I was placed in a general cell under arrest, at 3 o'clock in the morning I was taken off interrogation by investigator Kogan, who, after interrogation, said that "You, apparently, were arrested by mistake, since the agent, seeing your fussy appearance, you were in a hurry somewhere, jumped off a cab, rode with some gentleman, then again alone - all this led to the agent thought to suspect you of running away from someone, and he arrested you. To this I told the investigator that it was clear from my testimony why I was in a hurry, where I was, all this is easy to verify - the investigator promised by 11 o'clock on 17 [January 1919] my task is to finish, during the interrogation I was also asked the following questions:

1) Whether he served in the 16th corps; 2) Who is Volodya; 3) Where have I served since the October Revolution and 4) Do I have any acquaintances in Moscow.

The first question was, apparently, proposed to me because among the documents was a copy of my attestation of the chief of staff of the 17th infantry | different| division, presented to the chief of staff of the 19th Army Corps. The second question is because among the papers there was a letter from my former student of gymnastics, a 14-15-year-old boy, which was signed: "Your Volodya."

After sitting for two days, even more convinced of a misunderstanding, I assumed that the entire delay in my release was due to the verification of the addresses that I named during the interrogation.

On 18 [January 1919] in the evening I was released, my papers were returned to me, but it was suggested that I come for the things left behind on Monday 20 [January 1919], maybe. the general office was already closed, things are

roamed there. On [January 20] I came to Lubyanka 14 for my things, it turned out that the correspondence had already been forwarded to the Military Department of the Cheka for safekeeping, and in order to get my things, I had to take a note from the investigator who was in charge of my case, for which I needed to find out the numbers of the file, the stuff receipt and the protocol. In the office of the depositories, I found the correspondence on my case and made a selection of the numbers I needed.

Not being able to get acquainted with the protocols and all the correspondence of my case, I nevertheless managed to read the note pinned to the blue cover of the case and read briefly the statement on which I was arrested. On a sheet pinned to the cover of the case, approximately the following was printed: "Vol. Anderson, according to the conclusion of the investigator, should be released, as he occupies a responsible post in the Red Army, the case should be transferred for storage to the Military Department of the Cheka and monitoring of activities should be established.

The first sheet of correspondence was a "statement", which I also skimmed through. The statement was made by some soldier of the 152nd Infantry [Vladikavkaz Regiment, in which I served even before I was sent to the Academy of the General Staff in 1916. This soldier wrote that he met me at Mokhovaya Street. on a tram, considers it necessary to state that "at the time when Anderson served in the 152nd Infantry Regiment, he never supported democratic principles and was generally unloved by the soldiers, then, being the chief of staff of the 19th Army corps (such, by the way, I never was), comrade. Anderson surrendered to the Germans as a prisoner, the Germans were sent to Ukraine, and from there to Russia as a chion. This is approximately the wording in which the statement of a soldier of the 152nd infantry Vlad[ikavkaz] regiment was drawn up.

I absolutely do not consider it necessary to give more detailed explanations about the unfounded and stupid denunciation of my former, perhaps subordinate, I consider it necessary to report that I really was in captivity with the Germans for about two months, I was captured, being chief of staff of the 17th infantry division, during the period when the Germans went on the offensive after the armistice on the city of Dvinsk. The 17th division then stood in positions 11-12 versts ahead of Dvinsk. It was not only I alone who was taken prisoner, but all the headquarters, not only of divisions and corps, but even of the army located in Dvinsk - all this happened

\* This is the name of the Special Department of the Cheka.

because when the day before it was already known at the army headquarters and the army committee that the Germans were going on the offensive tomorrow, a telegram was received from the corps committee ordering everyone to remain in their places, not to fire a single shot, etc. After a few days of being in captivity, the Germans began to send captured officers from Dvinsk to a prisoner of war camp. Russians who declared themselves Ukrainians in Ukraine, and no documents were required to prove their Ukrainian origin, and to the Baltic region of the Baltics from 2.5 thousand officers and about 9 thousand half of the soldiers declared that they were Ukrainians, and the Germans sent such "Ukrainians" not to a prisoner of war camp, but to Kiev, keeping them in quarantine for up to 40 days. Among these was myself and my comrade from the Academy [of the General Staff] Lev Aleksandrovich Svetlov, who served in the headquarters of the 19th Corps. Upon arrival in Kiev, after 2-3 days, having learned that Great Russians were being evicted from Ukraine, more than half of those who arrived in Kiev (there were already Germans there at that time) went to the Great Russian Consulate to declare their desire to leave Kiev for Great Russia as soon as possible. Svetlov left with the echelon on the 3rd day, and on the 4th day he caught up with him in Moscow. Upon arrival in Petrograd, we appeared [to] the head of the Academy of the General Staff," who suggested that we go to Yekaterinburg, where the academy had just been transferred, to enter the senior class. This is the end of the entire period of captivity. Already being the chief of staff of the 5th Army near Kazan, at the Sviyazhsk station, I submitted a detailed report with documents attached to the People's Commissar of War to Trotsky, who was also stationed at the Sviyazhsk station in his train at that time. I received a 2,500-ruble allowance from Commissar Trotsky, and the correspondence was left on the train with Trotsky, the treasurer of the train. As for the failure to carry out democratic undertakings during my time in the old army, it is not clear to me what the denunciator is talking about: it has long been known that demanding and very strict commanders have always been hated by all the worst soldier element in the unit, probably due to this I also had such subordinates; Thus, I never hide the fact that I was always one of the strictest commanders in the regiment. As for the dislike of soldiers, let me point out the following

\* A.I. Andoga.

fact. In the first days of the revolution, when I temporarily served (immediately after graduating from the junior [junior] class of the academy) as the chief of staff of the 38th infantry division, when once the chief of the division, the former general [erall] Bukovsky went to the 152nd Infantry Regiment of Vladikavkaz, standing in reserve, in the 2nd and 3rd battalions, which I commanded in the first period of the war, with which I received the St. George Cross and the St. George weapon, when visited by the head of the division — stated that "they ask that Anderson remain for the entire time the chief of staff of the division, because. We know him from battles. During the period of the October Revolution, I served as a guardian of the 17th

infantry division, and during the period of the elective beginning in the army, I was in Petrograd on vacation, nevertheless, I was chosen by both all commands and the executive committee of the division as chief of staff, remaining in this position until complete demobilization .

In stating the fact of my arrest, either on suspicion or on denunciation, I cannot but express my surprise at the way this question was posed. Even if the denunciation were the real truth, then in that case, the IBSC, having received such a statement, having learned where I serve, it would seem that it was obliged to bring to the attention of my direct superiors, who already have the right to make this or that decision; if, however, I was arrested, as investigator Kogan stated, only because the agent of the Moscow Cheka Committee seemed suspicious of my fussiness and haste, then this method must be recognized as directly unacceptable, completely undermining the prestige not only of senior commanders in the Red Army, but in general of persons command staff, when anyone can be arrested, violating the decree, without the knowledge of the authorities, without presenting a warrant for arrest and without asking for documents. Noting the quite correct and polite treatment of all the employees in the IBSC with whom I had to deal, I cannot keep silent about the unacceptable disgrace in the room where the arrested are sitting.

In a small room with 3-4 chairs and 2 benches there are from 25-35 people, men and women together, the detainees do the cleaning themselves, there are not even bunks, they sleep right on the bare floor, they bring dinner in a bucket, but no plates , there are no spoons, so you have to take advantage of the courtesy of the sentry, who gives his spoon to the arrested in turn. The food is great."

\* From the words "Stating the fact ..." up to this point opposite the text, underlining

red pencil.

I ask you to report my report to the Chief of the Field Staff and a member

In|enno| -roar| olutional | Council of the Republic Comrade Aralov. A. Anderson

Resolution F.V. Kostyaeva: "S.I. Aralov - for the relevant orders on the inadmissibility of such arrests. K|ostyaev|. 23/[19] 19";

Resolution S.I. Aralova: "Send the extracts [to] the Special Department??. A[ralov]. 257".

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. L. 104-105v. Autograph in blue ink.

No. 2.11

Report of the Head of the Department of Military Communications of the Field Headquarters A.M. Arnoldov to the military commissar of the Field Headquarters S.I. Aralov on the style of work of the department with proposals for streamlining the system of military transportation"

No. 1583, Moscow, Garnet ier., 13 February 17, 1919 2

MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC TOV. ARALOV REPORT

When I assumed the post of military commissar of the Upvosorevsovet, it was discovered that all the work, including emergency transportation, was carried out very carelessly and sluggishly. Formed chaos reigned in the entire administration? %. The assistants to the commissar and the commissars of the departments were inactive and limited themselves only to "stamping" papers.

There was no initiative on their part. I immediately dismissed all military commissars from their positions. He transferred some to the Upvosofronts, while others remained completely overboard. In their place, I called new workers whose work I knew.

As it turned out, when he was the military commissar Comrade. Fominov, all specialists, including those holding responsible positions, worked very sluggishly. Office work and bureaucracy

deeply launched [and] their roots. All references and information have never been checked both in the Upvosorevsovet itself and in the Upvoso of fronts and districts.

\* There is a note on the document: "For your information. 20.11.[1919]".

"02/7

So, the other day I received information from specialists that the movement of steam locomotives between some stations of the Southern Front was stopped and will be resumed not earlier than in 4-5 days. From the information received by direct wire from the military commissars, it turned out that traffic between the same stations had already been resumed. This phenomenon is unacceptable, and I have taken measures to ensure that this does not happen again in the future, applying the most severe measures to those responsible.

Despite all my efforts to have direct supervision and management of the work of all departments of Upwoso, which is especially important in emergency transportation and so on. orders of an operational nature, I am actually deprived of this opportunity due to the fact that the departments of the Up Vorevitsoviet are located in different premises and even on different streets. I noticed this inconvenience and an important hindrance in my work in time, and I filed a petition with Comrade. Sklyansky to provide the Upvosorevsovet d. No. 19 on Prechistinka, to which the People's Commissariat of Education did not agree, and so far this room has not been provided to us. But one of these days, I hope this issue will be resolved in a positive sense, and the work will go more successfully.

Still, I must state the fact that, despite all the obstacles, the work of the Upvosorevsovet has made much progress, namely:

1) Everywhere, a red thread is a system in which the appointed commissars are not simple "stampers" of papers, but master the work so that after full preparation at any moment each of them could replace a specialist and work painlessly without prejudice to affairs. The experts themselves admitted that the commissars are starting to work and are working, and do not remain the same non-initiative controllers.

2) Under the dispatchers of the Upvosorevsovet and districts, military commissars are on duty, which have direct contact with the Field Headquarters and the Upvosofronts and districts. From them, at any time, I quickly receive any certificate of transportation.

3) In order to carry out more successful military transportation, the Upvosorevsoviet has formed a supply of transport vehicles and is evenly distributed among the Upvosofronts and districts.

4) All external protection of the railways is subordinate to the Upvosorevsovet.

5) The issue was resolved in the Special Meeting on leaving the ambulance trains behind the military department.

"2z

6) The staff of the commissariats of the Upvosorevsoviet, Upvosofronts, districts, military representatives on the roads and commandant's departments has been increased. =

7) As far as possible, all the best forces from the military commissars are involved in technical positions.

8) Route cards for echelon chiefs have been developed and are being put into practice.

9) The issue of the passage of employees sent on various occasions in hospital trains along their route is resolved.

PLANNED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:



- 1) General measures are being taken to combat demurrage of trains at hubs and stations and the theft of stoves.
- 2) A plan is being developed on an all-Russian scale on the procedure for providing places in headquarters wagons.
- 3) It is supposed to form a special military reserve of cool cars.
- 4) The question of inspections of lines of communication will be reviewed, of the need to include the personnel of the inspection in the Upvosofronts and districts with their disbandment as separate institutions. .
- 5) It is proposed to supplement the regulation on the departments of the chiefs of military communications in accordance with the changed states and petitions from the field.
- 6) Work out the state of Upwoso for individual armies and those that are part of the front.
- 7) On the formation of special departments of communications under the Upvoso fronts and districts.

Military Commissar Arnoldov

Secretary [J.A. Stigge]

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 2. D. 19. L. 63 sob-64. The original is a typewritten text with autographs.

No. 2.12

Telephone message of the General Staff officers of 1918, issued by V.I. Lenin, L.D. Trotsky, I.I. Vatsetis, S.I. Aralov with a repeated request to report on the progress of the investigation into the case of the arrested G.I. Theodori

Serpukhov April 17, 1919

2 o'clock 45 min.

To the Chairman of the Defense Council Lenin

Pre-revvoensovres[n] Trotsky

Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis

Pre-revolutionary military tribunal of the Republic of Aralova |

Copy: to the [head] of the staff [aba] of the Revolutionary Military Council [p] Kostyaev

To this day, we have not received any answer to our request of March 24, No. 111/6. about the hasty examination of the Teodori General Staff case and, at the same time, having, on the one hand, information about the presentation of a grave and shameful charge of espionage against Teodori, and on the other hand, information that no charges have been brought against him so far, under the authority of the issue of 1917, the undersigned reiterate their request not to refuse [the] order to inform the issue through them of those specific data of the prosecution, confirmed by documentary evidence, on the basis of which the issue could reasonably exclude Teodori from their midst and enter with a petition to expel him from the General Staff Corporation. In the same case, if there are no such data, then the issue cannot calmly relate to the fact of the groundless arrest of one of its members, whom the issue trusted and who occupied one of the responsible posts in the Republic, because. such a phenomenon does not guarantee a smooth future work for military specialists, as they are not insured against arrests without charge, and at the same time puts them in a false position beyond their still precariously established [in] relations with the political workers of the army, and therefore we appeal in the case of the latter, for ordering the release of Teodori and clarifying the reasons for the misunderstanding. No. 112/17.

By authorization of the 1917 graduation of the General Staff: Isaev, Modenov, Kuznetsov, Malyshev, Vinogradov, Kosach, Yurshevsky, Kuttyrev, Sievert, Stulba, Chintulov, Mattis, Sryvalin, Zeitlin, Maksimov, Dubinin, Samoilov, Pirog, Domozhirev, [Sysov], Stasevich, Skvortsov, Tarasov, Kadnikov, Baranovich, Dulov, Maygur, Cook, Petrov, Polozov, Vasiliev, Bardinsky, Zakharov, Shtrikhar-Shilo, Us, Yakovsky.

Per[ed] Strakovsky

Received by Ershov

17LU.[19] 19g 22h 45m from Serpukhov by direct [wire].

"05

Resolution V.I. Lenin: "Sklyansky for a review." RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 9325. L. 1—1 rev.  
Handwritten text of the decoded telegram. Resolution V.I. Lenin's autograph.

No. 2.13

Letter to L.D. Trotsky A.I. Akulov about the need to improve relations between I.I. Vatsetis and the Field Headquarters with other institutions and persons

[1] April 1919 2"

TO COMRADE Akulov

I briefly spoke with you on the phone about some telegrams and telephone messages from the Commander-in-Chief with complaints about the Central Control Center and the All-Glav Headquarters. Now, with some delay, I found in my room a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief and yours regarding the "unauthorized actions" of Comrade Rakovsky. I must tell you frankly that this telegram upset me extremely in all respects. Comrade Rakovsky's "unauthorized actions" consisted in the fact that he inquired about the condition of the 8th Army on the way and then, in a telegram to Comrade Lenin, expressed his views and possibilities from the 8th Army to allocate a unit to reinforce the Ukrainian Front. Rakovsky, of course, did not give any orders. Moreover, he very kindly provided a copy of his appeal [to] the Commander-in-Chief, which, of course, he was not obliged to do, since if the government found it necessary to meet the wishes of the chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet government, then the Commander-in-Chief would have been notified and his views on the matter would have been requested. But, I repeat, Rakovsky very graciously provided a copy of his telegram himself. There was no decisive intervention on his part, because no one would seriously call the telegram of the head of the Ukrainian government, containing wishes to send reinforcements and considerations, right or wrong, about the possibility of such a sending from the composition of the 8- th army. After all, on this basis, with much greater right, one could call "unauthorized actions" all the statements of the Commander-in-Chief, as

\*  
Dated according to surrounding documents.

sayushiye Vosnarkhoz, the political Ukrainian government or the People's Commissariat of Food. But since the Commander-in-Chief, of course, is interested from an operational point of view in questions of economic, political, etc., his indisputable right is to apply to the government with his thoughts, proposals, and demands on this matter. No lesser right of the head of the Ukrainian government is to address the government of the federal republic with proposals, considerations of a military nature. "Unauthorized actions" would have taken place if Rakovsky had ordered the secondment of a brigade from the 8th Army to the Ukrainian Front, but this, of course, was out of the question.

Normal work is possible with normal relationships. Meanwhile, these latter between Serpukhov and all institutions are gradually deteriorating. So, relations with the Eastern Front,

with the Southern Front, with the TsUS, with the All-Glavshstab, with the Ukrainian command, and now with the Ukrainian government, they are taking on a hostile character. This circumstance worries me in the highest degree, for it may make the task of the central command extremely difficult. In appropriate cases, since you or Comrade Aralov have to sign the statements of the Commander-in-Chief, I would very much ask you to draw his attention to the fact that, while defending the interests and rights of command, it is necessary to take into account the rights and interests of other institutions and persons. You understand that I consider it necessary to return to this question on a new, very acute issue, precisely because I highly value the work of the Commander-in-Chief and consider it necessary to eliminate completely superfluous and harmful points, which, as I said, threaten to extremely complicate the work.

RGVA.F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 46 with ob-47. Vacation — typewritten text.

No. 2.14

Report of the Presidium of the Serpukhov Council to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on the situation in the Field Headquarters and its interference in the affairs of the Council"

\* There are marks on the document: 1) in pencil: "On the bureau" (L. 62, top right); 2) with a pen: "to the archive. 27/W. [19]19".

"27

May 19, 1919

TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC

Presidium of the Serpukhov Council of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies

memorandum

The Serpukhov District Council of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies from the first days of the resettlement of the Field Headquarters in Serpukhov was constrained in its internal activities.

Not to mention the fact that the relocation to a small county town of such a cumbersome institution as the Field Headquarters extremely worsened the housing problem, due to which the council was forced to put aside for a long time any idea of improving the living conditions of the workers who remained to live as before in the basements. Since all the good quarters were packed with staff quarters, the task fell on the local executive committee to supply the Field Headquarters with fuel, which was absorbed by both the Field Headquarters and individual staff members in an incredible amount, to carry out, at the request of the Headquarters, work to clear the highway, etc. P. While in the premises of the Field Headquarters and in the apartments of the staff of the headquarters the temperature was maintained at 16 degrees and above throughout the winter, the working population was freezing due to a lack of firewood, and in the workers' apartments the temperature was below 0. The firewood crisis of the past winter in Serpukhov was undoubtedly caused mainly by the stay in Serpukhov of the Field Headquarters (as well as military units associated with the Field Headquarters), which consumed huge reserves of local fuel. Similarly, construction and other work carried out at the request of the Field Headquarters, not paid for from local funds, worsened the financial situation of the Serpukhov Council.

Despite all this, the 40,000-strong working population of the Serpukhov district, in the person of their council, willingly took on their shoulders all the hardships caused by the stay of the Field Headquarters in Serpukhov, understanding the responsibility and importance of the work carried out by the brain of the Red Army, which is the Field Headquarters. headquarters.

Unfortunately, not limited to purely operational work, the responsible employees of the Field Headquarters - the General Staffs - from the very beginning began to interfere in the internal life of Soviet institutions, initiating petitions for granting benefits to the Serpukhov bourgeoisie,

in the apartments of which they were given quarters. As soon as one or another Serpukhov manufacturer, merchant, homeowner, etc. he was involved in the rear militia and to serve his labor service, as the persistent petitions of individual generals to release him from labor service immediately began to arrive.

Not only that, a whole number of people who belonged to the largest millionaires - the most furious exploiters of the working class, who rightly deserved the hatred of the Serpukhov proletariat, were accepted into the service of the Field Headquarters. These individuals are by no means military specialists and in many cases barely literate, yet they have been given positions at the Field Headquarters—contractors, canteen managers, clerks, couriers and

etc.

While the Serpukhov workers were starving, receiving !/, bread, or even getting nothing for months at a time, all these former capitalists and exploiters who stuck to the headquarters used the Red Army ration and other benefits, which they flaunted before the local population.

The Serpukhov Executive Committee repeatedly appealed to the Commissioner of the Field Headquarters to clear this highest institution of the Red Army from exploitative elements, but all these requests remained futile.

On the contrary, in the course of time the Serpukhov big bourgeoisie, drawing closer and closer to the general staffs, penetrated the highest military institutions: in Moscow, the General Staff, the Registration Department, and so on.

All this caused at first bewilderment, and then indignation in the ranks of the proletarian masses, which definitely indicated that the Serpukhov big bourgeoisie was harboring by the Field Headquarters.

But, not content with the patronage of the bourgeoisie on the part of individual General Staffs, the Field Headquarters as an institution began to interfere in the affairs of the local council, turning to the local authorities with demands and instructions that went beyond the competence of the Field Headquarters. Suffice it to point out that when 14 poods of salt were confiscated from a local speculator, the head of the Administrative and Accounting Department, the General Staff, Daller, demanded that the council investigate this case, bring to justice the policemen who carried out the confiscation on the orders of the local Soviet government, and returned the salt to the speculator. Similarly, the local finance department received an order signed by [the same] Dallaire to suspend collections

5-10600

emergency tax from a local entrepreneur who joined the Field Headquarters. One could cite a number of facts\* of the intervention of the Field Headquarters [...]

CAOPIM.F. 3. Op. 1. D. 148. L. 62-62v. Fragment — typewritten text.

No. 2.15

Report of the accountant of the Office of the Field Headquarters A.F. Limonnikov to the head of the Administrative and Accounting Department of the headquarters on the transfer to another position in connection with the tactless actions of the head of the office S.S. Kharitonov

No. 17, Serpukhov May 23, 1919

REPORT to the Head of the Administrative and Accounting Department of the Field Headquarters of the RVS of the Republic

May 23 this year head of the office S.S. Kharitonov at 11:30 a.m. allowed himself to shout at me in his office, saying that I had a bad attitude towards my official duties and that I performed accounting worse than any clerk. The reason for such instructions on the part of Comrade Kharitonov was the fact that the head of the intelligence department had been returned

forwarded by the office to this department documents for expenses for exploration, but these documents were ordered to be sent to the intelligence department by the head of the office himself, and, consequently, having completed the named work, I only carried out his order.

In view of the fact that the head of the office allowed himself to repeatedly and undeservedly insult me earlier - allegedly for the inept performance of my task, to which I was assigned - I ask your petition to the chief of staff to transfer me to the position of one of the assistants to the head of the field headquarters department or, in extreme cases, a clerk.

To this I report that I have been in the clerical service for 16 years. In peacetime, he was the clerk of the military commander

\* The final fragment is missing.

Warsaw local brigade (Department of the Lassky military commander of the highest rank). During the war with Germany from July 25, 1914 to April 20, 1918, he served in the office of the Chief Supply Officer of the Western Front - first as an assistant, and then as head of the economic department of the named office. From April 20 to May 20, 1918, he was the head of the monetary department of the Tambov provincial military commissariat, from May 17, 1918 to the present, he was in the service, first in the Office at the Headquarters of the Supreme Military Council, and then in the Field Headquarters.

For my service in the supply office of the Western Front, I have an excellent certification.

Accountant of the Office of the Field Headquarters

Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of Limonnikov

Resolution V.V. Dallera" "Secret. To the inspectorate [department] - to comrades Vorobyov and [Vilkov]. In view of repeated statements, I propose that an investigation be carried out in which it is necessary to find out [what are] the relations between the chief of the Office and the employees. Daller". 19.W1. [1] 919".

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 5. D. 66. L. 368-368v. The original is a typewritten text with an autograph.

### Applications Nos. 1-2

## Investigation materials

Appendix No. 1 May 31, 1919 2.

INVESTIGATION on the report filed by the head of the Administrative and Accounting Department by the accountant of the Office of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic LIMONNIKOV on the actions of the head of the Office KHARITONOV

The following persons questioned in the present case testified as follows:

\* L. 368 - a simple pencil.      \*\* Nearby is an autographed visa of the military commissar: "Semyonov".

XOya27

K.I. Klimov: I will say nothing but good things about Kharitonov as a boss and a person. He is a demanding boss, and therefore every mistake made by a subordinate causes a certain irritation in KHARITONOV, especially since the entire service in our department, where hundreds of people visit a day, is the most nervous and tense.

As for KHARITONOV's relations with LIMONNIKOV, I can say that they used to be the best in Murom and in Moscow.

CM. Ryabov: I served with KHARITONOV together even before the Japanese War. "He was kind of strange even then. He always had rudeness in his voice, even with jokes. Therefore, no matter who he spoke to, his voice already sounds rude. to himself he seems a callous person, but in fact he is kind. When asked by employees, he is especially rude, but even without them (and with his employees and other staff officers) he is rude. He is rarely friendly. We don't have a person in the office whom KHARITONOV wouldn't get caught for the cause. KHARITONOV's relations with LIMONNIKOV are uneven: now he treats him with great confidence, now with reproaches, but this is always only when a mistake is discovered. KHARITONOV himself makes reproaches of ignorance of the matter, not excluding LIMONNIKOV. to everyone else. KHARITONOV himself works properly. As for LIMONNIKOV, he is also an assiduous worker, but it is possible that at present the family causes him more concern than is necessary in the service

case.

I.I. Vaskin: KHARITONOV is despotic by nature. He does not treat employees well, he often has clashes with everyone. In my opinion, KHARITONOV even simply has nit-picking about employees. Orders are given to them rudely, in an impolite manner. He will not give a sincere answer to the information asked by his subordinates, but always with a scandal. He is certainly nervous, but still he always likes to say something with an insult to a person, and not [something] sincere. He doesn't even greet the employees. All employees often hear from Kharitonov about the inability to conduct their business. to the authorities,

\* So in the text. Obviously, it follows: "in vain."

"20/7

Of course, KHARITONOV feels respect, but he is harsh towards the lower employees - not only his own, but the entire staff. After LIMONNIKOV's first statement against KHARITONOV, I was once in KHARITONOV's office and the latter, among other things, said to me: "I know you are undermining me, you will not succeed, rather I will throw you out one by one." With LIMONNIKOV KHARITONOV [now] does not speak for a week, then again - the same with others. In my opinion, KHARITONOV should not single out LIMONNIKOV from among other employees at work.

I.D. Slyusarchuk: I don't know, maybe KHARITONOV is also nervous, but in any case he is harsh and intemperate. His attitude towards employees is unbearable. He does not go towards his own or other employees - always somehow with a cry. Previously, KHARITONOV found fault with his subordinates almost every day. Who flatters him, then he is nothing to him. Lately KHARITONOV for some reason began to find fault with LIMONNIKOV. KHARITONOV does not value work. He will never answer a greeting to employees even on the street.

V.E. Vashchenko: In my opinion, KHARITONOV is a sick person. A normal healthy person would not allow himself such an attitude towards others as KHARITONOV. He has nagging at everyone, and then he somehow snaps. KHARITONOV found fault with RYABOV in particular: he threw papers at him and spoke rudely. The same is true for SLYUSARCHUK and VASKIN. Lately, KHARITONOV has nevertheless become more correct, which did not prevent him from attacking LIMONNIKOV completely in vain and unfairly - everything was done by the latter at the direction of KHARITONOV himself. However, KHARITONOV appreciates LIMONNIKOV, although sometimes he offends him for no reason. LIMONNIKOV himself never gave Kharitonov a chance. The last time he shouted at LIMONNIKOV, the latter even fell ill and left the service. It often happens that KHARITONOV, not understanding what the matter is, will yell at strangers, as it was, for example, with the head of the receiving station, IVANOV. Shouts and KHARITONOV's attitude towards everyone make them stop work. He never even apologizes. For example, I want to leave such a service.

A.V. Semenova: KHARITONOV is very rude and harsh, but I attribute this to his soreness. It is sharp to the extreme, but at the same time it is also soft, which, however, [happens] very

rarely. He is harsh with everyone—not just his employees. In relation to LIMONNIKO VU, he is the same as to others, i.e. to RYABOV and VASKIN. Besides

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he most of all comes into contact with them in the service. KHARITONOV requires careful and diligent work. Perhaps, sometimes in greater quantities, but still within the limits of the possible. I did not notice any particular injustice by KHARITONOV towards the employees. He does not greet an employee, except when he is healthy and, therefore, in a good mood. Kharitonov had conflicts with LIMONNIKOV and with others.

V.F. Malygin: KHARITONOV is rude to everyone, but, in my opinion, it is in his character. If he fails in something, he especially loses his temper. Often during his antics, he says "You" to everyone. Then he has no habit of greeting employees. In relation to LIMONNIKOV, he was especially harsh and rude.

A.A. Nikitin: I have known Kharitonov for 15 years. He is the son of a peasant. Kostromich comes from a former teacher. He was an officer and took courses at the academy. Its origin and congenital angularity, as well as the presence of pain, make Kharitonov be uneven and unrestrained. By virtue of his upbringing, he had been so uneven before, and not only now. As head of the office, he is unfair to everyone and shouts at everyone too. If anyone got it, then, of course, on merit. The blame for his treatment of employees falls, of course, on the latter. He screams when he finds mistakes. His remarks on the service are always fair. He is exacting exactly right. He does not take out rubbish from the hut, i.e. comments on errors and misses do not go further. I have not heard about the last case, i.e. the conversation between KHARITONOV and LIMONNIKOV was not in my presence.

V.N. Antsyferov: I have known Kharitonov for a long time. He is certainly an honest man. He is rude by nature. He was also ferocious in his service in the regiment. Here KHARITONOV strongly observes the interests of the service, protecting both himself, so as not to get into trouble, and the interests of his superiors. Therefore, sometimes, when inquiring, KHARITONOV gives only dry answers strictly according to the law, which is not always to the liking of those who are interested, since they do not always coincide with the opinion on the same issue of the authorities, who are often not aware of the numerous orders and explanations that KHARITONOV is familiar with. In relation to his subordinates who make mistakes, he always takes his own measures, i.e. tries to reason with them, which, however, he fails due to his innate rudeness. But KHARITONOV never files a report on his subordinates. LIMONNIKOV, as an accountant, must from beginning to end check all the papers that come to him, but he only checks the results in them. Latest Appropriations

(because they were not properly checked in the accounting department) were all wrong and were returned. Kharitonov often pointed this out and spoke about it" to LIMONNIKOV. Recently, an unpleasant paper came from Control, and KHARITONOV, of course, got exhausted and called LIMONNIKOV for an explanation. The latter said that he did not have time to work - KHARITONOV objected to this that he could work out at home, and LIMONNIKOV replied that he only studied until 8 o'clock and would never sit still again. After these words KHARITONOV said that I would teach you how to work. That's all I know about the present. Kharitonov is very nervous, he is rude even in the family and sometimes does not even talk to his wife. He is, perhaps, both painful and such in nature, but not vindictive. Most likely, he is unrestrained. I also had skirmishes with him, but on the basis of our old acquaintance, of course, they were liquidated and good relations resumed again. He is now being treated and takes cold showers. Of course, there is no ill will in his relations with employees - he knows the service well enough. As far as I could, I always tried to smooth his relations with employees.

A.F. Limonnikov: I have been serving with Kharitonov for a long time. I got to know him well both as a leader and as a person. He is sick, bilious, unfair to me and to others. Perhaps more to SLYUSARCHUK and VASKIN than to others. From KHARITONOV you can hear harsh expressions like: "You will be expelled from the service." As a sensitive person, I have always been

offended by his relations" | Complaining was hard and unpleasant, and I endured it. We had no disagreements in Moscow and our relations were good. Incidentally, I even asked KHARITONOV for advice on whether I should transfer to another service (before leaving here"), and KHARITONOV advised me not to. I took his advice to the leadership and came here. In Moscow, we had small harshness, but I, due to KHARITONOV's nervousness, forgave them. It was bad for RYABOV there. KHARITONOV shouted at him and threw papers at him. But RYABOV did not know the matter at that time and put up with it, but it was unpleasant for me to listen to this myself. However, I realized that RYABOV did not yet know the matter, and I excused Kharitonov for his treatment of RYABOV.

\* So in the text. That's right: about it.

\*\* Probably, this refers to the Military-Economic Supervision.

\*\*\* So in the text.

zhee "To Serpukhov, obviously, in November 1918.

"135

Here, in Serpukhov, our relations have changed. KHARITONOV is studying in his office and therefore moved away from us. Previously, we were always at work together and also went home from work. KHARITONOV often used to tell everyone that they weren't working very hard. I, as best I could, always smoothed his relationship with employees. Here, in Serpukhov, we work separately - KHARITONOV is alone at home, and we are. employees, together, and our relations have changed and become aggravated. He is generally not sociable by nature, and this alienates him from everyone. At least he, as a person, talked to us, otherwise he doesn't greet us, and doesn't say goodbye. Treats only as subordinates. I used to stand up for them and appease KHARITONOV, but I don't do this here, so if someone doesn't do something here and KHARITONOV starts screaming, then I don't interfere, although it hurts me to listen. KHARITONOV, by nature, still likes to have his subordinates talk to him as people, and not as employees, but I did not find the need for this, especially [since] he urged me to work. I do not like. when they urge me on, and asked KHARITONOV not to urge me on, but only to give instructions. Here, when Kharitonov's bile boils, he already decides in advance to scold someone. For me, there was a difficult case before Easter - KHARITONOV started yelling at me that the advance report was not ready (I did it for about a month with fits and starts). But KHARITONOV did not know the complexity of this work, and it was the most serious work in my entire service. I reply to KHARITONOV's remark that this work is difficult, all the more [because] I also have other daily work on my hands, and I cannot concentrate on this report alone. KHARITONOV told me that I did little work and could sit and then; Well, I say, I can't sit. Since KHARITONOV spoke to me in an elevated tone and unfairly, this began to unnerve me. Following this, KHARITONOV added. that if I do not want to work properly, then I can look for another. This offended me and I went, it was, to complain and met Commissar SEMYONOV, to whom I told the incident, asking him to take some unofficial measures against KHARITONOV so that he would not allow such rude antics in the future. SEMENOV, however, offered to file a collective complaint with the faction, promising on this condition to remove KHARITONOV, but, of course, I could not do this and told SEMENOV that such a complaint should not be filed. My resentment subsided after that, but all this affected my

health - I am nervous and very worried. I believe that KHARITONOV began to go far. At the same time, I asked for a transfer, because they never spoke to me in the service in the same way as KHARITONOV, i.e. that I'm out of place. KHARITONOV remained the same after this incident, but he treated me better. The other day, the department turned out 2 unpleasant ones in terms of the content of the paper. In one of them, when we figured it out, it turned out, in fact, that an employee of the intelligence department UDALOV was to blame, who let us down. It happened like this: I, on behalf of KHARITONOV, chose the known documents on the expenses of the intelligence department and, together with the accompanying paper, sent them there. There UDALOV signed only for receiving some of the documents, not all of them, and returned the rest to us. Since this was wrong, according to KHARITONOV's resolution, we again returned them there, and Udalov was offended by this, and the intelligence department sent us a caustic paper signed by the head of the operational department and others that the office should draw up a report, etc. - it was all written



very prickly. At the same time, on the same day (it was May 23), the controller also received an unpleasant paper stating that the appropriations presented by us often have errors in those expenses that are shown by other parts. You see, we have not checked and are not checking the demanding statements that come to us." Then, somehow, Control missed undivided appropriations, and I, knowing this, sent the same this time, but here Control returned everything back and also wrote that there were mistakes, and did not approve our statements, although earlier (as I said) Control did not give us such instructions either. Of course, all this upset KHARITONOV and he called me into his office. I noticed that he [in] Lately, he has avoided giving a shout-out in the presence of all the employees, but has tried to call him in. KHARITONOV immediately began to speak in a raised tone about the fact that the paper from the intelligence department had been returned. "and you let me down, confuse me and conduct business worse than the driver's letter. To this I objected to Kharitonov that I would bring the orders and we would see who was right. I bring and show Kharitonov the orders, saying that you are shouting at me, and I right - everything is right.

\* Most likely, we are talking about demanding statements for the issuance of salaries.

employees.

KHARITONOV began to "get out", he felt embarrassed that he got excited, and I already wanted to forgive him for his vehemence, but at that time I entered Volkov's office (from the operational department), and since KHARITONOV likes to show his power in front of others (yes besides, is it really good to get unpleasant papers), then he began again and said to me: "You are confusing everything, there is no strength with you." I indicate that I will look again. Nua KHARITONOV again: "What is there to read," he says. - We need a specialist. If you don't know, don't take it." I answered him that I can do it, that I am not guilty and I do not accept his screams and abuse, after which I left. Following me, KHARITONOV said, "I will make you listen." Returning to the office, I wrote a report to the head of the department, as I fell ill from all these troubles. I asked in the report not for an inquiry, but only for my transfer to another department, and then I submitted a report to the head of the department about my illness, asking to appoint me to the [medical] commission. You see, KHARITONOV after such scenes (i.e. dressing down) becomes the same as always. I began to reason that if I did not file a report, then I was not insured for the future from the fact that such scenes would not be repeated, and this, of course, would affect my health.

S.S. Kharitonov: Lately I have repeatedly received papers pointing out the errors of the office entrusted to me. This began to bother me, since I had to do everything myself and it turned out that I was the speaker of my own office, where there were a sufficient number of people who should report to me, but out of negligence I had to take on all the work. I often told LIMONNIKOV to check everything properly, and Control pointed out that it was impossible to conduct business in this way, as LIMONNIKOV conducts, and even called him personally for an explanation. But all the same, everything remained the same; the last time I ordered LIMONNIKOV to separate the appropriations, but he nevertheless connected them, after which Control returned our papers. I call LIMONNIKOV and tell him that his attitude to the matter is worse than the clerk. Of course, I was agitated from the unpleasantness, and my voice is always loud, so I spoke in a raised tone, but did not scold LIMONNIKOV. The latter, in response to my words, told me that a specialist was needed for this matter. When I find mistakes in employees, I will not complain about them, and if I see that a person is worthy of a reprimand, then I will do it to him and will not be ashamed of it. So it was in this case. LIMONNIKOV then

tells me that he does not have enough time for everything, but I told him that he cannot complain about this, since I often stay to work myself after 8 o'clock [in the evening] and he could stay for half an hour. Of course, LIMONNIKOV must find all the necessary information himself, but I notice his unwillingness to do this. If I were constantly pointing out the mistakes of everyone, then, of course, many others should have left the service long ago. During my explanation with LIMONNIKOV, there was VOLKOV, who overheard our conversation.

E.V. Volkov: I remember that not so long ago, when I went to the head of the office KHARITONOV, the latter spoke to the accountant LIMONNIKOV about some reports of the intelligence department. These reports, as I understood, were not kept, and LIMONNIKOV wanted to unsubscribe so that the intelligence department would compile them themselves. KHARITONOV, however, pointed out to him that the intelligence department did not keep any books, and therefore its office and accountant should do this work themselves. At the same time, KHARITONOV reproached LIMONNIKOV for not having made this report earlier. LIMONNIKOV answered him that he could not do this, as he was busy. Then KHARITONOV says that if there was a real accountant, then he, of course, would have coped with such work. LIMONNIKOV, apparently, did not understand Kharitonov's answer and declared that he worked a lot. KHARITONOV objected to this that if he works a lot, then you can't limit yourself to this, but you need to sit in excess of what is supposed to be - and then everything will be in order. Then LIMONNIKOV, in a sharp and elevated tone, declared that he did not recognize these reproaches of KHARITONOV and did not want to talk about this, after which he left. Kharitonov said nothing after him. After this scene, I got an impression that was completely unfavorable for LIMONNIKOV, since he answered KHARITONOV rudely and sharply. I heard that KHARITONOV himself was generally rude, but here with LIMONNIKOV he was correct, and I was surprised at his restraint. In my place, I, a calm person, would not allow LIMONNIKOV to talk to me like that.

A.A. Demkin: KHARITONOV does not shout at me in vain. Unless, of course, that you do not fulfill, then you will fall. I didn't see anything bad from him. He is demanding when something is not done at work. Of course, employees come late, they are reprimanded for it, but they don't like it:

when the boss yells.

Testimony of employees V.M. SKOROKHODOV and M.Ya. CHIRKOVA were not recorded due to the lack of any material for this investigation.

yyj id of the assistant to the head of the inspection department

Vorobyov

Military Commissar [signature]

May 31, 1919

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 5. D. 66. L. 368 with ob.-373. The original is a typewritten text with autographs.

Appendix No. 2, Serpukhov, June 6, 1919

## CONCLUSION"

From interviews with the staff of the Office of the Field Headquarters, it turned out that KHARITONOV, being a sick person and distinguished by unfriendliness, at the same time has a rough voice, which [due to] congenital angularity and upbringing makes him a callous person in the eyes of others.

In the service of KHARITONOV, being an honest and fair worker, he demands careful and diligent work from his subordinates and, for the missteps and blunders of employees, scolds them "on the conscience", and reproaches, in case someone does not know his business, makes reproaches to everyone without exception and always on merit, without any evil will.

Recently, according to the recall of those interrogated, KHARITONOV has become more correct.

Some of those interrogated explain this attitude in Kharitonov's service by his nervousness, others by the nature of the service in his office, which is tense to the highest degree, while others see this as nit-picking in relation to themselves, although there is no evidence of such.

LIMONNIKOV, confirming the circumstances of the case indicated by him in the report and the expressions made by KHARITONOV in their explanation, and not denied at the same time by KHARITONOV himself, as

\* Title of the document.

this is evident from his - KHARITONOV - testimony, declared that he was ready to forgive KHARITONOV's shouts, if an employee of the Operational Directorate VOLKOV had not entered during their explanation. In the presence of the latter, KHARITONOV began to point out his mistakes again and even said in pursuit when LIMONNIKOV was leaving: "I will make you listen."

What VOLKOV stated was not at all confirmed and, on the contrary, he, having previously known KHARITONOV's rudeness, was surprised in this case by his correctness and was struck by the behavior of LIMONNIKOV, who answered KHARITONOV rudely and sharply.

According to KHARITONOV, recently, due to the negligent attitude of employees to the service, a large number of papers executed by them began to return back to the office with indication of errors in calculations, non-compliance with the formalities required by law, etc., keep track of which KHARITONOV himself does not, of course, have the opportunity. When, under such circumstances, the papers were returned by the Control, he - KHARITONOV, having called the accountant LIMONNIKOV, whom Control even called for an explanation, indicated to LIMONNIKOV that his attitude to the matter was worse than the clerk, while (since he, KHARITONOV, was excited by this unpleasant paper for him), he spoke in a raised tone, which he already has so loudly: of course, he did not scold LIMONNIKOV, but pointed out that if he, LIMONNIKOV, as he stated, did not have enough time, then he could sit even after 8 hours, as Kharitonov himself does.

LIMONNIKOV himself, without denying that he made mistakes (although he justifies himself by the fact that Control had previously made such mistakes), declares that his desire was not to investigate his relations with KHARITONOV, but only to transfer him to another position, in order not to have anything to do with KHARITONOV in the future, since this has a bad effect on his—LIMONNIKOV—health.

Wreed assistant to the head of the inspection department

Administrative and Accounting Department Vorobyov

Military Commissar [signature]

\* It was underlined in pencil, opposite the pencil mark: "it was not."

"b" June 1919 Serpukhov

Report by V.V. Daller F.V. Kostyaev":

"I report to the chief of staff:

I consider Kharitonov, head of the office, a good, conscientious worker who knows his job very well.

Kharitonov often answers in a rude manner and conducts a conversation in a rude manner; but this rudeness is not impudent, but inborn, which Kharitonov, apparently, cannot always overcome owing to his general nervousness.

Limonnikov is not right in official terms, but he has the right, like all employees, to demand the necessary restraint from Kharitonov.

I guess:

- 1) Establish a balance in the relationship for myself;
- 2) to propose to Kharitonov to switch to a more correct tone and
- 3) Leave Limonnikov in the office, suggesting that he avoid mistakes in the business entrusted to him.

Vladimir Daller V/YTD 1) 919,

Resolution [F.V. Kostyaeva]: I suppose to issue an appropriate order [2 words are illegible]. 9/ M1., (19) 19. [signature].

Resolution of the leadership of the PS: "To pacify both of them to the very head [of] the Administrative and Accounting Department. Head[Head] piece [aba] Kostyaev. Aralov "" 9/U1.[1919]".

V.V. Daller's litter": "Done, to the point. Daller. 5/UP.[1] 919".

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 5. D. 66. L. 368-372v.

The original is a typewritten text with autographs.

No. 2.16 Report by S.I. Aralov to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on the relationship between the RVSR Field Headquarters and the Serpukhov Soviet

No. 708/2, Serpukhov And June 1919

\* L. 380 vol. - Signed in black ink.

\*\* Ink, L. 380 vol.

\*\*+ Pencil, L. 380, over text.

\*\*++ Ink, autograph-visa.

\*\*\*\*\* Black pencil, L. 380, in the upper right corner.

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RKP

I report the following about the relationship between the RVSR Field Headquarters and the Serpukhov Soviet: the deployment of the Field Headquarters in such a small town as Serpukhov, which followed for strategic reasons, could not, of course, go without a trace, but in the memorandum of the Presidium of the Council, not all issues are covered correctly. The small conflicts that arose during the relocation of the Field Headquarters between the representatives of the Headquarters and the Council were always liquidated by me by mutual agreement. In the end, it was possible to achieve full contact between the Field Headquarters and the Soviet: the communist part of the staff of the headquarters took an active part in local political work. The organizational work of the Serpukhov Council was all the time not up to par, which ultimately contributed to the deterioration of the food situation in the city, which reached an acute crisis 2 months ago. and the Eastern Fronts, at my request, sent more than 10 wagons of food as a gift to the Serpukhov workers, the Field Headquarters issued certificates to representatives of the Council on unhindered travel to the front to purchase food. Telegrams were sent to the fronts with a request to assist, and the expeditions positive results. A petition was filed before the People's Commissariat for Food on behalf of the Field Headquarters to take measures to improve the food situation in the city; the petition was granted. All these measures made it possible to smooth out the acuteness of the moment, and the food situation improved. The Serpukhov Council often experienced a severe financial crisis and repeatedly applied to the Field Headquarters with a request for the issuance of a loan of several hundred thousand rubles, and the Field Headquarters always went forward, than

greatly facilitated the position of the Council. Thus, support was provided in all major issues. Turning to the facts given in the note of the Presidium of the Council, I can say that I, on behalf of the Field Headquarters, agreed to the resettlement of employees, but asked that they not be placed in worse conditions, which the Council guaranteed. Nika-

\* Here and throughout the document, italicized words are underlined in black.

handle Maximov.

what protection of the bourgeoisie does the Field Headquarters not provide; if there are clinging, which is difficult to avoid, then I have taken steps to remove them; yet newcomers are subject to strict controls. Contractor Kulkov, who really turned out to be from the environment of the prosperous bourgeoisie, "after the statement of the chairman of the Executive Committee Comrade Antonov about Kulkov's unwillingness to obey the order on resettlement, I was immediately dismissed and sent to the disposal of the Military Commissariat for appointment to the army. "The incident with the head of the garrison, not understanding the scope of his competence, after my instructions, he was liquidated by the official apology of the head of the garrison to the Executive Committee. The Administrative and Accounting Department received a statement addressed to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic from one of the citizens of the city of Serpukhov about the allegedly incorrect seizure of salt from him, which he was carrying under permission. forwarded for him and the head of department Daller with signatures to the Executive Committee, with the note "to investigate the case" and a request "to notify the results" ". At the same time, I gave an order to Comrade Semyonov, pointing out the inadmissibility of intrusion into the sphere of competence of the Council, and ordered that no such papers be sent in the future. As for indications of a more favorable position of the headquarters in terms of heating, it was true that the temperature in the headquarters premises was maintained during the winter at a level at which work was possible, otherwise the efficiency would have been reduced, which could not but have an impact on the defense of the Republic. The city could well be satisfied with the prepared stock of firewood, if the Council would arrange a supply. The employees of the Field Headquarters, who lived in the city, were in the same conditions as the rest of the population, and the temperature in their apartments dropped below zero degrees. I believe that the facts set forth in the memorandum of the Presidium of Serpukhov-

\* Here and throughout the document, underlined words are underlined by hand with a simple pencil.

\*\* Opposite the litter of V. Maksimov: "not in the rear militia ?!"

\*\*\* Opposite V. Maksimov's litter: "It happened more than once, according to a member of the M| of Moscow | Provincial Committee Comrade Kokushkin.

Council, great importance is attached, and the appeal itself to the RVSR and the Central Committee seems to me superfluous and little substantiated.

All these misunderstandings were resolved by me after my arrival from the front.

Military commissar and member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Aral Republic

V. Maksimov's resolution: "The present explanation, together with the report of the Serpukhov District Committee, should be handed over to comrade. Gusev <and V.M. Smirnov> in order to avoid such. the frictions described here. 19/1.[19] 19 Vlad[imir] Maksimov.

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 10. D. 14. L. 189--190v. Vacation - typewritten text on the letterhead "RSFSR. Military Commissar of the Field Headquarters and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic" with an autograph.

No. 2.17

The report of the communist - cipher officer of the Field headquarters - S.I. Gusev about the need to remove the General Staff officer from the encryption business

Serpukhov June 12, 1919 2.

Commissioner of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic

When developing and approving the new states of the Field Headquarters in October 1918, comrade. Aralov managed to defend the position of head of ciphers of the Field Headquarters and his assistant - "party workers". What the latter was dictated to - I consider it completely superfluous to expand, but I believe that the need for such foresight on this issue has not lost its sharpness to this day. However, some time ago, on the sole instructions of the former Chief of Staff Kostyaev, another person was assigned to the head of ciphers - the General Staff.

The reason for this order was the disappearance during the distribution of 3 copies of the cipher that had not yet been put into effect. <...> For me, as the head of ciphers, this state of affairs seems very ticklish. For, formally and in fact, being responsible not only for the integrity of the number of ciphers, but also for the safety [and] conspiracy of such, with the assignment to me of the General Staff (whose entire activity in terms of ciphers boils down to the fact that he

By

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\* L. 189, over text, black pen.

instead of me, he receives incoming packages with ciphers and, after reviewing [c] [n] them, hands them over to me for storage and use, as well as for supplying them to the relevant headquarters) deprives me of any guarantee of the minimum preservation of the conspiracy of ciphers. The latter I think is absolutely abnormal.

Reporting the foregoing, I ask for your relevant instructions.

Head of ciphers. [Portnov]

Resolution S.I. Gusev": "Comrade Danishevsky. Draw up an order on mandatory encryption exclusively by the communists. In addition, it is necessary to strictly check the composition of the cryptographers, how old and loyal they are. S. Gusev. 1/U Sh".

<Litter of K.Kh.Danishevsky": "T[ov]. Gorshkov. I ask you to draw up a [draft] of the corresponding order and submit it to me. 2/8. Danishevsky.> —

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 10. D. 14. L. 214. The original is a typewritten text on the form "Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic" with an autograph in a green pen.

No. 2.18

From the minutes of the meeting of the MK RCP (b) - a record of the report of S.I. Gusev about corruption in the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and about shortcomings in the work of military censorship

June 21, 1919

Minutes of the meeting of the Moscow Committee of the RCP dated 21/11. 1919."

Gusev: [...] Concluding my report, I want to draw the attention of the M[oskovsky] Committee to the Headquarters in Serpukhov. The atmosphere there is very bad.

While at the front, at the head of all units, next to the commanding staff, there are communists, and everywhere there are such communist cells, here, in Serpukhov, there are extremely few communists,

the best comrades [comrades] from the cell were taken away by comrade. Aralov on the Western Front, the cell left to me has absolutely no influence.

\* L. 214, over the text - an autograph in lilac pencil. \*\* L. 214, above the text - an autograph in blue pen.

\*\*\* Title of the document.

Serpukhov military specialists allow themselves absolutely unacceptable treatment of communist comrades. The local organization of the communists is also behaving not entirely correctly: it is campaigning against [Polevoi] headquarters, incites workers to agitate against him. In dep | The [field] headquarters does not have political commissars everywhere, and some of the available commissars are not up to par. You understand everything. How important it is that everything goes well in our [Field] headquarters, that there is a strong communist cell that establishes strict control over innumerable specialists. Therefore, I propose to the Military Organization [at the MK RKP(b)] to allocate suitable comrades, solid and reliable, to send them to work in the [Field] headquarters. It is necessary to establish strict control, communist control, at the headquarters and organize party work in the district, where deserter uprisings often take place.

Tov. Gusev answers the questions put to him.

1) About military censorship. Our military censorship often lets into print what must not be omitted, and does not let through what is allowed. This is because it is cut off from the military command[ing] and acts independently. It must be subordinated to the command of the fronts.

[...] About Stavka. There really are a lot of useless elements there, and the Serpukhovian bourgeoisie has found a job at their service. There are things there that I will talk about with Dzerzhinsky. [...]

CAOPIM.F. 3. Op. 1. D. 101. L. 1, 3v. The original is a typewritten text with an autograph.

No. 2.19

From the memorandum of the military commissar of the TsUPVOSO V.V. Fominov in the Central Committee of the RCP(b), E.M. Sklyansky about his methods of work, about b. Head of UVOSO of the Eastern Front V.A. Zhygmunta, Head of TsUPVOSO M.M. Arzhanov and other leading personnel of the department

July 6, 1919 Very secret

1) To the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party

2) Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic Comrade. Sklyansky;

Copy: to the member of the RVSR, the military commissar of the Field Headquarters comrade. Gu-seva.

Member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, military commissar of the Central Directorate of Military Communications V.V. Fominova

Memorandum [On the appointment of military commissars and their relationship with military specialists |

\*^ Possible - and applications" in practice - are two main areas of activity [...] of military commissars with technicians - military specialists.

The first opens in its essence the slogan: "Beat the specialists." Long live the leadership of the commissars. This method has an undisguised tendency to seize the apparatus of military communications into the hands of communist specialists. The seizure must begin with the immediate occupation of leadership positions - the chiefs of military communications (in this case, all levels, their assistants and heads of departments).

The basis and justification of this method are two provisions: a) treason and betrayal on the part of white specialists in individual cases; their formal attitude to the case for the sake of "silver coins" - as a mass phenomenon, as a rule. The assumption that the available forces of the Communists are sufficient to seize the apparatus in their hands and conduct business in accordance with [the] demand[s]. The nursery of this direction is Petrograd. From there, even a diagram of the organization of the military communications apparatus according to this principle is presented (the diagram is attached at the end of the report ").

The second direction is based on the full use of the experience of the knowledge of specialists and the conviction that it is impossible to do it by one's own efforts. This is not possible without placing responsibility on them. Responsibility is possible subject to the presentation of a known doses of initiative - independence.

\* So in the text. Should read "applicable". \*\* All attachments to the report are missing from the file.

This last point of view is the official point of view of the Party. It was adopted by the US Party Congress and, consequently, must be put into practice for all members of the Party. The same principle underlies the structure of the entire organism of the country's military forces. Order No. 461 of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic forbids military commissars to interfere in the technical side of things. However, the rights and duties of military commissars have not been deliberately defined so far. With the proper proportion, tact, mind, everything becomes "a wide opportunity to influence the course of business in the most tangible" "" way.

I belong to the number of preachers of the official faith of the party, not out of fear, but out of conscience. Not because this line is official and obligatory, but because of discipline alone, but also because my own conviction coincides with the party line. And since I am entrusted with the duty to unite the activities of all military commissars of military communications of the Republic, I (to the best of my ability) oblige the authorities subordinate to me to use this particular method of relations with military specialists. [...]

I consider it appropriate to confirm the inconsistency of the first one with only two examples from practice. method.

For 8 months, V.A. was the head of military communications on the Eastern Front. Zygmunt, a member of the Russian Communist Party (though a very young member). In the past, he was a member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat for Communications.

Assistants, heads of departments and responsible officials in general, he also selected for himself party members. I have already spoken about the state of the apparatus of military communications in the East. This is evidenced by the materials attached to the report. This is also confirmed by the information coming from the new command post - the General Staff of Afanasyev. and the military commissar under him, Comrade Paramonov (see appendices).

The second example is from areas that are in close contact with military communications. In the department of the railway apparatus built

\* There is space for the word in the document.

\*\* Memory error. It probably means something else. \*\*\* So in the text. Should read: "always remains".

\*\*\*\* So in the text.

\*\*\*++ So in the text. That's right: "contiguous".

on the principle of the primacy of commissars and the irresponsibility of specialist technicians. There is no reason to testify to the practical suitability of this system and, nevertheless, its advantages.



Conversely, there are many reasons to argue the opposite. Reasons are well known. He became a parable  
tongue

As everywhere in the units of the army, specialists - masters of military affairs in military communications - are split by the revolution into three unequal forces. The best, not rich in numbers, works with the revolution for his conscience. Works despite hunger, impoverishment, contrast with the past. THEM, these people who bring their knowledge to the altar of the liberation of mankind, cannot but be surrounded by love and respect. There are few of these in the apparatus of military communications. But they are.

The second group (the most numerous) - bearing the "Bolshevik oppression" due to grave material necessity. These people hate the revolution and everyone like it. Disfigured by the "great provocateur of peoples" - capital, they are cowardly, as on a barometer, fluctuations in political bad weather are noticeable on them; they are passively hostile and (sometimes) cowardly, cautiously, against the calculations of the day, out of class hatred. They are valuable only for their experience, knowledge[s], organizational[s] and skills. They do not create new forms, they carry only traditions with them; they are formally related to work; they are indifferent to its end result. But still they are necessary. There is no one to replace them. And learn the class victoriously "they still have something.

Third layer. Most are strong, brave, hostile. Tricky. Spies. They work on behalf of enemies that have not yet been defeated. Collect information. Transmit. With the removal of strategic reserves on the fronts and the need to wage war by transferring troops along the so-called internal communication lines, espionage in the organs of military communications has become of paramount importance.

The attitude towards the first two groups on the part of the procurators of the revolution—military commissars—is evident from the very nature of these groups. There are no disagreements here. Spies and traitors stand apart. In the process of current work in the institution, they are not

\* So in the text. That's right: "The best [power], not rich in numbers." \*\* So in the text. "operational". \*\*\* More correctly:

opportunity to capture. Based on the mass of small observations, one can only localize suspicions on a certain group of people. Further, the method of unceremonious [joint] is already needed; establishing, if possible, all connections and acquaintances, then arrests, then evidence, then merciless reprisals. The forces for the implementation of this system of combating treachery are not at the disposal of the military commissars. It is necessary to involve detective bodies, in this case, the Special Department of the Cheka. On the application of this measure to a group of employees of the Central] upr | pressure | military communications, I insist before the Special Department.

I recommend the same method of struggle to the commissars of the UPVOSO of the fronts.

[...]

[About the heads of the TsUPVOSO at the PSH RVSR M.M. Arzhanov and I.A. Barmina]

[...] The personality of the head of the Central Directorate of Military Communications M.M. Arzhanov is characterized by the following main features.

Ambitious. Extremely committed to material goods and life's comforts. These two reasons - no others - are the stimuli of his activity. This alone—nothing else—determines its relative value. In order to keep with the amount of material wealth that accompanies the post of head of the Central [head] department of military communications, he strains his efforts, strives to show his worth. Not for the sake of the cause.

He is extremely unscrupulous in the means of strengthening his own well-being. Rules of any morality does not know. Is it a Hottentot? And this is by no means an exaggeration and not a red word.

On the contrary, it is the most essential element of his moral character, since it is generally appropriate to deal with questions of morality in this report.

He considers the things and advantages assigned to the position (car, office, furniture, etc.) as given to him personally.

Complete disregard for the rights (legal, natural - equally) of their subordinates; even helpers. Vengeful. For directness and pointing out the mistakes of subordinates, he persecutes with persistent

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best available" (head [head] | department [department] of the General] staff [aba] Savenko, General] staff [aba] Nikulin, General] staff [aba] Afanasiev and a lot of small fry were appointed by him to lower positions -ness, exiled to the front and dismissed [without] any dependence on usefulness and ability to work).

Lying. In business and personal matters, he lies equally to everyone with or without reason. Often naive, ridiculous. Sometimes dangerous and harmful. In reports vols. Trotsky and Sklyansky, Chief of the Field Staff, reports" invariably in my or my deputy's presence, distorts the true state of affairs in the direction of obscuring the shortcomings of the apparatus, unfulfilled promises and, consequently, as a result of the possibility of incorrect combat calculations.

He strives (which, by the way, naturally, characterizes not only him) to get on the reports without a commissar-witness and, through shameless lies, "strengthen" his own position. Not [s]only smart, how practical. And then unilaterally - in order to use their official position for personal, family and other conveniences.

He has considerable longevity (25) experience in the railway business. Experience - from a small agent to the manager of the Operational Directorate of Railways after the October Revolution. He does not have a higher military education, and his military report is also insignificant, which is a minus for the head of the Central Military Administration and seriously slows down work in other parts of it. Qualitatively, the value of his experience according to ... the system would be correct to assess the mark 3. This does not prevent him, at every convenient or inconvenient occasion, from flaunting phrases of self-praise, invariably beginning with the words "I am a quarter of a century", etc. and call himself "the creator of the dispatch business in Russia." To this last title he seems to have some real claim.

Frivolous and talkative. All his activity — even positive, useful — invariably bears the imprint of ... "" "" phrase, effect, shown"

There is no seriousness, depth, scope of thought and creativity and does not promise to be.

\* So in the text.

\*\* So in the text. That's right: "ostentatious." \*\*\* (Leaving room for a word.

\*\*\*\* (Leaving room for a word.

\*\*\*\*\* So in the text. That's right: "ostentatious."

Ho ut

As an administrator, it is not amenable to a short, sharp assessment. Has merit. There is pressure. The ability to give orders so that they are executed. Often this skill borders on inexpressible"

impudence.

Maintains discipline among subordinates without difficulty - by methods that are strong, but not for a long time acting (dressing, threats, penalties, arrests).

He is executive himself, but without initiative, with the exception of economic issues.

Its extreme and sharp shortcoming is the inability to design local bodies of military communications, to direct, to improve the apparatus, depending on the accumulated [experience]. True, a significant proportion of the disarray must be attributed to objective conditions. However, the knowledge of conscious efforts towards ordering remains invariably great.

Local bodies - front and army UPVOSO - arose spontaneously, from local forces and means. They still work handicraft. Their organization is extremely imperfect. The selection of staff is random and therefore in need of close guidance [and] instruction. The main "elements of any administrative apparatus, in particular the UPVOSO - 1) the center (the brain and the owner); 2) communications; and 3) local authorities of all instances. Only with the relative perfection of these three terms can the sum be considered satisfactory. The central body - "TsUPVOSO" - is relatively perfect. Relatively because there are major flaws here. The selection of employees is good. Lots of valuable experts. But the system of work of departments and departments is not united in the person of the head of the department. He does not conduct the work, does not direct it. It only makes noise, often in Repetilovsky style. From this coherence, friendship, if I may say so, there is no ensemble.

Ratings, threats, complete disregard for the dignity of subordinates act strongly, but not for long. A habit is formed not to serve, but to serve. With the disappearance of the formidable bosses from sight - at least temporarily - it is a matter of relief (as something unpleasant) postponed.

The most important of the departments of the central administration, the 3rd (military operational) does not dare to shine with the perfection of organization.

\* So in the text.      \*\* Originally stood: "Special".

Ha"

zation. On the contrary, in his work, the lack of reasonable guidance from the boss is most obvious. For close observation, it is clear that there is not one "once" or "not yet reached". No, M.M. Arzhanov knows that the department where 65-70% of the work of the TsUVS is concentrated - all transportation - is seriously ill. I have repeatedly drawn attention to this. He agreed. But so far everything has been limited to spacing. Here we are undoubtedly dealing with ignorance of the methods of organization—scientific, serious organization of work; the inability to introduce a simple, expedient, convenient, perfect system of work, so that it requires simple skills from people, free from a mass of unnecessary, routine.

Is it so important. In order to win, it is necessary - along with other elements - to have a system of struggle that is not only not worse than the enemy, but also superior - in terms of expediency.

The second element is that the connection can be considered satisfactory" (meaning the connection in the technical sense of the word). Difficulties only in relations with other departments in the operation of communications. Eliminating this shortcoming is beyond the scope of a single PCO. He, at best, may have the initiative in this matter.

The situation is bad with obtaining the necessary information from the field. They come out randomly. It turns out a lot of unnecessary ballast to the detriment of the necessary. Precise, short, clear norms have not been created. There are many parallels with the work of the NKPS. This area closely borders on the imperfection of local organs. They must be taught to walk. There are no trained people. Here M.M. Arzhanov is not wealthy at all. He is completely absorbed by the current work. He flounders almost helplessly in her waves; he is unable to get out to the island, to the heights, to survey all the work, to create the main ... "", which would allow him to master the turbulent streams gushing from everywhere all over again.

current work, shackle it into the steel channel of the system. Doesn't look ahead, can't look. His slogan, although it may be unconscious, is "his wickedness prevails for the day." The only exceptions are economic issues and some worries about the "arrangement" of employees. In this M.M. Arzhanov shows meritorious activity.

\* So in the text. \*\* So in the text. That's right: "satisfactory." \*\*\* Space left for the word.

Another (most important) side of the characteristic is political. Often speaks of his complete devotion to the interests of the revolution. It seems that he repeatedly raised the question of joining the RCP. His favorite motive on this score is ranting that "Your humble servant will be the first to be shot when Kolchak comes," etc. It is bold to sometimes discuss the subject of the historical inevitability of the proletarian revolution and how contemptible specialists are who do not understand this inevitability. Repeats. The stock of his social ideas is extremely thin. He does not go beyond filthy, scattered thoughts, borrowed from conversations with his Bolshevik acquaintances and rarely read newspaper articles. From the very first words, it invariably goes astray [thought], goes over to a purely philistine genre. In the assurances of his loyalty, one can clearly hear and feel the image of a petty predator, mutilated by capital, capable of considering phenomena only from a personal point of view. .."" stuck in him ineradicably and sees through all his relations, in his deeds, dealing with people, manners.

That was the case until recently. But during the last two weeks, there have been 3 facts that inspire suspicion, but are not sufficient for categorical conclusions. I will state them: 1) In one of the reports to the Chief of the Field Staff (date), a question arose about the route that should have sent the 2nd brigade of the 5th rifle division, which was then transferred from the Eastern Front to the Southern (then the assignment was changed to Petrograd). The brigade was located in the Birska area. Boarding it on ships was delayed for a long time partly because of the lack of ready tonnage on Belaya, partly because of the lack of concentration during the units themselves ... "The tonnage was expelled from Kazan. M.M. Arzhanov began to expound on the advantages of transporting this brigade along According to M. M. Arzhanov, the brigade had to reach Ufa in march order. Arzhanov went up to a map showing the disposition of units along the fronts, and began counting the number of versts from Birska to Ufa.

\* So in the text. That's right: "disfigured." \*\* Space left for the word. \*\*\* Space left in the text for - sentence (2).

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as many per versts as per the numbering of divisions located along the front. The need for calculation was not caused by anything, especially since the exact number of miles from Birska to Ufa was known to M.M. Arzhanov, and right there, in the conversation, was once again prompted to him by my deputy comrade Shchukin, who was present at the report. The suspicion of this case is aggravated by the fact that M.M. Arzhanov is extremely sensitive in his relations with his superiors. Such tactlessness as contemplating the most secret map in someone else's office, and even the authorities, does not fit in with all the rest of M.M.'s behavior. Arzhanov" under such conditions. In any case, the presence of excessive curiosity should be recognized here - there is no evidence of treacherous or philistine to judge. But when looking at the map, the colossal importance of conveying this information to the White command becomes so obvious - that, perhaps involuntarily, the construction of reason sins with confusion with fear.

At the same time, the transfer of the 2nd and 3rd brigades of the 2nd Infantry Division from the area of st. Chishny (see Zlat. to Tsaritsyn, then the 3rd brigade was turned to Petrograd). In the same report, twice, in the presence of Comrade Shchukin, he first pointed out to the Headquarters, by the way, that the Tvorino-Tsaritsyn line was not occupied by the enemy and, therefore, the movement of echelons along it was possible. From the echelons of the 2nd brigade along the railway route Chishny - Samara - Syzran - Penza - - Rtishchevo - Balashov - Povorino - Tsaritsyn (the rest of the echelons - from Samara Vol

Tsaritsyn). When the lead echelon (out of 6) approached Balashov M.M. Arzhanov suddenly gives the order to turn the echelons to Kamyshin for reloading and further following by water. To a later question - on what basis - he replied that the Povorino-Tsaritsyn line had been cut by the enemy. Upon further explanation, it was established that he allegedly understood the negative statement of F.V. Kostyaev in the sense that this line has been cut. How he could understand in this way the absolutely categorical, two-fold statement of the Chief of Staff, which does not allow for two collisions, remains unclear.

The whole essence of the suspicion lies in the fact that (according to the situation) his order could have passed unnoticed by me. He was accidentally exposed by an assistant to the head of the 3rd department Gavshevsky. And the situation near Tsaritsyn was such that the delay in reinforcements

\* So in the text. That's right: Arzhanova.

day, even for an hour, was extremely seductive, because it threatened the revolution with disaster.

True, a day and a half later, a message was received from the Field Headquarters about a break by that time of the Povorino-Tsaritsyn line in the Serebryakovo-Archeda sector. The trains still had to turn to Kamyshin. Earlier, the order came out about this even successfully." But this is already a matter of chance. The essence of suspicion remains in force.

June 27 - a new similar case. On June 25, by the way, the transfer of the 7th Infantry Division from Votkinsk to the Kursk-Lgov region began. A separate brigade of Comrade Argyra was attached to this division and was supposed to go along with it, then an additional order was received to send this separate brigade to the Balashov area, while two brigades of the 7th division should follow the previous assignment of M.M. Arzhanov informed the Deputy People's Commissar, Comrade Markov, about the change in the route and the direction of the entire division to the Balashov area. From reviewing the wording of the orders for this transfer, I found that they can by no means be understood in the sense that the entire division must be turned around. The Field Headquarters was requested and the necessary routes have now been established.

For all three cases, common features are: some confusion of the situation - a ghostly vagueness of operational orders, muddy water, giving the possibility of formal excuses. The urgent urgency of the transfers is indispensable, when urgent instructions were received from the Field Headquarters by telephone to "drive the echelons with might and main," and when any delay of an hour matters.

I am by no means a spy maniac. I do not draw categorical conclusions. I am only talking about the suspiciousness of some of Arzhanov's actions.

The following also belong to this category of my observations: M.M. Arzhanov shows an excessively great interest in operational affairs and military secrets.

Wherever possible, on trips, he asks everyone who knows something about the number of troops, their location, the productivity of cartridge factories, etc.

\* So in the text.

"and I"

In particular, such curiosity of his was evident during my last trip with him (June 19-23) to the Southern Front - in connection with reports from the CPS about the catastrophic workload of the Kursk-Kastornaya nodes and the impossibility (because of this) of bringing in reinforcements. captivity. By the way, during this trip he most clearly demonstrated his inability, deeply and intelligently, to manage the case. Same". The subordinates closest to him also concentrate a lot of suspicions on themselves. These are - V.V. Akhsharumov and S.M. Tannenberg and the 2nd assistant to the head of the 3rd department - Yudichev.

There is no way to verify the validity of the suspicions by the apparatus of the commissars. I have already spoken about this.

The conspiracy of military secrets is extremely weakly placed in the administration.

To the case of reports on the movement of troops M.M. Arzhanov attracts too many people whose attitude to this matter is at least remote. Now a survey is being carried out on the procedure for keeping military secrets.

This circumstance, however, does not so much characterize the administrative failure of M.M. Arzhanov.

Whether by virtue of his talkativeness or intentionally, but always with particular pleasure and prolixity, he relishes the failures at the front, the shortcomings of certain prominent Bolsheviks, especially his superiors, and criticizes their individual unsuccessful orders. At the same time, it is incredible. And certainly in the presence of many. However, without much malice, just like that, with a significant flavor of gossip.

With news from the front about the retreat, he spreads incredible panic around him; exaggerates, invents new information that has no resemblance to reality.

Intentionally or due to character traits - no data to decide. Probably the main reason is the second with a slight admixture of the first.

All significant groups of observations on the nature of the activity of the behavior of M.M. Arzhanov, which I managed to do during 2 months of work as a military commissar of the TsUPVOSO.

The characterization suffers from a significant drawback - the absence of references to facts confirming the validity of the conclusions. By no means

\* There is space for a sentence in the text.

not because there are no facts. There are too many of them. To reinforce with them the validity of each group of properties of M.M. Arzhanov would not be difficult. But the report would have swelled immeasurably from this. I admit this major gap, because there are absolutely no data to conclude about my personal hostility to M.M. Arzhanov. Relationship with him is excellent. Violent conflicts are avoided. The characterization can be concentrated on the following short statements:

1. Politically, it inspires serious suspicions.
2. As an administrator - has significant advantages, but no less significant shortcomings.
3. As a theoretician and organizer, a deep, serious leader in business, he cannot withstand even the most superficial criticism.
4. Common features: without any ethical foundations - without any gods and ...' in the soul; the strictest and most consistent confessor of the cult of personal well-being. Everything is sacrificed to this god.
5. In the future, there is no reason to expect the deployment of new plans and abilities - therefore, [from the point of view of] better management of the M.M. Arzhanov revealed himself completely, with all his poor content.

It is necessary to point out one more external circumstance that complicates the work of the head of the Central [Directorate | Military] Communications].

At the Field Headquarters, he is regarded low and does not believe him; also in the Revolutionary Military Council; The Cheka and (in particular) the Special Department of the Cheka, the People's Commissariat for Communications, are conducting a fierce campaign against him, although they are unable to collect indisputable material.

In some issues, the TsUPVOSO is identified with the personality of Arzhanov, and this has its negative meaning in solving some extremely serious cases. Such is the question of martial law on the railroads. When discussing it, other opponents ... of the military department in the implementation of martial law argued something like this: "How, Arzhanov will order the Cheka and the NKPS", etc.

The expectation was already hanging in the air when Arzhanov would be "finally" removed. They even ask some questions about this topic.

\* There is space for a word in the text.

MM. Arzhanov is a bitch. The atmosphere of harassment, dissatisfaction, distrust unnerves him, devalues his few, but, undoubtedly, existing virtues. I reported to Comrade Sklyansky and Comrade Aralov at the Field Headquarters about the need to resolve the atmosphere around Arzhanov, since he had not been replaced by a better one. It seems that after the report some improvement followed.

Until now, I have been an energetic defender of Arzhanov, by no means regarding him highly. The position of his numerous, often shameless opponents seems to me frivolous. They only say to drive away. No one agrees on who to replace. And that's just the whole point.

The apparatus of military communications works under Arzhanov one way or another. It is unnecessary to recall the importance of transporting troops at this moment. Every change entails a certain period of interregnum, until the new broom masters the matter, does not get used to it to the fullest. For this period (its duration is different) weakening ... of the activity of the apparatus, no doubt [will take place]. This happens during at least short absences of Arzhanov and his replacement by another.

If so, then the change can only be justified by the undoubted and large advantages of the new candidate. Meanwhile, no one has so far not only guaranteed, but no one has put forward an indisputably better, certainly superior candidate. On the sly, cowardly and irresponsibly they slip someone in, but all this is extremely frivolous, light-hearted. With such an attitude to the matter in a month, if not earlier, the need for a new replacement will arise - and so on without end.

The position can be formulated as follows.

A stronger candidate than M.M. Arzhanov.

Its replacement is urgently needed, but requires an extremely careful substitute.

Until now, there was none.

The best outcome, no doubt, would be the appointment of a party technician, strong enough. In all honesty, he doesn't. I present a sample of the work of one of the secret contenders for this post (See in the appendices Comrade Gollender, military commissar of the 3rd department of the TsUPVOSO). The report is addressed to me.

There remains a choice of valuable specialists.

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b, that I do not have a shadow of a doubt about the need

ia of specialists and especially in the construction

mi, but I can't help but mind those shapes

at the moment, the joint work of specialists and ' \_

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political workers;. In total, over a thousand people work in the field headquarters / this figure

reported to me by commissarami, at the field headquarters, by comrades Preisman,

and Vasiliev; figure indicated" in the first report twice.

VEYa blah taken by eye /. I don't know if such a huge amount is really necessary.

\ W: shvo people / I heard that under tsarism there were much less /; Not

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this question is currently occupying me, It is characteristic that of:

thousands of real military specialists, i.e. people

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occupying positions requiring special military training, knowledge and experience, approximately forty-five to fifty people can be counted, this figure also. received. me from the commissar of all inspection departments, T. Preisman, and the commissar of the operational and naval department + t Vasiliev; steel, i.e., the vast majority of employees in the field -

headquarters, occupy the positions of clerks, clerk "aA be

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secretaries, machinists) and others, clerks, and zorch) Anaryn C +

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"cial military knowledge, and should be replaced by military specialists

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sheets, 48: the rest of the positions are the usual democratic layman "but har?

Russian public, No. 'actually', for some reason, almost all posts . a-na agr araty

are replaced by "former officers or relatives of military specialists. —\_

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Report of the communist A.A. Antonov to the chairman of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense V.I. Lenin "On military specialists and political workers in the Field Headquarters" with Lenin's resolution: "To Gusev, And then to the Cheka to the investigation of the Headquarters." January 12, 1919 1st sheet. RGASPI, see doc. No. 2.6

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Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council L.D. Trotsky

and Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Republic I.I. Vatsetis. 1918 RGASPI

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Statement by L.D. Trotsky to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) regarding the decision to purge the Field Headquarters. June 16, 1919 1st sheet, see doc. No. 3.6

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commander in chief of all

armed forces of the Republic Tenshtabist E.I. Isaev (cartoon by S.S. Kamenev A.A. Ovsyannikova). 1919 TsMAMLS

Military Commissar of the Naval Department K.Kh. Danishevsky. 1931 of the Field Headquarters A. V. Vasiliev.  
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Note of the General Staff Officer G.I. Tgodori Chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky with a protest against illegal detention.  
June 25, 1920 RGVA, see doc. No. 5.6

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yuri L087 SVAO VOIN, 1020. Research Institute:

"Having checked Ve AZNO on our reconnaissance reports, I discovered that uld Ch where habrya m-tsa edzbo" is larger than ours, but despite this, the enemy is "better vrorukhen and. supplied, we. all ýý resist vzhysya-mu and ,deliver tsel blows. The explanation of this act lies in the composition. Armiin, In the past, Jean. napa army'lah and the army of the enemy were class: 52 us dratïors. ,Working. for that? 2 sides: an offence, but then the war zaolavdaa post peano to increase the strength of the army and how is that for us. takýý the opponent was able to cobilize krýotvin, I. here is the bloody weakness of the enemy |

Nana army becoming. working did not remain classy, so aka 420

sleep your pleas, krötyanotvo, "in most of your life. x6 na pashé # "WEB

sotoropo, y` opponent ýý aria. ok azalas made from vrah dobna "vee

"asan, 'der: 'ace? Xia in ,causing the top of the ve officers., Army depikvs.

ena. y > 9. not lasso and c. this is her minus. Therefore, our 8th year has been polluted,

whether

{fat proylom, If 8: Tse last year `Daniki to led such an offensive E

GUIDE

Our watch was beaten, beaten, but now we are quite sure; . that " 'victory will be wa 'by us. 0: 'surrender. and there is no need to go back. It should be noted that m-ts to that (back the situation at the front was. much more blasphemous than now, then

(it was horrendous. 'The threat to Potrograd. Denikin is on the offensive, and in the East

k. 'our' offensive "folkyuo yy and V- of our Like. walked yy ýý, 75

and hell

u (Autupet. whether there or to throw forces to the South. snan showed that tact

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43 5 = ka, newo. olaviocommander) hieradahs navaid NHH on standing but on

guivattsudvny; / Now on the One Front! \ma. zekrepayayatisjar Our parts 'puiho- ,dit. in order, already: ndchinart strikes hvuvgudarn and soon Yukhny

front will be. BYANDENH stand ýchivym, It is necessary to carry out todeEo more intensively. tam.

47 about pen ortanizatsionuyu 'work. It is true that Deniyin is pulling up the ropes and

GA

, soon' » probably ,renew ne denial, but he gave us a nut per- ! melon" which, uh, used" 'to tidy up our

Parts. For. Donikin mobilized 'now all men-

"yyyy is populated and catches A but,we are late, however

`swelling' refers. to neh gu and vrahdebno, but brrot with a dose of rubbing

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dream but in! state, 7 Avnidina one way of fighting 0 to zertirsov---

"razstrol" we have besides this. spbsoba - agitation , Yes, we can fight dese:

Oh, but Donikin will not succeed, he is powerless, like Kolchak,

From the minutes of the meeting of the Moscow City Conference and the RCP (0) - a recording of the report of S.I. Gusev "On the military-political situation" with criticism of L.D. Trotsky and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. July 12, 1919 1st sheet.

CAOPIM. see doc. No. 6.1

IPEYN 29061 `(eñnyiru 4 | p ppzhchpoat 'rg - yishnypý 9) "rryyýý vonoraU" vpaoshonro htanagod riia

Based on the observation [th] — I take responsibility to certify the 3 strongest candidates:

1. Serebryakov Vladimir Georgievich - former Major General of the General Staff.

Deep theoretical connoisseur of military messages. The best one I have ever seen. Approaches issues scientifically, seriously, always with detailed arguments, with a large scope of thought, thinks out to the end, to the details. He wrote extensively on military matters. The practical experience is significant. During the war of 1914-1918 [g]. was the chief of military communications of the Romanian front.

Recently, the head of military communications of the Belitarmia (now the 16th Army).

Currently, he is an inspector under the head of the central administration.

The minus is the weakness of military impulses, which he himself admits in a conversation with relatives.

Oppressed by the material damage caused by the revolution. He is from a rather wealthy family; now he walks around in some shirts, although (out of habit) clean and tidy. Naturally, his general mood is unfriendly. However, he doesn't get angry.

As a leader and organizer, he certainly stands high. As an administrator, he is weaker, but..."

There is no courage and swagger in dealing with various instances of Soviet institutions, as with Arzhanov. No pressure. This shortcoming can and should [be] compensated for by a more active role of the military commissar.

Accurate data on his political physiognomy has not been collected. The general impression is that it is safe. The most serious candidate available"

2. Ivan Alexandrovich Barmin - former General Staff | major general.

More than 20 years experience. For a long time he served as head of the movement of troops in various regions, mainly in the West.

During the war of 1914-1918, by the way, he was the head of the operational department at the Headquarters (Glavperevoz). He knows the matter thoroughly. Domineering. With great will and pressure. In this he by no means

\* There is space for a word in the text.      \*\* The proposal is written entirely by hand.

To

weaker than Arzhanov and will almost surpass him. From the political side, it is quite safe.

Does not shine with theoretical knowledge.

A very serious candidate. If it were said that Serebryakov would not accept the post, citing weakness of will and slight inability to adapt to modern conditions, Barmin could replace him without any special defects.

3. Sergey Vladimirovich Tomlin - former Major General of the General Staff.

The tenure is not great. He knows the matter relatively. Initially takes the question deeply and truly, but never thinks it through to the end. Throws only a thought - a spark, which, flashing brightly, dies away without a trace. There is reason to fear that, as an administrator, he will be exchanged for trifles, that he will not be able to retain the main threads of leadership. He was the head of military communications on the Northern Front. Now he is an assistant to the head of the central administration.

Much weaker than the first two.

There is still quite a strong candidate, the fourth -

Chebotarevsky Vladimir Nikolaevich, head of the 2nd department of the TsUPVOSO. Former colonel. An old experienced traveller. For a long time he was in charge of the movement of troops in the Ryazan-Ural and other regions. He knows the matter very well. Smart. Direct ... "", does not fawn over superiors. Holds himself independently.

His candidacy cannot be considered serious for formal reasons. He is not of the General Staff and the Field Staff will vigorously rebel against his appointment.

It is possible to guarantee only the probable superiority of each of these candidates, and especially the first two.

Whether this superiority will reveal itself in practice is difficult to vouch for.

Dismissal of M.M. Arzhanov will meet the main obstacle on the part of Comrade Trotsky, in which M.M. Arzhanov, contriving to meet upon arrival in Moscow and report without witnesses, maintains a happy confidence that everything is calm on Shipka.

Applications:

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 12. D. 8. L. 12 06-21. certified typewritten

\*

\*\* COPY. \* So in the text. That's right: "Basic Threads".

\*\* The document omitted a place for part of the sentence. signed. Certified \*\*\* The original was obviously by Assistant Secretary

Missar of the RVSR Field Headquarters.

Chapter 3

EXPERIMENT OF THE CC "WITH A SHINT OF MISSTRESS", OR A CONSPIRACY AT THE FIELD HEADQUARTERS OF THE REVIOUS MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC

And after the USh Congress of the RCP (b) V.I. Lenin continued to actively intervene in military matters. So, on April 28, L.D. Trotsky was properly kicked at a meeting of the Politburo, which considered the issue "on the implementation of the resolutions of the Party Congress on the reorganization of the All-Russian Main [headquarters] and other organizations of the Military Commissariat". Ilyich firmly kept his finger on the pulse military department.

The case of the conspiracy in the Field Headquarters unfolded just at the moment when Trotsky's disagreements about the "defense of Petrograd" with the Central Committee (as Trotsky formulated it in My Life) reached their apogee, and in particular, it turns out from the message of the chairman of the RVSR to the Bolshevik Central Committee - with Lenin himself? In the words of Trotsky, "In the technical and operational fields, I saw my task primarily in putting the right people in the right place and letting them prove themselves. My political and organizational work in creating an army completely merged with the work of the party. Lenin probably saw his task in the same way - he needed a devoted person in the RVSR from authoritative party "bosses", whose share in the party would be no less than that of Trotsky, and the Commander-in-Chief, who would carry out the strategic plan needed by Lenin. Such people could be S.I. Gusev and S.S. Kamenev. Did Lenin know that they had worked together on the Eastern Front, and that behind Kamenev there was a small military group, personally loyal to him and controlled by Gusev?"; the circumstance that Gusev hated Trotsky and Vatsetis and as early as December 1918 criticized the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic as absolutely incompetent

organ???

On May 24, Trotsky actually wrote to the Central Committee that such an appointment was inexpedient." Under these conditions, Antonov's report came in handy: Lenin got a "joker"...

The Serpukhov Special Branch of the Cheka, in fact, the "pocket" counterintelligence of Semyon Aralov, began to spin the "Stavka" case. Its chief, A. Volkov, was a party worker who had a poor idea of the technique of counterintelligence support. So bad that he once even exposed his agents at a completely unnecessary job?". On April 14, Aralov panicked, sending a tentative note to Kedrov, in which he announced the possibility of an attack on the Headquarters by agents of the White Guards and asked to strengthen the security of the headquarters. At this time, there were reasons for concern: there was an influx of foreigners and "rather dubious persons" into Serpukhov, whom it was quite natural to suspect of espionage, at least in favor of the Entente. And on May 15, Volkov intimidated Semyon Ivanovich with suspicions about an assassination attempt being prepared on him. In addition, he proposed to establish surveillance over the assistant to the commandant of the Field Headquarters A.A. Stadler (who had in Kazan, according to information, a connection with the suspected espionage Hofstad), the head of the communications service of the Field Headquarters, General Staff A.P. Medvedev and his assistant. At the same time, back in 1918, the head of Soviet counterintelligence, Max Trakman, reported to Aralov that one of the most responsible posts in the Field Headquarters (head of the Communications Service) "is in the hands of Medvedev, a person who does not inspire confidence from the point of view of Soviet power" ? '.

Already on May 3 Serpukhov Special Branch of the Cheka A. Volkov denounced S.I. Aralov about the arrest of the head of the general department of the Operational Department of the Field Headquarters I.D. Modenov and sending him to Moscow at the disposal of M.S. Kedrov?

On May 4, the Special Department arrested General Staff Officer A.P. Medvedev. The reason for the arrest is the same as in the case of Teodori: Troitskaya's slander. From the questions that were asked to Medvedev, it follows that they wanted to incriminate him with links with the Entente (specifically, with French intelligence) and planned to link the Medvedev case with the cases of Tarasov, V.V. Daller, Antsiferov and Theodori?%. Immediately after his arrest (May 4), Aralov asked M.S. Kedrov "to quickly, if possible, sort out the Medvedev case in a few days: he is a major specialist "in the field of communications, an engineer and a general staff by education"; "carried a big

work, accurately and quickly fulfilling the instructions given to him. Aralov described Medvedev as a unique organizer, who "cannot be replaced in the complex communications apparatus of the Field Headquarters" and whose absence "slows down the work." Although Aralov stood up for Medvedev out of pragmatic considerations, this nevertheless characterizes him as a good leader. He even vouched for the General Staff officer, and after two interrogations (10 days after his arrest) Medvedev was released.

The Chekists' passion for gigantomania is understandable: as D.S. Novoselov, back in October 1918 - early 1919, their department was in a deep crisis. "VChK," writes D.S. Novoselov, was originally created as a punitive and repressive body, subordinate and controlled only by the top leadership of the Bolshevik Party, supervision of its activities by ... other departments was purely formal. It was at the meetings of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Council of People's Commissars that the political tasks of the Cheka and the methods of its work were determined ... To determine the place and role of the Cheka in the party state apparatus of Soviet Russia, it is necessary to take into account the differences between the Bolshevik leaders ... One group or another. ... often appealed to Lenin, who, in turn, tried to play on their differences, pursuing his own goals. The direct subordination of the Cheka to the Council of People's Commissars ensured control over it not only by the Bolshevik Party, but also by its main leader," Lenin, which especially irritated the party bosses. The need for reorganization was expressed by such prominent Bolshevik organizers as I.V. Stalin, N.I. Bukharin, N.V. Krylenko, G.I. Petrovsky and others. A L.B. Kamenev, D.I. Kursky, A.V. Lunacharsky, M.S. Olmsky and L.S. Sosnovsky proposed at the end of 1918 to Lenin to actually liquidate the Cheka and transfer a number of its functions to the Special Department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, headed by F.E. Dzerzhinsky. The latter would actually put the main punitively repressive body of Soviet Russia under the control of Yakov Sverdlov?%. The Chekists themselves lacked unity in their views on the place and role of the "Office": in November 1918, at the Second Conference of Extraordinary Commissions, a discussion began on the report of V.V. Fomin. Secretary of the department of the Cheka for the fight against speculation and the non-resident department G.S. Frost, pointing to the unfolding on the pages of the party

press "the polemic about the independence of the Cheka", suggested "to clarify that the Cheka, being departments of the executive committees, are subordinate to the latter and there can be no question of any independence; at the same time ... emphasize that the Cheka are administrative, not judicial"; to coordinate work with the criminal investigation department, the police and other bodies, include "everywhere the heads of departments of the Office of local executive committees as members of the Commission." Frost was echoed by a member of the Board of the Cheka and the head of the department for combating the counter-revolution N.A. Skrypnik, who recommended to be strictly guided by the provision that the extraordinary commissions play a "purely administrative role" and should not interfere with the competence of "revolutionary tribunals, people's courts and other judicial instances." Following discussions and negotiations with his party comrades, Lenin succeeded in defending the Cheka and once again concentrating power in his own hands. However, the Chekists needed to prove their rights - in 1919 they sought to inflate the merits of their department and fabricated cases, linking real cases of treason to "counter-revolutionary organizations" that never existed. The Medvedev case is no exception. The connection of the three General Staff officers, in my opinion, is impossible: the years of graduation from the academy - Daller - 1902, Medvedev - 1912, Teodori - 1918 (we could not find information about Antsiferov). It is noteworthy that Medvedev sent the report on the arrest to Daller, who, no doubt, was very pleased with the attention paid to him by the state security agencies, and could not fail to inform the headquarters leadership about the details of Medvedev's interrogation.



On May 19, 1919, the Serpukhov Soviet drew up a memorandum about the dominance of the "Serpukhov big bourgeoisie" in the Field Headquarters, which angered the starving (unlike the Stavka employees) "proletarian masses", and corruption in its leadership. The note undoubtedly contributed to escalating the situation around the Field Headquarters. Formally, it was addressed to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic - in fact, the Moscow party organization that "took" political control over the "Red Headquarters". The issue was discussed at the Moscow Party Bureau. When reading the note, the awareness of its author is striking - he is aware of the processes that took place not only in the highest front (Field Headquarters), but also in the central military apparatus located in Moscow, namely, in the All-Russian

skom main headquarters and the Registration Department of the Field Headquarters of the RVSR. The Revolutionary Military Council itself is not directly named in the document, but in fact it is a stone in its garden. The degree of the author's awareness indicates that this document of the county executive committee was directly ordered to compromise the PSH. It's not that it reported anything new about corruption at the headquarters, it's just that it was remembered in a very timely manner... 3%

On May 22, at a joint meeting of the Political and Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) "Due to a number of reports about the actions of Samoilo on the Eastern Front, as well as about Kostyaev," the question "about Kamenev and the further state of affairs of the Eastern Front" was considered?%. In fact, the issue of replacing F.V. Kostyaev in this post of head of the PS; proposed the candidacy of S.S. Kamenev. On May 24, Trotsky wrote to Sklyansky that it would be more expedient to appoint Kamenev "commander of the Eastern Front - by his nature he is a commander, not a chief of staff." From Trotsky's telegram to E.M. Sklyansky for Lenin, in particular, follows:  
1) The question of changing the leadership of the Field Headquarters was a matter of decision; 2) Lenin even then suggested removing F.V. Kostyaev, and instead of insufficiently firm (as follows from the document) and extremely loyal to Kostyaev, the commissioner of the headquarters S.I. Aralova\*!! - appoint M.M. Lashevich (protege of G.E. Zinoviev); 3) most likely, Trotsky was secretly against these permutations. He gave Lenin his consent to replace Kostyaev, but remarked: "the whole difficulty" is in replacing the general with "a person who would be no worse." To top it off: "when Kostyaev is dismissed, it is necessary to have a preliminary talk with the Commander-in-Chief so as not to upset the entire machine at once", i.e. work Stakes. Trotsky spoke out against the replacement of Aralov by Lashevich (his disagreements with Lashevich are well known \*\*?), who, according to Trotsky, would hardly be stronger than Aralov. Understanding that Semyon Ivanovich would definitely be removed, Trotsky proposed S.I. Gusev, his longtime foe and devoted "Leninist": out of two evils, the chairman of the RVSR chose, as it seemed to him, the lesser?!?.

On July 2, the Central Committee decided to recall S.I. Gusev from the Eastern Front and appointed Commissar of the Field Headquarters, if there were no obstacles from Trotsky. On June 3, did Ephraim Sklyansky telegraph this to the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council? Trotsky did not object - and

he miscalculated: on June 15, at a meeting of the Central Committee with his participation, the Commander-in-Chief decided to leave Vatsetis, to appoint General M.D. Bonch-Bruevich, "S.I. Appoint Gusev (!) as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic with a seat in Serpukhov, instructing him, together with Bonch Bruevich, to reduce and change the composition of the Headquarters.

On June 16, Trotsky sent a statement to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) protesting against the decision to purge the Field Headquarters. The statement is very bold and not very restrained: "the decision contains an element of whimsy, mischief (! - S.V.): this is how it will be perceived ... You can make any kind of ferocious decisions, but they should not have Pavlovian whim: "I want to mate a rabbit with a canary - and nothing else." The combination will be interpreted as a quirk of confusion and desperation. The collapse and betrayal among the specialists will increase. Especially if this is supplemented by the arrest of K ostyaev, who ... works 20 hours a day. In terror, the elements of caprice harden and disorganize much more than the most ferocious cruelty... The headquarters is a "nativity scene"... I do not doubt the enormity of the exaggeration of various gossips... American wisdom generally recommends not to change from horse to horse when you move through fast flow. At the most critical moment, we harness such horses that pull obviously apart (I.I. Vatsetis and M.D. Bonch-Bruevich, whose relationship did not work out. - S.V.)". Appeal

Trotsky was ignored, the decision of the Central Committee was not canceled. On June 17, the chairman of the RVSR resigned, but Lenin retained him: Trotsky was needed both in the military department and in political life. In a note to L.B. To Kamenev, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars "categorically protested" against any attempt to offend L.D. Trotsky and "persistently emphasized" that the Central Committee was guided "exclusively by considerations of the international significance of Comrade Trotsky in general and his role in Soviet and party work in the RSFSR"?! Gusev began to actively implement the decision of the Central Committee. He immediately took up the PSH, in which, as he stated, only conspirators served ?! ".

Bonch-Bruевич did not serve in the Red Army at that time: back in August 1918 he left military service under the pretext of poor health. In the spring and summer of 1918, the general held one of the key positions in the army - the military head of the Supreme Military Council. The appointment was due to the fact that Mikhail

Bonch-Bruевич was the brother of Vladimir Bonch-Bruевич, the head of the Council of People's Commissars. During his first audience with the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, which took place at the end of November 1917, M.D. Bonch-Bruевич offered his services to organize a rebuff to the external enemy (the Germans), but set a condition for Lenin - "not to force" him to fight internal enemies, in this case, "many counter-revolutionary generals." Lenin did not accept Bonch-Bruевич's condition. The organizer of the audience is V.D. Bonch-Bruевич - after its completion, he expressed his dissatisfaction with his brother ". Before the revolution, Bonch-Bruевич earned himself the reputation of an obsessed spy-maniac-"German eater"? On November 22, 1917, the General himself was known to the Bolsheviks as "an inveterate Black Hundredist" (an expression of People's Commissar of Labor A.G. Shlyapnikov). G. Shlyapnikov, his deputy G. F. Fedorov, commissioner for the survey of private banks A. N. Padarin, temporary deputy people's commissar of agriculture A. G. Shlikhter? At first, Bonch-Bruевич had a strained relationship with Trotsky, which is little known due to the performance played out by L.D. Trotsky in August 1918: he allegedly did not want to resign the general, calling him an indispensable leader? Bonch-Bruевич did not work well with many Bolshevik military leaders - in particular, a member of the Supreme Military Council N.I. Podvoisky actually left the top military leadership in April 1918: he hated General??3, and he seemed to despise Podvoisky? ". Mikhail Dmitrievich did not develop relations with V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko: in March 1918, in a memo to M.D. Bonch-Bruевич asked V.I. Lenin to resolve the issue of the subordination of the "Commander-in-Chief of all the troops of the Ukrainian People's Republic" to the Supreme Military Council. Bonch-Bruевич stated that there was no general plan for conducting military operations in Ukraine; asked to clarify the rights of the Council in relation to the leadership of the Soviet Ukrainian troops and Antonov-Ovseenko personally; informed Lenin about Antonov's unsuccessful double request "regarding indicative military data" and the decision of the Supreme Military Council on the immediate dispatch to Ukraine, to Antonov, the General Staff

and two commissars "for communication" and clarifying the state of affairs in the troops of V.A. Antonov". In the Supreme Military Council, M.D. Bonch-Bruевич retained a certain independence from L.D. Trotsky, sending his reports on the most important issues to three addresses: in addition to the Council in the Council of People's Commissars (Chairman V.I. Lenin and to his brother) 725. This clearly did not suit both Trotsky and Sklyansky?? On December 11, 1918, N.A. Suleiman, who referred to the decrees of the Council of People's Commissars and the decrees of the All-Russian Central Executive tell you that I won't give you any information, but you would be at Comrade Lenin's that same day, as Rattel did, who stuffs Bonch Bruевич and he calls thirty times at night on empty business. - S.V.) were not so scrupulous about the field regulations. All this must be done not only in order to nail the chief or the commissar, but to nail me, and Trotsky, and the Defense Council, if he sins. Probably Mikhail Bonch-Bruевич and his closest associates

repeatedly complained to Lenin about the Bolsheviks - members of the Supreme Military Council. In any case, M.D. Bonch-Bruевич in the spring and summer of 1918 was the cornerstone of L.D. Trotsky, organized by V.I. Lenin to eliminate the possible threat of a military coup led by the "Red Bonaparte". Back to military service M.D. It was no coincidence that Bonch Bruевич was called up: at first glance, he, like no other, suited S.I. Gusev. The general hated those who occupied a number of key positions in the Field Headquarters of the General Staff in 1918 (according to his statement, "the release of Kerensky"??) so much that F.E. Dzerzhinsky, having come to an agreement with him about the purge and reduction of the staff of the Stavka, characterized this hardened intriguer as "a man of business, without a stone in his bosom"??. Bonch-Bruевич wrote in his memoirs that he later learned about the role in his appointment of memos and memos that the general sent to Lenin even after his resignation from the post of chairman of the Supreme Military Council; in one of the notes, according to the general, he insisted on "the need to recreate the General Staff,

albeit under a different name, and proposed a long-term plan for streamlining the high command. It is possible that such a report actually took place. But in our opinion, this is a mistake in the memory of M.D. Bonch-Bruевич: the general is referring to his report of December 21/1919. Bonch-Bruевич's opinion that the proposal seemed to Lenin "worthy of attention" is highly doubtful: the adoption of this project, in our opinion, would only aggravate parallelism in military command. Reporting to V.I. Lenin about the need to create a special body within the apparatus of the military administration to free the RVSR from a number of functions, the general actually proposed to further increase the already huge central military apparatus\*?.

On June 16, 1919, the RVSR, consisting of Sklyansky, Vatsetis, Gusev and Akulov (note that Trotsky was not at the meeting), following the decision of the Central Committee, decided to appoint M.D. Bonch Bruевич, Kostyaev to be temporarily seconded to Vatsetis. In a note to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) dated June 17, Lenin pointed out that the Central Committee had come to the conclusion that the Field Headquarters was a "nativity scene" and had taken "a definite step" to "radically change" this situation (i.e., to purge the Stavka ) 77. On June 16, Sklyansky's secretary "unexpectedly" came to Bonch-Bruевич's apartment and demanded that the general go with him immediately to Trotsky. Having fulfilled the order, Bonch Bruевич learned (and not from Trotsky, but from Sklyansky) about his appointment, carried out through the Central Committee of the RCP (b), and received an order "to leave for Serpukhov and immediately take up office." According to the general, he could not "understand" what caused such "happiness"; from Sklyansky, only permission was obtained to "postpone the departure to Serpukhov for a day." Bonch-Bruевич hoped to take advantage of the delay, in his words, "to find out the motives" for his return to the Red Army, in fact, most likely, to try to disavow the decision, which became an unpleasant "surprise" for the general. From conversations with his "brother and other persons close to the government", the general concluded that "Vatsetis is suspected of something bad, no one knew what exactly (supposedly. - S.V.). Sklyansky also had some assumptions about this, but he spoke dully and indistinctly, either not trusting me, or not really knowing anything"?? °. It is not known how truthful and accurate the general is (whether Sklyansky really did not tell Bonch Bruевич the real

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the reason for his appointment or the general carefully avoided the reputation of a "cleaner"; with whom, apart from the Manager of Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars, did he communicate). It is known for certain that the decision to call Bonch Bruевич for leadership work at the Field Headquarters was made no later than June 1, 1919.<sup>236</sup>

The biggest mystery of Bonch-Bruевич's reminiscences about his new appointment: "Sklyansky could not say for sure which headquarters I was appointed: the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief or the Field Headquarters. In the first case, I found myself subordinate to Vatsetis; in the second, my boss was the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic or his deputy... I, at the risk of being unceremonious, tried to meet with Lenin. Vladimir Ilyich... could not receive me. But right there, through my brother, he conveyed that I should immediately go to Serpukhov and conduct business there independently of Vatsetis, for I was appointed not to him, but to the head of the [Field] headquarters

Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic?'. One can doubt the reliability of this information, but in principle they explain why, having replaced the head of the PSh, the Bolsheviks dragged on with the change of the Commander-in-Chief.

Gusev, according to the orders from the Field Headquarters, arrived at Headquarters and took up his post on the same day (he signed the first order on June 16) \*\*. It is interesting to compare the orders of two chiefs of the Field Staff - Kostyaev on resignation and Bonch-Bruevich on taking office. On June 23, 1919, Kostyaev announced in the order for PSh No. 204A: "From now on, he handed over the post of Chief of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of the General Staff to Mikhail Dmitrievich Bonch-Bruevich"?\*. July 11 M.D. Bonch-Bruevich: "Called up from retirement, on June 18 (emphasized by me - S.V.) this year. arrived and assumed the position of Chief of the Field Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic"?@. Why this performance? - immediately after the release of Kostyaev's farewell order, all documents go signed by Bonch-Bruevich. It is possible that Bonch-Bruevich retroactively postponed the date of his arrival to 5 days ago in order to hide the non-fulfillment of the order: he obviously tried to disavow the decision on his appointment not a day, but 6. Further description of the actions of M.D. Bonch-Bruevich in his memoirs is refuted by the protocols of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. When Bonch-Bruevich arrived in Serpukhov, he, according to him, did not find a single member of the

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RVSR: "All of them traveled around the fronts, and each (and there were more than 10 people) gave instructions and orders without coordinating them with other members of the Revolutionary Military Council." Bonch-Bruevich, according to his appearance, immediately telegraphed Lenin about the need to convene the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic""', Bonch-Bruevich's telegram for some reason was not found, but the resolutions of the Revolutionary Military Council of June 16 and 22, 1919 were published ...3 \* °

It is curious that with the appointment of Gusev, the status of the PS increased sharply: on July 13, for the first time, an order was issued on the PS with direct reference to the decision of the Defense Council of July 9.

The party leadership really had something to fear: the reports of the Special Department of the IBChK for the spring-summer of 1919 are full of reports about the counter-revolutionary moods of the former officers, which were intensified as a result of Denikin's attack on Moscow. So, in the intelligence report about the headquarters of the railway. troops of the Republic said: "Sensing the approach of Denikin, the former officers and [military] officials almost did not hide their political physiognomy and are now beginning to campaign on the basis of the food issue. The hostile attitude towards the communists is noticeable. There are 90% reactionary-minded specialists in the headquarters. In addition, in May-June 1919, anti-Soviet forces became more active. A number of Bolshevik organizers got the impression that the Entente was behind all these forces. "On the night of May 23, 1919," V.N. Mantsev, at a meeting of the MK RCP(b), - the ICChK on the wings of an illegal printing house of the Party of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, found a large number of leaflets and appeals in which workers and peasants "called for the support of [ataman] Grigoriev and the overthrow of the Bolshevik rapists. In addition, the Cheka and the Moscow Cheka have information that the Social Revolutionaries are preparing a number of terrorist acts, assassination attempts on Lenin, Trotsky, and others. Terror is also being prepared and financed abroad. [...] The articles of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries suggest that they have people bribed by the Entente. A number of prominent workers - the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries - are rumored to work in the headquarters of volunteer chieftains, they are in the headquarters of [ataman] Makhno. To top it off, things are not going well for us at the front (italics mine. - S.V.). Taken Pskov, anxious in the South. All this forces the IBSC to once again pay special attention to the fight against the counter-revolution, which has recently died out."

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On May 28, 1919, a joint meeting of the collegium of the Cheka, the Moscow Cheka, the NKVD and representatives of the MK RCP(b) took place on the creation of a unified headquarters for the fight against counter-revolution in Moscow. It is noteworthy that originally published in a collection of documents about the IBSC, then in a collection about F.E. Dzerzhinsky, the extract from the minutes of the meeting has discrepancies with the text of the original. The main difference between the texts is the deletion in the excerpt of the debate. However, there are more serious discrepancies:

a number of theses proposed by the participants in the debate were attributed in the copy to Dzerzhinsky, probably in order to emphasize their significance in the eyes of the addressees of the resolution. In addition, the last (15th) paragraph in the original was an instruction to the employee of the Cheka department for combating crimes *ex officio* and the head of security Lenin A.Ya. Belenky "to equip a printing house and an engraving shop for the needs of the Cheka", in a copy - an order to the chief of staff of the internal guard troops of the Republic K.M. Volobuev "to clarify the issue of the state of protection of the city of Moscow within a week"? Dzerzhinsky, who spoke, noting the activation of counter-revolutionaries in the rear due to the failures of the Red Army, pointed to the "need to create a single, efficient, non-cumbersome body" to coordinate the activities of all departments involved in the fight against counter-revolution in Moscow. This center was supposed to "develop and outline plans for the liquidation of counter-revolutionary activities." As members, Dzerzhinsky proposed deputy. Chairman of the Saratov Provincial Cheka and Head of the Provincial Police Saratov M.A. Deutsch and as a representative of the Cheka, his deputy Ya.Kh. Peters. In the original version, it was indicated that "the need to transfer the less important work of the Cheka [—such as] the fight against speculation at the present moment to other bodies" was pointed out during the debate by the representative of the NKVD Vasilyev." In the final text, Dzerzhinsky suggested that Deutsch should be pointed out in his speech to "the need for close contact between the Cheka in the provinces and the local police commissariats" in order to relieve the Cheka from secondary functions and focus its attention on the fight against counter-revolution. Dzerzhinsky's proposal to create a "single efficient ... body" was unconditionally supported by the MK RCP (b) - this was reported to the meeting by the secretary of the MK V.M. Zagorsky (Lubotsky). Mantsev proposed to develop in advance precise instructions for the proposed

body and stressed the need to eliminate overlap in this work. Deputy Head of the NGO VChK A.V. Eiduk proposed to introduce the chairman of the MC of the RCP(b) into the body. Secretary of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and member of the collegium of the All-Russian Cheka V.A. Avanesov (Martirosyan) insisted on strengthening measures to combat counter-revolution, stating "a certain weakening in this area." Based on the results of the discussion, a governing board - the operational headquarters - under the IBSC was temporarily formed, consisting of representatives of the IBSC, NGO VChK and the transport department (TO) of the VChK (one from each body). The operational headquarters was obliged to inform the departments about the work of each other and "give urgent instructions on strengthening and achieving the goal"; to carry through the departments new measures to combat the counter-revolution; to raise a broad agitation among the communists in order to enlist them in the struggle against the counter-revolution.

The meeting also decided to apply to the party bodies:

— in the Central Committee of the RCP(b) "with an indication of the need to take harsher measures and severe punishments against counterrevolutionary elements." In fact, with the help of the meeting, Dzerzhinsky and Kedrov and their comrades shifted the initiative to intensify the Red Terror (how else can such measures be called?) to the leading party body.

- to the MK RCP (b) with a request to send reliable communists to the ICChK for mandates for the right to detain "all persons engaged in counter-revolutionary activities." In principle, this item was a gesture of desperation: its implementation, in fact, concealed the threat of exposing the agents of the Cheka and the Moscow Cheka in the event of their accidental detention by "reliable party comrades."

Instruct the Chekist authorities:

- The Cheka "to instruct the provincial Cheka more often and more systematically in the fight against counter-revolution";

— IBSC to check the registration of persons living in Moscow. Note that little has changed in Moscow since 1919;

— TO VChK was obliged to report daily on the work of the Presidium of the VChK.

Dzerzhinsky's proposal to introduce Deutsch and Peters (the latter as chairman) into the staff was accepted. Dzerzhinsky, such an appointment was doubly beneficial: firstly,

the appointment of a member of the Board of the Cheka endowed the operational headquarters with great opportunities; secondly, Peters was temporarily deprived of the opportunity

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to take an active part in the leading work in the Cheka<sup>®</sup>, and Dzerzhinsky hardly liked the presence next to the creature of the late Yakov Sverdlov, who twice replaced him during the time of disgrace. decision: "To pay special attention to the work of the Special Department of the IBSC among the Red Army soldiers and every 3 days to submit to the IBSC a summary of the work of the relevant departments in this direction."

On May 31, 1919, the apogee of panic was published in Pravda by Lenin and Dzerzhinsky's appeal "Beware of spies." It says: "The attack of the White Guards on Petrograd clearly proved that in the entire front line, in every major city, the Whites have a wide organization of espionage, betrayal, blowing up bridges, organizing uprisings in the rear, killing communists and prominent members of the workers. organizations. Everyone must be on duty. Redouble vigilance everywhere, consider and carry out in the most rigorous manner a number of measures to curry spies and white conspirators and to capture them. ... Let everyone be at a guard post - in continuous, organized in a military way with the committees of the party, with the Cheka, with the most reliable and most experienced comrades from the Soviet workers.

By the summer of 1918, the "subversive" activities of I.V. Stalin in the military department. As early as May 3, Dzerzhinsky, treated by Stalin during his winter trip to Perm," proposed at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee that a representative of the Special Department of the Cheka "make weekly reports to the member | Central Committee to Stalin for the report of the Orgburo or directly to the Orgburo" (the proposal was accepted, the decision was reported to M.S. Kedrov): °. On June 18, 1919, Stalin reported to Lenin that "a major conspiracy has been opened in the Kronstadt region" with the aim of capturing the fortress, subjugating the fleet, striking at the rear of the Red Army and opening the way for Rodzianko to Petrograd. Stalin brought to the attention of Lenin that all participants in the conspiracy had been arrested, and an investigation was underway. "The atmosphere became so tense that on June 15, 1919, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) obliged all party institutions and their employees to report all facts to special departments treason, desertion and espionage?"; the leadership of the NGO VChK subsequently emphasized the significance of this decision of the Central Committee, "applying to the commissars" of the Red Army? ° \*. And on June 22, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee issued a decree that assigned (explained in the order of the VChK) heavy tasks -

purge the Soviet Republic of all the enemies of workers' and peasants' Russia... Inside the country, the White Guards, taking advantage of our partial (emphasis mine. - S.V.) our failures, raise their heads and try to get in touch with the sworn enemies of the proletariat - the Kolchaks, Denikins, Finnish, Polish and other White Guards. In the very rear of our army there are explosions of bridges, warehouses, theft and concealment of weapons so much needed by the army, etc., etc.»:?.

On the night of July 3, 1919, General Staff officer N.N. was arrested in Serpukhov. Domozhirov 29), who testified on July 8 against the Commander-in-Chief and his colleagues. The testimony stated that lately Vatsetis's position "seemed to be shaken (which is not surprising, taking into account the treatment of him by the chairman of the RVSR. - S.V.), he became gloomy and started to drink." General Staff Officer E.I. Isaev convinced the drunken Vatsetis that the Whites were preparing to seize power and threatened to shoot or even hang the Commander-in-Chief, promising, however, to save his life and leave him in the post of battalion commander if Vatsetis would help them. The commander-in-chief agreed drunk, but all "preparations were only in the field of conversations" and no concrete steps were taken by the "conspirators", except for a small Latvian part, according to Domozhirov's testimony, "as if" (Domozhirov's words should zalsya) sent to Moscow or has been in Moscow for a long time. Moreover, it soon became clear that the Commander-in-Chief was in fact not popular even among the Latvians, on whom (Isaev allegedly proceeded from this) he seemed to be able to rely on. Domozhirov himself, having arrived in the 15th Army, to the Latvians, "I saw with my own eyes how much they love "grandfather" (as they called the Commander-in-Chief behind their backs. - S.V.) and how everyone there will follow him, - except for swearing choice words from side of the RVS members ... I didn't hear anything about the Commander-in-Chief, but when I said that I was a member of the RVS

If Vatsetis could be appointed to the army, then Danishevsky (a member of the Revolutionary Military Council. - S.V.) shouted: "So it's true! Yes, this is a betrayal." On this, Domozhirev testified, the talk about the coup ended, after which Isaev raised the question of "creating the skeleton of the General Staff in order to put the issue of 1917 in such a position that any power would reckon with it"! The last thought should really correspond to reality: even A.A. Antonov, speaking with individual General Staff officers at the end of 1918, stated: "The General Staff officers - at least most of them - try hard to emphasize that they serve the government and

by no means

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want to know about no Bolsheviks and even about no classes." If Isaev did not voice the issue of placing the issue in a special position under any authority, then it certainly was implied.

The chronology of the events set forth in Domozhirev's testimony is specified according to the orders of the Field Headquarters in terms of personnel. June 8 "arrived on June 4 of this year. Chief of Staff of the Western Front of the General Staff N.N. Domozhirev" was seconded to F.V. Kostyaev and was credited "from the indicated date for all types of allowances at the headquarters"? On June 18, was Domozhirev appointed commander of the 15th Army? but by order of July 4, "the former commander of the 15th Army, who arrived at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief ... N.N. Domozhirev is seconded to the headquarters and credited for all types of allowance from June 30" (as the basis - Domozhirev's report dated June 30 No. 2785) 79. The choice of Chekists as the first victim of Domozhirev was probably due to the already twice (1) was under investigation. For the second time among the three accused of disclosing military secrets?% - there was no talk of treason at that time, but nevertheless ... In addition, shortly before Domozhirev's arrest, Domozhirev's headquarters received an unflattering assessment. On June 23, Ivar Smilga told Ephraim Sklyansky: "Smilga reported by direct wire that the work of the headquarters of the Zapfront was completely unorganized. The same opinion is held by Vatsetis, Kostyaev and Petin. Smilga demands the immediate dispatch of Sollogub to the post of head of the operations department and at least two general staff officers who are quite experienced and have previously worked on our fronts. I fully support Smilga's request"?@.

On the testimony of this General Staff officer (quite frankly, a very shaky base), an investigation unfolded. The key moment, as already mentioned in the Introduction, was the drunkenness of the Commander-in-Chief?\*. After the arrest of Domozhirev, the leading employees of the PS were interrogated, and the Revolutionary Military Tribunal of the Republic was involved in the investigation.

V.G. Krasnov and V.G. Daines published a fragment, probably, of the preliminary testimony of the General Staff officers:

"E.I. Isaev:] At one of the meetings in late April or early May [1919], Malyshev proposed to organize the capture of Tula, Serpukhov and Moscow in order to carry out an internal coup.

[I.P. Pavlunovskiy:] Who was to be at the head of the conspiracy?

\* Pavlunovsky I.P. - 1st Deputy Head of the Special Department of the Cheka.

[A.K. Malyshev:] In my opinion, none of us could stand at the head of the conspiracy, thanks to our political insignificance. The only one who could lead the movement was Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis, who, according to Isaev, is still hesitating. After lengthy conversations, which found out the inconsistency of our assumptions, the plan was abandoned.

[I.P. Pavlunovskiy:] If I understood correctly, then Isaev had an active influence on the Commander-in-Chief?

[B.I. Kuznetsov:] Isaev somehow (I don't remember when it was) apparently told Vatsetis that he was threatened with a noose if White gained the upper hand.

Note that from the testimony of N.N. Domozhirev dated June 6, it is clear that Isaev told the drunken Commander-in-Chief. There is no mention of drunkenness here.

“N.N. Domozhirev:] Then, if I am not mistaken (now there is no confidence - S.V.), the Commander-in-Chief allegedly (italics mine. - S.V.) asked Isaev: “What to do?” Apparently, from that time on, Isaev began to direct Vatsetis to correct his fate and do something serious. I visited the Chief of the Field Staff, Kostyaev, who was terribly stunned by his dismissal (not earlier than June 15, 1919 - S.V.) and scolded the Commander-in-Chief in every possible way. Then he said to him: “Let's arrange a coup for them” or “We need to arrange a coup for them”, I don't remember the exact words”? |

“The last two sentences, perhaps, shed light on the events of the conspiracy: Vatsetis, Kostyaev and their subordinates could recognize the need for a military coup after June 15, 1919. Then it was a reaction to the already taken decision to purge the Field Headquarters.

On June 21, 1919, at a meeting of the MK RCP (b), Gusev drew attention "to the Headquarters in Serpukhov", where "a lot of useless elements" had accumulated, creating an "extremely bad atmosphere." According to Gusev's impressions, there were “extremely few” communists in PS, the best S.I. Aralov took to the Western Front, inherited “the cell has absolutely no influence”; Serpukhov military specialists allowed themselves “completely unacceptable treatment of ... communists”; the local organization of communists carried on agitation against the Field Headquarters among the workers; in the PS departments there were not commissars everywhere, moreover, individual commissars were “not up to par”. Gusev proposed to the Military Organization under the MK RCP (b) "solid and

reliable" communists to establish strict control over the employees of the PS and to establish party work in the Serpukhov district, where rebellions of deserters often occur. Gusev finished with a promise to talk about the need to purge the Field Headquarters with F.E. Dzerzhinsky \*! The result of the "conversation" could not but become arrests: less than six months have passed since the Chekists seized counterintelligence from the Registration Department of the Field Headquarters, and passions for the arrest of G.I. Teodori have not subsided yet. After the arrest of Teodori's classmates and comrades-in-arms, the alternative to the OO VChK was finally destroyed. ", still in Petrograd (that is, until May 1918) who were members of "various White Guard organizations of an allied orientation": thus, - Pavlunovsky reported, - General Staff officers N. N. Domozhirev and B. I. Kuznetsov jointly with Teodori and Khitrovo?" Were they part of an organization with General Staff Officer Polyakov at the head?" °; “Isaev participated in some organization in which Kuzmina-Karavaeva, who was in connection with the Polyakov organization” belonged?

On June 23, 1919, Trotsky, criticizing the Special Department of the Southern Front, did not deny himself the pleasure of "applying" Kedrov. The chairman of the RVSR drew the attention of the Central Committee through his deputy Sklyansky (he was supposed to convey the message to E.D. Stasova to V.I. Lenin and L.P. Serebryakov) “to the complete and unconditional worthlessness and even harmfulness of special [s] departments in the current composition. They are headed by unqualified persons. Questionable elements, careerists, loafers, ignoramuses appear as agents. Since the Special Department considers itself independent of such authoritative bodies as the Revolutionary Military Councils, the Special Departments fall into opposition and engage in petty intrigues. I am not aware of cases of disclosure of traitors, spies, conspirators by special departments, but they are engaged in enhanced surveillance of members of the Revolutionary Military Council, old party workers? By June 24, Dzerzhinsky had already come to an agreement with Bonch-Bruевич, who made a "good impression" on him regarding the "cleansing and downsizing of the Field Headquarters" with | 200 to 300 people. Dzerzhinsky reported that in connection with the reduction of PS employees, “there is a question of relocating the headquarters from Serpukhov to Moscow”? ". At the same time, already on June 24, a joint meeting of the Political and



The Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee discussed the report on the resignation of Bonch-Bruевич, who was extremely burdened by the position that had fallen like snow on his head. The general, with his unwillingness to work, "got" I.I. Vatsetis, and S.I. Gusev", the latter, on June 25 or a little later, sketched and sent to Lenin a kind of "theses" (as Lenin dubbed the text) about the Field Headquarters, in which he sharply criticized Vatsetis, who singled out for himself | ppm of PS work and not smart enough even to understand the impossibility of "giving the right directives to the fronts." The PSH itself was characterized by Gusev as a "purely paper institution", the sudden disappearance of which the fronts "would not even feel". Got it in the "theses" and M.D. Bonch-Bruевич with his eternal whining about being appointed head of the PS? As a result, already on July 13, by the decision of the RVSR, Major General P.P. Lebedev, to whom Bonch-Bruевич surrendered his post on July 22? Pavel Pavlovich Lebedev was educated in the Nizhny Novgorod Count Arakcheev Cadet Corps, the Alexander Military School (1892), the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff (1900, 1st category). Member of the First World War. He was in military service from 1890 (experience in 1919 - 29 years) - assistant to the head of the clerk (from February 1904), acting assistant. head clerk (since April 1904), assistant chief of a section (since November 1904) of the General Staff; assistant to the head of the department (from June 1905), clerk (from May 1906) of the GUGSH; clerk of the mobilization department of the General Staff (since March 1909); clerk of the Mobilization Department (since March 1909); head of the department (since September 1910) of the GUGSH; served as a qualified command of a battalion in the 4th Finnish Rifle Regiment (May-September 1912); head of the department of the General Staff (since January 1913); Head of the Department of the Quartermaster General of the Staff of the Southwestern Front (since September 1914); general for assignments under the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front; Assistant Quartermaster General (since July 1915), then Quartermaster General of the Northwestern Staff (since September 1915); i.d. Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army (since April 1917). Voluntarily joined the Red Army. From April 1918 he headed the mobilization department of the All-Russian General Staff, from February he held the post of chief of staff of the Eastern Front? \*. After being appointed Chief of the Field Staff, on August 12, 1919, Lebedev issued an order establishing a new procedure for keeping secret documents.

commissars, which, no doubt, should have improved the state of affairs at the headquarters: in fact, control over its implementation was henceforth assigned primarily to the commissars of the headquarters." Office No. 23 of V. M. Kozlova from service and handed over to the Special Department of the Cheka for spreading false rumors about the departure of PSh from Moscow'.

In June 1919, General Fyodor Kostyaev, who was suspicious of the graduation of the Academy of the General Staff in 1917, as established by A.A. Zdanovich, gave the following testimony during the investigation: "At first, after leaving the academy, this graduate did not have a definite identity, but later, from March ... [1918] . the idea of creating a young General Staff... as opposed to the old one... When the Commander-in-Chief came up with the idea of appointing some young General Staff officers of the 17th grade, inexperienced, to positions of responsibility, I opposed this in every possible way. So it was with the appointment of Isaev ... to a command post on the Eastern Front ... and Domozhirev ... his first employees were from this issue, and he looked at them as if they were his own people ... "

By July 1919, the general attack on the military department had entered its final stage: on July 2, Lenin took out Antonov's January report "from the bins" and handed it over to the Revolutionary Military Tribunal." It is curious that in the original of Antonov's report V.I. Lenin put at the same time, there are no cases of conspiracy in the Field Headquarters in the fund of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal. It turns out that during the execution of the text of V.I. a copy of AA Antonov's report - the question is - when?

On July 3, at a meeting of the Central Committee, a number of important military issues were resolved, including the renewal of the composition of the RVSR and the relocation of the headquarters to Moscow? (The move took place in the first days of August? \*). On July 4, the Central Committee decided to strengthen the Special Department of the Cheka? \*; The Organizing Bureau was obliged

hear the report of S.I. Gusev about the Registration Department of the PS "after consideration of this issue in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic" - in the composition of the RVSR updated on July 3. Naturally, they made a decision about the need to clean the RU from military experts." On July 4, one armed company of the 9th reserve rifle battalion was

sent to Serpukhov to the head of the PS - M.D. Bonch-Bruевич, who "crept" into the confidence of Dzerzhinsky himself, to carry out guard duty. The MChK intelligence report (No. 21 of July) says that the majority of the Red Army soldiers of the battalion were "on the side of the Soviet government", the state of discipline was recognized as satisfactory. The next day (July 5) a team of machine gunners of 20 people went to Kozlov, probably to strengthen the security of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. In the set of intelligence reports of the Special Department under the MChK for 1919, there is no similar strengthening of the security of these military bodies - most likely, units loyal to the Bolsheviks were sent to the Field Headquarters due to understandable fears of active actions on the part of the General Staff after the "petition" for Theodori.

On July 3, Lenin pushed through the Central Committee inflicting a final blow on Trotsky's supporters in the Revolutionary Military Council": I.N. Smirnova, A.P. Rozengolts and F.F. Raskolnikov was replaced in the RVSR by the old foes of the People's Commissariat of War - S.I. Gusev and I.T. Smilga, as well as A.I. Rykov??, apparently appointed for purely pragmatic reasons (he was supposed to coordinate the activities of the military department and the Supreme Council of National Economy). The Central Committee decided to give Vatsetis an "honorary military appointment with a decent salary" \*°. I. Deutscher writes that Stalin called the Commander-in-Chief a traitor, 77 but, judging by the resolution, there was no talk of betraying the Commander-in-Chief at the meeting: most likely, this was said in the heat of the moment due to the disagreement between the leadership of the Eastern Front and the high command of the Republic on strategic issues. Lenin noted at the meeting that every effort should be made to prevent "spiritual | demobil[ization] of military labor[s] kov"??? - most likely, Trotsky was once again reminded that the Bolsheviks are not old officers and have the right (and even the obligation, of course, for the good of the cause) in military work to appeal against decisions that are dubious, from their point of view, in the party bodies. On July 5, Trotsky sent a statement to the Central Committee, in which, referring to the conditions of work at the fronts, he asked for exemption from membership in the Politburo and chairmanship of the Revolutionary Military Council, as well as approval as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Trotsky called a number of steps taken by the Center "uninhibited and downright dangerous violations of the military system ... established and approved by the [VIII] Party Congress (emphasis mine. - S.V.)". The highlighted phrase is quite indicative: in his battles with the Central Committee, Trotsky

referred to the decision of the highest party body. Lenin drew up a draft resolution of the Org and Politburo of the Central Committee refusing Trotsky's resignation, according to which the OB and PB undertook "to do everything in their power" to regulate the work on the "most important at the present time" Southern Front, which Trotsky took up personally. Recognizing the policy of the chairman of the RVSR on the Southern Front as completely legitimate, the OB and PB pledged to give Trotsky "an opportunity to achieve with all his might what he considers to be a correction of the line on the military question, and, if he wishes, to try to speed up the party congress"! Trotsky was given the opportunity to take part in the work of the PB and the RVSR to the extent that he himself determines? Let us note that this was just not difficult: now there were so many supporters of Lenin in the RVSR that the Old Man could no longer fear for the fate of the "throne" and pursue his own policy in the military department. In July 1919, Lenin even gave him a document similar in form to Cardinal - Nome novel by Alexandre Dumas. With an amendment, in fact it was just a beautiful gesture bordering on a mockery.

In the memoirs of K.Kh. Danishevsky says that on July 5 and 6 the state of affairs at the Field Headquarters was assessed by a special commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b); On July 7, Danishevsky himself, in his note to the Central Committee of the Party, insisted on "an urgent change in the main command" and the removal of "a number of responsible staff workers from work"???. Danishevsky recalled: "I believed that the headquarters in its current composition no longer deserved political trust and that it could not be entrusted with conducting major operations with colossally unfolding fronts."

This is quite probable: Danishevsky never trusted Vatsetis; besides, between June 30 and July 13, the RVSR was not going to" - Danishevsky could well be in Moscow. The rest of the passage of the memoirs of Karl Khristianovich should be treated with extreme caution: they appeared in the same book with the memoirs of another participant in the events described - S.S. Kamenev: "It was necessary to put at the head of the armed forces ... the commander and chief of staff, already directly, on the experience of the front command, who proved their ability to navigate in the Civil War and in fact studied strategy and tactics

enemy and successfully countered this strategy and tactics with Soviet, revolutionary strategy and tactics, taking into account all the peculiarities of class war. like S.I. Gusev and others like him, but that's not the point – Danishevsky recognized S.S. Kamenev and P.P. Lebedev as such people.\* The fact of Karl Danishevsky's trip to Serpukhov to study the situation was confirmed in his In an article by A. A. Zdanovich, a researcher in Danishevsky's memorandum to the Central Committee: "The change of the Commander-in-Chief must be carried out urgently... assistants. Katkovich must be arrested... Attention should be paid to trips for [orders] Dylan and Ernst Vatsetis to Moscow, Kostyaev should be removed from headquarters. The RSFSR fund should be removed from the control of the Commander-in-Chief. In no case should Kostyaev be allowed -8 RVSR Directorate , and Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis at least as a consultant to the Defense Council or another higher military institution. The special department of the Field Headquarters is to be purged""? . |

July 8 F.E. Dzerzhinsky and I.P. Pavlunovsky compiled a report, the addressee of which was the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. However, the original document was deposited in the secretariat of V.I. Lenin, therefore, the document was drawn up specifically for the chairman of the Defense Council. The leaders of the Special Department reported on the establishment of a connection between the Kronstadt White Guard organization and the White Guard organization of the headquarters of the Western Front. At the same time, the interrogation of the main participant in the organization of the Western Front - the chief of staff of the front and the commander of the 15th army, the General Staff officer of the 18th year of graduation N.N. Domozhirev made it possible to reveal the central organization coordinating the activities of all fronts (with the exception of the Eastern one), aimed at carrying out a military coup and located in the Field Headquarters of the RVSR ""\*. Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis was named the head of the organization, who was going, as the testimony of the detainees said, to "shake Moscow." The Cheka and its Special Department proposed to arrest Vatsetis and members of the organization - E.I. Isaev, Head of Intelligence of the Field Headquarters B.I. Kuznetsov, consisting for assignments under the head of the PSh A.K. Malysheva, Yu.I. Grigoriev, who had (as the authors of the report indicated) connections with Moscow

White Guard organizations and connected through them with part of the regiments stationed in Moscow - as well as the nephew of the Commander-in-Chief, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 15th Army, Ernest Vatsetis, personal adjutant Vatsetis S.S. Dylan, commandant of PSh A.V. Remer and his assistant A.A. Stadler. In addition, it was proposed to arrest acting. Chief of the Field Staff F.V. Kostyaev "for failing to inform about the existence of an organization for the preparation of an uprising and espionage" 29. In the absence of representatives of the military department (even Ephraim Sklyansky), the Council of People's Commissars decided to replace Vatsetis with Kamenev, and the point of discussion was called "on updating the composition of the RVSR"". The fact that, contrary to custom, not even Sklyansky was present was not accidental: exactly by the summer of 1919, Trotsky managed to tame Ephraim - he even allowed himself to be late for meetings of the Politburo sometimes, for which he received a scolding on July 3. On July 8, the investigations of the Chekists resulted in the arrest of I.I. Vatsetis\*\*. Vatsetis himself asked to listen to him in the Council of Defense, but the council did not consider it necessary, and (the Commander-in-Chief reminded Lenin 2 years later) "decisive" was the word of the chairman of the Defense Council "®". On this day, Dzerzhinsky, Krestinsky, Lenin and Sklyansky telegraphed Trotsky about the arrest of Vatsetis in connection with N.N. Domozhirev. The latter named E.I. Isaev, who was "for a long time for assignments at the Commander-in-Chief" and lived "with him in the same apartment." The telegram indicated that the Commander-in-Chief was denounced by numerous pieces of evidence and a number of data.

Judging by the letter of Vatsetis to Lenin dated October 21, 1921, during the arrest of the Commander-in-Chief on July 8, Teodori's situation was repeated: Vatsetis ended up in solitary confinement. During the arrest, the Commander-in-Chief was told that "allegedly" he was not accused of anything, "even allegedly he was not arrested, but only "isolated" and therefore he would not be interrogated"! (Moreover, the "conspirator" was allowed to write his autobiography while in custody"?). When asked by Vatsetis about the reason for the arrest, the answer was: "For reasons of the revolutionary time."

On July 8, in the evening, in pursuance of the decision of the Central Committee, at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, Lenin signed a draft resolution on the replacement of Vatsetis S.S. Kamenev as Commander-in-Chief. The arrival of a new commander was not accidental: according to A.A. Samoilo, on the Eastern Front S.S. Kamenev "in his official relations was far from impartial to his employees, the number of which, according to the opinions of persons,

who knew Kamenev closely, the latter stubbornly replenished them for reasons not only pursuing the benefit of the service. In other words, nepotism was inherent in Kamenev even to a greater extent than in a number of other military leaders, and therefore there was no need to worry about saturating the Stavka with new cadres (the question is what kind) instead of those arrested ... This is confirmed by orders from the Field Headquarters. °.

On the night of July 9, 1919, the arrest of E.I. Isaeva, B.I. Kuznetsov, A.K. Malysheva and Yu.I. Grigoriev", On July 9, Gusev ordered the head of the 5th Latvian Soviet Rifle Regiment "immediately send guards to the Field Headquarters ... to escort those arrested to Moscow" 5. On July 13, the head of the Office of the PSh S.S. Kharitonov and military commissar Semyonov telegraphed to the Registration Department: "Send [to] Serpukhov on July 15 [by] 11 o'clock to examine Kuznetsov"? It is noteworthy that M.D. Bonch-Bruevich, requesting | July 4 I.P. Pavlunovsky about the arrested, dated their arrest on the night of July 9-10. Extremely strange memory error: only a few days have passed. It is even more strange that S.I. did not correct the mistake. Gusev, who imposed a "send" visa on the telegram. In the telegram of the general, the list of those arrested is specified: in addition to Vatsetis and the 4 named general staff officers, the head of the intelligence department B.I. Kuznetsov, assistant to the head of the operational department V.K. Tokarevsky, commandant of the headquarters A.V. Remer, his assistant A.A. Stadler and for instructions under the commandant F.M. Kotkovich. Bonch Bruevich asked Pavlunovsky who the arrested people were and what their formal status was – whether they were detained "under administrative procedure", whether they were under investigation, or whether their arrest should be regarded "as a measure against evasion from such"! The order for the PSH dated July 28 states that the following employees of the staff are listed under investigation behind the Special Department of the Cheka: A.V. Remer, A.A. Stadler, F.M. Kotkovich, B.I. Kuznetsov, V.K. Tokarevsky, for special assignments under the head of the PSh A.K. Malyshev", for special assignments under the former Commander-in-Chief E.I. Isaev, adjutants of the former Commander-in-Chief S.S. Dylan and E.I. Vatsetis, clerk of the former Commander-in-Chief E.M. Ufimtsev, clerk of the Department of Artillery Inspector S.D. Ni[kolai] ... since May 14; Servant of the General Department of the Administrative and Accounting

management of F. Rudnev since July 12" (it is not clear what the arrest of the latter is connected with). S.S. Dylan was noted by L.D. Trotsky as early as August 19, 1918 (he was already personal adjutant of I.I. Vatsetis at that time), along with the then commandant of the headquarters of the Czechoslovak Front A.V. Remer, head of the Kazan division I.E. Slavin, General Staff Officer Petrov, deceased military leader Avrov, Commissar of the 4th Army M.A. Levin and the brothers Valery and Ivan Mezhlauk."

I.T. Smile. Regarding the resignation of I.I. Vatsetis, he referred to the "strategic differences" between the Commander-in-Chief and Kamenev, casually mentioning a conspiracy at the Field Headquarters ("at the Headquarters," in his words, "...self-seekers and rogues made their nest"). Smilga spoke about the relocation of the Field Headquarters in order to rationalize the work of the RVSR, "which also included some changes." The head of the PU, who worked together with Kamenev on the Eastern Front, characterized the new Commander-in-Chief as "a capable, hard-working person",

"in good faith" studied "methods of conducting a civil war" and completely loyal to the Soviet government. At the end of the interview, Smilga expressed confidence that the appointment of Kamenev as the new Commander-in-Chief "would be a step forward" in the matter of military development.

On June 11-12, during the interrogations of Kuznetsov, Isaev and Malyshev (in the published copy of the interrogation, the latter was twice erroneously named Menshov), conducted personally by Dzerzhinsky or under his chairmanship, confessions were obtained. The protocol of the interrogation contains a number of ambiguities: it is probably not even a protocol, but a copy of a draft record made by Dzerzhinsky during the interrogation. If the content is captured by us correctly, we get the following picture:

— Kuznetsov and B.P. Polyakov established contact with Yu.I. Grigoriev through his classmate N.A. Kiseleva "on a date in Moscow".

- The phrase "Domozhirov went to look for Arseniy" is alarming. This refers to the Metropolitan of Novgorod Arseny. But why did Domozhirov plan to "learn about the foreign situation" through him? A clergyman, albeit of high rank, is

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not an intelligence officer or NKID. Grigoriev, Isaev, Domozhirov, Malyshev, on behalf of Kuznetsov, tried to establish the seriousness of the threat from the Whites and the Entente. Mamlijev (an unidentified character, not mentioned by Dzerzhinsky and Pavlunovsky in the final report) proposed to appoint his military leader in Tula "to lead the movement of workers and seize the shooting center." Firstly, why are there no "pieces" of testimony of the key participant in the "conspiracy" - Mamlijev - in the report of Dzerzhinsky and Pavlunovsky of July 23, which is a compilation of fragments of testimony of the General Staff officers diluted with comments? It is unlikely that these are fictional characters. Either they managed to avoid arrest and therefore were not interrogated, or they categorically refused to testify ... Secondly, the very idea that any military instructor (i.e. military specialist) can lead the movement of workers is absurd .

- Malyshev suggested using Vatsetis for a coup; Isaev, according to his statement, "objected, referring to his inconstancy and talkativeness in a drunken state." Again a reference to the drunkenness of the Commander-in-Chief ...

- June 16 or later (after the removal of F.V. Kostyaev) Vatsetis "in tears said" "Shake Moscow". Malyshev proposed to capture Tula (Tula Cartridge Plant), Serpukhov (Field Headquarters, probably cutting out the commissars and the communist cell) and make a "march on Moscow". Everything is clear with the Field Headquarters, it is even possible to allow the capture of a cartridge factory, but with what forces to make a "camp on Moscow": the "issue of Kerensky" could not do this without support, and even 93 versts still have to be driven to Moscow; It takes time to issue an order for the transfer of units, and it is not a fact that the Bolshevik commissars will not be able to cancel the counter-revolutionary order by shooting, if necessary, the commander, who is allegedly ready to risk his life for no one knows what.

- Yu.I. Grigoriev "agreed through informed persons in Moscow [to enter?] into contact with Denikin" and, if necessary, to transfer to him information about the transfer of units from the Eastern Front to the Southern. Another oddity: why didn't they ask during the interrogation who these mysterious "informed persons" were?

A different explanation was given by S.I. Gusev on July 12 at the Moscow City Conference of the RCP(b). Speaking about the victories at the fronts and mentioning the liquidation of the military conspiracy, Gusev announced the victory "in the form of a reorganization of the military administration." According to him, Revvo

The National Council of the Republic, as the Center uniting all military work, "turned out to be a fiction", often interfering with the army in organizational work, "now the Revolutionary Military Council has been created, in whose hands all work will be concentrated and there will be no more multi-center." Further, Gusev added Trotsky: "Some comrades rebelled against the abolition of the Revolutionary Military Council[s]—sitting

upstairs. It seemed to them that everything was going well, but something else was felt on the periphery, the need to create a healthy center was visible, and the only way to make it such is to involve people of practice with organizational experience" "?".

Not earlier than July 23, as already mentioned, Dzerzhinsky and Pavlunovsky reported to Lenin about the conspiracy. The typewritten copy of the report was also studied by Leon Trotsky.

Judging by the notes, Trotsky was interested in the following fragments:

- 1) Kuznetsov, Isaev and Malyshev tried to establish contact with the Whites;
- 2) Grigoriev intended to establish contact with Denikin's headquarters through the General Staff officers B.P. Polyakov and V.N. Selivachev;
- 3) According to the General Staff, only one person could lead the uprising - Joachim Vatsetis, who was afraid of reprisals from the Whites in the event of the victory of the latter;
- 4) An offer to Vatsetis was made by the General Staff during a joint drink;
- 5) A psychological turning point in the behavior of the Commander-in-Chief occurred after the replacement of Kostyaev by Bonch Bruevich (on the eve of Vatsetis's summons to Moscow), as a result of which a number of Stavka employees took the side of Bonch-Bruevich, and Vatsetis decided that he could rely on his Latvians in his actions;
- 6) "The White Guard group of the Field Headquarters was in the initial stage of its organization, i.e. she had just been created, outlined her tasks and plans, and began only partial implementation of them, and she was still so uninfluential that her presence in the Field Headquarters did not affect the course | operations on the fronts.

From all this, the reader (we will not take the liberty of thinking for Leon Trotsky) can conclude: even if everything that the General Staff officers showed during the investigation is true, then the desire to organize a military coup is just as good for them

you can still be charged with guilt (in the conditions of the Civil War, this was quite enough for execution). But the practical involvement of Vatsetis in the "conspiracy" – instead of drunken talk – was certainly the answer to the decision to purge the Field Headquarters and the first actions of the Stavka commissar Gusev and the Chekists.

The special department of the Cheka continued the investigation of the Headquarters in August 1919. In all likelihood, in the first days of August, the OO asked the chairman of the RVTR, K.Kh. Danishevsky on the persons appointed to command positions by order of I.I. Vatsetis: On August 5, this information, together with a copy of A.A. Antonov dated January 12, 1919. Danishevsky sent I.P. Pavlunovsky"? S.I. Gusev continued to actively contribute to the investigation into the case of the Commander-in-Chief. On August 14, he sent I.P. Pavlunovsky a list of persons appointed in June-July to command positions, indicating: "all these persons were appointed exclusively to the 14th Army and, apparently, by Vatsetis alone." Thus, the Chekists found out which personnel of the former Commander-in-Chief could pose a danger to the Soviet Republic. | August Gusev instructed Danishevsky to prepare an order on the removal of the General Staff officers from the cipher business \*". On August 6, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee approved the "Regulations on Commissars of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic" developed by Gusev and Danishevsky, which gave the commissars great powers"??.

September 24 F.E. Dzerzhinsky reported at the meeting on the liquidation of the counter-revolutionary organizations - the "National Center" and the headquarters of the Volunteer Army of the Moscow Region, without mentioning a word about the liquidation of the conspiracy at Headquarters (Doc. No. 3.7). And this despite the fact that Dzerzhinsky probably had grounds for linking the "conspiracy" in the Field Headquarters with the liquidation of the two indicated organizations: on September 17, one of the Stavka employees, Mikhalevsky, reported to S.I. Gusev that he was offered cooperation with the Whites. It is unlikely that Sergei

Ivanovich did not bring the information to the relevant authorities. We give him his due - the commissioner of the PSh doubted the value of the proposal made to his employee "through second hands", however, he allowed the "implementation" to continue. The last document (doc. No. 3.13) is noteworthy, according to which (if the employee did not lead the Stavka commissar by the nose) Mikhalevsky allegedly received the task of transferring the deployment of the Reds to the South for Denikin

nom front and established the presence in Moscow of a battle group of whites and a spy organization. The document was drawn up no earlier than September 24 - this leads to suspicion: about 700 "counter-revolutionaries" were already under arrest. However, Mikhalevsky was probably not aware of the matter: Dzerzhinsky's report about the disclosure of the conspiracy was published in the press only on September 27 (Doc. No. 3. 12-3. 13). Whether there was an attempt at recruitment, or whether the enterprising employee of the Field Headquarters only wanted to emigrate with a decent "business trip" - we do not know, but the information is a faceless thing. To the same, the former colonel of the guard V.A. Miller on October 12 during interrogation in the case of the "National Center" said: N. Suchkov said that "he managed to free several persons involved in the Vatsetis trial." There is a clear chronological inconsistency - either the interrogated colonel was misled by Suchkov, or ... \* ?? In any case, in Felix Dzerzhinsky's speech, despite the testimony he and Ivan Pavlunovsky received from the General Staff, there is not a word about a "conspiracy" at Headquarters. Probably, by September 1919, the Chekists achieved, with the help of the July arrests, the tasks that were set for them [V.I. Lenin].

The VChK tried to organize provocations around the strategy in the fall of 1919 on September 11, as well as the deputy head of the RU T.P. Samsonov-Babiy wrote to S.I. Gusev "an explanatory note" in which he insisted on the reduction and filtering of the Administration Consultation consisting of military experts: officers can reveal Soviet agents and inform the enemy." Gusev sent a copy of the note to K.Kh. Danishevsky with the resolution: "This completely coincides with my previous assumptions. I am only waiting for the decision of the Organizing Bureau on this issue in order to sign the order." On November 30, Danishevsky forwarded another copy of this report to F.E. Dzerzhinsky". Not later than November 25, 1919, the head of the Special Department of the Cheka, G.G. Yagoda, on the orders of Dzerzhinsky, requested from the assistant military commissar PSh K.Kh. Danishevsky's conclusion "on the reasons for the withdrawal of Yudenich's army from our troops surrounding him in a ring, which were sufficient in number for the complete encirclement and destruction" of the enemy; "Is the way out of the encirclement not explained ... by the lack of control and negligence" of individuals. As a result, Dzerzhinsky received a response with a certificate for

by the signature of General Staff Officer [S.I.] Danilov: "During the operation against Yudenich, he was actually never surrounded; 2) I believe that the encirclement would be possible if the 7th and 15th armies moved faster, and the 7th army would not tolerate the touch of the enemy during the battle and if the 7th army did not leave so many bayonets in reserve during time of decisive battles; 3) I definitely believe that [D.N.] Nadezhny's sloppiness played a role, as did his unreasonable distribution of bayonets into groups - in fact, without a striking fist" "\*".

Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee M.I. On October 20, 1919, Kalinin repeated twice to his wife N.N. Domozhirova: "The case is empty, and "they" (Chekists. - S.V.) now confess that they are keeping your husband for nothing" "".

No. 3.1

Report of the Department of Military Control of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic S.I. Aralov about the work environment of the Field Headquarters in Serpukhov

No. 01503, mountains. Moscow December 4, 1918. "Top[top] secret Only in your own hands"

REPORT TO COMRADE ARALOV

In pursuance of your personal order on the clarification by the Department of Military Control of the conditions and situation under which the Revolutionary Military Council in Serpukhov will have to and has to work, I

employees of my department were sent to Serpukhov, who urgently found out the following so far:

1) At the time of the supposed uprising, control was established at the post office and telegraph, which no longer exists today.

There is no official in the post office who would establish the correct control over the functions of all employees and would give the appropriate directives. The post office is run by an official who is alien to Soviet power and far from politics.

+ Received by S.I. Aralov December 22, 1918 \*\* Entered by M.G. Truckman in green ink.

erth

2) At the telegraph station, the situation is the same - the manager of the telegraph station, VINTSEVICH, does not in any way resemble a Soviet worker. The staff is small, there is no control, despite the fact that one of the employees pointed out suspicious negotiations.

3) In the Extraordinary Commission, the situation is as follows:

All employees - 4 people: one chairman and three employees; limited to external observation, casually overheard conversations, etc., because both the lack of people and their inexperience do not allow us to put things right. The greatest material and work of the Cheka is provided by voluntary and occasional denunciations. If there is an organized conspiracy or a spy organization here, they will certainly pass by the ears and eyes of the Cheka. Until now, arrests and searches have been carried out by the Cheka on instructions from Moscow. The matter of the search is further complicated by the fact that the registration of arrivals and departures is terribly bad in the city: for example, when searching for an old resident of the mountains. Serpukhov, who has lived here for 15 years, was not listed in the address table. The employees of the address desk themselves willingly confess to the poor formulation of the case.

Along with such gaps and defects in everything, Serpukhov is the most suitable place for conspiracies, blackmail and speculation. The headquarters, a significant number of troops, food supplies and military equipment are located here. A huge number of factories and plants, where there can always be a large number of dissatisfied.

The largest centers are the headquarters and the "Centro Collegium" for accounting state property in the county.

The "Centrocollegium" is such a large and interesting institution that I have given special instructions for developing its essence, and I will report all the results in my next report, as well as in relation to the headquarters, regarding which information has been received that one of the most responsible posts, like the Communications Service, is in the hands of MEDVEDEV, a person who does not inspire confidence from the point of view of Soviet power. I have already pointed out this Medvedev before.

All the details regarding the officers of the headquarters and the system of work are currently being grouped and will also be reported in the corresponding report.

In order to eliminate the above decrees and establish correct and productive work, I would suggest first of all:

1. Appoint a commissar - 1) a communist for the telegraph office, 2) a post office and 3) a telegraph office from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic";

2. Assign the correct and accurate registration of all living inhabitants of the mountains. Serpukhov



3. Order the commandant of the Serpukhov station to take care of the correct registration of documents at the railway station."

Head of Military Control Department

Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic M. Trakman

Head of the active part Plancis

RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. L. 65 with ob.-66. The original is a typewritten text autographed by M.G. Trakman in green ink,

Plancisa in burgundy ink.

No. 3.2

Note by S.I. Aralov to a senior official of the Special Department on the need to strengthen military counterintelligence in Serpukhov and the protection of the Field Headquarters""

April 14, 1919

Dear comrade!

The work in Serpukhov of the Special Department should be placed on a great height and widely [spread out].

The danger is from without, not from within.

Obviously, a number of agents of the White Guards penetrated the environment of the workers, [soldiers] of the 5th regiment, and work is underway to attack [on] the headquarters from the outside. I ask you to listen [everything strictly] and send more workers. Serpukhov - Headquarters and the center of all operational work, and therefore the matter of guarding headquarters must be taken seriously.

With comradely greetings \_ Aralov

\* The internal numbering was done by an unidentified person with a simple pencil. Actually this amendment proposed to appoint three instead of one commissioner.

\*\* Opposite item number | litter in purple pencil: "Draw up a report and states."

\*\*\* Opposite points No. 2 and 3 of the litter in purple pencil: "Offer the Cheka of Serpukhov." TO notes opposite the proposal of the UWC as a whole - the resolution of S.I. Aralova (blue pencil): "to execution."

\*\*\*\* Presumably, the addressee of the report was M.S. Kedrov.

14LU.[19] 19 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. L. 198-198v. The copy is an autograph in blue ink.

No. 3.3

Report of the head of the Serpukhov Special Branch of the Cheka A. Volkov S.I. Aralov on measures taken to eliminate espionage and counter-revolution

, mountains. Serpukhov April 15, 1919

To the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR comrade. Aralov REPORT

Taking into account the moment experienced, as well as the situation that has arisen, in particular in the mountains. Serpukhov and in order to take measures for the liquidation, I ask you to carry out

the following:

1) In view of the fact that recently there has been a strong influx of foreigners, as well as rather dubious persons who allegedly come to the headquarters, etc., allegedly on business, and therefore I ask you to give an order to the garrison so that all persons arriving by service affairs, etc. (both civil and military departments) must immediately, at the same hour upon arrival in the city, register with the commandant of the city, to whom it is obligatory, with a note in the book, who, from where, on what matters and to which institution - Denia has arrived.

Since up to now no registration has been carried out and there was no accounting of both the population and those arriving, thereby they made it possible for all enemy agents to penetrate not only into the city, but even into those institutions that represent a well-known State secret, for which I appropriate action will be taken.

2) In order to preserve the well-known secrecy of the work of the headquarters, it is necessary to establish the following: a) the issuance of passes for the right to enter the headquarters should be arranged outside the headquarters building on the grounds that an agent who entered the headquarters building allegedly (at least) to obtain a pass and passing by the doors, near which there is a sentry, where almost every minute on official business you have to pass both you and all political figures who

for them they play a certain role, and therefore no one is guaranteed that one will not make an attempt on you; c) the agent needs to know the layout of the offices of all responsible employees, which at present seems possible to them, because those persons who received the distribution of products are unreliable, namely, comrade. Stadler, who was monitored while he was in Kazan, and it was established that he had a connection with persons suspected of espionage, namely one Gofstad, who is currently under the supervision of the Kazan Special Department. Therefore, I ask you to make an appropriate order that those persons who are entrusted with the issuance of passes pay (careful) serious attention to the correctness of the documents [s], and most importantly - to the seal impression, and that they daily present you with a list by department, which the faces of whom they visited, and this is the best control - to establish which of the ranks of the headquarters and who visits.

3) In order to put you in safety, in view of the fact that an attempt can be expected at this time [on you] as a prominent political figure, because the strict issuance of passes for the right to enter the headquarters will establish that, beyond any doubt, what they will try to produce in the apartment, and therefore I ask permission to place one agent in your apartment, who will neutralize all this and at the same time collect information, since the most bureaucratic families are placed in your apartment. |

4) Speak personally on the phone with Comrade Kedrov, so that he will allow you to open a pass desk here, which is necessary in order to accurately establish the identity, because. it will be obligated to such a person that all persons who need to leave Serpukhov must apply to the pass office to obtain the appropriate pass - where the departing person must fill out the appropriate questionnaire, which will serve as a document for the department identification.

5) On April 17, I will start organizing a checkpoint at Serpukhov station.

6) In view of the fact that the head of communications comrade. Medvedev and his assistant Belov need to establish an internal agency, and therefore I ask you to make an appropriate order about

hiring for a position (any) in the named department of one of the agents of the OO.

7) From today's day, i.e. since April 15, observation of (comrade) citizen Uspensky has been established - I will inform you daily about the results.

8) A statement was received that citizens Savinkov, Lomasov and Zhemarkin from the old cotton-printing factory were former | neck | Konshina are campaigning to come out with a white flag - I am taking measures to

investigation.

9) I ask you to invite all political commissars of the headquarters to keep an eye on employees and employees and to report all persons who are in doubt to me for investigation.

10) On April 15, there was a meeting in the special-purpose battalion attended by agents of the department, where it turned out that one could definitely rely on 2/3 of the composition, while the rest of the 1/3 is doubtful, but with good agitation one can - next.

Head of the Serpukhov Special Branch of the Cheka

A. Volkov

Resolution S.I. Aralova": "Golenko. Take action."

RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. L. 246 with ob.-247. Autographed in blue ink.

§ 3.4 Report by A. Volkov S.I. Aralov about the need to provide assistance to the Serpukhov branch of the Special Department of the Cheka

No. 146, Moscow, Znamensky per., 3 April 21, 1919 Secret

TO THE COMMISSIONER OF THE FIELD HEADQUARTERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC TOV. ARALOV In view of the fact that the work of counterintelligence can proceed systematically, then | only| when all politicians of all institutions meet halfway, i.e. assist in the implementation of certain orders and orders that are essential for

\* So in the text. \*\* Above, to the left of the text - an autograph in blue pencil.

OO, without which the work of counterintelligence is extremely difficult, at that time it is useless.

Therefore, I ask you to make a proper order to all political committees so that they provide assistance, and I also ask: 1) On the immediate replacement of the city commandant, 2) Give an order around the city so that everyone arriving in the mountains. Serpukhov must immediately register with the commandant of the city and check in upon departure, 3) When issuing passes for the right to enter the headquarters premises, carefully examine the documents with a note to whom such a person is sent and on what business and daily after issuing an extract through one of the headquarters commissars present to me", and 4) Report daily about all persons traveling on business trips and on vacation one hour before the train leaves.

Please notify me of further instructions.

Head of the Special Department Volkov

Clerk E. Kalugin

Resolution S.I. Aralova": "Comrade. Golenko. Negotiate with the chairman of the executive committee on the appointment of the commandant, on the publication of the appropriate | orders. Commissar Adm[instrumental-accounting department] comrade. Semyonov to check the pass book every day and get in touch with the head of the NGO on all commandant issues. 24LU.[19] 19. Aralov.

Litter": "Measures taken."

RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. L. 215. The original is a typewritten text on the letterhead of the Serpukhov branch of the Office of the Special Department of the Cheka with autographs in blue ink.

No. 3.5

Report of the General Staff Officer of the Operational Directorate A.P. Medvedev to the head of department V.V. Daller with a request for leave after unreasonable detention in Butyrka prison and for transfer to another position

No. 191/I., mountains. Serpukhov May 16, 1919."

\* I emphasized with a simple pencil S.I. Aralov.

\*\* To the left of the text - an autograph in pencil.

\*\*\* Above the text is a blue pencil.

\*\*\*\* Document on the form "CHIEF OF THE COMMUNICATION SERVICE OF THE FIELD STAFF OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC". Per document

HEAD OF OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENT

I report that on the night of May 4, I was arrested at my apartment in the mountains. Moscow (Granatny per., 20) according to the order of the Special Department. A search was carried out in the apartment, after which, according to the warrant, I, the arrested person, was taken to the Special Department, and from there on May 5 I was transferred to the Butyrka prison and placed in a solitary strict cell.

The first interrogation was carried out to me by the investigator of the Special Department on May 6, the second interrogation on May 13, after which on May 14 I was released into the custody of S.I., a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. ARALOVA and they took a subscription from me that I would be in the mountains. Serpukhov and undertake to appear at the first request of the Cheka.

At the first inquest I was charged in writing with espionage. Such a grave and shameful accusation brought against me, judging only by the course of both interrogations during the investigation and by the documents collected and attached to the case, cannot be considered justified and in any way serious, but is, on the one hand, the result of a vile and a provocation, rare in its impudence, on the part of the former employee of the Troitskaya Field Headquarters, and on the other hand, some kind of fatal misunderstanding for me.

Troitskaya, who had nothing in common with me at all, testified that I knew definitely that she was in the service of the White Guards, that one day, when I met her, I said that "the end is coming soon, ours is gaining the upper hand," that one day she rode with me in the carriage and saw how I was carrying a package to the "deputy of the French consul." Then came the accusation that, as if I had some kind of secret apartment in Trubnikovsky Lane, I sent some cards by courier to some Semenov on Myasnikskaya Street, I have connections with the French, I deposited documents with someone and a few other minor questions.

They asked me if I knew the General Staff Tarasov (I don't know), Daller and Antsiferov and Teodori - and what relationship do I have with them.

Of the physical evidence attached to the case: 1) photographic card of the General Staff A.A. Neznamov, my former boss; 2) an unused pass to the staff car, taken me for

those have pencil marks: 1) "Administrative department]. 18.M1. [1919]"; "According to resolution. 19.U1. [1919]]".

telegraph employee (she did not go); 3) photographs (2) of mine with my headquarters of the 47th Infantry Division, taken in April 1917; 4) my report in 1916 at the School of Ensigns in Chertkovo (Galicia) with [o] the scheme for this report; 5) a map of the breakthrough of the front near Brzezany (Galicia) in June 1917; in addition, two or three more unimportant pieces of paper were taken away. Thus, one can see that all that I had to go through during these 2 weeks, all that I am going through now, receiving information about all those humiliations of me as a person that were allowed in my absence

in general, and during the searches that took place at my place in particular - all these were vain accusations and insults inflicted unintentionally, and in some cases with evil will, on me, who from the first days of the October Revolution had been continuously working in responsible posts, who was entrusted with top-secret assignments (personally handing over top-secret packages to the chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and the Supreme Military Council"), who created a coherent and reliable communication system, regardless of difficulties and frictions of various types and from different sides.

All this had a hard effect on me, undermined my energy and lowered the efficiency of all kinds.

Reporting on the above, I convincingly petition for permission for me at least for the next 10 days of rest, because I am completely physically unfit for work and I need to calm down a bit.

In addition, I report that in the coming days I will ask you to assist in granting me another position, if not in the Field Headquarters, then in another institution, so as to continue leading such a responsible communication work under the circumstances known to you, aggravated by the whole situation that accompanied my arrest, I absolutely can't.

Engineer, military electrician of the General Staff Medvedev

Resolution V.V. Dallera: "To the inspection [department]. Keep in business. Daller. 19.W1.[1] 919""",

\* IN AND. Lenin. \*\* L.D. Trotsky. \*\*\* L. 349 - a simple pencil.

RGVA. F. 6. Op. 5. D. 66. L. 349 with ob.-350. The original is a typewritten text with an autograph.

No. 3.6 Statement by L.D. Trotsky to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) regarding the decision to purge the Field Headquarters"

June 16, 1919

In the Central Committee

U[dear] t[comrades]

Regarding yesterday's decision on the Headquarters, I consider it necessary to leave a written statement.

The adopted decision contains an element of whimsy, mischief: this is how it will be perceived by both "interested" and their "parties". You can make any kind of ferocious decisions, but they should not contain Pavlovian whim: "I want to mate a rabbit with a canary - and nothing else." The combination will be interpreted as a quirk of confusion and desperation. The collapse and betrayal among the specialists will increase. Especially if this is supplemented by the arrest of K ostyaev, who "does not drink, does not play cards" (witness account Aralov's testimony) and works 20 hours a day. In terror, the elements of caprice exasperate and disorganize much more than the most ferocious cruelty.

The bet is "nativity scene". Certainly not a monastery there, I suppose. But I do not doubt the enormity of the exaggeration of various gossips. Our headquarters of the 13th Army was sentenced to hard labor for "vicious behavior" (drinking, etc.) - now everyone is fussing about their pardon, because the employees of the headquarters work in good faith, and there is no one to replace them. We have recently experimented a lot in the field of mobilization. We spent—despite warnings—a lot of energy and time on the "authoritative" mobilization 10-20, and as a result not only lost a lot of time, but also showed the muzhik that if you don't want to, then don't mobilize, despite the decrees. This will affect the current mobilization.

\* There is a pencil mark on the document: "after reading, return for archive." Originally stood: "nearest". Correction L.D. Trotsky.

Now we are starting to experiment—with a touch of mischief—in the area of Headquarters. American wisdom generally recommends not changing from horse to horse when crossing a fast stream." But at the most critical moment we harness horses that obviously pull apart...

The rejected combination of comrade Lenin had almost all the immediate disadvantages of the accepted one, and, moreover, removed the command of the Eastern Front, regarding which (the front) the Central Committee again made a decision in fact to cancel the decision of the Half Bureau that it was he, the Eastern ] front, is <important> paramount, and not the Petrofront.

With comrade | Arish | ad[ive] L. Trotsky

16/1.1919

RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 12 with ob-13. Autograph.

RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 14. Certified typewritten copy.

Printed according to the text of the autograph.

No. 3.7 Theses [S.I. Gusev] about the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic!

Between June 25 and July 3, 1919

1. The basic rule of military organization: the larger the military unit, the less the share of work its command devotes to operational and administrative issues. The regiment has absolutely no organs of supply, no organs of formation and position. 99% of the work of a regimental commander is operational work. The division already has supply and formation organs (reserve battalion), and 50% of the work of the divisional commander is devoted to this issue. In armies with widely developed supply and formation organs, 25% of the work of the commander falls to the share of operational issues, the remaining 75% to supply and formation. The front command devotes no more than 10% of its work to certain issues. Finally, the share of the commander-in-chief accounts for 1-2% of operational work, and he must devote almost all his working time to supply and formation issues.

This shows that t[ak] called | called | The field headquarters, from whose jurisdiction work on supply (CUS) and formation (Vserosglavshstab) was completely removed, performs only an insignificant share of the work of the main command and the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs.

2. The high command has to issue directives to the fronts about once every 3 months, and then only closely monitor their implementation and changes in the construction situation. No matter how simple, at first glance, the operational work of the Commander-in-Chief, no matter how short the directive lines: actively defend, attack, defeat the enemy army, capture such and such lines and gain a foothold in them), but for a correct decision, it requires taking into account numerous facts (the numerical composition of one's own forces and the enemy's, the state of supply, reserves, geographical and climatic conditions, political conjuncture, etc.) The field headquarters, completely cut off from the Central Control Center and the All-Russian Headquarters, cannot carry out correct accounting and, consequently, cannot give correct directives.

3. At best, if the Commander-in-Chief is smart enough to understand that he cannot give correct directives, he will try not to spoil the work of the front command and not interfere with it by his orders and orders, for which he will maintain close contact with the front and not make not a single important decision without first consulting with the front. In this case, the Commander-in-Chief will not be harmful. In the worst case (and we have such a case in Serpukhov)

The Commander-in-Chief and the Field Headquarters, by their most benevolent directives, will most often disrupt the work of the fronts, push them to make mistakes, and generally harm the cause.

4. The Front Command, in comparison with the Field Headquarters, is in incomparably more favorable conditions, because it combines operational, supply and organizational work. Consequently, it has the ability to take into account all the elements of the operational task much more correctly and give a more appropriate situation and, consequently, | Oval |, a more correct solution.

5. If our Field Headquarters suddenly disappeared, the fronts would not feel this (so insignificant is its share of work), because they need not directives, but supplies and replenishments. Rather, the fronts

5 So in the text. It follows: "strategic."

it would be easy to sigh without losing anything but viscous and incorrect directives.

6. Our Field Headquarters is a purely paper institution, deprived of the material ability to change the situation on the fronts (supply, replenishment, reserves); his work is a harmful function, around which several hundred very busy people, but essentially doing nothing, revolve. Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis is a typical example of such a "paper case man[a]". From the hard work of the high command, which falls to the share of the Field Headquarters, he allocated 1/1000 part to himself. Of the 2-3 hours of daily stay at the headquarters, he devotes 5-10 minutes to work, and the rest of the time is occupied with idle chatter. He is not even interested in the reports of the head of [TsUPVOSO] and the inspectors. Systematic communication between the chief and the front command is not maintained. The most important and responsible decisions are made in one minute, involuntarily, impulsively jumping out of his head, without prior careful study of the issue. At the same time, he is very panicky "So, when the news was received about the surrender of Kharkov, which after the fall of Belgorod even a military expert could not foresee, which, moreover, did not lead to a radical change or, at least, to a significant deterioration in the situation, he immediately, Literally in 10 seconds, he decided to retrain the 25th division to Kursk, directed to the Ural direction. Only my indication that such an order would be tantamount to the speedy surrender of Samara and Saratov and the union of the Dutovites with Denikinists sobered him up and forced him to abandon this rash decision. Just as unsystematic and thoughtless are administrative, economic and organizational issues, since more or less accidentally they end up in the Field Headquarters. The following two facts are most expressive. In April, 50 thousand rifles were stored in the warehouses of the [South] Front, but there were no replenishments. In the same last April, there were many replenishments on the Eastern Front, but there were no rifles. The result is a strike on both fronts. The second fact: a huge place in the work of the Field Headquarters is occupied by the invariably satisfied numerous requests for benefits to military specialists (in case of illness or death of a mother, father, children, brothers, sisters; in case of loss of things, loss) and for the preservation of the former

\* So in the text. Followed by: "fiction". \*\* So in the text. It follows: "At the same time, he is an alarmist."

holding upon transfer to a lower position. The Commander-in-Chief is personally in charge of all this question of benefits. The rest of the responsible employees of the headquarters are also spoiled officials, more or less executive, more or less capable, who, with a businesslike and free air, revolve around a non-existent business. However, one or two good workers seem to

There is.

The new chief of staff, Bonch-Bruevich, differs from the old one in greater misunderstanding and greater stupidity, greater obsequiousness and less diligence. He regards his stay at the headquarters as the shortest and stubbornly wants to leave. As a result, instead of 5 papers, the Commander-in-Chief now has to read up to 40 papers daily, which causes him to sincerely indignation.

7. Vseroslavshstab (formation) and TsUS (supply) allocated to the spheres of influence of the deputy pre-revolutionary military resp[u] comrade. Sklyansky. Complete separation is completely abnormal and also contradicts the type of organization of revolutionary councils that has developed on the fronts and in the armies, where all branches of military administration (organization, supply, operational part) are inextricably linked with each other (organization, supply, operational part) are united in one center. To the extent that the Field Headquarters, cut off from formations and supplies, is unable to correctly pose and resolve operational issues, so the Central Control Center and the All-Russian Headquarters, [torn off] from the operational unit, are unable to correctly pose and resolve issues of supply and formation. The reputation of the TsUS and the All-Russian Headquarters in the armies and on the fronts is the worst, unfortunately, not without good reasons.

8. The general meaning of the previous theses: [it is necessary] to create a single center uniting the operational management of the fronts, their supply and replenishment.

9. This center can be operational only on the condition that it is made up of comrades who have gone through a front-line school. The central officers who fell asleep in the central offices should be sent to study in the armies and the front-line soldiers should be settled in their place, according to the calculation: 1 efficient front-line soldier / to replace 10 rear idlers.

10. In creating this workable and competent center, it must be borne in mind that all the fronts are represented in it as evenly as possible and that the representatives of the fronts know their front well and continue, being in the center, to maintain close contact with them, receiving from his front a constant

information and from time to time going there. A little experience in the Field Headquarters convinced me that the Headquarters knows the fronts very poorly. |

11. Distribute non-military experts between the rear and the front. One efficient front-line military specialist, tested many times at the front both from the side of work and from the side of loyalty, instead of 10 always suspicious rear military experts.

12. Such a change of rear and front military experts is the best remedy against enemy espionage and White Guard conspiracies. Enemy espionage tends most of all to central institutions. Scattering them around the fronts and armies, we will destroy their organization and deprive them of the opportunity to receive information from the place where they flock. In armies and divisions they will find themselves in an incomparably worse position for their espionage work.

13. These measures (the exchange between the front and the rear) must be carried out with a certain gradualness, with unrelenting steadfastness and regularity. No concessions, no concessions.

14. These measures should be equally extended to the Field Headquarters.

15. In addition to the main measures in the fight against espionage and conspiracies, the following measures must also be taken: a) control checks on the composition of employees of central institutions, where there is a lot of bourgeoisie, radical purge and reshuffling; b) downsizing; c) the introduction of secret observers into the number of employees, specially paid by official remuneration and instructed by the Special Department [VChK].

16. Along with the creation of a workable and competent center that really unites all branches of military work of real front-line centers, it is necessary to carry out centralization in the field of supply and formation. In fact, this centralization is already being carried out, but not decisively and consistently enough. The subordination of the districts to the fronts will give them the opportunity to restore battered units and create new ones incomparably faster. The same must be done in the field of supply, giving the fronts (not the armies, for starting from the fronts, centralization has already become possible) in that

\* So in the text.



or in some other form, independently produce clothing and food procurements (for example, by subordinating district and provincial military camps to them).

17. This temporary decentralization will, in the order of time, create efficient bodies in the field of formations and procurements at the fronts and will thus give the center the opportunity, by combining these organizations and their work, to establish really (and not paper) ) centralization.

18. This decentralization will essentially mean the transfer of the base of formation and procurement from hungry and skinned centers to grain and not yet united places. In particular, this applies most of all, first of all, to the Eastern Front and then to Ukraine. Therefore, it is necessary to send there from the centers both workers and the material part necessary for the formations. The department of formations on the Eastern Front already exists and is actively working, it only needs to be expanded and strengthened, and in Ukraine it needs to be rebuilt. Therefore, the good people of the All-Russian Headquarters should be sent to the Eastern Front and the Ukraine. The same must be done with [o] a significant part of the TsUS.

19. In the event that the Field Headquarters still remains a dead paper institution, I ask you to replace me and send me to the army or to the front, because I find the collapse around an illusory business without any possibility of organizational initiative an occupation in the highest degree disgusting, especially after a live and fruitful work at the fronts.

Litter V.I. Lenin: "Abstracts?? Whose? Gusev?"

RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10317. L. 1-5. Typewritten copy.

\*

Litter V.I. Lenin - an autograph in pencil.

No. 3.3

Testimony of the person under investigation - General Staff Officer N.N. Domozhikov - in the case of the Conspiracy in the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic

July 8, 1919.

\* So in the text. Obviously. meant: "will allow in time." \*\* So in the text. Obviously, it meant: "circling".

\*\*\* L. | - above.

Indications gr. Domozhikova 8/ UG, 1919 on the preparation of a coup, which was being prepared at Headquarters'

On July 6-7, at Headquarters, Isaev, Kuznetsov and Malyshev told the following: recently, the position of the Commander-in-Chief seemed to be shaken, he became gloomy and started to drink. In one of these minutes, Isaev told the Commander-in-Chief about the fate that was being prepared for him in the event of a seizure of power by the Whites (noose or execution and, in extreme cases, the position of battalion commander, if the Commander-in-Chief could help in any way - Kuznetsov from the underground parties of Moscow had this information) , and to the question of the Commander-in-Chief: "What to do?", - gradually and persistently, exclusively under a drunken hand, he began to instill in him the idea of \u200b\u200bcreating a coup in order to seize power in his own hands and then act, depending on the circumstances. The plan was supposed to be something like this: to send some units (faithful to Moscow, to raise an uprising in Tula in order to seize Tula in their own hands, as the only artillery supply base of the Republic, which would put the Republic in an extremely hopeless situation. Soil in Tula she was grateful, and, according to the indicated persons (I can't name exactly who - the conversation was general), the workers there are so opposed to the Soviet regime that at the first signal they would raise an uprising. The mood in Serpukhov is also favorable for an uprising ( by the way, checking this [information] about

Serpukhov workers from Kostyaev these days, I received from the latter, on the contrary, the most reassuring information that the workers are on the side of the Soviet government, and, by the way, they really do not like the Commander-in-Chief, which in turn was confirmed by both Isaev and Kuznetsov) . All these preparations were only in the realm of conversations, and, be that as it may, no steps were taken at all to put the plan into practice, only (and I can't vouch for that) that they allegedly sent some insignificant Lettish army to Moscow. part or in Moscow there has long been some part of the 5 [th] Lettish Regiment. In Serpukhov itself, the 5 [th] latpolk was supposed to serve as a stronghold of the uprising, which, according to Isaev and Kuznetsov, loves "grandfather" (Commander-in-Chief) "terribly", which, I think, is really not at all (my personal observations and | by scent" | in the end), when the talk about this stopped, and Isaev himself confessed that the 5[th] lat-

\* Title of the document. \*\* The word is illegible.

the regiment does not like the "grandfather" as much as it was supposed to. In Tula, in the provincial military commissar or in some other position, "their" person was supposed to be appointed, but who exactly was not scheduled. Finally, Isaev so impressed Vatsetis with his idea that the Commander-in-Chief finally once told him that he agreed to shake Moscow (I don't remember the real expressions), asked him not to leave. wept on Isaev's shoulder (as Isaev put it). But when the Commander-in-Chief sobered up, he did not raise a conversation about it. I, without clarifying the issue of my new appointment, went to Kursk on vacation, and before leaving I asked Kostyaev to appoint me to Sklyansky as a manager of affairs or to the district: I did not want to ask for the academy, because. I was afraid that I could very quickly be assigned to the front from there (I, by the way, told Kostyaev that I was with Sklyansky in Moscow, that the latter allegedly asked my opinion about Kostyaev and that I personally could not be removed to the rear, because The front needs me. Of course, I was not at Sklyansky's.) Kostyaev promised to talk to Sklyansky about my appointment to Sklyansky. In a conversation with Malyshev, Kuznetsov and Isaev[y], we sorted out the places where I could be appointed: I refused the Moscow [military] district, I didn't want to go to the eastern ones, it was necessary to remove the head of the headquarters in Orlovsky , from which I also refused there. There were only southern Ukrainian cities where I would go with pleasure, especially Kharkov and Odessa. Kuznetsov proposed Odessa, because. there it was possible to establish contact with Shcherbachev (who is in Paris together with Golovin, which Kuznetsov knew from the underground circles of Moscow) through Shcherbachev's relatives who, apparently, in Odessa, and also through some colonel , whose last name I don't remember, Shcherbachev's former adjutant, I think Melchakov (2), who could also be in Odessa. They talked about how it would be good for Semashka to be the district commissioner of Odessa, because if Semashko is not completely his own person, then, in any case, it is easy to work with him; Semashko himself (I knew this) was busy about being transferred to the Ukraine and even asked me, if the opportunity presented itself, to put in a good word about him in Moscow. On June 13, I receive a telegram from Kostyaev stating that I have been appointed army commander. Previously, I spoke on the apparatus with Malyshev - which one I found out - in the 151st | (Latvian), and on the apparatus scolded him for this appointment. The numbers of June 8-9, having learned in Kursk in the house the most terrible situation in the sense of life of the parents, wife (we were forced to

to live in a carriage for lack of a place at home), I wrote a letter to Kostyaev asking him to be assigned "anywhere" as soon as possible. Kostyaev explained my appointment in such a way that this place was suitable for me: "He tried to carry out my appointment with him, because he goes to Sklyansky. Isaev, Malyshev and Kuznetsov were unhappy with me, because my appointment was also unexpected for them. We had a rather stormy conversation, where they reproached me for being very friendly with Kostyaev and, perhaps, passing on all our conversations to him, but I reassured them. Then Isaev's thoughts took on the following form: the 15th Army, whose commander is his own man and in which the soldiers and Latvians in general will follow the Commander-in-Chief anywhere, can render a valuable service for the coup - only there you need to appoint a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the army who would acted in a certain direction. Such a person, according to Isaev, was Ernest Vatsetis, who loves an excellent apartment, wine and women. In connection with the departure of Kostyaev and the complete precariousness of the position of the Commander-in-Chief, Isaev decided to leave as a military instructor in Moscow, because. there "the military instructor makes reports directly to Lenin" (what is the purpose of this departure is vague for me, Isaev just wanted to be in the public eye and pass through Lenin to the people the 1917 graduation "").

The next day after this conversation, I was summoned to the office of the chief of staff, where the Commander-in-Chief, Kostyaev, Gusev and then Akulov were. The Commander-in-Chief thanked me for my service in the staff, and then declared that, as an energetic person, I was assigned to the Latarmiya to put it in order, that the army had been reorganized to such an extent that it was alleged that the 2nd and 3rd Latvian regiments (Reds) themselves took Riga. The rest fled to their homes, abandoned and surrendered almost all the artillery. In general, it is necessary to disperse the entire "gang" (I remember this expression was). Then, turning to Gusev, the Commander-in-Chief said that "it would be nice to be a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 151st | army to appoint Ernest Vatsetis, a communist, an old party worker. Gusev promised to speak with Trotsky. Before leaving, Malyshev asked that if Bonch-Bruyevich kicked him out, he would come to the 15th Army. In the 15th Army, I saw with my own eyes how much they love "grandfather" there and how everyone there will follow him - except for the choice of swear words from the members of the Revolutionary Military Council (Danishevsky, Berzin, Lensman ") nothing was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief heard as well when I said that a member of the RVS Army could

\* So in the text. I mean Ya.D. Lentsman.

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be appointed Vatsetis, then Danishevsky shouted: "So it's true! Yes, it's a betrayal." The 15th Army was indeed in the most terrible state. On June 28-29, I was again in Serpukhov, having been relieved of the post of commander, where I told Isaev and Kuznetsov about Latvia's relations with Vatsetis: Isaev replied that the Commander-in-Chief was "an idiot and a fool", with whom one cannot say a single word - he, I think he told everyone everything, but the Letts" (Dylan, the train commandant, could have done this) also told the army - "you need to stay away from such a fool, otherwise you will ruin your heads because of talking," Isaev added ...

This is where the talk about the coup ends, after which Isaev immediately brought to the stage the question of "creating the skeleton of the General Staff in order to put the issue of 1917 in such a position that any authority would reckon with it" ( This question has been dealt with in paragraph a of the general scheme of organization").

8&/USH]. Domozhirev

Some of Isaev's expressions: "Commander-in-Chief a hat, an old galosh, a notorious coward, a wine barrel, afraid of everyone "with a mandate"" - "he came with great powers," says the Commander-in-Chief about anyone who comes with some assignments and orders .

UI. 11919] Domozhirev

RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D.61. L. 3-6 about. Autograph in pencil.

No. 3.9

Interview with the head of the Political Directorate and member of the RVSR Bolshevik I.T. Smilga to the correspondent of the Pravda newspaper about the change of the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Republic, the renewal of the composition of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the arrest of a number of employees of the RVSR Field Headquarters

July 9, 1919

high command. - What are the reasons for the resignation of Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis?

\* To the left of the highlighted fragment of N.N. Domozhireva: "?".

\*\* Not in the file.

— Major disagreements of a strategic nature between Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis and Commander of the Eastern Front Kamenev. Vatsetis was a resolute opponent of the attack on east.

Life has shown that Kamenev was right, that stopping our advance in the east would have brought to naught all the successes achieved on the Volga. In addition, morals have recently settled in the headquarters that do not correspond to its high position. All sorts of self-seekers and crooks built their nest there.

- Is it true that the bet is transferred to another place?

-- Yes. Everything bad will be removed from there. The postponement of the Headquarters will help to organize the work of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, in which some changes have also taken place.

-- Can you tell me the composition of the Revolutionary Military Council?

- Chairman - Trotsky, his deputy - Sklyansky, Commander-in-Chief - Kamenev, Commissar of the Field Headquarters - Gusev, Head of the Political Directorate - Smilga and Rykov, who unites all military supplies in his hands.

What can you say about Kamenev?

— I know Kamenev from joint work on the Eastern Front. He is an officer of the General Staff, a former colonel. He finished his service in the old army as chief of staff of the 3rd army, to which position he was appointed under Soviet power. After the demobilization of the old army, he immediately joined the Red Army, where he held the posts of military leader of the Nevelsk section, division chief and then commander of the Eastern Front. Commanding the front, [Kamenev] showed his best side. Capable, hard-working person. He conscientiously studied the methods of conducting the Civil War. On the political side, he proved himself to be a completely loyal and honest person to the Soviet government. I am sure that his appointment to the post of Commander-in-Chief will be a step forward in building our army.

"Is it true". 1919. July 10.

No. 3.10

Report of the 1st Deputy Chairman of the Special Department of the Cheka I.P. Pavlunovsky V.I. Lenin in the case of the White Guard organization in the Field Headquarters"

\* A document on the letterhead of the Directorate of the Special Department of the Cheka. The document bears the mark V.I. Lenin with a simple pencil (L. 1, above the text): "to the archive. secret. The word "secret" is underlined three times.

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Not earlier than July 23, 1919

REPORT ON THE CASE OF THE WHITE GUARD ORGANIZATION IN THE FIELD HEADQUARTERS

REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC"

Arrested on the night of July 8-9 this year. A group of people from the Field Headquarters consisting of: for assignments under the Commander-in-Chief ISAEV, the head of the Intelligence Department KUZNETSOV, for assignments under the Chief of Staff MALYSHEV and the teacher of the Academy of the General Staff GRIGORIEV, according to the investigation, set itself the following tasks:

a) Establishing communication with the headquarters of Denikin and Kolchak;

6) The overthrow of Soviet power through an internal coup;

c) Seizure of the army command and control apparatus under the guise of recreating the General Staff.

a) Establishing communication with the headquarters of Denikin and Kolchak

"Preparations have begun to establish some connection, which, it must be said, was and was conducted a long time ago (since the beginning of 1918) with Kolchak and Denikin, with those political parties that exist underground in Moscow, with the clergy (Patriarch Tikhon and Novgorodsky Bishop Arseny), with almost all underground foreign consulates existing in Moscow" . (Indication of Domozhirev) "".

"Both of us (I and Isaev), having arrived in Moscow (I don't remember the day - in the middle of June), called Grigoriev to my house, and then continued the conversation in Isaev's carriage.

The gist of the conversation is this:

How will we be treated in response?

Answer:

- It's bad, they will judge.

How to avoid court?

- There must be evidence of your loyalty to the whites.

- And what guarantees can there be that everything that is said is true?

\* Title of the document.                      \*\* I have italicized words here and throughout the document for readability.  
—

An exhaustive answer was not given to this, because the conversation was terminated after our departure, but it was said that guarantees would be given and that Grigoriev would introduce us to a person who would satisfy us (with his solidity, as I wanted). They spoke all the time allegorically, so that no one was bound by the form" (/Tokazanie Kuznetsova).

In addition, Kuznetsov testifies: "In a conversation between Isaev and me with Grigoriev in the carriage, Isaev stated that we (I, Isaev and Malyshev)" are looking for ways to get in touch with the whites. To this, Grigoriev replied that there was no need to search, because. connections can go through Moscow."

Grigoriev said this: "Of course, you can help us a lot, but you need to unite in Serpukhov."

To this, I told him that "I, Isaev, Malyshev are united, but that, in addition, I talked with Tokarevsky and saw a person who is more inclined to sympathize with the young General Staff than the old one, and that the rest of the old General Staff officers are unlikely to join such an association. will go." In the same conversation, Grigoriev asked me (which had never happened to him before) if I knew about the transfer of units from the Eastern to the Southern Front. I replied that I did not know, but I could say a lot about the enemy. To this, Grigoriev replied that he was not interested in the latter "(Kuznetsov's testimony).

"The second meeting with Kuznetsov (which was mentioned in the previous excerpt) took place at the very end of June or even in the first days of July. This was at the moment when Kursk was close to falling. That is why I was interested in whether the troops were being transported to the Southern Front" (Grigoriev's testimony).

"So: starting with the fact that, wishing to know what they would do with us in the event of a reaction, and turning to Grigoriev for an explanation of this issue, we approached the solution of the issue of entering into contact with the whites - through the same Grigoriev" (Deposition of Kuznetsov).

On the issue of establishing contact with the headquarters of Denikin and Kolchak, Grigoriev testified: "I really promised Kuznetsov to establish contact between their group and the headquarters of Kolchak and Denikin in order to clarify the participation" of the General Staff officers who actively participated in the creation of the Red Army:

\* Here and below - the underlining in the text of the RGVA was made by L.D. Trotsky in blue pencil, on L. 36 he put down with the same pencil: "Secret" and a note about reading: "T". All annotations in the text of the RGVA are made by the chairman of the RVSR.

\*\* So in the text. It meant: "destiny."

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"To do this, it was supposed to establish contact with Denikin's headquarters, but not directly - by sending his people, but through informants in Moscow. These tasks served as the topic of our conversations at meetings: 1) on June 10-15 and 2) in the first days of July. In these conversations, it turned out that neither Isaev nor Kuznetsov could undertake this task - and it was proposed that I take on this task. I agreed.

I intended to establish contacts through representatives of the General Staff Polyakov and Selivachev" and through representatives of the Academy serving in the All-Russian General Staff — Korsun, Shishkovsky, Elizarov, Myslitsky and Vysotsky. I hoped to receive answers to the questions of interest to us about the attitude of Denikin's headquarters to graduation in 2-3 weeks. Before us was the question of what would be personally offered to us by Denikin's headquarters in order to prove our loyalty to Denikin. In connection with the need to clarify our position, it was clear to us that our relationship to Denikin had to [proceed] "" in the sense of "" proof of our loyalty to him; what exactly should have been expressed [outcome] of our relationship to Denikin - this question was not discussed until I received orientation (tasks) from Denikin. In my last meeting with Kuznetsov (the period when the enemy was approaching Kursk), I asked whether the transfer of troops from the Eastern Front to the Southern Front had begun or would begin. If those circles, through which we supposed to receive information from Denikin about relations with us, would require proof of my loyalty to Denikin, then I could pass on the information received from Kuznetsov about the transfer of troops from the Eastern to the Southern Front "(Grigoriev's testimony).

"I had the opportunity to establish such a connection; If I had not been arrested, then I would have managed to establish contact with the headquarters of Kolchak and Denikin in two weeks. I myself had no direct connection with the headquarters. To the question through whom I intended to establish contact with the headquarters of Denikin and Kolchak, I answer: through Polyakov (who is currently on vacation in the Oryol province), Silvachev "" and the ranks of the General Staff:

\*\* Opposite in the text of the RGVA - the letter "Sh" (headquarters). \*\*\* Originally it was: "pour out".

\*\*\*\* The word is written by hand.

\*\*\*\*\* Originally stood: "outpouring."

\* Opposite in the text of the RGVA litter: "+".

Korsun, Vysotsky, Shishkovsky and Myslitsky. When asked what facts gave them reason to believe that the named persons listed above have the opportunity to establish contact with the Field Headquarters group with the headquarters of Kolchak and Denikin - Grigoriev answered

did not give.

6) Plan to overthrow Soviet power:

Simultaneously with the establishment of contact with the Whites, the Field Headquarters group expressed its assumption about the ways to overthrow the Soviet power through an internal coup.

"At one of the private meetings (at the end of April or at the beginning of May), Malyshev proposed to organize the capture of Tula, Serpukhov and Moscow with the aim of an internal coup.

The capture of Tula, the ammunition supply base, put the Republic in a difficult position. The capture was to be carried out by internal means with the help of workers opposed to the Soviet regime. The capture of Serpukhov was supposed to be carried out with the help of the 5th Lettish Regiment and also local workers. parts did not seem "difficult" (Isaev's testimony).

"His (Malyshev's) proposal to appoint someone as a military instructor in Tula to lead the movement of workers, due to the complete absence of people who could take over the work of the organization, was not approved" (Isaev's testimony).

To Domozhnikov's question: "What to do?" - I declare that it is necessary to capture Tula and Serpukhov, and then Moscow will fall. It was necessary to capture Tula because it was the center for supplying the Red Army with cartridges, Serpukhov - as the place of Headquarters. The uprising was to take place with the help of local workers opposed to Soviet power. After that, part of the rebels had to move on to Moscow and occupy it, which was not difficult, because there are no reliable authorities in Moscow. At my suggestion, none of us could stand at the head of the movement, due to our political insignificance, lack of connections, etc. At the head of the uprising, the only one who could become was the Commander-in-Chief, who, according to Isaev,

\*\* So in the text. Followed by: "customized". \*\*\* So in the text. It means "not imagined".

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while fluctuating. Isaev added to my words that the Commander-in-Chief was sure that the 5th regiment would follow him. Domozhnikov offered himself in Tula (whether as a military instructor or something else - I don't remember) to grope for ground and establish contact with the workers. To this I remarked to Domozhnikov that this could not be done; he cannot get an appointment in Tula. Other persons for this role were not offered. After lengthy conversations, which clarified the groundlessness of our assumptions, the plan was abandoned" (G/Lokazanie Malysheva).

#### c) Capture of the army control apparatus

"A program for the restoration of a large General Staff has been planned for implementation, by occupying the positions of the General Staff in the Republic in all branches of managing one's own people" (Domozhnikov's testimony).

"Isaev's idea is a strong General Staff, which influences all sectors of the country's life, for the purpose of its military power, regardless of who is at the head of the board" (Malyshev's statement).

#### d) Role of Commander-in-Chief VATSETIS

The investigation has not yet been able to establish a formal connection between the former Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis and the White Guard organization of the Field Headquarters, but his behavior as Commander-in-Chief created the conditions under which a White Guard organization was to come forward from the White Guard-minded ranks of the headquarters, in particular from the White Guard-minded - Military General Staff Officers of 1917. Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis with his talk about shaking Moscow; about the need to find out their fate after the overthrow of Soviet power; that the Latvians will not extradite him; about the need for him to move to the 15th army, where he absolutely must prepare the ground for this and, by appointing Domozhnikov and his nephew E. Vatsetis, consolidate his influence in it; about the fact that he believes in the graduation of 1917 and relies on it"; with his conversations, he created the conditions under which the White Guard-minded elements felt that Vatsetis, as Commander-in-Chief, was on their side and, with the help of the armed forces on which he relies, would not let them offend and help to implement the plan to recreate the General Staff. Fear for his fate in the event of the overthrow of Soviet power and the desire to find out his future position at all costs pushed him to the newly created White Guard organization. Isaev, a member of the organization, took advantage

against Vatsetis in order to call him to active actions against the Soviet power. The investigation has not yet established under whose influence Vatsetis

began to show his activity, expressed in the following: "Isaev somehow (I don't know when it was) apparently conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief that he was threatened with a noose or execution if the Whites gained the upper hand, and only if the Commander-in-Chief did something if he helps, then we eat a battalion (Kuznetsov's words). Then, if I am not mistaken, the Commander-in-Chief seemed to ask Isaev - stunned: "What to do?" Apparently, from that time on, Isaev began to direct the Commander-in-Chief to correct his fate and do something serious "(Indication Domozhirov).

"During this time, Isaev always pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief that the graduation of 1917 would support him" (Domozhirov's testimony).

"I was at Kostyaev's, there were already fees for moving to Moscow. Kostyaev was terribly stunned by his dismissal and scolded the Commander-in-Chief in every possible way and, it seems, on that day he said that the Commander-in-Chief had blurted out to him the other day: "Let's arrange a coup for them" or "We need to arrange a coup for them" (I don't remember the exact words ) (Domozhirov's testimony).

"Undoubtedly, from all the words it is clear that Isaev played a role, keeping the Commander-in-Chief in suspense and imposing his thoughts on him" (Domozhirov's testimony).

"When there were failures on our side, the Commander-in-Chief became nervous and (as Isaev reported) sent his nephew Ernest Vatsetis to Isaev to resolve the issue of what would happen to him" (Malyshev's testimony).

"In connection with the failures on the Western Front, as well as on the Eastern, the Commander-in-Chief once, returning from Moscow, sent Ernest Vatsetis to Isaev, who conveyed that "uncle" (Commander-in-Chief) was thinking about raising the issue point-blank, and decided to take him to Serpukhov is a weapon, and he, Ernest, should be appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 15th Army "(Malyshev's testimony).

"Having heard that the Commander-in-Chief expressed such an opinion, I told Isaev in a private conversation that, given the similar situation in the cities mentioned (Tula, Serpukhov), the Commander-in-Chief could capture them right there and added: the devil take all this mess, although some kind of end" (Deposition by Malyshev).

"To what extent the Commander-in-Chief was discouraged by the appointment of Bonch-Bruevich is shown by the fact that on the day of departure (for the last time) to Moscow,

\* Opposite in the text of the RGVA - the letter "Sh" (headquarters). \*\*-Opposite in the text of the RGVA litter: "+".

when he arrived at the [Field] headquarters drunk, he told me and some other people that everyone recoiled from him and [crossed over] to the side of Bonch-Bruevich, and added: "Do you know" Bartholomew's Night "? - but I have the 5th regiment here and I will not give up "(Malyshev's testimony)".

"When, one day, Isaev told me that how to get out of the situation, I asked him what the Commander-in-Chief was thinking of taking power on his own: after all, he did not have the strength for this. He will have to get in touch with Kolchak, otherwise he will not be able to resist; Isaev answered: The Commander-in-Chief is power-hungry and thinks that. popular. Isaev told me that the Commander-in-Chief proposed to withdraw the Latvian army to the rear and place it somewhere in the center. I remember once I told Isaev that the Commander-in-Chief (I don't remember whether cartridges or rifles) ordered part of what was being produced from Tula to be transferred to Serpukhov and added: of course, if he set himself any goal, then this is correct - it is necessary to arm nie. I remember that Isaev said that the Commander-in-Chief said that the clergy are strong and must be reckoned with "(Malyshev's testimony).

## Conclusion

After the arrest of the head of the active branch of the Special Department of the Western Front, IONAS, and the connection between the spy organization in Petrograd and the organization on the Western Front,



On the night of July 2-3, a special department [of the Cheka] arrested the commander of 15 DOMOZHIROV in Serpukhov, the investigation of which established his participation in the White Guard organization at the Field Headquarters. Domozhikov was an active participant in the meetings of the White Guard group and, due to his high official position, was influential among the other members of the group.

Participation in the meetings of the group is recognized by Domozhikov in his testimony.

An extract from the testimony of Domozhikov dated July 20: "After the official introduction of the Nashtar Revolutionary Council to Kostyaev, when I entered Malyshev's office, I met Isaev, Kuznetsov and Malyshev here.

Then Kuznetsov and Isaev began to speak like this: "We must take Tula (or capture). The capture of Tula immediately leaves the government without any artillery supply.

"THE RELATIONS WITH THE CLERGY HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED YET. I WANTED TO TALK WITH FATHER ARSENY, FOR WHAT

\*  
Opposite in the text of the RGVA - the letter "Sh" (headquarters).

I WAS TO TAKE IT MYSELF "(Domozhikov's testimony dated 7-6, 1919).

"AN HOUR AND AN HALF AFTER KUZNETSOV ASKED ME TO GO TO HIS OFFICE AND I WAS PRESENT AT THE VERY END OF THE CONVERSATION WHEN ISAEV SAID: "SO, WE DISCUSSED OR 3 PROVISIONS OR 3 POINTS (I don't remember)" AND ON THE BASIS OF THIS, WE START FROM THE FIRST, WHEN I SAY THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO START BUILDING THE SKELETON WHILE, KUZNETSOV AGREED "(Domozhikov's testimony of July 7 [19] 19).

The participation of the remaining persons arrested in the case of the White Guard organization in the Field Headquarters is expressed as follows:

2) For instructions under the Commander-in-Chief E.I. Isaev, an active participant in the White Guard organization of the Field Headquarters, was present at all meetings and, together with Kuznetsov, initiated the idea of capturing the army command and control apparatus by recreating the General Staff.

3) For assignments under the head of the Field Headquarters, MALYSHEV A.K. - an active member of the White Guard group, participated in meetings and proposed a plan for the overthrow of Soviet power (the capture of Tula, Serpukhov and Moscow), which was postponed by the group until a corresponding military instructor in Tula was found.

4) Head of the reconnaissance department of the Field Headquarters - Kuznetsov B.I. - an active member of the group, a participant in all its meetings. Developed a plan for the re-establishment of the General Staff and through Grigoriev established contact with the headquarters of Denikin and Kolchak.

5) Head of the composition of the students of the Academy of the General Staff - Grigoriev Yu.I. - an active member of the group and technical executor to establish communication with the headquarters of Denikin and Kolchak.

Regarding the list of participants in the White Guard organization of the Field Headquarters, the investigation found that most of them were General Staff officers graduated in 1917 and, with the exception of Malyshev, had previously (in Petrograd) been members of various White Guard organizations of an allied orientation.

So, for example, Domozhikov and Kuznetsov, together with Teodori and Khitrovo, were part of the organization headed by the General Staff Polyakov. Isaev participated in some organization in which Kuzmina-Karavaeva, who was in connection with the Polyakov organization, was a member.

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The investigation established that the White Guard group of the Field Headquarters was at the initial stage of its organization, i.e. it had just been created, outlined its tasks and plans, and began only partial implementation of them, and it was still so uninfluential that its presence in the Field Headquarters did not affect the course of operations on the fronts.

This situation could only continue until the establishment of communication with the headquarters of Kolchak and Denikin.

Obviously, with the establishment of this connection, which, according to Grigoriev. there would be "in two weeks". the role of the organization would have changed significantly, and its presence in the Field Headquarters would certainly have had an impact on the development of operations on the fronts; The possibility of this influence was prevented by the arrest of the White Guard organization on July 9 of this year.

Deputy Chairman of the Special Department of the Cheka Pavlunovsky

RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 12317. L. 1-9.

The original is a typewritten text autographed in pencil.

RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 89. L. 37-44. Fragment of typewritten text.

It is printed according to the text of the RGASPI, in the footnotes the notes are reproduced on the copy of the RGVA.

No. 3.11

From the minutes of the Moscow citywide conference of the RCP (b) - a recording of the report of F.E. Dzerzhinsky "on the White Guard conspiracy"

September 24, 1919 PROTOCOL of the Obshegorod conference of the Moscow organization of the RCP

dated 24 September"

Opens the conference Comrade. ZAGORSKY.

\* Opposite in the text of the RGVA - the letter "Sh" (headquarters).

\* Title of the document.

The leadership of the meeting is entrusted to the Executive| k|omis| these MK RCP.

Comrade Pyatnitsky presides. [...]

3. Report of Comrade Dzerzhinsky on the White Guard conspiracy. [...]

DZERZHINSKY: The work of the Cheka has been very successful lately. Even when the spy plot was uncovered, we received clues about the existence of an even larger conspiracy in Moscow. Then, as a result of intensive work, we managed not only to cover up the leaders, but also to liquidate the entire organization headed by the famous "National Center". The chairman of the "National Center]" was captured while receiving a report from Ambassador Denikin. Very valuable documents have been captured and will be published. Then we attacked the trail of a military organization [consisting of] in connection with the National] Center, but which had its own independent headquarters. This military conspiracy was also liquidated in time. Both the Cadets and the Black Hundreds and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries took part in these conspiracies. The general political direction was given by the Cadets. About 700 people were arrested. Their goal was to capture Moscow and disorganize our Center. At their last meetings they prepare their final speech. Even the hour is set: 6 pm. They hoped to capture Moscow at least for

a few hours, take over the radio and telegraph, inform all fronts about the fall of the Soviets and thus cause panic and disintegration in the army. To carry out this plan, they accumulated their officers here; in their hands were 3 of our military schools: one in Vishnyaki, the Higher Rifle School in Kuntsevo, and the District Artillery School in Moscow. They planned to start a campaign in Vishnyaki, Volokolamsk and Kuntsevo and divert forces there, and then raise an uprising in the city itself. They developed a very detailed action plan: Moscow was divided into sectors along the Garden Ring; to build barricades in the streets behind the Garden Ring, to fortify on the line of the Garden Ring and from there in some places (points) attack towards the Center. I will now read the explanatory note to the plan, which shows how accurate and detailed their plan of action was (read). Unfortunately, I must admit that we do not know how to draw up such plans. They were so sure of victory that they had already prepared a whole series of

\*\* In the version of the newspaper "Pravda" it is specified: "Shchepkin".

\*\*\* In Volokolamsk.

titles and orders. These documents are very interesting: they reveal the character of "Our | center" and the headquarters of the Volunteer Army of the Moscow region. The national center was led by the Cadets, while the majority at the headquarters were Black Hundreds. This was reflected in their proclamations (reads the proclamation of the N|National|Center]). To carry out their plan, they needed to have weapons. They concentrated it illegally in schools that were under their influence, as well as bought it from our warehouses and formed their own warehouses. Their strength, according to estimates, was equal to 600 "personnel [military], and, in addition, they counted on some parts in which they managed to put their people to prepare the ground. Thanks to great connections in the headquarters, they managed to send their people everywhere They used our comrades for this purpose, taking advantage of their credulity and their habit of arranging for their acquaintances. To prevent us from using the Red Terror against them, they hoped to take possession of Comrades Lenin and Trotsky and keep them as hostages. It is sad that among those arrested there was one communist who later turned out to be a member of the Black Hundreds, a member of the Union of the Russian People. The Moscow organization should pay attention to this. There is a lot of laxity and unacceptable credulity in our organization: there was not a single one in the district artillery school. We secretly sent our man there for surveillance, and he says that there the White Guard plans were discussed quite openly - and this was not only in this school alone. In the School of Disguise, some parts of the garrison are also not ours. What are we doing? What measures are we taking? So far, almost nothing. With our laxity and carelessness, the carefully worked out plan of the White Guards could cause us irreparable harm. Trotsky is right when he says that one can stumble over trifles. This lesson should make us more merciless. We must stigmatize every sloven as a traitor. Activity K| omit] that defense will be wasted without the support of the whole party. He should have the right to order without appeal, not only formally, but also in practice. Every member of the Party must fight desertion and our licentiousness. Recently, a check was made on the weapons available in the units. It turned out that many institutions did not keep records of the weapons they had. A huge number of rifles, cartridges, revolvers were found, about which nothing

\* In the version of the Pravda newspaper, the figure is 800 people.

knew. It is clear that with such a formulation of the matter, it was not difficult for the White Guards to get weapons. The Committee of Defense has adopted and is implementing a number of measures to protect the city (announces resolutions of the Committee of Defense). The success of our struggle against the conspirators depends on the support which every member of the Party renders in carrying out these measures.

Prov]. Myasnikov on behalf of M[oskovsky] to |omite] It proposes a resolution expressing the confidence and approval of the Committee of Defense. T[[ s]. Torgovanov proposes, as an addendum to it, to oblige every member of the party to search the house where he lives. Comrade Torgovanov's proposal was rejected. The resolution proposed by the Moscow Committee is adopted unanimously. The conference moves on to the next item of the agenda. [...]

CAOPIM. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 199. L. 84 a.

Typewritten text of the uncorrected transcript.

"Is it true". 1919. September 27. No. 215 - Publ. in: F.E. Dzerzhinsky: Chairman of the Cheka - OGPU. 1917-1926 / Comp. A.A. Plekhanov, A.M. Plekhanov. M., 2007. S. 141-142.

Published according to the text of CAOPIM.

No. 3.12—3.13

Reports of S.I. Mikhalevsky, who is attached to the Field Headquarters Commissioner. Gusev about the attempt to recruit him by Denikin's agents in Moscow

September 17 - not earlier than September 24, 1919

No. 3.12 Report by Mikhalevsky S.I. Gusev about the attempt to recruit him

September 17, 1919

Tov. Gusev At the private apartment of my old acquaintances (in the city of Kalgash) (the Bondyrevs), I met a certain Pigelau Fyodor Mikhailovich and

\* In the version of the newspaper "Pravda" there are discrepancies with the text of TsAPIM. In addition, the printed version is severely curtailed.

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his wife. As far as I could understand from fluent phrases, Pigelau's past is as follows: in general, a representative of the "golden youth" of Moscow (or St. Petersburg), a former cadet of the Nikolaev Cavalry School (in St. hovens] in the former Empire - guards, etc.), a former cavalry officer (which regiment he did not find out), who graduated from the University and the Lyceum in Moscow, is married to a former aristocrat (her maiden name and the first husband's surnames are unknown to me).

The political sympathies of both P[igelau] and his wife are sharply monarchist without any "sentiment". My conversation with these gentlemen revolved around political questions and boiled down briefly to the following:

Communists and those (two surnames were named - Commander-in-Chief Kamenev and the second person - it is not clear) from the "specialists" who, by their actions, contribute to the well-being of the Bolsheviks, must be mercilessly destroyed, especially the "Kids and Zhids" - the last two categories in the mass;

Those of the "honest citizens" who have the opportunity to enjoy the confidence of the Bolsheviks should, in fulfillment of their "civic duty", help Denikin in every possible way in his holy work.

This last gave me the opportunity, as if by the way, to tell Pigelau that I have the opportunity, using the almost unlimited confidence of the Bolsheviks, to see the most secret documents, such as, for example, the deployment of our (Red) troops of the Southern Front, and the last I can easily copy. This statement of mine provoked an extremely lively and indignant question from P[igelau]: "Why didn't you present it (deployment)?" I let him know that I had no connection with the right people, to which he immediately offered: "Give it to me, and I will give it to the right place - think about it and tell me your decision." I answered in full agreement. Further, the following sensations were reported from "competent sources":

On the 20th, von der Goltz's "decisive offensive" will begin;

Mamontov, Denikin, [Poluki] go to a common connection in the Gomel region;

after 2 days, a state of siege is introduced in Moscow;

military establishments and headquarters are being prepared for evacuation to Kazan;

in addition, Shigelau] told me that he had Denikin's appeal to Soviet officers, from which it was clear that "the Bolsheviks

lie about denikin's perpetrated by the prisoners of the former | shimi| repression officers" (I did not find out the details of this appeal).

To characterize the same P[igelau], I'll add: recently (I didn't find out more precisely) an active white former colonel of the Kargopol regiment was hiding in his apartment, who "miraculously" escaped from his apartment during the [s] searched in it (obviously, by the Cheka; his excellent friend, known from the trial of English spies, Fride was shot). To my question about the degree of guilt of the latter, P[igelau] replied: "Of course, he did his duty, but think what an outrageous and ugly accident - they gave out sticks" ... ", in the same house where P[igelau] lives ], during the search, an acquaintance of his escaped through a drainpipe - an active white, former captain, who safely disappeared to Denikin and recently made himself felt; his good friend ex. an officer (Kashkov, Koshkin??) escaped execution in the Razumovsky area — and thus: there were 13 people in the sentenced party, they shot a stock, by the end he was left in the car with one escort, whom he stunned with a blow of his fist, and fled.

Four days later, I (yesterday) again visited my acquaintances (the Bondyrevs), but I did not get anything interesting, except that, apparently, my position with the commissar of headquarters somewhat embarrasses them and forces them to be careful - this was the last thing yesterday especially bro - it was in the eyes.

17/yy. Mikhalevsky

Resolution S.I. Gusev": "Comrade. Pavlunovskiy. In view of my departure, I am sending comrade. Mikhalevsky at your disposal. 21/X. S. Gusev.

Resolution K.Kh. Danishevsky: "To the secret business."

RGVA.F. 6. Op. 12. D. 8. L. 65 with ob-66. Autograph in blue ink.

Resolutions - red pen.

No. 3.13 Report of Mikhalevsky S.I. Gusev about an unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate the White Guard organization

\* So in the text. \*\* Crossed out by K.Kh. Danishevsky.

"7

September 24, 1919

Tov. Gusev

Report

24/yy. 1919

I. Today I visited the B[ondyrevs] in order to: a) get a final answer to my proposal, i.e. whether and to what extent white conspirators will trust me and in what concrete way it will be expressed; 6) to receive proper instructions and a "white" passport - and it turned out:

P. That person "X" (or "Ivan Ivanovich"), who, on the oral recommendation of me by B[ondyrev], was supposed to recommend me to the "conspiracy" and carry out the work described in paragraph |, left

Moscow and, according to P[igelau], perhaps for two reasons: a) fleeing a possible arrest or 6) fulfilling another duty in connection with Denikin, |

Sh. And therefore "since. I (those P[igelau]) don't know anyone except him ("X") and I don't do politics at all, then I can't help in your (i.e. my) desire to serve Den[ikin] in anything, except perhaps So I'll give you this advice:

a) if you (I) decide to really serve D[enikin] — make the transition to him completely independently, and

b) get a passport for the first time, take all the documents and data you have - both about the measures and actions of the Bolsheviks, and a list of their names, as well as your recommendation, and

The main thing:

arrange yourself in such a way that your absence in Moscow does not arouse suspicion (for example, a vacation) and go to Kiev, and if the combat situation changes - to Kharkov, where you report to the head of counterintelligence, introduce yourself to him, nothing about without hiding your past activities, and give him what you will have.

GU. To provide more real assistance to Pigelau] categorically refused, because. "always eschewed any active work in favor of the whites", also refused to take my deployment for transfer.

U. I believe that the question is this: I should go to Kyiv (Kharkov). The risk of this undertaking is clear to me, but so are the

the results that this trip will give and get which I will certainly be able to - in this regard, I need:

1. material data about our actions, in general, those that can give an idea of my usefulness to Den[ikin], and precisely in work for him here in Moscow;
2. providing me with a royal passport in my real name and a convenient passage to the front (Southern or Southwestern);
3. a month's leave from you, Comrade Gusev;
4. providing me with funds in order to save me, among other things, from "white" money, which I will not use under any form or sauce;
5. supplying me with a completely "decent" civilian suit, etc., and, finally,
6. detailed instructions for me in the most important possible phases of my work in the future.

In [about] changing previous reports I will add: B[ondyrev] he was neither a junker nor an officer; he is a volunteer - the rest is correct; P[igelau] - also. Your opinion about the harmlessness of these gentlemen is correct: they are endlessly afraid of the "extraordinary people" and are attached to the "peaceful family hearth" to the strongest degree; as for sympathies, of course, they remain the same as indicated earlier.

Mikhalevsky |

RGVA. F. 6. Op. 12. D. 8. L. 66-67-67v. Autographed in iron gall ink.

No. 3.14 Report of S.I. Mikhalevsky, who is attached to the Field Headquarters. Gusev about the assignment given to him by Denikin's agent

Not earlier than September 24, 1919. Yesterday I was at the apartment of my acquaintances B[ondyrevs] |, where he received the following assurance from Ivan Ivanovich:

1. I am recommended to active whites in Moscow to join the organization, for which:

\* Inscribed by S.I. Goose in red ink.

a) I must prove my loyalty to Denikin by fulfilling the order of the Whites as a courier to Denikin and handing over the true location of the troops and their number (the Reds on the Southern Front).

My final "entry" will take place within the first 10 days. The presence in Moscow is confirmed: 1) a white combat group, 2) a white spy organization, and 3) surveillance.

The task of the first group is "liquidation of TT. Trotsky, [S.S.] Kamenev (Commander-in-Chief) and, it seems, [L.B.] Kamenev and Sklyansky - in the first place."

Mikhalevsky

RGVA. F. 6. Op. 12. D. 8. L. 65. Autograph in blue ink.

No. 3.15 Letter to I.I. Vatsetis V.I. Lenin with a request to remove from him the charge of preparing a military coup

Moscow October 27, 1921

Dear comrade Vladimir Ilyich!

On July 8, 1919, due to some hitherto unknown circumstances, I was removed from the post of Commander-in-Chief and imprisoned, where I spent three and a half months in solitary confinement. When I was arrested, I was told that I was not accused of anything, that I was not even arrested, but only "isolated" and therefore they would not interrogate me. To my question: "Why am I arrested?" - I received the answer: "For reasons of revolutionary time."

Nevertheless, as far as I know, the most formal investigation was carried out in my case, the results of which not only were not presented to me, but I was not even introduced to them, at least in part. Thus, I was completely deprived of the opportunity to refute the accusations leveled against me with actual evidence, the consequence of which was the fact that everyone could say with impunity about me whatever came into his head. No wonder that after all this, my case was exhibited in such a light that cast a certain shadow.

On my name.

After some time, rumors also reached me that, based on material that was not refuted by me and completely unknown to me, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee issued a resolution approximately as follows:

"The behavior of the former Commander-in-Chief, as it turned out from the data of the investigation, paints him as an extremely unbalanced and illegible person in his connections, despite his position. It turns out with certainty that there were elements near the Commander-in-Chief that compromised him. But, taking into account that there are no grounds for suspecting him of direct counter-revolutionary activities, and also taking into account his undeniably great merits in the past, the case should be stopped and Vatsetis placed at the disposal of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs.

This resolution, the verdict, was handed down on me in absentia at the very time that I was present, and therefore there was every opportunity to demand explanations from me on all the investigative material, if that had been desirable at that time. This was not done, and the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee gave me in absentia a description of an unbalanced person.

Such a characteristic is as much a surprise to me as it is to anyone who knows me well.

You saw me for the first time on the historic night of July 6-7, 1918, during the Left Social Revolutionary uprising, when you invited me to the Kremlin to report on the state of affairs in Moscow. Did I look like an unbalanced person at that critical moment? Haven't I reported to you with complete calmness and composure that before 12 noon on July 7, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries will be utterly defeated? Haven't I carried out my report exactly?

Let us recall the situation in Kazan on August 6, 1918. With a handful of men, I defended to the last extremity in the headquarters, which I left when the lower floor was in the hands of the Czechoslovaks, and at the last minute personally led a handful of brave men to storm the Kazan Kremlin, captured by the Whites. Is this how an unbalanced person acts?

Do not refuse to recall my further activities: my personal reports to you on the situation on the fronts, the war plan, the creation of the army, fronts, field administration, the publication of states and charters, the victories I won, such as: the defeat of the Dovbor-Musnitsky corps,

Khon"

the defeat of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Moscow, the defeat of the Czech founders on the Volga, the defeat of Krasnov's army, the occupation of the Ukraine, Latvia, etc., and finally the defeat of Kolchak near Samara, and the last operation was carried out according to a plan personally developed by me, and under my not mediocre telegraph guide. Can all this work and all the listed events be the result of the creativity of an unbalanced person? Finally, to all this it is necessary to add the establishment of contact in operations with the army of Soviet Hungary. |

Having become acquainted in detail with all my activities cited here, it can be said with confidence that the military history of all ages knows no other example of such a grandiose work - both in the creation and organization of the country's armed forces, and in the special exploitation of these forces in space. and time, especially if we take into account the whole environment in which this work was carried out.

Can all this work with its final result be the basis for characterizing me as an unbalanced person?

In my special work, perhaps, I was to a certain extent original and original, and, as such, was not understood. But there is a huge distance from this circumstance to imbalance.

The second circumstance that appears in the resolution of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee as an accusation against me is that I, as it were, was promiscuous in my connections. I already consider this question to be an intrusion into my private life and therefore I will not discuss it.

The third accusation reads: "It turns out with certainty that there were elements near the Commander-in-Chief that compromised him." Such an accusation is already completely incomprehensible to me in its meaning and significance. If this was really so, then what did my commissars do and what did they look after? Why didn't any of them ever point out this circumstance to me and demand the removal of these elements?

More than two years have passed since then. During this time, many different counter-revolutionary conspiracies have been uncovered, but traces of my imbalance or my connections in these conspiracies have been established.

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was not and my name still remains crystal clear, as it was. All these (elements) that surrounded me and were with me are currently occupying responsible



positions, and some of them even very serious posts.

If we take all of the above into account, then I have the full moral right, as a person and a conscious citizen, to think about the question: what exactly was my crime? On what grounds is the resolution of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee based, which so cruelly branded my good name and belittled the tremendous work that I, with the full consciousness and pure conscience of a citizen, brought to the RSFSR? I cannot find an answer, but instead I am more and more convinced that I am now in the position of a big man, who has been put in a corner for some reason and pointed at him with a finger.

Do not think, comrade. Vladimir Ilyich, that with this letter I want to ask for some favor...

No. I have decided to write this letter to you for reasons very closely related to the above events.

The fact is that in July of this year Comrade. Smilga told me in a friendly conversation that this summer, in a private conversation, you stated that in the matter of my attitude to the pursuit of Kolchak's defeated army, everything is still not clear to you, that, nevertheless, in your opinion, there was something...

Whether this is true or not, I do not know, but it would be highly desirable for me to clarify all the misunderstandings that occur, for which I ask for your comradely permission.

As you know, the day after my arrest Comrade. Smilga stated in Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee that the reason for my removal was a disagreement between me and the commander of the Eastern Front, comrade. Kamenev on the issue of the persecution of Kolchak, defeated on the Volga, and that Kamenev turned out to be right in this issue.

I can safely say that Mr. Smilga completely distorted the truth in this statement. I have a misunderstanding with Comrade. Kamenev came out on the basis of his not entirely successful command of the armies of the Eastern Front, as a result of which the 3rd, 2nd and 5th armies were defeated in turn. For these major failures comrade. Kamenev was removed from the command of the RVSR

\* See doc. No. 4.9.

"23/7

front, and I personally took up the defeat of Kolchak. Personally, I drew up a plan of operation, which consisted of the following: by constant attacks from the south in a northerly direction, the strike group of Kolchak, which went over to an energetic offensive, st. Ufa to Simbirsk at the same time as the troops operating north of the Kama, drag it to the Samara region and, thus tearing it away from the troops operating north of the Kama, defeat it here  
apart from the latter.

To put this plan into practice, I was promoted to the post of chief of staff of the Eastern Front P.P. Lebedev, and I personally took over the general leadership of the front by direct wire from Serpuukhov.

My plan worked brilliantly. As is known, Kolchak's shock group was utterly defeated east of Samara and its remnants were forced to launch a hasty offensive, exposing the left flank of their troops operating north of the Kama.

On the question of the pursuit of the defeated armies of Kolchak, there were misunderstandings of a purely tactical nature, namely: I demanded that the pursuit be carried out in a forced order, separate mobile and flexible, adapted for operations in the Ural Mountains, vanguards, and not cumbersome divisions and armies, in order to prevent Kolchak's northern group of troops, which was only battered but not defeated, from leaving through the passages of the Northern Urals to Western Siberia. I proposed to strengthen these vanguards as needed at the expense of those who switched to our

side in a large number of Kolchak's military units, of course, having done with them the previously known preparation and selection of the appropriate element. This is one of the conclusions of revolutionary tactics, which in this case could be applied with success.

In addition, I demanded that the remnants of Kolchak's army be liquidated no later than mid-August (of course, the same 1919), without letting them out of the Urals. I received an answer to this demand from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front, which at that time was again commanded by Comrade. Kamenev that this task is impossible before late autumn. I couldn't claim more than what people could give.

But the real misunderstanding between me and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front arose on a completely different basis, as Comrade. Smilga, for reasons unknown to me, for some reason, is completely silent. I am catego

rially demanded the transfer from the Eastern Front of four unemployed (for lack of an enemy in front of him) divisions to the Southern and Western Fronts against the army of Denikin and Yudenich, where we felt a great need for reserves. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front by all means hampered this extremely necessary strategic measure. and finally reduced it to the fact that such a withdrawal of troops from the Eastern Front impedes the use of the successes achieved on the Volga.

Such an accusation, of course, is a complete absurdity, which was subsequently confirmed by the events on the Southern Front, which showed that I was really right in demanding as early as May to begin the transfer of divisions to the south from the Eastern Front, which were really completely free there.

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front acted from the point of view of its bell tower, but meanwhile, in my hands was the strategic lever of the entire WAR.

Both the political and the strategic situation required the defeat of the army of General Denikin in the shortest possible time, and for this purpose I had to find the necessary forces.

After all, it was clear that the main theater of military operations was still the territory of European Russia, that it was here that the knot of final victory was tied, and therefore it was too early to withdraw all the best troops, which were the armies of the Eastern Front, from this theater to Asia.

With these brief explanations, I intend to end my letter and address you in conclusion with the following request:

In view of the fact that on July 8, 1919, the Defense Council did not consider it necessary to listen to me and your word was decisive, I earnestly ask you to give me or you personally an opportunity to clarify all misunderstandings or, through a special person entrusted to you, to obtain from me all the necessary information for you. explanations, so that, if the time has already come, to remove from my name the shadow cast on it in the ill-fated days of July 1919 for me.

Please accept my sincere assurances of my deep devotion to you.

With comradely greetings: I. Vatsetis

Moscow, October "27" day 1921

True: M.V.

RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 940. L. 1-6. certified typewritten

COPY.

Chapter 4

"TROTSKY WAS WALKING AGAINST THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF [KAMENEV] AND THE ACCEPTED STRATEGY...": WHOSE STRATEGIC LINE WILL BE PUT INTO LIFE?

"There were four cases of strategic disagreements that overwhelmed the Central Committee; in other words, there were as many disagreements as there were main fronts," he recalled in the 1930s. L.D. Trotsky ... - The first sharp dispute arose ... in the summer of 1919 in connection with the situation on the Eastern Front ... I took care to strengthen Vatsetis' confidence in himself, in his rights, in his authority. Without this command is unthinkable. Vatsetis believed that after our first major successes against Kolchak, we should not dig too far to the east, on the other side of the Urals. He wanted the Eastern Front to winter on the mountain range. This was supposed to make it possible to withdraw several divisions from the east and transfer them to the south, where Denikin became an increasingly serious danger. I supported this plan. But he met strong resistance from Kamenev, commander of the Eastern Front, former colonel of the General Staff, and members of the [Revolutionary] Military Council [Front] Smilga and Lashevich, old Bolsheviks. They declared: Kolchak is so defeated that not many forces are needed to pursue him; the main thing is not to give him a break, otherwise he will recover during the winter and by spring we will have to start the eastern operation all over again. The whole question, therefore, consisted in a correct assessment of the state of Kolchak's army and its rear. Even then I considered the Southern Front immeasurably more serious and dangerous than the Eastern. This was later fully confirmed. But in the assessment of Kolchak's army, the rightness turned out to be on the side of the command

Eastern

front. The Central Committee ruled against the high command and thus against me, since I supported Vatsetis on the basis that there are several unknowns in this strategic equation, but that the need to maintain the still too fresh authority of the commander in chief is a solid value. The decision of the Central Committee turned out to be correct. The Eastern Front allocated some forces for the south and at the same time victoriously advanced into the depths of Siberia on the heels of Kolchak. This conflict led to a change in the main command. Vatsetis was fired, Kamenev took his place. If an arrest can be considered a dismissal, then Trotsky is certainly right...

On April 12, 1919, compiled by V.I. Lenin "Theses of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in connection with the situation on the Eastern Front." Based on these theses, the situation at the front was recognized as threatening, the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars recognized the Eastern Front as the main one and took urgent measures to strengthen it "...

Trotsky admitted in his memoirs: "In the war with Denikin, in the defense of Petrograd and in the war with Pilsudski, I occupied an independent strategic position and fought for it, sometimes against the command (of the majority of the RVS of the Republic as a whole and the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Republic of Kamenev in particular — S.V.), then against the majority of the Central Committee"\*®. Two years later, the former commander of the Eastern Front, S.I. Gusev. In Gusev's memory, there were 2 out of 3 cases. His opinion is subjective - as an antagonist of Trotsky and a direct participant in the events. But the main meaning is conveyed correctly:

"On April 28, 1919, our armies, thrown back by Kolchak to the Volga and Vyatka rivers, begin a counteroffensive. The success of the entire operation rested on the constant detour of the left (southern) flank of Kolchak, as a result of which he had to ... roll back on the whole front from Orenburg to Perm. The operation has been a brilliant success from the very beginning. ... 7 days after the start of the operation, unexpectedly, without a request from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front, which at that time consisted of comrades. Lashevich, Yurenev and me, front commander S.S. Kamenev (future Commander-in-Chief) is removed from his post. Gusev quotes Trotsky's order to replace Kamenev: sacking Kame-

Neva "on a 6-week vacation and expressing gratitude to him on behalf of the Red Army, I firmly hope that the troops of the Eastern Front, under the leadership of the new commander A.A. Samoilov, will develop the successes already achieved and give the Soviet Republic a complete victory over Kolchak.

In 1921, Gusev recalled: "Appointed instead of S.S. Kamenev, commander of the Eastern Front A.A. Samoilov is an excellent staff worker, an intelligence specialist, as well as P.P. Lebedev (the future Chief of Staff of the Red Army) ... from the very first days they discovered insufficient familiarity with operational issues, insufficient skill in the operational management of the armies of the front. In the old army, both of them, as far as I know, had to work almost exclusively in staff posts, which probably explained the fact that they gave the impression of newcomers at the front. An extremely difficult, unbearable situation has been created for the members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front. We saw that the directives are given incorrectly, erroneously, that the front command gets nervous over the head of the army commanders, often changes directives, pulls armies and divisions, etc. We openly spoke about this to A.A. Samoilov and P.P. Lebedev, and we had very cruel disputes with him. The commanders of the armies also began to get nervous and (an almost unprecedented thing) openly opposed the front command and openly criticized the directives coming from it. Relations between the front command and the army took on an extremely abnormal character. The front began to unravel. And then we resorted to the only means that remained with us, as members of the Party. We bombarded our Central Committee with lengthy telegrams demanding the return of S.S. Kamenev to the [Eastern] Front. So far, these telegrams have not been found in our archives, but, apparently, they were quite convincing - a month later S.S. Kamenev, by order of the Central Committee, again took command of the Eastern Front» «®. Noteworthy are the memoirs of S.S. Kamenev - according to him, he was summoned to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to E.M. Sklyansky, who reported the order "to return to Simbirsk and take command of the Eastern Front again." Kamenev expressed doubts about the possibility of returning: "How can I return to the post of commander of the front, when just two weeks ago I was removed from this post? Who will listen to me?" For that

Sklyansky "rather impressively scolded" Kamenev, pointing out the "irrelevance" of doubts, and conveyed the order to V.I. Lenin "to immediately go to Serpukhov, where the headquarters of the commander-in-chief was then located, and 'negotiate' with him." Surprises continued in Serpukhov, where Vatsetis allegedly told Kamenev that he was "removed for failure to carry out ... orders and indiscipline." Kamenev began to protest. According to Kamenev's memoirs, "the difficult assignment to find a 'common language'" with Vatsetis would have become impossible if it were not for the intervention of one of the members of the RVSR - "as far as I remember, Comrade Aralov"\*'. So, about the appointment of S.S. Kamenev was supposed to find out on May 22, "Most likely, it was Aralov who resolved the situation

By June 1919 I.I. Vatsetis, taking into account the obvious need to provide assistance to the Southern and Western fronts (which was repeatedly demanded by the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars), went, according to V.G. Krasnov and V.O. Daines, on "an extremely risky, but perhaps the only right step in that situation," namely, as Trotsky later wrote, "remove several divisions from the east and transfer them to the south, where Denikin turned into an increasingly serious danger". Trotsky supported the plan of Vatsetis, considering the Southern Front "immeasurably more serious and dangerous",

The conflict between the Commander-in-Chief and the command of the Eastern Front flared up with particular force as a result of the directive of the Commander-in-Chief of June 6. The directive set as the immediate task - to defeat Kolchak's troops operating in the area of the right bank of the river. Kama, take control of the course of the Belaya and Kama rivers and urgently gain a foothold on the flanks by creating strongholds in the areas of Perm, Osa, Sarapul, Birska, Ufa, Sterlitamak, Orenburg, Uralsk. This directive was perceived by the front command as an instruction to suspend the successful advance of the front, which threatened with "the most serious consequences" - they were protested in a report to the Commander-in-Chief of June 10." S.S. Kamenev subsequently stated bluntly: "In June [1919] I did not fulfill the order of the Commander-in-Chief in the full sense of the word. The offensive on the Eastern Front developed quite successfully. The White Guard armies of Kolchak rolled back behind Ufa, and at that time

The commander-in-chief gave the order to stop beyond the river. White. I refused to stop the advance.  
The issue has been resolved

to Vladimir Ilyich" \* °.

As Gusev wrote, "to "fix" on the banks of the Kama and Belaya and to allocate several divisions at the same time meant:

- 1) "Give Kolchak the opportunity to rest and go on the counteroffensive ... Kolchak, having rested, would jokingly break through our front and force our troops to retreat again to the Volga";
- 2) The advancing units of the Eastern Front, "inspired by the brilliant success of the first weeks, irresistibly rushed forward. To stop them in the midst of the revolutionary upsurge that has engulfed them would mean no more and no less than the risk that a formidable suspicion of treason on the part of the command staff will arise in them";
- 3) "Ahead, just beyond the rivers Kama and Belaya, tens of thousands of fresh, strong reserves from the Ural workers who hated Kolchak were waiting for the Red Army";
- 4) "With the fastest possible advance, it was possible to achieve the fastest separation of divisions and their transfer to the Southern Front" "?"

I.I. Vatsetis in a letter to V.I. Lenin (the same 1921) interpreted the facts differently: he "categorically demanded the transfer from the Eastern Front of four unemployed (for lack of an enemy in front of him) divisions to the Southern and Western Fronts against the army of Denikin and Yudenich, where we felt great need for reserves. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front by all means hampered this extremely necessary strategic measure and in the end reduced it to the fact that such a withdrawal of troops from the Eastern Front prevents the use of the successes achieved on the Volga.

The position of the Commander-in-Chief I.I. Vatsetis was supported by L.D. Trotsky, who also came into conflict with S.I. Gusev associates. The fate of the Bolshevik dictatorship depended on the right strategic decisions, so the top leadership of the party, in particular V.I. Lenin. The conflict between Vatsetis and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front, as a result of Gusev's and his comrades' appeals to the Central Committee, resulted in a conflict between Trotsky and Lenin, the essence of which is conveyed in the collection about the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and Trotsky's appeal to the Central Committee of June 16.

At the beginning of June 1919, a threatening situation developed near Petrograd. June 2 E.M. Sklyansky and I.T. Smilga reported to the joint meeting of the Org and Politburo of the Central Committee "on the state of affairs on the Western Front." The question of the situation on the fronts was obviously supposed to be discussed at the plenum of the Central Committee on June 8 or 9. However, Lenin

was against the meeting and insisted that the convening of the plenum be postponed until Trotsky arrived, which was reported to the head of the military department by Sklyansky on June 5. On the same day, Lenin asked Trotsky: "Are you fully informed about the situation on the Southern Front? What are you doing, where are you going? I would consider it useful to send Minin to Tsaritsyn now to carry out work on his defense. What do you think about it?" June 8 G.E. Zinoviev and I.V. Stalin reported this by telegram to V.I. Lenin." On June 10, he drafted a resolution of the Central Committee on the recognition of the most important front of the "Petersburg". The project was to withdraw a division from the Eastern Front and divide it between Petrograd (°/,) and the Southern Front (°/,)\*\*. Lenin carried his decision through the Politburo." On June 13, the group of Leon Trotsky issued a resolution of the RVSR (signed by Trotsky, E.M. Sklyansky and I.I. Vatsetis) recognizing the Petrograd Front as "the most important front, requiring an extraordinary concentration of forces and exceptional measures to rally units and consolidate the front." From the Eastern Front, as suggested by V.I. Lenin, it was decided to withdraw 2 strong, combat-ready divisions, including 2 brigades already assigned for transfer to the Petrograd Front. On June 10, the command of the Western Front reported to Vatsetis about the current situation, following the results

The Commander-in-Chief ordered the transfer of 2 divisions from the Turkestan Army of the Eastern Front to Petrograd.

Lenin then reconsidered the issue and recognized the Eastern Front as the most important “- under the influence of S.I. Gusev.

June 13 L.D. Trotsky ordered the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front “with exceptional energy to allocate, in accordance with the given order of the Commander-in-Chief, two combat-ready divisions without any delay so that they could be loaded and sent to their destination in the shortest possible time.” Trotsky sternly warned the Revolutionary Military Council about the responsibility for carrying out the order.”

June 15 at a meeting of the Central Committee L.D. Trotsky insisted that the main front should not be the Eastern, but Petrograd. In this he disagreed with V.I. Lenin. The very next day, on the basis of the decision of the Central Committee, a decision of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was issued, at the meeting of which Trotsky was not present. The Central Committee followed Lenin, deciding on the Eastern Front to continue “an intensive offensive with the aim of quickly resolving the

but the commander of the task is to smash Kolchak's troops ... In order to change the orders given, three are immediately removed. combat-ready brigades, of which one is sent to the 10th Army, and two to Petrograd. The Eastern Front undertakes to prepare within a week the withdrawal of three more brigades. The moment of removal is determined by the Commander-in-Chief. V.G. Krasnov and V.O. Daines conclude that the “point of view of I.I. Vatsetis”<sup>7</sup>. But at the same time, they do not take into account the decision taken at the same meeting to replace F.V. Kostyaeva M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich as chief of the Field Staff <sup>8</sup>, and this decision had far-reaching consequences.

To top it all off, by the beginning of the summer of 1919, on the front of the 8th, 12th, 13th armies of the Southern Front, the situation was approximately the same as on the German front by the spring of 1918: the armies fled, the Red Army soldiers held meetings, arrested commissars and commanders (there were even cases of executions), “whole teams and battalions, headquarters of regiments and even brigades” disappeared from the battlefield: for example, “an entire brigade arbitrarily left the front, arrested the command staff.” The commander of the 9th Army, N. Vsevolodov, who went over to the side of Denikin, later testified that the Field Headquarters, which did not expect “such a collapse” of the front, became agitated; “L.D. Trotsky, who, as usual, began arrests and mass executions, but this did not save the front from collapse. On July 1, 1919, Trotsky left for Moscow. Commander of the Southern Front V.M. Gitis “managed to blame everything on Vatsetis” <sup>7</sup>. Blame it very opportunely! Probably, this drove the last nail into the lid of the “coffin” of I.I. Vatsetis.

According to Trotsky's apologist Isaac Deutscher, on July 3, 1919, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), retired I.I. Vatsetis and the appointment of the winner Kolchak in his place - S.S. Stalin insisted on Kamenev. If this is the case (which is unlikely), then S.I. Gusev: according to A.A. Samoilov, he “established almost friendly relations” with Kamenev, moreover, when from May 6 to May 28, 1919, Samoilov was the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front, Kamenev through Gusev (with whom, by the way, they lived in the same house) exerted a “strong influence on the adoption and implementation of all operational considerations.” This is apparently confirmed by a fragment of the transcript, which is quoted in their book on Trotsky by the researchers V.G. Krasnov and V.O. Daines:

“[S.I. Gusev: | At the present time, the volume of operations has outgrown the capacity of the existing high command, from which petty interference in the activities of front commanders continues. Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis must be replaced by a man capable of leading numerous fronts and understanding the peculiarities of our war.

[L.D. Trotsky:] I am against the change of Commander-in-Chief, since Comrade Vatsetis proved his devotion to the ideas of the revolution and skillfully carried out a number of operations against the troops of General Krasnov and Admiral Kolchak.

Contrary to custom, V.G. Krasnov and V.O. Daines do not cite the document in its entirety, but only mention "a furious verbal skirmish between supporters and opponents of I.I. Vatsetis """. Indirectly, the information is confirmed by the memoirs of K.Kh. Danishevsky: "At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party (obviously, on July 3, 1919 — S. V.) Gusev spoke especially sharply and convincingly. The volume of operations was said to have outgrown the capacity of the existing high command; that on his part petty interference in operations continues, inevitable at the beginning of the war (1918), but which became harmful in 1919; that the fronts have already put forward new strategists and tacticians, who should be given the opportunity to transfer their experience to the headquarters of the main command (Field Headquarters. - S.V.), where people of the old way of life who had not been directly on the fronts of the Civil War were directly concentrated "" ". By detente, I highlighted the obvious inconsistency with the truth; indeed, the graduates of the courses of the Academy of the General Staff who held key positions did not have front-line experience of the Civil War, but they all went through the First World War; and the average age of these people of the "old way" was about 30 years. "Trotsky spoke furiously and stubbornly against the change of the main command. At the first meeting of the Central Committee, no definite decision had yet been made on this issue. Vladimir Ilyich confined himself chiefly to isolated remarks, clarifying questions, etc., but it was evident that he was dissatisfied with the high command. The next day (July 4, 1919 - S.V.) a further discussion of this extremely important issue was scheduled. Trotsky did not appear at the meeting, citing illness. About 10-15 minutes after the phone call from Lenin, who proposed to convene the Central Committee at Trotsky's apartment if he was unable to appear, the chairman of the RVSR came and the meeting of the Central Committee continued. Trotsky again

sharply insisted on the need to leave the former main command, pointed out that there was no reason to change it, announced his resignation if the change was carried out. All Lenin's remarks indicated that the head of the party "already stands firmly for the change of the main command and for the fact that it is the command of the Eastern Front that must be appointed to this responsible post, because it has already learned to beat the enemy and has fully shown its devotion to the cause of the revolution "" ".

July 7, according to the memoirs of K.Kh. Danishevsky, he was called by V.I. Lenin also instructed "to immediately go to Serpukhov on the issue of preparing a change of command." On the same night, Danishevsky, accompanied by several party workers, left by car for Serpukhov: "Everything happened as planned. On July 8, 1919, a new composition of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was announced with the inclusion of the new Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev..." On the arrest of Vatsetis on July 8, K.Kh. Danishevsky kept silent in his memoirs<sup>77</sup> On July 9, I.T. Smilga, in an interview with a Pravda correspondent, turned on the hurdy-gurdy, citing the reason for the replacement of Vatsetis by Kamenev as Commander-in-Chief, "major disagreements of a strategic nature ... Vatsetis was a resolute opponent of an offensive in the east. Life has shown that Kamenev was right.

In the summer of 1919, the Southern Front was under the close attention of L.D. Trotsky," and all summer long the actions of the chairman of the RVSR were criticized by the members of the Central Committee." Reasonable in some cases. In July S.S. Kamenev and commander of the Southern Front V.N. Yegoriev disagreed about the time of the counteroffensive on the left wing of the Southern Front. Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front G.Ya. Sokolnikov panicked, succumbing to the logic of Yegoriev: he urgently called Trotsky. On July 27, the chairman of the RVSR asked for the replacement of Etoriev as a person a priori convinced of failure - at first he offered to give Egoriev an assistant, and then make it an assistant commander. plan, to make clarifications to "all responsible workers", and in addition, added to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, in addition to 6 already included in it, 3 new members - I.T. Smilgu, L.P. Serebryakov and M.M. Lashevich. And all this, instead of appointing a single assistant to the commander of the Southern Front - on July 29, Trotsky wrote to the Central Committee (Lenin) sharp

protest. Everything would be fine, only on August 3 Trotsky doubted the correctness of the planned S.S. Kamenev of the offensive plan, considering it more profitable to strike not in the Tsaritsyno, but in the Voronezh direction (the local peasantry sympathized more with the Soviet government than the Tsaritsyno Cossacks) \*\*. Lenin did not heed Trotsky's advice and on August 10 demanded that E.M.

Sklyansky to start the offensive ". Despite the haste of Trotsky and the command of the Southern Front with the preparation of the counteroffensive, the enemy forestalled the Red Army units - the crushing raid of Mamontov began; if not for the actions of N.I. Makhno, everything would have ended very sadly for the Bolsheviks" On August Trotsky wrote: "I'm waiting here for Serebryakov with a group of political workers. I hope that Serebryakov will strongly strengthen the local Revolutionary Military Council, which is still very weak, despite the very good commander in the person of Yegorov." that Trotsky had other reasons to wait for Serebryakov: as the daughter of Leonid Petrovich writes, his relations with Stalin became more complicated; "Apparently, Serebryakov had an intuitive distrust of Kobe". On August 6, the Polit- and Orgburo of the Central Committee jointly at an enlarged meeting consisting of Lenin, Stuchka, Kamenev, Tomsy, Kalinin, Beloborodov, Bukharin, Stasova and Sokolnikov considered the report of G.Ya. Sokolnikov about the situation on the Southern Front and a telegram from I.T. Smilga about the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front. Decided: "Reduce the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front to the composition of four comrades (Sokolnikov, Smilga, Lashevich, Serebryakov). In view of the need for a reduced composition of the Revolutionary Military Councils in general, to propose to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic that the remaining members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front not be included in the Revolutionary Military Council in the future. Instruct tt. Gusev and Sklyansky to carry out this decision in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. It is noteworthy that it was not Trotsky, but Gusev, who was entrusted with carrying through the RVS decision of the Politburo: during this period he was the actual head of the military department.

The situation was so difficult that the Bolsheviks again returned to the idea of using the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries for their own purposes. After discussing the PLSR statement "about their new position", the Politburo instructed L.B. Kamenev and E.D. Stasova to continue negotiations with former "fellow travelers in power" (in particular, I.Z. Shteinberg) and decided "from case to case" to release individual Left Social Revolutionaries and their groups "to work behind Denikin's lines"; to organize such

Dzerzhinsky was instructed even to organize meetings with the arrested Steinberg.

August 16 I.T. Smilga telegraphed the Central Committee (and then Gusev) that the commander of the Southern Front was not coping with the matter, Sokolnikov and Trotsky were bringing disorganization into the management of the front. Smilga proposed to recall Trotsky and Sokolnikov, to create a new Revolutionary Military Council of the front from Smilga himself, his permanent partner M.M. Lashevich and a "efficient military specialist", after which the responsible communists should be immediately transferred from the Eastern Front to the Southern. Around August 25, Smilga asked to convene a plenum of the Central Committee "for the final solution of the question of the Southern Front", the failure to resolve which "will cost ... extra funds, strength and blood" ". Gusev sent a copy of his telegram to E.D. Stasova, who supported the proposal to temporarily recall L.D. Trotsky to the center and appointment of G.Ya. Sokolnikov to the Western Front. On the same day, Smilga sent a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP(b), in which he reported on the difficult situation on the Southern Front and called the main reason for the failures of the Red Army "the inability of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front to command and control the troops." According to Smilga, "the current composition of the Revolutionary Military Council is unfit for work. Mutual misunderstanding is so strong that it is not necessary to think that it will be possible to "work together"". At this time, the RVS of the front were M.M. Lashevich, I.T. Smilga, G.Ya. Sokolnikov. Lenin, in a reply telegram, expressed the hope that Smilga would establish normal relations with L.D. Trotsky; asked "not to be nervous, not to burrow" -. Probably, another turning point began in relations with Trotsky ...

On August 30, the Politburo of the Central Committee, having considered Trotsky's statement on the report of I.T. Smilga about the Southern Front, decided: "Take note of it." With regard to Trotsky's trip to the South and to Petrograd, to propose to Trotsky "to go to St. Petersburg for a day for responsible official speeches on Finland. Then send him to the Southern Front with a stop along the way in Tula and Orel to intensify operations against Mamontov. If the situation with Mamontov changes for the better before the return of Comrade Trotsky, the question of the time of the trip to the South should be considered again.

As established by Z.L. Serebryakov, by the autumn of 1919, the situation on the Southern Front continued to worsen catastrophically. On September 6, Trotsky, Lashevich and Serebryakov telegraphed to the Central Committee and reported



by direct wire to Lenin: "The danger of a breakthrough of the front in the Kursk-Voronezh section is becoming obvious... The center of gravity of the struggle on the Southern Front has completely shifted to the Kursk-Voronezh direction, where there are no reserves." They proposed emergency measures of struggle, considering it necessary to shift the main blow against Denikin's troops to the Central direction. This meant a change in the previously adopted plan developed by S.S. Kamenev, according to which the main actions were planned to be deployed in the direction of Tsaritsyn. Initially, Lenin did not consider it expedient to change the existing plan. However, in the minutes of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee on September 11, there is no criticism or disapproval of the proposal of Trotsky, Lashevich and Serebryakov, and on September 21 the Central Committee adopted a number of decisions, according to which, in fact, the plan of Trotsky and his colleagues to counterattack Denikin's troops was adopted. "Leo Trotsky again was a member of the people's commissar for military affairs.

Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis himself attributed his resignation and arrest to strategic disagreements in the Bolshevik leadership. On December 16, 1919, Joachim Vatsetis described the reasons for his replacement by Kamenev as "extremely weighty in the form in which they were presented to the Government." Member of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee V.A. Avanesov told Vatsetis immediately after his arrest that he was not suspected of "counter-revolutionary or conspiracy, or in the state of any anti-government organization. Vatsetis, in his words, imagined that "somewhere in the bowels a new regrouping of forces took place, which threw a new person in my place, which person, probably, put forward other tasks that were fundamentally at odds with those tasks that I sought to solve" . Smilga Vatsetis analyzed the official statement in parts:

1) The Commander-in-Chief was not at the height of the situation, Vatsetis did not want to attack in the East and thereby did not use the victory on the Volga, while Kamenev quite rightly stood for an offensive in the East. This statement by Ivar Smilga, according to Vatsetis, "sinns with a lack of truthfulness, since it was I (Vatsetis. - S.V.) who ordered the commander of the Eastern Front to speed up actions against Kolchak and defeat him no later than mid-August; the commander of the Eastern Front at that time argued that he could do away with Kolchak only not earlier than autumn; the statement about the advance to the east must be "deciphered": "Advance to the East —

it means to pursue Kolchak and finish him off, but to organize military operations in Western Siberia is completely different, it means to begin the conquest of Asiatic Russia, i.e. to give our military operations a wide scope, this means chasing space, this means drawing a significant part of the forces of the Eastern Front into Western Asia, at a time when Denikin is our main enemy in the South, against whom decisive military actions must be taken - excellent forces, concentrating them in the South at the expense of all other fronts of secondary importance, at least temporarily. So the statement of comrade. Smilga in this respect is completely untrue."

2) About "self-seekers and rogues." Vatsetis considered it below his dignity to answer this consideration, taking into account, firstly, the fact that there is a Chief of the Field Staff for such statements, and secondly, the innocence of the General Staff officers who were released simultaneously with Vatsetis.

According to Vatsetis, the winter of 1919/1920. the correctness of his strategic line became finally clear: "The new Commander-in-Chief [S.S. Kamenev] launched an offensive in the South ... according to other plans. He sent the main blow to the Cossacks; but against the main forces of Denikin, i.e. against the Volunteer Army, insufficient forces were sent to them. [...] The August offensive, as built on foundations that did not correspond to the nature of the political and strategic situation, as we know, ended catastrophically for us. We were defeated and driven back far to the north, drawn into the winter campaign. The current offensive, as we see, is being carried out according to the principle that was the basis of my July plan, [from] left in the Field Headquarters [and] providing for the direction of the main attack on the Volunteer Army"".

In conclusion, Joachim Vatsetis wrote: "The commander-in-chief [Vatsetis] was of the opinion that we needed to achieve decisive results of the war before the onset of winter. Consequently, during the months of July, August, October, it was necessary to resolve all the most important issues put forward by the strategy for the final crushing of the main enemy, which the Commander-in-Chief considered Denikin, under whose command were both the Volunteer Army and ... and all the forces of the Donskoy and other Cossacks who aspired to take possession of the South of Russia. [...] There is no doubt that we had the opportunity

to defeat Denikin's army on the basis of those measures that were scheduled by the Commander-in-Chief at the beginning of July ... A plan was worked out for the restoration of our fronts and a plan of operations against Denikin. According to this plan, the main blow should be directed at Denikin's Volunteer Army by our retreat from the Kursk-Kiev front in the general direction to Rostov-on-Don by our four armies, namely, the 8th, 13th, 14th and 12th. As for the Don Front, the Commander-in-Chief thought to give it secondary importance and to keep only the 9th and 10th armies against it. However, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, the situation in the Republic developed in such a way that it was unlikely that only the work of strategy could make it possible to end the war victoriously before the onset of winter, since Denikin's Volunteer Army, defeated by us, could again retreat to the Lower Don region and again use the Don Cossacks in as his cover, which, undoubtedly, could create a situation in which Denikin would have the opportunity to restore the lost combat capability of his defeated units. In view of the foregoing, the Commander-in-Chief believed that in order to achieve the goals he had set, it was necessary that politics would come to the aid of the strategy (emphasis mine. - S.V.), namely, that the Government would offer all Cossacks, starting with the Don, a formal world. The commander-in-chief believed that the Don Cossacks were inclined to leave the ranks of the active counter-revolutionary armed forces on the condition that they remain untouched by us. [...] The Commander-in-Chief did not have time to make an offer to the Government due to his completely unexpected arrest. As for the measures of the strategy, they were all completed by July 8, i.e. to the day of the arrest of the Commander-in-Chief. The Field Headquarters had a completely prepared plan for the restoration of the Southern Front, developed earlier by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of the "above-mentioned proposals", Vatsetis assessed his arrest as follows: "Understanding the military events of late June and early July [1919], we we cannot keep silent about one fact that had major consequences, namely the change of the Commander-in-Chief, or "his dismissal from office", as it was officially said, in the form as it took place, namely, the Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis himself was suddenly arrested at that time when he was summoned to Moscow, to the Council of Defense, and made a report there before the meeting on a plan for further activities (he didn't, but had to do it. - S.V.), moreover

the further situation of this "dismissal" led to a complete lack of continuity between the strategic work of the former Commander-in-Chief, i.e. Vatsetis, and the new Commander-in-Chief Kamenev. After the arrest on July 8, no one asked... what was the plan for the further activities of the deposed Commander-in-Chief (naturally, everything had already been decided. — S.V.). His former chief of staff, Kostyaev, was also arrested, and the closest associates of Kostyaev and Vatsetis from the General Staff were also arrested. Thus, the new Commander-in-Chief began to develop his operational work on a completely new platform.

No. 4.1 "Telegrams of L.D. Trotsky V.I. Lenin about the alleged reshuffles in the top military leadership?

May 21, 1919 Personally, in my own hands

By direct wire from Kharkov, taken 22.5.19] 9, 1 o'clock.

[...]

No. 48/s.

3. [For] the return of [S.S.] Kamenev to the Eastern Front instead of Samoilo?" I agree, but I don't know where [S.S.] Kamenev is now. I don't object to the dismissal of Kostyaev either (I often raised this issue myself), but the whole difficulty lies in replacing him with a person who would be no worse off. I do not think that Lashevich was harder than Aralov. It just has a different kind of softness. Rather, Gusev is already suitable for the Field Headquarters. In any case, upon the return of [S.S.] Kamenev, [and] even more so upon the removal of Kostyaev, one must first talk [with] the Commander-in-Chief so as not to upset the whole machine at once. I propose to start from the most acute moment, that is, the return of [S.S.] Kamenev, and for this, find him and immediately summon him to Moscow. At the same time, identify possible deputies for Kostyaev and Aralov, which is less urgent. Communicate your decisions.

No. 51/s.

4. Was Bonch-Bruевич given the intended mandate? ?%

No. 52/s.

5. POST-SCRIPT. However, I must say that Kuzmin, Orekhov, Naumov, Vetoshkin had the same opinion about Samoilo, as Lashevich, Gusev, Smilga about [S.S.] Kamenev, as Aralov about Kostyaev. These front-line attachments are our common misfortune.

No. 49/s.

May 21, 1919.

Pre-revolutionary military council Trotsky.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 14. L. 103. Uncertified typewritten copy.

No. 4.2

From the minutes of the extended meeting of the Politburo and the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the KWP(b)

- military matters

June 2, 1919

MEETING OF THE EXTENDED POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BUREAU OF JUNE 2, 1919"

PRESENT: tt. Lenin, Rakovsky, Krestinsky, Dzerzhinsky, Kamenev, Smilga, Kalinin, Serebryakov, Mitskevich, Tomsky, Muranov, Sklyansky, Tsyurupa.

Order of the day: 1. Military issues: a) Reorganization of the military administration and military command in Ukraine; b) Western Front; c) Appointments and transfers.

1. a) Reorganization of the military administration and military command in Ukraine in connection with the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of June 1, 1919.

1. a) As a directive for the members of the commission developing the forms of relations between the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics, adopt the following provisions, binding on representatives of both the Ukrainian and Russian Republics (see Appendix 1).

In view of Comrade Rakovsky's report that Army Commander Voroshilov and Dybenko took most of the military property recaptured from Grigoriev into the hands of their armies—

\* Title of the document.

Instruct Comrade Rakovsky to send a telegram to Comrade Trotsky in Izium and ask Comrade Trotsky to take the most vigorous measures to transfer this property to the disposal of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

The question of the direction of international formations in Ukraine -

International formations available in Ukraine are assigned to the 12th Army for operations in Galicia and Bessarabia.

6) Reports vols. Sklyansky and Smilga on the state of affairs on the Western Front.

See appendix P §§ 1, 2, 3.

4. The military department should find candidates to fill the positions of army commander and members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Belitarmia.

5. Instruct the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to send 5-6 thousand reinforcements of the Belitarmia to one of the first stages, and also to reinforce it in one of the first stages due to the new mobilization of trade unions.

6. Tov. Delegate Smilga to the Belitarmia to streamline affairs in it and allow him to come to Moscow to instruct the work of Comrade Gorbunov approximately once every 10 days.

c) Questions about the transfer of senior officials of the military department.

1. Tov. Gusev is recalled from the Eastern Front and appointed to the Headquarters as a commissar under the head of the Field Staff, if there are no obstacles from Comrade Trotsky.

2. Tov. Semashko is seconded from the Western Front and sent to the disposal of Comrade Trotsky to be assigned to one of the armies of the Donbass or the Southern Front.

3. Tov. To recall Natsarenus from Petrograd, if Comrade Stalin does not file a formal protest against his recall, and to submit it to the Revolutionary Military Council for appointment to one of the armies of the Donbass or the Southern Front.

4. Tov. Send Mekhanoshin to the disposal of Comrade Trotsky and expedite the departure of Comrade Raskolnikov to Astrakhan. [...]

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 11. L. 1-2. Typewritten text.

Appendix 1 MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN UKRAINE I. The active army of the Ukrainian Front is abolished. Instead, an army is formed, operating in the direction to the east and subordinate to the Southern Front

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(now the 2nd Ukrainian Army) and the 12th Army, operating in the direction to the west and subordinated directly to the High Command.

P.

1) The entire territory of Ukraine is divided into military districts, the number and boundaries of which are determined immediately by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

2) The district military commissariats are subordinate in all respects and without any restrictions to the All-Russian General Headquarters on a general basis, as in the Russian Republic, and are created and work according to the states of the military districts of this latter.

3) The rank of People's Commissar of Ukraine and the right to vote in the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine shall be enjoyed by the District Military Commissar of the Kyiv Military District. Under the People's Commissar of Ukraine, there is a secretariat for a special staff.

4) The staff of the secretariat of the People's Commissariat of War of Ukraine is developed by the latter and approved by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. The composition of the employees is appointed by the People's Commissar of Ukraine.

5) The People's Commissariat of War of Ukraine informs the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine about the state of military affairs in Ukraine, represents in establishing relations between all district military authorities with civilian authorities and in settling conflicts that arise between military authorities and civilian ones.

On the basis of these directives, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic develops a regulation on the rights of the People's Commissariat of War of Ukraine and submits it for approval by the Politburo of the Central Committee. The Politburo of the Central Committee makes a decision on this provision by contacting the Politburo of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

6) All central bodies of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs of Ukraine are abolished or transferred to other departments, with the exception of those and to the extent that it is recognized as necessary to preserve the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

7) This decision is subject to implementation by June 7 of this year.

" RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 11. L. 5-5 vol. Typewritten text.

## Annex 2

1. The Central Committee instructs the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to reorganize the troops

Western Front (Belitarmy, Latarmy, etc.) and bring them together in battle

new connections, guided solely by strategic considerations.

2. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic is granted the right to all national

divisions and separate units, depending on the situation in

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to reorganize as soon as possible, to reduce them into general-size divisions and transfer them to other fronts from the areas they currently occupy.

3. Disband the Estonian army as a separate independent combat formation.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 11. L. 6. Typewritten text.

No. 4.3 Letter from the former Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front A.A. Samoilo I.I. Vatsetis about the situation in the RVS Front

Serpukhov June 8, 1919 Absolutely confidential

Ioakim Ioakimovich Vatsetis

GRACIOUS LORD, JOAKIM JOAKIMOV!

Commanding the troops of the Eastern Front in the period from May 6 to May 28, I, as a commander, was put in a very difficult [position] by the relations that had developed with members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front, vols. Gusev and Lashevich. These relations, as well as the named persons, had such a strong influence on the adoption and implementation of all operational considerations that now, for the common good of the cause, I consider it my official duty in a completely honest way, for your

personal information, to bring to your attention about the aforementioned situation in which I had to work to command the troops of the front.

Direct participation vols. Gusev and Lashevich in making decisions on operational issues, it seems to me, was initiated and carried out with the consent of Comrade Kamenev himself. A few days after my arrival at the front, Comrade Gusev, on behalf of the Revolutionary Military Council, demanded of me (in the presence of a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 5th Army, Comrade Rozengolts) that I should not discuss operational issues with the chief of staff in the absence of members of the Revolutionary Military Council, referring to the fact that such a procedure was adopted at the front and that I am obliged to adhere to it, and not limit myself to submitting already prepared orders to the Revolutionary Military Council for signature, as a result of my discussion of the situation together with the chief of staff. In order to explain this first incident, I consider it necessary to report that comrades Gusev and Lashevich came

We went to the headquarters at about 12 o'clock, while the chief of staff and I started work at 10 o'clock. And I took advantage of this free interval so that, free from other activities of the Revolutionary Military Council of a non-operational nature, I could think over the situation more carefully and make a decision, which, of course, by no means excluded the corresponding report of the Chief of Staff to the Revolutionary Military Council.

I must say that the third member of the Revolutionary Military Council, Comrade Yurenev, in this respect kept himself on completely legitimate grounds: along with [o] attention, the most intense, to all operations, he never allowed himself to put pressure on the adoption of one or another opera - positive decisions and, conversely, tried to smooth out, as far as he could, the brewing conflicts with TT. Gusev and Lashevich. I have the best memories of my collaboration with Comrade Yurenev.

As far as I could explain the situation that was being created, the latter was a direct consequence of the dismissal of Comrade Kamenev, who had established almost friendly relations with Comrade Gusev: both even lived in the same house, which circumstance was undoubtedly of great importance, since Comrade Kamenev, remaining after his departure to live in Simbirsk and even in his former apartment, could not but maintain, as it seemed to me, business relations Art. Gusev, and through him to even influence the adoption of certain decisions, the implementation of his views, etc. I noticed cases when Comrade Gusev expressed, for example, one view, and then, even on the same day, after a trip to home, returned with different or changed views. Of course, I cannot confirm all this, but the probability of such communication suggests itself.

Comrade Lashevich's relationship with me was somewhat different. As a former army commander, comrade Lashevich is more familiar with military affairs, but I still have not formed a definite opinion about who influences whom: comrade Lashevich on comrade Gusev or vice versa, one fact was obvious - both in all matters occupied exactly the same position, but Comrade Lashevich's participation was expressed not in a discussion of military issues, but in simple criticism, as it seemed to me, sometimes even with little justification, but always with the most authoritative air and in the most categorical and even harsh form. At the same time, Mr. Gusev and Lashevich expressed their negative attitude towards operational considerations openly, not embarrassed even by the presence of strangers in the room, sometimes arriving from the army. As striking examples of the latter

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I can cite the following: 1) on the issue of the well-known telegram from the Commander of the 5th Tukhachevsky, who openly accused me of contradictory orders, Comrade Gusev assumed a certain position as the defender of Comrade Tukhachevsky, whom he considered absolutely right, which he did not hide from expressing and with strangers; 2) When the commander of the 2nd raised the question of transferring two regiments from the 5th army to him, which transfer I did not agree, for operational reasons, to make in the coming days, Comrade Gusev called to the apparatus of the commander of the 2nd and advised him to insist before me on the transfer of regiments, promising him his cooperation in this regard.

In his steps of this kind, comrade Gusev sometimes even crossed the boundaries of general decency: for example, when comrade Novitsky (assistant commander of the Southern Group comrade Frunze) conveyed to comrade Gusev about the desire of comrade Frunze to talk with me about the fate Southern group (such was admitted by me,

contrary to the opinion of the Revolutionary Military Council, to exist only as an operative unit), Comrade Gusev replied that it was not worth talking to me, since Comrade Kamenev was again appointed commander of the front, and then, after a few minutes of conversation on other topics, t Gusev again confirmed his advice to Comrade Novitsky with the following phrase: "Don't forget to tell Frunze not to squander empty beads" (regarding the Southern group). At my conference on this matter with Comrade Yurenev, how should I react to the above phrase in an official official conversation, Comrade Yurenev persuaded me to refer this incident to him for settlement in order to avoid my direct conversations with Comrade Gusev .

As an addition to what has been reported, I consider it necessary to note the view expressed to me more than once that Comrade Kamenev, even in his official relations, was far from impartial towards his employees, the number of which, according to the opinions of people who knew Kamenev closely, the latter stubbornly replenished for reasons not only pursuing the benefit of the service.

I note this trait here because, even when I heard about the return of Comrade Kamenev, I had to advise some direct employees of the Komfront (I do not mean here the chief of staff, but the persons who asked to consider their conversation private) not to complicate matters by excitation the question of leaving the Eastern Front at the same time, even if Comrade Kamenev made the service more difficult by his biased attitude towards employees not personally chosen by him.

Please accept the assurance of my absolute respect and devotion

A. SAMOILO

City] Serpukhov

July 8, 1919

Correct: General Staff [signature]

Resolution V.I. Lenin: "To Sklyansky and Trotsky. Secret."

RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10076. L. 1—2v. Certified typewritten copy.

Resolution V.I. Lenin's autograph in pencil.

There are marks on the document: 1) E.M. Sklyansky about reading: "Sk" in the middle of L. 1; 2) "Case] No. 2".

Accompanying I.I. Vatsetisa L.D. To Trotsky: No. 224/8, Serpukhov June 9, 1919. Top secret, Into one's own hands

Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic L.D. TROTSKY

I am enclosing a copy of a private report made to me by the former commander of the Eastern Front, Samoilov. For the good of the cause and the creation of normal working conditions on the Eastern Front, I consider it necessary to bring this report to your attention.

APPENDIX: a copy of the report of the former commandant Samoilov.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF Vatsetis

Right: General Staff Martynov

RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 9. The original is a typewritten text on the letterhead of the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Republic, autographed in red pencil.

Accompanying L.D. Trotsky in the PB of the Central Committee of the RCP (b): To the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP

I have received through the Commander-in-Chief the attached report of the former Commander Samoilo, made to the Commander-in-Chief [in] private order.

For my part, I consider it useful to familiarize the Politburo of the Central Committee with this report.

Likewise, I am enclosing a private letter to me from Comorsi Behrens, whom I know as an inactive, but very conscientious and honest worker. I see only one way out: the appointment of an authoritative, energetic worker as an independent deputy for maritime affairs, who would fully enter into the matter and make the necessary expedient pressures, which now - in the absence of any serious control - are replaced by random tweaks.

Both letters upon familiarization please return to me.

June 19, 1919 L. Trotsky

No. 152/s\*

Kursk

RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 16.

The original is a typewritten text autographed in blue pencil.

RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 10-11v. Certified typewritten copy.

No. 4.4

Telephone message S.I. Guseva E.M. Sklyansky about the contradiction of actions for the transfer of units from the Eastern Front to the decision of the Central Committee.RKP (6b)

Later June 15, 1919,

Telephone message No. 707

Tov. Sklyansky

From the Eastern Front were withdrawn until June 25: from the front reserves of 15 different regiments (brigade of the 4th division, Bashkir units, fortress regiments) and from the armies (from the battle line) 2 brigades of the 2nd division and the 1st brigade of the 5th and divisions. The Eastern Front lost its front reserves, the Turkestan Army of its army reserve (2 brigades of the 2nd division) and the 5th Army of its army reserve (brigade of the 5th division). At present, 2 more divisions are being withdrawn from the Eastern Front: the 31st (from the 5th Army), which was scheduled for withdrawal according to the decision of the Central Committee, and

\* Entered by hand.

7th division (two-brigade from the 2nd army, formerly in the army reserve) with the brigade of Argir (from the 3rd army). No other orders to withdraw parts of the division were given by the commanders and are not expected to be given in the near future. There was a lot of talk and controversy surrounding the removal of these parts, but the removal itself did not create any confusion. Comrade's protest Smirnov is psychologically completely understandable, because the weakening of the 5th Army at a time when the last decisive blow to Zlatoust began to develop is felt by the army very painfully. Further withdrawal of units from the Eastern Front, which lost 42 regiments in May-June, at least in the next 2-3 weeks, I consider dangerous and creating a real basis for just protests from the armies and the front, and also contrary to the decision of the Central Committee. The very possibility of further withdrawal of units from the Eastern Front is due to the obligatory dispatch of rifles and machine guns there for



formed units and replenishment of former formations. Unfortunately, the assignment for June to the Eastern Front] was not completed at all, and the Eastern Front received only 2,500 rifles. The reason for the non-fulfillment of the order is confusion in the CUS. who first gave outfits to one warehouse, and then transferred the outfits to another warehouse. |

Member of the RVSR S. Gusev

RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 14. L. 200--201. Autograph in lilac pencil.

No. 4.5 Extract from the minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (Bolsheviks) on military issues

July 3, 1919 (morning session)

Minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (Bolsheviks) 3 / UP - [19] 19 (morning session |)"

In attendance: tt. Lenin, Tomsky, [L.B.] Kamenev, Kalinin, Serebryakov, Smilga, Dzerzhinsky, Stalin, Beloborodov, Trotsky, Krestinsky, Stuchka, Bukharin, Evdokimov, Zinoviev, Muranov, Stasova, Danishevsky, Rozengolts and Gusev.

\* Title of the document.

U. Military matters:

1. a) Transfer the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to Moscow. (Unanimously).
  - 6) To appoint [S.S.] Kamenev as Commander-in-Chief of Command. Chief of Staff by agreement with him.
  - c) Give Vatsetis an honorary military appointment with a decent salary. Appointment specifically approved by the Politburo.
  2. Create a Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of six comrades actually working in it. Include Comrade Trotsky as its chairman, Comrades. Sklyansky, Gusev, Smilgu, Rykov and Commander-in-Chief [S.S.] Kamenev. Release all former members of the Revolutionary Military Council from this title.
  3. In the presence of TT. Milyutin, Rykov, Krasin, Tsyurupa, Mezhlauka, the Central Committee decides to immediately unite the entire army supply organization. To entrust technical implementation to one person (a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, comrade A.I. Rykov), who receives dictatorial powers in the field of supplying the army. The Small Council of Defense in connection with the unification of the supply of the army is abolished.
  4. Draft letter of the Central Committee to the military commissars, submitted by comrade. Zinoviev, after discussing it with comrades Zinoviev and Trotsky, transfer it to the Politburo. |
- To instruct Comrades Trotsky and Smilga to draw up and publish, on behalf of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, an instruction on the rights and duties of commissars in the army, provided for by the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Party Congress.
5. In addition to the ongoing mobilizations of 19-year-olds and 10% of the professional mobilizations, the rest of the mass party and professional mobilizations should be suspended. Suspend also the mass dispatch of communists in old outfits. From now on, only personal selection of party workers to fill the positions of commissars in the army and for political work in the army and in the rear, especially among the garrison.
  6. In order to obtain the largest number of both political workers for the army and the rear, and supply workers, stop or at least reduce to a minimum the work in the central and local not absolutely necessary commissariats and departments.

No. 4.6

Telegram from a member of the RVSR and RVS of the Southern Front A.I. Akulova V.I. Lenin and L.D. Trotsky with a request to release him from responsible military work

No. 8484 July 6, 1919." 2 hours 40 minutes.

#### TELEGRAM

From Ryazhsk, railway - [To] Moscow, the pre-revolutionary military council to TROTSKY on location; presovnarkom to LENIN

For a variety of reasons, I conclude that Kursk's military policy is changing. During my work, I have come to certain conclusions that are indisputable to me, which I am not able to change for the sake of the mood of the moment. Let me ask you to release me from any military work, or at least from a particularly responsible one. And if, according to the conditions of the moment, my further participation in military work is necessary, I ask you to give me a separate organizational task in the form of the formation of any one division. I think that I would have solved this problem well if I had been given the right to choose the staff at the place indicated and with his consent. Don't refuse

answer -

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, at my location. No. 882

Member of the Revolutionary Military Council A.I. Shkars

Resolution comrade. Sklyansky: "TT. KRESTINSKY and STASOVA. 8.USH. Sk.

RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1237. L. 1. Uncertified typewritten COPY.

No. 4.7

Telegram G.Ya. Sokolnikova L.D. Trotsky and V.I. Lenin about disagreement with the strategic plan of the Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev

\* Telegram received on July 6, 1919. at 7 o'clock. 20 minutes. \*\* So in the text. It means "course".

July 24, 1919

ADVISION OF THE REPUBLIC TO TROTSKY OF THE PRE-DEFENSE TO LENIN copy: CHIEF COMMITTEE TO KAMENEV

Kozlov, 24 July. At a conference [with] the Commander-in-Chief [in] Kozlov, I expressed my opinions against the plan proposed by him. Without pretending that this plan is being revised, which would only confuse the planned operation, I do not consider myself entitled not to point out the circumstances that one way or another must be taken into account. I consider it erroneous to think that Denikin's strike is directed [in] an easterly direction: firstly, from this sector Denikin is already making a transfer [in] other directions; secondly, he will strike as far as possible from the front of our eastern armies in order to hinder their naturally expected transfer; thirdly, politically Denikin is not interested in saving Kolchak, and [in] military terms, saving is too expensive, difficult, long. [In] reality, there is more reason to expect a strike in a westerly direction: firstly, the presence of shock units here indicates this; secondly, the bases are closer here — the Black Sea ports; thirdly, the establishment of a united front to the west[e] with the Romanians [and] the Poles is strategically easier, politically more profitable. The most probable of the western directions is the direction to Bryansk. Combining an attack on Bryansk with the already well-defined movement of the Poles on Mozyr creates the threat of a gigantic bag into which the entire Ukrainian group falls, because by capturing only these two nodes, Ukraine is cut off from Moscow. On the other hand, the distribution along the Black Sea coast reduces the importance of Novorossiysk, and with it the Kuban region for Denikin, which becomes especially important.

meaning [in] connection with the uprisings in the Caucasus and Kuban, disagreements with the Kuban Rada, clashes with Georgia, that is, factors squeezing Denikin's army out of the Kuban cradle. Therefore, concentrating the strike from the Don [and] Kuban side may mean striking at the least important direction for Denikin, since southern Ukraine will already be turned by him into a new base of operations. The possibility of the capture of Ukraine, the catastrophe of the Ukrainian armies must be more carefully considered. At the same time, Denikin is preparing a major operation in the general direction from Uryupinskaya on Gryaz.

I affirm that Denikin is generally more dangerous than Kolchak, because, firstly, he has a numerous officer cadre; secondly, Cossack units that are weakly susceptible to political decay, moreover, cavalry units; thirdly, shorter communication and operational lines. on the Southern Front represents not so much a turning point as an intermission. If the initiative for the resumption of active operations falls into the hands of Denikin (and, apparently, this will be the case), then we may again find ourselves in a disadvantageous position, and these prospects will begin to take on real significance. Every day of delay in the planned transfers, every delay in the approach of reinforcements and, in particular, in the sending of weapons, receives extraordinary weight [in] the present situation. I add: for the area of the 8th, 9th, 10th armies you can be relatively calm. [In] the 13th district, the most unpleasant surprises, opportunities are not ruled out. [In] the region of the Sumy and Poltava groups, the situation is also unstable; further south is not aware due to lack of communication. [About] the receipt of this telegram, I ask you to notify specifically. | Sokolnikov

Litter V.I. Lenin: "from Sotskolnikov; to the archive."

RGASPI.F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10708. L. 1-2.

The original is a typewritten text with an autograph.

Tpometa V.I. Lenin's autograph in blue pencil.

No. 4.8

Note by L.D. Trotsky by direct wire to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) about the need to send responsible communists to the front-line provinces, where units for the Southern Front are being formed

No. 237 July 27, 1919 2 hours "Top[top] secret

Note by direct wire from Kozlov, accepted 27.7.1919 2 hours

\* IN AND. Lenin circled the word.

\*\* L. 1 - top, right.

\*  
Receipt time.

Moscow, Sklyansky for the Central Committee.

Political work is now of decisive importance in the front-line provinces, where the formations of the Southern Front are taking place. Responsible workers should be sent there - agitators of party committees. Steklov must be sent immediately.

No. 237. 27 July. Pre-revolutionary military council Trotsky.

Sent to: comrade Lenin, comrade Serebryakov, comrade Stasova and by telephone

RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 17. Typewritten text.

No. 4.9 Memorandum of L.D. Trotsky to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on the elimination of the conflict with the headquarters of the Southern Front

August 3, 1919

## HIGHLY SECRET TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTS

Not so much in order to formally eliminate the misunderstanding with my telegram about the Kozlovsky headquarters, but in view of the enormous importance of the question in essence, I consider it necessary to orient the Central Committee more closely regarding the situation that has arisen.

### 1. Factual details - to eliminate the conflict

After Sokolnikov informed me (there were no other members of the Revolutionary Military Council in Kozlov) regarding the lack of "operational authority" and doubts expressed in passing by the commanders about the plan, I suggested not to talk to the commanders at all about this question. The motive expressed by me to Sokolnikov was formal: "the fulfillment of the plan of the Commander-in-Chief is not a question and cannot be the subject of conversations and gossip." At that moment I sent you a telegram, but an hour or two later, on the eve of my departure, I thought over the situation again, went to Sokolnikov and told him that it might be better to step over formal considerations and put the question squarely on the merits. He agreed. A brief conversation followed with the commander, who replied: "I know only too well how difficult it is to say with certainty in advance which of the plans will give the best results, but I am a soldier, I know how to obey and, moreover, I want success. If you have someone better than me, nominate

those, because against Denikin success is needed both for the republic and for me. But if you leave me, I will do everything and do what I can." The Nashta Front Pniewski, to whom I raised the question of the measures to implement the adopted plan, spoke of the plan rather positively, or rather passively, as about something that had been decided. Here we decided to remove Peremytov with him, replacing him with Berens. Counting on the appointment of Selivachev, an authoritative and experienced person in the operational sense, through whom it would be possible to have some verification of both doubts, hesitations, and factual errors, Sokolnikov and I came to the conclusion that in this way the matter would be put forward with sufficient thoroughness, completely ensuring the implementation of the plan.

Under these conditions, you can imagine my astonishment when I received a panic telegram from the Politburo in Penza.

### 2. Actual position

The blow was decided by Tsaritsyn, i.ġ. Kamyshin, i.e. now Saratov. As far as I understand, there is only one reason: it is closer to deliver reinforcements from the Eastern Front here. All others are sacrificed to this consideration.

a) the offensive will take the longest path;

6) in the Don region, where it will meet the highest resistance;

d) reinforcements are grouped near an extremely shaky section of the front. During the transfer, Kamyshin was surrendered;

e) the Voronezh direction remains the shortest and, in terms of population composition, the line of least resistance (the peasantry, not the Cossacks)";

f) The 8th Army (Voronezh direction) is undoubtedly the strongest and most reliable in all respects. A decisive blow in this direction is much more secured by the whole situation, just as the grouping of reinforcements in the rear of the 8th Army is much more reliable.

\*

Here and further in the document, the underlined words are inscribed by L.D. Trotsky.

\*\* I leave aside the third option, which is the most favorable for us in economic and political respects: to Yekaterinoslav, the Donetsk basin, Taganrog, since the considerations that it is difficult to form the necessary fist on unstable Ukrainian soil are based big or smaller

grounds. (Approx. Doc.)

But, leaving aside the question of choosing the direction of the main attack, I must point out the complete underdevelopment of the entire offensive from the organizational and supply side.

The spare units of the armies of the Southern Front already have a very significant number of replacements. They cannot be put into action due to the untimely arrival of uniforms and weapons. This issue is part of the operational plan. It was necessary to work out in detail where to send supplies, weapons, uniforms by block trains for the speedy strengthening of the armies in the most important sectors. This question has not been worked out in the slightest. Meanwhile, the influence of armed replacements is of incomparably greater importance than the joining of two divisions of the Eastern Front, of which the arrival of the first is completely indefinite in time, and the second seems to be in general questionable.

Since two divisions of the Eastern Front will be important for a decisive blow, I believe that the time spent on transferring them to the Voronezh direction would pay off a hundredfold with a blow along the shortest and most favorable route in all respects. In essence, the main command was reduced to two divisions from the Eastern Front and to a geometric line of advance; but the line had already changed, lengthening after the fall of Kamyshin.

In this situation, I believe that the plan as a plan will practically not work. There will be pressure on all fronts, we have a preponderance of forces, sooner or later the general organizational work of the Party will have an effect. With a preponderance of forces, we will press, break through, push back and advance, squeezing the ring.

I am enclosing herewith a conversation by direct wire between the Commander-in-Chief and the commanding officer. It is clear from the conversation what vague outlines the plan assumes when it is carried out in practice. In fact, the front will have to decide, and, apparently, rather empirically, since the plan given from above does not contain elements of development.

### 3. Appointment of Selivachev on the merits

Of course, the Politburo – I hope – is not going to” [hypothetically] inspire confidence in the “operational authority”. Here we need not-

\* Inscribed by hand over the shaded "may".

which are more businesslike guarantees. The appointment of Selivachev is, in my opinion, such a relative guarantee not only in relation to Kozlov, but also in relation to Moscow, i.e. if serious mistakes are made there, then Selivachev will provide timely tactful advice ( if he wants) he will correct without conflict. Visibility will be maintained, and the plan will be carried out as necessary. Selivachev, in any case, is recognized by everyone as an intelligent, capable and knowledgeable person. The whole question is to what extent he wants to be conscientious and active. But if he remains a purely passive performer, then there will be no harm, but a small benefit, since in everyday work he will not be able not to make certain corrections to Kozlovsky's work.

command.

Hence a small conclusion. With all the fullness of faith in operational authority, there is no reason to refuse some additional practical guarantees, which in the future course of events may turn out to be more reliable than faith and more reliable than authority itself, and at the present time provide only the best (i.e., the most free from rude misses) holding

planned plan.

Trotsky

August 3rd

Romodan — Mirgorod

P5. The appointment of Selivachev took place. I believe that the demonstrative staffing of the Revvoensovyuzh has disappeared. So the incident is over.

L. Trotsky]

RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 37-38v.

The original is a typewritten text with corrections and an autograph with a simple pencil.

Published in: Krasnov V.G., Daines V.O. Unknown Trotsky. M., 2000. S. 205-208.

Printed according to the original text.

No. 4.10

Telegram I.T. Smilga to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on the need to convene a plenum of the Central Committee to resolve the issue of the Southern Front

\*\* Inscribed by hand over the shaded "serious".

August 16, 1919, 0 hours. 21 min.

Moscow, Central Committee of the Communists - Stasova. Extraordinary. Military

Mokhovaya 7, apt. 3

I consider it my duty to inform the Central Committee of the following: a trip [to] Kozlov and a meeting with the rest of the members of the Southern Front led me to the conviction that the presence of Trotsky and Sokolnikov at the front was disastrous. I consider them the main culprits for the defeats in the south. The organization they created and the way they work show that they have no understanding of military affairs. In the field of command, control, supply - chaos, due to the inability to put things right. In this situation, the efforts of the center cannot be used on the Southern Front in the proper amount. The current composition of the Revolutionary Military Council is inoperable. I ask you to convene a plenum around August 25 to finally decide the question of the Southern Front. Failure to resolve this issue will cost the republic extra money, effort and blood. 0 [hours] 21 | min.] Smilga?%

RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 48. Typewritten text on a telegraph form.

No. 4.11

Ciphergram I.T. Smilgi S.I. Gusev about the need to recall L.D. Trotsky and G.Ya. Sokolnikov and updates of the RVS Front

No. 956 "copy - comrade Stasova

August 16, 1919 10 a.m. 50 min."

Moscow, Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic GUSEV I was convinced that the command was not coping with the case. He also made sure that the presence of Sokolnikov and Trotsky would bring nothing but death to the front. Their work is contrary to the most basic provisions of military affairs. Huge Revolutionary Military Councils and distribution

\*  
Received at 5:45 p.m.

\* Hereinafter in the document, the words in italics are inscribed by M.N. Burakova.

\*\* Telegram decryption time.

work between individual members leads [to] complete decentralization in the field of command and control of troops, which, [in] turn, leads to complete collapse and death. I have no possibility of influencing the Southern Front and even my own armies with the present composition of the front. The only way out of the situation is to recall Grotsky and Sokolnikov from the front, set up a normal Revolutionary Military Council of the front with me, Lashevich and a capable military specialist, and begin pumping workers out of the east. The position on the left flank is getting stronger every hour. There is no doubt that the operation will be successful. Give me an answer immediately. No. 019 Smilga 16/8 10 a.m. 50 min. Deciphered and burned the original (PORTNOV) True: Secretary of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic M. Burakov RGASPI F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 49. Certified typewritten COPY.

No. 4.12

Extract from the Special Department of the Cheka from the White Guard newspaper "Morning of the South" - with an article by N. Vsevolodov "The Defeat of the Southern Soviet Armies"

September 16, 1919." Soviet secret

Extract from the White Guard newspaper

The defeat of the southern Soviet armies

On March 12 [1919], the troops of the Soviet armies of the Southern Front were ordered to move at dawn on March 16 [1919] to the most decisive offensive against Novochoerkassk.

It is characteristic that the headquarters of the front, when issuing this order, had [no] the slightest idea either about the location of the units of the 9th Army, much less the units of the 8th Army, which was supposed to deliver the main blow from Lugansk. Due to natural bad weather, the connection between the front headquarters and the 8th and 9th armies, as well as between the headquarters of the armies and divisions, was lost.

\*\*\* So in the text. That's right: "from".

\* Date of compilation of the extract by the Special Department of the Cheka.

During the week, the army headquarters did not know what was being done in the divisions and even where they were located.

Meanwhile, the 16th division of the 9th army was making a very dangerous flank march, replacing units of the 12th division of the 8th army on the front from the mouth of the river. Kalitva to st. Mityakinskaya.

The 12th division began to approach Art. Lugansk, being almost 5 days late. The cavalry of the 16th division and the separate cavalry brigade of the 9th army could not be found anywhere, and yet it was intended to pursue the enemy, who still had to be defeated. |

Under such circumstances, the attack of the 8th and 13th armies was to begin, from which Gittis expected to decide the fate of the entire campaign.

But the vigilant command of the Volunteer Army prevented this attack. March 15, n.s., i.e. Exactly one day earlier, the Volunteer Army, having wrested the initiative from the hands of the enemy, went on the offensive itself, attacking it to the south-east of Lugansk. This attack turned out to be fatal for the Soviet army.

In a one-day battle, the 2nd brigade of the 21st division of the 8th army, representing the top of the wedge of the Mackensen phalanx, was utterly defeated. The remnants of it in disorder rushed to flee to Lugansk and, along the way, dragged along with them parts of the Inza division, abandoned from the reserve.

As early as March 17 [1919], the Soviet command tried to restore the situation by decisively going over to the offensive on the front of all armies, but it was already too late. The initiative passed entirely into the hands of the command of the Volunteer Army.

Gittis no longer had to advance, but to fight back: not to beat, but to fend off the powerful blows of the Volunteer Army, raining down on the shock Soviet group one after another.

The cavalry of the Volunteer Army, which broke through, deepened the breakthrough all the way to Luhansk, causing panic and confusion everywhere on the Soviet troops.

The Soviet command was very confused and began to look for the "wolf division" of Shkuro and tanks.

Every Red Army soldier knew about the division of General Shkuro and the Soviet troops. It was said that this division did not take prisoners; she is dressed in wolf hats and wolf skins; In front of the division, a banner with the image of a wolf's head is flying, and on the back of which is the inscription: "Death to the Communists." They indicated that this division was attacked

always led by General Shkuro himself. There are many legends about the name of the latter. The very name of this general inspired an incomprehensible fear and awe in the Red Army men. The appearance of the division has always been associated with the defeat of the Soviet troops.

The front command, as it were, supported and contributed to the development of these [x] rumors, and on March 17 [1919] an urgent telegram requested all the armies about the whereabouts of the "wolf division of General Shkuro."

This telegram, signed by Gittis, indicated that the outcome of the operation that began near Lugansk depended on the timely detection of General Shkuro's division.

Either in the armies the eyes of fear were large, or there were evil jokers, but only by March 20 [1919] from [o] all the armies (not excluding the 10th) urgent reports were unanimously received that "the wolf division of the general [ erala] Shkuro" was discovered on their front. In other words, the mysterious division of General Shkuro was simultaneously discovered at the front of all six Soviet armies.

It was no better with tanks. The commander of the 10th Army of the General Staff, Klyuev, reported that at the station. Repair found 80 small tanks with British teams. These obviously incorrect and contradictory reports further confused Gittis and created an uncertain and extremely nervous atmosphere.

The same fate befell the Moscow division. Not having had time to complete the concentration near Lugansk, this division, brought into battle piecemeal by small pickets, quickly melted away in a sea of attacks and, in the literal sense of the word, "was smashed piecemeal."

By March 20 [1919], the 12th division had barely begun to appear, with warheads at st. Luganskaya, why Gittis, in order to avoid a new separate defeat, did not dare to let her go into battle.

At that time, the left flank of the 9th Army was inactive and was only silently present on the battlefield during the defeat of the 8th Army; ] May-Maevsky, including with the division of General Shkuro".

Firmly clinging to the two divisions of the 13th Army, the division of General Shkuro firmly chained them to one place, not allowing them to provide assistance to the three Soviet divisions that were crushed near Lugansk.

\* So in the text



By April 1 [1919] Gittis finally admitted his defeat and in a lengthy report to Serpukhov announced that they were going on the defensive until a new concentration of strike forces.

Gittis' new plan was designed for the following: units of the 9th Army were to occupy the line of the river with the weak units of the 14th division. [Lonna] from the mouth to the station. Kamenskaya; all other forces of the army - the 16th and 23rd divisions should be concentrated at st. Gunderovskaya and Novobozhedarovka and, together with the 12th division at Mityakinskaya, attack the right flank of the general's army | May-Maevsky from the flank and rear.

Thanks to the deliberate order of the headquarters of the 9th Army, the strike group was concentrated, contrary to the order of the front, not at Novobozhedarovka, near the 8th Army, but at Ust-Belokalitvenaya, 100 miles away from the 8th Army for the purpose of inflicting a separate defeat on her.

And so it happened: on April 11 [1919], units of the 23rd division under the command of the division commander of the 23rd Golikov crossed to the right bank of the Lonn and first occupied the Repnoe station, and then, isolated and surrounded on all sides, were defeated and, having lost their artillery, driven back.

The defeat of the 8th and 9th armies made it possible for the command of the Volunteer Army to strengthen its flanks against the 13th and 10th armies and achieve] the most decisive successes.

With the appearance of tanks on the flanks of the 13th Army, a complete collapse began.

On May 26 [1919], the commander of the 13th Army of the General Staff, Gekker, reported to the front that there were no forces to stop the retreating army: people were demonstrating, arresting their commissars and command staff, there were cases of executions, entire teams disappeared from the battlefield and battalions, headquarters of regiments and even brigades: from the Slavyansk region, a whole brigade arbitrarily left the front, arrested the command staff, and soon the same report followed from the commander of the 8th Army of the General Staff, Lyubimov.

The Serpukhov headquarters, which did not expect such a collapse, became agitated. Trotsky himself arrived in the 12th Army. His appearance was terrible. Arrests and mass executions began, but this measure, beloved and tested by Trotsky, did not help. The front continued to fall apart, and on July 1 [1919] Trotsky hastened to leave Kupyansk

to Moscow.

Quite the opposite mood prevailed at the front headquarters near Gittis. The latter managed to blame everything on Vatsetis. The defeat was not given importance: it was believed that the retreat would not be deep. Hoping for strong, staunch 9th and 10th armies and with their help to restore the situation.

But this time, too, the high command of the Volunteer Army did not doze off and gave the order to concentrate groups near the Konstantinovskaya and Grand Dukes to attack the left flanks of the 9th and 10th armies. By this, Gittis' plan was again warned, and instead of delivering a powerful blow with the help of the 9th and 10th armies, the Soviet command had to surrender Tsaritsyn, Balashov, Borisoglebsk - these most important centers with their numerous reserves.

N. Vsevolodov

The article belongs to the former commander of the 9th Army, who went over to the side of the Whites.

The newspaper "Morning of the South" is kept by comrade. Dzerzhinsky.

Deputy Chairman of the Special Department of the Cheka Pavlunovskiy 16 - jŷ - 1919

Comrade Lenin

At the same time, an article by the former commander of the 9th Army N. VSEVOLODOV, who went over to the side of Denikin, is forwarded.

The article was published in issue 157-185 of the newspaper Morning of the South, published in Ekaterinodar.

Deputy Chairman of the Special Department of the Cheka Pavlunovsky

Litter V.I. Lenin: "to the archive".

Morning of the South is a daily socio-political and economic newspaper. No. 157-185. Wednesday 17 (30) July 1918

RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 11173. L. 2-5.

The original is a typewritten text with an autograph.

Attitude - the original - a typewritten text on the letterhead of the NGO VChK with an autograph.

No. 4.13 Note by I.T. Smilga to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) with accusations of L.D. Trotsky in slander

"e

September 26, 1919

In the Central Committee

I affirm that Comrade Trotsky waged a campaign against the Commander-in-Chief and the adopted strategy. I did not reproach Comrade Trotsky with a single word for arguing against the decisions of the Central Committee outside its walls, and therefore I cannot take his words about "untruth" and so forth personally.

26 Sep| November | I. Smilga

RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 59. Autograph with a simple pencil.

No. 4.14 From the minutes of the meeting of the MK RCP (b) - a recording of the report of A.F. Myasnikov about the military position

October 13, 1919

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE DATED October 13, 1919"

Instead of Comrade, who did not wait for lack of time. Gusev, the report on the martial law is made by Comrade Myasnikov.

Myasnikov: I will not dwell on the 3 secondary fronts for a long time and will direct my main attention to the decisive Southern Front. [...] Our weakness lies in our command staff, in the poor organization of the Southern Front and in the unsatisfactory work of the Centre. 2 months ago our Southern Front was destroyed by Denikin and it actually did not exist. Since then, a huge organizational work has been carried out, but it is far from being completed. About 150,000 troops were poured into the Southern Front during the summer [1919]. Now about 90,000 more are pouring into the Southern Sector. Our second weakness is our command staff. In the intercepted report of Colonel Korobkin, who fled from us, to Kolchak, the military experts working in our army are characterized and divided as follows: 1st part - active officers, working

\* Title of the document. \*\* So the text refers to Colonel V.V. Kotomin.

working actively against the Red Army; 2nd part - passive officers engaged in passive sabotage, and finally 3rd part - desperate officers who want only

end of the war and work for the Red Army. The Red commanders are devoted to the revolution, but far from being sufficiently trained. The lack of a dedicated and knowledgeable command staff plays a huge role in our defeats.

Before the reorganization of the RVSR, which took place a month and a half ago, the work of the Center was almost not carried out, the central command did not exist. After the reorganization, the work went on at an accelerated pace and the results are already showing. Very good results were obtained by the fact that the RVSR took over the supply of the army with rifles and cartridges. The supplies for the army are still very badly arranged in our country; Our central supply agencies are still working very poorly. We make 18,000 overcoats a day. At 3 months old, we could dress our entire army, but the overcoats do not get into the regiments and the soldiers remain undressed. Previously, on the fronts, very often there was not enough cartridge. Now that the business of supplying them has passed into the RVSR, the demands of the fronts are being satisfied. The 3 weaknesses of our armies that I have indicated largely determine our failures on the Southern Front. In order to finally break Denikin's resistance and go on the offensive, we need to improve our armies by infusing new communist cadres into them; increase the influx of new formations and improve supplies. [...] |

Decree of the Moscow Committee of October 13, 1919

Comrade Myasnikov's report on the martial law—Take note of the report.

CAOPIM. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 101. L. 79 with ob-80. Typewritten EKZ.

No. 4.15 Statement by I.T. Smilga to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) about the war with Denikin  
November 3, 1919 Top secret

In the Central Committee of the RCP, copy to Comrade Lenin

“257

War with Denikin”

1) Operations on the Southern Front should aim at capturing Kharkov and the Donetsk Basin. Movement to Kievshina and Khersonshina is inexpedient. for the social processes beneficial to the Soviet power in these areas have not yet become clear enough.

2) The main and decisive direction still remains the South-Eastern Front, where in the rear of the enemy there is either an open uprising (Caucasus), or a position close to an uprising (Kuban, Black Sea coast), which creates the possibility of the fastest liquidation Denikin.

3) Our capture of Tsaritsyn opens the way for us to the Kuban and broad prospects for the Soviet movement in the south, and therefore the high command must be given the task of taking possession of it at all costs.

4) The offer by the Cossack councils of peace is a consequence of the growth of the Soviet movement in the North Caucasus, the Kuban and the Don, on the one hand, and Denikin's frank monarchist deviation, on the other, and should be taken into account by us as the beginning of the decay of Cossack democracy.

5) The conduct of peace negotiations with these councils should not in any way interfere with the organization and strengthening under the line of Soviet elements in these areas (peasantry, Soviet Cossacks). The main task of these negotiations is to decompose "" the rear of the enemy, but by no means to carry out a positive program (independence and other nonsense).

6) Immediately conduct the widest campaign in the troops associated with the Cossack regions (Budyonny's corps, etc.), so that they do not feel abandoned and abandoned, which can lead to disastrous consequences.

7) Immediately update the composition of the Cossack department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and turn it into a military tool of the Cossack policy.

November 3 I. Smilga

RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 64. Copy as original — typewritten text autographed in purple ink.

\* Title of the document. \*\* So in the text. That's right: "decomposition".

## Chapter 5

### "I WILL BE THE FIRST... VICTIMISE, AS A MILITARY SPECIALIST, AND THE OTHER ALL SHUT OFF, BEHIND THE BACK OF THE PARTY": THE FATE OF THE ARRESTED GENERAL STABISTS

The arrest of Vatsetis and his subordinates did not provoke a protest from the Bolsheviks, senior officials of the military department who never trusted military specialists and were afraid of the threat of a possible military coup. It is possible that this is what made it difficult to unravel the mystery that shrouded in darkness an important episode of Soviet military development, and still maintains the certainty of individual historians (for example, S.T. Minakov) that the "conspiracy" took place. At the same time, there is an alarming situation that developed in Serpukhov after the arrest of Joachim Vatsetis, which contributed to the growth of panic among party workers. One of them wrote to Trotsky: "Dear Lev Davidovich! In my conscience, I inform you that you should certainly take note: since the dismissal of Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis, the Latvians of the 5th Lettish Regiment stationed here have been spreading rumors among the people, especially among the youth of the mountains. Serpukhov, that they will soon raise an uprising and destroy your Headquarters in Serpukhov. So I can't help telling you about this rumor. Perhaps you will be able to destroy this damned plan in time and bring it to naught by transferring it to positions and replacing the regiment with another, or transfer it to another place. Vatsetis kept this regiment only for his protection, but now, with his expulsion, the regiment should be withdrawn from Serpukhov. I remain one of those who respect you..." (surname omitted in typewritten copy) 7". Judging by Trotsky's actions, this note (or, perhaps, an anonymous note) did not shake his conviction in the innocence of the Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, he invited the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal of the Republic (RVTR) and the author

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an aunt party worker with more experience in the party than Trotsky, and even more so Pavlunovsky, B.V. Legrand to check the reasons for Kostyaev's arrest. To fulfill this request, on August 22, 1919, Legrand had to, in his opinion, "request a file from the Special Department." Judging by the fact that the file is not in the RVTR fund, even if Legrand requested it, the Chekists did not transfer this file.

With the position of the people's commissar in relation to Vatsetis and Kostyaev, everything is clear. In contrast to the position of his deputy, the cunning Ephraim Sklyansky. On August 22, in response to Trotsky's request, chairman Boris Legrand replied: "According to a certificate from the pre-special department, Comrade Pavlunovsky, it turned out that the message of Kostyaev's wife that her husband was not being released, waiting for your arrival and decision, did not correspond to reality. The circumstances of the arrest and the reasons for the detention of Kostyaev are well known to Comrade Sklyansky, who informed me that he would personally report to you on the state of the matter." Sklyansky was in constant contact with Pavlunovsky and could well have learned about the state of affairs from him. But then the question is why he suddenly expressed a desire to report to the People's Commissar only after the wife of the arrested general intervened. Didn't "cunning Ephraim" (this is how the researcher M.A. Molodygin called Sklyansky) carried out Lenin's instructions in this case? Noteworthy is also the telephone conversation between Adolf Anskin, deputy member of the RVTR, and Ivan Pavlunovsky, on the basis of which Legrand wrote an answer to Trotsky:

- The wife of the former nashtarevsovet Kostyaev informed Trotsky before the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic that her husband Kostyaev was being held in custody pending the arrival of Comrade Trotsky and his decision. By order of T.

Trotsky, I ask you to inform me whether Kostyaev's report corresponds to reality and, in the affirmative case, indicate what justifies this kind of reference to comrade. Trotsky, who has no data against Kostyaev.

- I had no conversations with Kostyaev's wife and no references to Comrade. Trotsky did not do to anyone, - in the text of I.P. Pavlunovsky underlining B.V. is typed in italics. Legrand. - The message of Kostyaev's wife, in my opinion, is gossip. The Special Department does not bring any charges against the former Nashtarev military council Kostyaev, but the issue of his release has not yet been resolved for various political and strategic reasons.

In other words, let Vatsetis and Kostyaev and his comrades sit in prison, and we are here to decide strategic issues.

From July 9, 1919, Vatsetis was excluded from all types of allowance at the headquarters, as indicated in the order for the Field Headquarters, "on the basis of the order of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of July 8"? "On September 3, L.D. Trotsky reported The Political and Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) about the letter received from I. I. Vatsetis and raised the issue of the release of the former Commander-in-Chief. Borodov, V. I. Lenin, I. T. Smilga, L. B. Kamenev, K. T. Novgorodtseva (Sverdlova) The PB and OB instructed Dzerzhinsky to "prepare a report to the Central Committee on the Vatsetis case" "!!". Dzerzhinsky he was in no hurry to fulfill the instructions given to him: a discussion on the issue (in a slightly modified form) took place at a meeting of the Politburo only on November 6, 1919. Present: Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Stalin, Krestinsky, with advisory votes - Trotsky's opponent I.T. Smilga and Dzerzhinsky (let us recall Stalin's hatred of military specialists.) Dzerzhinsky, on behalf of himself and his 1st deputy Pavlunovsky, proposed "to apply the amnesty announced by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to General Staff officers Domozhirov and Malyshev arrested in July in the case of the Field Headquarters, Grigoriev and Isaev, and the latter should not be given any responsible positions." The Politburo accepted Dzerzhinsky's proposal, stipulating that none of the liberated should hold any more positions of responsibility, and entrusting the Cheka with supervision of all the said General Staff officers. Let's try to penetrate the mean veil of the PB protocol. Since Dzerzhinsky proposed to release four General Staff officers, giving all but one the right to occupy responsible positions, there was absolutely no corpus delicti in the actions of the indicated employees of the Field Headquarters. Then the thesis of A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov seems logical: "The "Field Staff case" blown up by the Specialists burst like a soap bubble." However, the Chekists did not formally admit that they were wrong - probably with the blessing of the party leadership. The General Staff officers were released under an amnesty - i.e. formally, no one has removed the blame from them. To release all the graduates of the Nikolaev Imperial Military Academy in 1918 meant to recognize the complete wrongfulness of the arrests - the extreme

In the first case, it turned out to be G.I. Theodori. On December 30, 1919, the General Staff sent a "teardrop" to F.E. Dzerzhinsky, asking for release from Butyrka prison, but the chairman of the Cheka did not heed the petition. On June 25, 1920, Teodory sent a second request \*\*. It is not known whether it was by order of Dzerzhinsky or one of his collaborators, but in January 1921, when the hype around the "conspiracy" had completely subsided, Teodori was released?°. On October 21, 1921, Vatsetis asked Lenin to drop the charges against him. The Commander-in-Chief wrote that he was aware of the thorough investigation carried out in his case, but no charges were brought against him. The Commander-in-Chief remained in the dark until the moment when rumors reached him about the decision of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which "in absentia" dubbed Vatsetis an unbalanced person! and accused him of "compromising ties." Vatsetis logically remarked: where, then, were the commissars looking all this time? Recalling his merits, Vatsetis asked for rehabilitation, proving the obvious wrongness of I.T. Smilga. Litter V.I. Lenin did not leave a ° in the report.

The arrested General Staff officers formally continued to work at the Field Headquarters, their families received rations. So, on October 31, 1919, Nadezhda Pavlovna Teodori, "living in Moscow in house No. 5] on Ostozhenka, was issued a certificate "that she is the wife of G.I. Theodori, who is at the disposal of the Chief of the Field Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council

Republic, which is certified by a signature with the attachment of the Soviet seal"?! It is noteworthy that this document was issued by the Administrative and Accounting Department of the PS instead of the one drawn up on August 2, but not issued to the wife of the General Staff Officer ... The courses of intelligence and military control of the RVSR that N.P. Teodori "is the wife of the head of the Intelligence and Military Control Courses". moreover, the document was signed by the temporary head of courses ??.

The only incident with providing for the families of those arrested took place on October 17, 1919, when the chairman of the cooperative of employees of the Field Headquarters, K. Verbitsky, refused to satisfy the request of his wife N.N. Domozhirev about the issuance of products out of turn, according to Verbitsky himself, "to the detriment of everyone else who was waiting in line and tired of the long wait." According to Domozhireva, having brought her, "already exhausted and tired ... to

tears." Upon learning that Domozhirev himself had been arrested, Verbitsky quite naturally doubted whether his wife had the right to receive rations, and subsequently had a correspondence with K.Kh. Danishevsky. The assistant head of the inspection department of the Administration and Accounting Department explained that a member of a cooperative "may be expelled from such a cooperative by decision of the general meeting by closed ballot", but Domozhirev was not expelled. P.P. Lebedev considered it necessary to hold Verbitsky accountable for arbitrariness, but K.Kh. Danishevsky, after listening to Verbitsky's arguments, to his credit, said that "the incident can be considered settled."

The answer to the inquiry about Teodori was sent by the Special Department of the Cheka to the Field Headquarters only on November 3, 1919, and on its basis, the General Staff Officer was excluded from the lists of the headquarters and removed from allowance only | December?! - probably, even the new leadership of the Red Headquarters was in no hurry to implement such decisions.

In the order on PS of October 20, 1919 No. 293, the last (9th) paragraph about Teodori was deleted (presumably by P.P. Lebedev): "According to the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of September 16 of this year No. 148, the consultant Register of the General Staff Teodori, registered with the Special Department of the Cheka under investigation |, pending a new appointment, is seconded to the Field Headquarters of the RVSR since September 17 of this year. Due to the fact that the Field Headquarters did not receive an official notification from the Special Department that Teodori is subject to immediate dismissal or temporary suspension from his post - until this notice is received, Teodori must be kept all types of allowances and satisfy him according to the certificates at the headquarters, both with monetary allowances and with the Red Army rations. Reason: Decree of July 30, 1919"???. On October 29, the order for the PS about Teodori was adopted in a different edition: now the order of the RVSR No. 1484 was added to the basis and the date of assignment was changed - September 17 to October 1, 1919. to continue the course of defending their employees.

As it turned out from the order on PSh dated November 6, 1919, Vatsetis was officially "at the disposal of the Deputy Chairman of the RVSR" (E.M. Sklyansky) from the moment of his arrest. By order of November 6

cetis was seconded to the Field Headquarters and credited for "all types of allowances" with a salary of 7000 per month? ^?,

Nephew of the Commander-in-Chief E.I. Vatsetis was released from the investigation of the Special Department of the Cheka on October 18, the next day he was sent to the disposal of the Political Directorate of the RVSR?".

Adjutant Vatsetis S.S. Dylan was released no later than October 19, 1919 and given the opportunity to continue working in the Field Headquarters>25.

From \$ November 1919 B.I. Kuznetsova, A.K. Malysheva and E.I. Isaev, by order of the PS of November 18, 1918, was prescribed "to believe there is evidence upon release from arrest." Probably, on November 18 they took up their new duties in the Field Headquarters? Is it true that Malyshev was sent to the disposal of the head of the Higher General Staff already on November 23?", as well as B.I. Kuznetsova. The latter, according to "tradition", until November 23, 1919, was on the orders of the Chief of the Field Staff ?? \*,

On December 25, E.I. Isaev?? Thus, obviously, they tried to prevent revenge on the part of the arrested - now they worked in different places. B.I. Kuznetsov, in accordance with his age, was sent to the "almshouse": it was in the Higher School of Staff that the old general had been sitting since 1918, causing the dislike of Vatsetis and the fierce hatred of Teodori and his comrades.

On December 9, 1919, a meeting of the medical board was held to dismiss Teodori's classmate, Assistant Head of the Intelligence Courses of the Republic of Uzbekistan G.A. Mattis?°. Remarkably, the order was based on Ozolin's statement and RU's intercourse: dated November 28, 1919: in principle, Mattis should have sent a personal statement to the leadership, and not an "intercourse" °3!...

HE N. Domozhnikov, who was under arrest three times, the first order for the PSH was issued on December 15, 1919. The General Staff Officer, "at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief" (Vatsetis, presumably, in "Butyrka"), departed on December 1 to the place of the new service? ?.

V.G. Sievert, who has been seconded to the Field Headquarters since September, was placed at the disposal of the head of the TsUPVOSO229 on December 17, 1919,

To the credit of the Commissioner of the Headquarters S.I. Aralov, it should be noted that, according to L.D. Trotsky, in August 1919 was "oppressed both by the general situation of the [12th] army and by personal affairs"...

No. 5.1 Petition of A.M. Malysheva in the name of E.M. Sklyansky about the release of the arrested General Staff Officer A.K. Malysheva

November 4, 1919 27

Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic Comrade Sklyansky - Citizen Anastasia Mikhailovna Malysheva

My husband is Alexander Kozmich Malyshev of the General Staff, who was for special people. instructions under the Chief of the Field Headquarters - July 9 of this year. was arrested simultaneously with the former Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis and other members of the Field Headquarters by the Special Department of the Cheka and is still imprisoned in Butyrka prison. —

In February 1918, after graduating from the academy, when the German hordes were striving for the heart of Revolutionary Russia — Petrograd, my husband was among the first to voluntarily join the ranks of the nascent Red Army and from that moment did not leave it, serving in various positions. , including at the front.

The anniversary of the Great October Revolution is coming, when the whole Republic will celebrate liberation.

Therefore, I, as the wife of a Soviet official, appeal to you, as a representative of the Highest Soviet Power, with a request to intercede for the oblivion of what is imputed to my husband, and to grant him amnesty, so that on the Great Day of Liberation he could meet free holiday and with renewed vigor set to work for the benefit of the working people of the Soviet Republic.

Anastasia Malysheva

November 4, 1919

RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 304. L. 21-21v. Autographed in blue ink.

Nos. 5.2—5.3 |

Petitions of E.Ya. Domozhnikova before the top leadership of the Red Army on the release of the arrested General Staff N.N. Domozhnikova

\* Incoming number of the secretariat of the chairman of the RVSR - 1549 dated February 5, 1920

Not earlier than November 4, 1919

No. 5.2 Application addressed to E.M. Sklyansky about the release of N.N. Domozhirova

Not earlier than November 4, 1919."

To Comrade Sklyansky - the wife of the former chief of staff N.N. Before

Mozhirova E.Ya. Domozhirovoy Petition

On the great days of the second anniversary of the Russian Revolution, I turn to you with a fervent plea to assist in the release of my husband, who has been languishing in prison for 4 months. On this day, the criminals will see freedom, but I ask for a pure and blameless person before the Soviet government, who devoted all his strength to the construction of the Red Army and burned with only one desire - to live and work for its good.

My husband N.N. Domozhirov entered the Red Army on March 14, 1918, and his service was not actually interrupted. During the October Revolution, my husband was at the Academy of the General Staff, where he was a member of the executive committee. Having stayed until September 15, 1918, the chief of communications of the headquarters of the Northern sector and the Petrogradsky district, he, when forming the headquarters of the Northern Front, at the direction of the Commander of Parsky and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council, comrade Glezarov, was first appointed head of the Administrative Department, and then by order of the members RVS comrades Pyatnitsky and Glezarov and commander of Parsky - on October 20, 1918, he was appointed acting leader. nashtaseva. In January 1919, the already new Komsev Nadezhny and members of the Revolutionary Military Council Tupin, Pyatnitsky and Goncharov petitioned for the approval of her husband as Nashtasev, and he was approved by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

Having already received a ready-made headquarters and not finding in it such assistants who could facilitate his difficult work, he himself, still inexperienced in such a big job, was forced to take on the whole burden of all the "front work", straining all his energy.

\* Incoming number of the secretariat of the chairman of the RVSR - 1550 dated February 5, 1920      \*\* Here and further in documents words are underlined in blue pencil - pref

positive L.D. Trotsky.

Giyu and giving all the forces of the Red Army. All, literally to the point of fainting. Members of the Revolutionary Military Council and commissar Pyatnitsky, Pozharov, Ioddlin, Shuchko, [Gorenov], Adamson, chairman of the Special Department of the Western Front Comrade Alexander; communist headquarters cell; commissars Levin, Friedman, and others — can attest to both the work and the political direction of her husband: he participated in rallies, in the celebrations of the revolution, lectured at courses for agitators, devoting even his free minutes to the common cause.

Commissioner UVS" Mosk | ovskogo] district M.I. Lazarev vouched not only for the past, but also for the future work of my husband, offering himself as a political controller to him.

At the end of May this year. the husband was relieved of his post and appointed to command the 15th Army. For reasons hitherto unknown to him, he did not have to accept the army, and on 3 [July] he was arrested.

During the interrogations of comrades Dzerzhinsky and Pavlunovsky, it turned out that the husband did not belong to any anti-government organizations and could not belong, according to his inner conviction.

So, being completely clean before the Soviet government, the husband has been in prison for 4 months already and he is tormented by complete inactivity after vigorous activity, aggravated by the fact that he realizes that he can and should work for the Red Army, which he himself created and which



deeply devoted. His health, undermined by overwork, had a heavy effect on his imprisonment, and his illnesses (myocarditis and skin tuberculosis) became extremely aggravated. He dies in prison.

I beg you to remember all the merits of your husband before the army and on the day of the great Russian holiday to return him to work. Every day of confinement kills the strength of the husband, his health and working capacity. He will use every day of freedom for the benefit of the army, giving it all the knowledge, all the energy, all the love.

Sick, exhausted — I can't be of any use to the Soviet government now — and therefore, if the matter of my husband's release is being delayed, I ask for your petition for my husband's release on my bail — by imprisoning me as a hostage for him.

I will go for it with joy and calmness, for I know that my husband's work will quickly disperse all the clouds that have come over him, and knowledge and

\*  
Office of military communications.

his experience will not be wasted uselessly at the moment of exertion of all the forces of the Soviet Republic.

E. Domozhirova

M. Ordynka, 13a. sq. 10, tel. 10--07--14

RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 304. L. 22—22 rev., 25. Autograph in red ink.

No. 5.3 Letter to L.D. Trotsky with a request to release N.N. Domozhirov

Not later than November 5, 1919

M. Ordynka, 13, apt. 10

Comrade Trotsky!

For four months I endure, and believe that, on the one hand, complete despair, on the other, the only hope for your help, give me the courage to disturb you. I believe in your justice, I deeply believe that you know my husband's services to the Red Army and believe his innocence.

From all sides I hear assurances that my husband's case is trifling and that he will soon be released. Days go by. I forgot how to believe the words, and little by little despair seized me.

The anniversary of the Revolution is near. On this day even criminals will see freedom. Will the person who gave all his strength to the Red Army, who worked tirelessly for its good, see it? Will he see?

Tov. On July 8, Pavlunovsky told his husband that he was legally free, and only formalities remained. Tov. On October 20, Kalinin repeated to me twice: "The case is empty and "they" now confess that they are keeping your husband for nothing."

Understand me, my suffering is to know that my husband is innocent and is dying in prison.

Every day of imprisonment kills his strength, health, ability to work.

He would devote every day of freedom to work for the benefit of the Red Army.

Tov. Trotsky, I beg you to release my husband and make the great Russian holiday joyful for us.

Front commanders and commissars can shed light on my husband's activities.

Commissar of the Department of Military Communications Lazarev vouches for her husband with his head.  
And I can imagine how many guarantees from the communists will be needed.

Everyone loved him and deeply respected him for his superhuman work.

If the case drags on, I beg you on my knees to release my husband, and put me in prison as a hostage for him -  
after all, then distrust of my husband will disappear by itself - the only reason for his imprisonment.

I implore this as a wife striving to alleviate the undeserved suffering of her husband, and as a citizen striving to  
ensure that her husband's strength, knowledge and experience are not wasted at the moment of the highest tension  
of all the forces of the Soviet Republic.

Respond! You know better than anyone that my husband does not deserve such an award.

The wife of the former Nashtaza E. Domozhirov

RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 304. L. 23-24v. Autographed in red ink.

No. 5.4 Petition of N.P. Isaeva in the name of E.M. Sklyansky about the release of the arrested General Staff  
officer E.I. Isaev

Around November 4, 1919."

Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, comrade Sklyansky - Citizen Nina Petrovna Isaeva,  
who lives in Moscow on Malo-Afanasevsky per., d. No. 7, apt. 1.

My husband, of the General Staff, Evgeny Ivanovich Isaev, who is on special assignments under the former Commander-  
in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Republic, Comrade Vatsetis, was simultaneously with the latter arrested by the  
Special Department of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission on July 9, 1919, and is still being held in Butyrka prison .

\* Incoming number of the secretariat of the chairman of the RVSR ~ 1550 dated February 5, 1920

Knowing my husband as an honest worker of the Soviet government, who went to serve in the Red Army immediately  
after graduating from the Military Academy of his own free will, one of the first in February 1918 at a difficult moment in  
the Republic during the German invasion and continued that with full zeal of a responsible worker, including up to  
self-sacrifice (as was the case during the reconnaissance during a storm on Lake Onega), I appeal to you, as a  
representative of the Higher Authority, and ask for your petition for amnesty on the upcoming anniversary of the  
October Revolution - my husband, so that I, his wife, his old mother, the family of his late brother, who is currently  
fighting in the ranks of the Red Army on the Southern Front, could celebrate this holiday with complete satisfaction.  
I, as a wife, know my husband well and vouch for him entirely.

I am enclosing a business card. Akulov addressed to the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee,  
in which he asserts my husband's innocence and asks for my assistance.

November 4 Citizen of 1919 Nina Isaeva Moscow

RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 304. L. 26 with ob.-27. Autographed in blue ink. |

No. 5.5 Petition of N.P. Theodori in the name of L.D. Trotsky about the release of the arrested General Staff  
officer G.I. Theodori

Around March 12, 1920

Dear Lev Davidovich!

I turn to you with a big and serious request for me.

My husband, Georgy Ivanovich THEODORI, has been imprisoned in Butyrka prison for exactly a year now without specific charges. All his work on the creation of the Red Army and for the benefit of the Soviet Republic, you probably know, because a lot has been written and said about it, and therefore I will not repeat it so as not to bother you with unnecessary reading. I beg you to release him from prison. After all, one word from you and he will be free. Life has become beyond my power: my husband is deprived of his salary,

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and I get 2020 rubles, and I myself can't feed myself tolerably, but I have to feed my husband, because after a year of imprisonment, he was very weak. February 25 this year I was robbed: they took all the necessary things and a lot of wearable clothes. I used to sell my old things and had the opportunity to feed my husband with this money, now I am deprived of this too. Once again, I beg you to have mercy on my husband and release him. Do not deprive me of faith in your justice and sympathetic attitude towards your employees - return to the family a protector and breadwinner, and to the Republic an honest, energetic worker. N.P. Theodori

Moscow, B. Molchanovka, d. No. 21, apt. 2

RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 304. L. 222. Uncertified typewritten copy.

Telephone message of the Head of the Office of the RVSR S. Seitz

To the special department of the Cheka March 22, 1920 18 hours. 40 min. Telephone message No. 273 B Special Department of the Cheka

I ask you to give a certificate on the state of affairs of G.I. Theodori to present such a report to Comrade Trotsky.

Administrator of the Prerevolutionary War Council Seitz

Handed over by Boikov, received by Pukhalskaya

RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 304. L. 221. Vacation - typewritten text with an autograph.

Information about the answer to the telephone message April 2, 1920

A request was submitted to the Special Department for an immediate response to telephone message No. 273, which was promised do.

Duty|urn| authorized M. Grushin

Pukhalskaya said that telephone message No. 273 had been sent to its destination, the result would be announced.

Kalantarova received the certificate. RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 304. L. 220. Typewritten copy.

A telegraph request from the Secretariat of the Chairman of the RVSR to the Special Department of the Cheka about the progress of the case of G.I. Theodori

April 29, 1920 6 p.m. 35 min.

Handed over by Bergin, Tikhalskaya received.

Telephone message No. 456 to the Director of Affairs of the Special Department of the Cheka Comrade Yagoda - from Comrade Trotsky's Secretariat.

Having no answer to the telephone message No. 273 dated March 22 of this year, addressed to the Special Department of the Cheka, I again ask for a certificate on the state of affairs of G.I. THEODORI to present it to the report of comrade. Trotsky.

Manager of the Prerevolutionary Military Council S. Seitz

RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 304. L. 218. Vacation - typewritten text with an autograph.

The telephone message is the answer of the Director of Affairs of the NGO VChK G.G. Berries

April 30, 1920 13:00 35 min."

Telephone message No. 4211

From the Special Department of the Cheka - to the Secretariat of Comrade. Trotsky

At No. 0456, the Special Department of the Cheka informs that in view of the new data that have come to light in the Teodori case, it cannot be released in the near future.

Signed by the Head of the Special Department of the Cheka Yagoda

Transmitted by Tukhalskaya, received by Makhov |

RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 304. L. 219.

Typewritten text of the decoded telegram.

\*  
Receipt time.

No. 5.6

A note from a prisoner in Butyrskaya prison G.I. Teodori to the Chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky with a protest against illegal and unreasonable detention

To the chairman of the Cheka and a member of the Council of Defense of the Republic, comrade Dzerzhinsky, Georgy Ivanovich Teodori, imprisoned in cell No. 46 of the male solitary corps of the Butyrka prison.

Cell No. 46 of the IOC of the Butyrskaya Prison on June 25, 1920

Tov. Dzerzhinsky

Copy of sent application 30.XI. [19] 19 years old and, obviously, did not reach him

Statement

In the first days of March 1919, I was sent on a business trip with Comrade. Pavulan (to inspect the setting up of undercover affairs on the ground) to Lithuania and Latvia, and on March 12/22, by cipher telegraphic order of comrade. Kedrova was arrested in Dvinsk, and for 9 months now (now 16) I have been in solitary confinement in Butyrskaya prison (now in the Internal Prison of the Special Department of the Cheka). Such a term without an announcement of a verdict only on suspicion of complicity in espionage, which not only was not proven, but according to which not a single document was presented to me, except for the words of the executed blackmailer-typist Troitskaya that she allegedly lived with me. And around these words (what is the connection with complicity in espionage) revolved around those 6 questions to which I was subjected from March 22 to the last days of June 1919. Interrogation of Vel comrade. Kedrov in the presence of Comrade Feldman; and then Comrade Vogel; and the last interrogation around June 16 again Comrade Kedrov. Without touching on the conduct of the interrogation and the real reasons for the arrest, I will give you a brief report on the nature of my activities and my request addressed to you, as the chairman of the Cheka, a member of the Defense Council of the Republic and the head of the fight against

counter-revolution, based on the charge brought against me at the last interrogation around June 16 on suspicion of complicity in espionage.

To describe my work on the formation, organization, management and supply of the Red Army, several volumes would not be enough, especially since this work was stamped by Aralov, Pavulan and

others, my name was little known; I will only point to the works that came to my mind. who brought the Red Army out of the partisan stage. volunteerism and small prefabricated detachments into that powerful force, which it already represented by December 1918. Moreover, during my imprisonment, all those conclusions of mine about the organization of the Red Army, which were considered counter-revolutionary by some people at that time, are now not only carried out, but the very ignorance of them is now punished even by law (decrees).

[...] on May 27, 1918, the day of my arrival at the Operod of the People's Commissariat of War, my permanent (from 9 o'clock in the morning until 2 o'clock in the morning) work at the Operod of the People's Commissariat of War began. In fact, only Aralov, Teodori, Pavulan and Kuznetsov worked in it. Ciccolini appeared sporadically. The rest of the employees (and then during my check up to 10,000 passed through the lists) only appeared for rations and food. Working under the guise of a Left Social Revolutionary, Mustafin and a group of other people immediately began to interfere with me. And only by July 20 did I succeed somehow (especially when comrade Ciccolini, who employed a lot of people, mostly women, left) to reduce the number of "rations" employees to 565 people and organize some work. This happened because from the very first day (from May 27) I had to assume control and leadership of the fight against the Czechoslovaks and Cossacks, because Mr. front "and therefore did not want to do anything in this area (the army was volunteer).

[...] 6) The management of operations against the Czechoslovaks, due to the impossibility of obtaining truthful information from the field, the lack of accurate data on the combat composition and strength of our troops, friction between the "commanders in chief" and constant interruptions in communications - caused a number of energetic, constantly protested TT. Ciccolini and Boyarsky took measures to organize uninterrupted telegraph communications without cluttering the Moscow Central on Myasnit'skaya, and by June 18 the first fruitful results were obtained (this is an important historical moment for the Red Army, an era for its life, a turn to success and fruitful organization), because we had information about the detachments, began to group them, established communications and prevented: a) the connection of individual groups of Czechoslovaks (beat them in parts) and b) a series of explosions by Czechoslovaks of bridges that could have irreparable consequences for us in the future.  
|

[...] 8) On the day of the speech of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (July 1918 g77) - There were only comrades in Operod. Aralov, Teodori and Pavulan; and work along the front was not interrupted for a single second (this was the only explanation for the successful liquidation of Muravyovshchina?%: we were not at a loss in Operod and in a timely manner, in cipher, Comrade Aralov gave, under my dictation, the necessary instructions about grouping, etc.) .

[...] 10) From the end of July to the end of August 1918, my permanent and uninterrupted personal work began (I did not trust anyone) - in the direction of st. Shikhany and [in] the area of Simbirsk and Nizhny at the disposal of Comrades. L.D. Trotsky and Vatsetis troops, supplies, weapons and workers (this is only my merit - this will be confirmed by comrades Muralov, Aralov, Vatsetis, and, if he were alive, then the late comrade Ya.M. Sverdlov, unfortunately, all stored in his memory, but did not write down anything). But Com. L.M. Karakhan knows how much I worked during this anxious, difficult period. Exceptionally quickly (because I had the powers and full confidence of Ya.M. Sverdlov, L.D. Trotsky and S.I. Aralov ""), a continuous secret telegraph communication was established. Tov. Lenin personally received every evening by telephone (Kremlin wire) a report from Comrade Aralov and myself. Twice, during a period of very anxious and difficult days, I was summoned to Comrade. Lenin and everything that I reported was confirmed. There was trust, there was no intrigue, there was no envy and gossip - there was an obvious result of my work.

11) At the beginning of September, along with the organization of victories on the Eastern Front, I personally carried out (this is my third important merit, which caused terrible hatred for me in the General [General] Staff), despite the opposition and desire of the chief of the All-Glavstab gr. Svechin, who convinced even Comrade. Sklyansky, on September 5, 1918, the registration of specialists of the General Staff under the control of Operod (military control - comrade Trakman). This stopped the imperceptible (in the heat of the enormous work and our difficult trials), but a huge leak of the General Staff to the counter-revolutionary camp. The fact that the generals fled is half the trouble: they are mediocre and with slow-witted brains, but very valuable combat youth of the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th grades and the guards unit of 1917 left with them. We have already managed to delay some of the latest issues and some of the professorship, and now they are working perfectly.

12) A political branch of the Operod was created, which laid the foundation for political departments in the armies, etc. At the head - a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Comrade. .Vasya

13) The first mobilizations under exceptionally difficult conditions (Comrade Sklyansky did not even believe me when I said about the existence in our country of registration sections of regional, provincial and district military commissariats and their significance in matters of mobilization) were carried out and developed by the Operod, and then they were led by the current head of the Field Headquarters [Revolutionary Military Council] of the Republic Pav[el] Pavlovich | Lebedev.

14) A number of measures have been developed to attract officers to the army, especially the graduation of 1917 (then M.S. Kedrov was against - this was the first reason for distrust in me; but life was for me: now everyone is called And how many persons of the class of 1917 shed their blood in the Red Army, how many of them were shot by the Whites, how many died because of the provocation of the Whites - "external" and "internal").

15) The beginning of the correct organization of military agents, intelligence, counterintelligence (communists and comrades Chintulov) and military censorship (comrades Greyer and Baturin) has been laid. What is being done now - I do not know, but this department of the General Staff was put on the elementary right path.

16) Simultaneously with these works, I spent an exceptionally dangerous, most terrible, difficult life, full of personal insults, bullying and attacks, during the period of constant visits of "self-proclaimed", "artisanal" and real commanders in chief, commanders and others from the Don, the Caucasus and Ukraine (Comrades Aralov and Ciccolini, when these violent faces appeared, prudently went into a secret room). During this period (June, July and August), correctly called by Comrade Danishevsky the period of "seizure of weapons by various suspicious detachments for the purpose of bartering", I had to undocument many persons, sometimes even with "genuine" mandates, sending them to the Cheka with danger for his life [...] And how many threats of executions, names, etc. On two occasions (once with Parkhomenko) I had to go even to Comrade. Lenin personally: once in the presence of comrade Ivanov Kavkazsky, another time in the presence of comrade. Stalin to clarify the false picture of the requirements and report from the field on weapons.

During the same period, the Operod and the departments of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs were reorganized under my unswervingly firm leadership. Tov. Sklyansky did not accept a single state, not a single appropriation without my verification and the inscription "viewed" (see the Operoda archive. A lot of money, funds and

lives were saved). The number of people hanging out in Operod had decreased by the time it was reorganized into the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic from 9-10 thousand ma "295 people - quite reliable, energetic, honest and hard-working. Only a citizen | Troitskaya. my written reports in September, October and November, Comrade Aralov, and then Citizen | Gazdanin | Kostyaev, were not fired, saying that she was unhappy, crying and would end up on the street (Comrade Aralov must confirm this, because Comrades Pavulan, Girshfeld and a number of other people heard this.) Troitskaya was recruited by the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Mustafin before my arrival at the Operod of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, that is, before May 27, 1918.

17) On October 16, 1918, the formation (according to the instructions of L.D. Trotsky and Vatsetis) of the only (secret) intelligence and military control courses in Europe was completed. It was

my children; everything was thought out to the smallest detail; all the experience of the world and civil wars was used for the courses. Comrade is invited. Kavtaradze. I have personally checked and written a number of manuals. What is being done now, I do not know, but the first issue (mine, then I was arrested) did not give a single traitor.

[...] 19) Personally vols. Lenin, Sverdlov, Trotsky, Sklyansky, Chicherin and Karakhan daily and weekly received an unadorned, concise, honest, truthful, correct report on the military-political life in the first (June and mid-July) detachments, and then regiments, then about entire military formations of the Red Army, about the course of formations, reorganization and summaries of reports from the field. Comrade Aralov personally helped me in these works and sometimes L.M. supplemented them. Karakhan. There was trust, there was expedient work.

20) All maneuvers, tactical exercises, military training plan, artillery firing of the Moscow district commissariat and work regiments took place (at the request of N.I. Muralov) under my direct supervision". But I didn't have to do it, and no one paid me for it (after all, it was on holidays - days of rest). From the deeds in this work it is necessary to look for all causes of dissatisfaction, and sometimes even anger against me, of individual commissars (Comrade Marya Sina, I don't know the names of others) and "handicraftsmen", who believed that "military training" was as simple as baking rolls (12- and 24-hour

\* So in the text. Should read: "before".

Red Army training program put forward by some of THEM).

Comrade Dzerzhinsky, there would not be enough paper and time to describe everything that was done by Operod and his chief of staff. We did not publish descriptions of our work, did not advertise it on any of the anniversaries. because they worked ideologically. honestly, in the awareness of the need for our hard work. And I am writing this short excerpt (forced in self-defence) from my personal colossal work only to give you a small picture of our working life and how I was repaid for it. The number of hours of my daily work was 17-19: I came at 9 o'clock in the morning, left at 2-3 o'clock in the morning, always tired, or a comrade. Aralov, or together with Comrade. Pavulan. My whole life, every detail of it passed before my eyes and together with comrade. Aralov, Pavulan, Ippolitov, Girshfeld and other communists. I report that I have done many, many useful things; I never: emphasized this and did not come forward, modestly yielding to others to put their stamp on my work (because I am not ambitious and not selfish); I stubbornly and persistently refused the Registration Directorate [RVSR Field Headquarters] and its formation, blatantly reporting that even in peaceful conditions this position is dangerous and requires great civic courage and endurance, I did not flaunt my work (maybe this is bad), but 10 months (now 16 months) in a prison prison, under the slander of a blackmailer, forced me to turn to you and remind you of myself.

[...] Compare even what I modestly listed with those insinuations and gossip (based on personal motives), unproven suspicion of complicity in espionage, in order to see how unfair, exceptionally cruel the attitude towards me of representatives of that party (communists), with which I am vitally connected with all my enormous creative work in creating, shaping and consolidating the power of the Red Army. But even if we assume that Troitskaya's slander is correct (although this is unnatural and illogical: a person cannot split into two parts), then even then I have long ago atoned for everything both with my work and cruel imprisonment with all the consequences for vision and health. There can always be mistakes, and especially in those terrible conditions in which the work of the Operod Narkomvoen proceeded (without staff and a lot of small employees, adventurers and "radishes", dreaming

Shih about major positions and affairs). Already in July 1918, dispersing these "persons" and reporting to Comrade. Trotsky about the need to create the state of Operod, without going beyond the framework of only the necessary. I said that we (Aralov and I) are still intact, because our work gives only success: at the first mistake, I, as a military specialist, will be the first victim. and the rest all fade away, standing behind the back of the party.

And yet, because of the chatter of only one blackmailing employee, who was detained, moreover, in the service of softness, comrade. Aralov and the kindness of the citizen[citizen] Kostyaev (and, moreover, in the Field Headquarters, and not in the Registration Department), - I have been sitting in solitary confinement for 10 months (now 16 months), not even knowing the result of the case and the deadline. What would happen to me if all those dismissed by me from Operod wrote denunciations in turn? |

Therefore, I appeal to you, as the head of the Cheka and one of the senior leaders of the party, with a request: 1) to restore justice and release me;

2) if someone's personal motives and pride are hurt (although I was very far from thinking of hurting anyone or personally doing evil to anyone in my whole life), then amnesty me, release me and let me finish my life working in a military training or another of your choice or comrade. Trotsky region of the Red Army, and not slowly die in a half-starved and painful state of solitary confinement (muscular rheumatism, complicated by deadly cold and concussion in the spinal column in the war).

G.I. Theodory, December 30, 1919

IOC cell at Butyrka Prison

This request is a statement sent on December 30, 1919 from the Butyrka prison, apparently to Comrade. Dzerzhinsky did not get it, because there was no answer to it. Again rewritten and attached to the application to comrade. Vadim June 25, 1920

G.I. Theodori

RGVA. F. 33221. Op. 2. D. 216. L. 8-11v. Autographed in black ink.

RGVA. F. 33221. Op. 2. D. 216. L. 1-7. Typewritten copy.

Chapter 6)

"NEVER HAVE THE STEPS AND INTENTIONS BEEN KNOWN TO THE ENEMY IN SUCH DETAILS AS NOW AT THE NEW STATS": THE REACTION OF TROTSKY AND REVVOENSKOVET OF THE REPUBLIC

It is possible that the rank and file members of the party found I.T. Smilga, but it clearly did not satisfy the chairman of the RVSR. The version of I. Deutscher, and after him the authors of the GRU Empire, that the "conspiracy in the Field Headquarters" led to a new stage in the inner-party struggle??, needs to be clarified. So, the Commander-in-Chief was arrested on July 8, and the composition of the RVSR was changed on the 3rd. In this context, the version that the "conspiracy in the Field Headquarters" played into the hands of Stalin, who was able to "knock out from under Trotsky" a number of his creatures and include loyal people in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, sounds unconvincing. However, a certain connection can be traced. It is logical to assume that the arrests at the Red Headquarters were not the cause, but the result of a blow to the military throne of Trotsky - the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. On July 6, 1919, a member of the RVSR and the RVS of the Southern Front A.I. Akulova asked V.I. Lenin and L.D. Trotsky about release from responsible military work. The request was partially respected: on July 8, Akulov was released from membership in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, but remained a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front until August 1919. Only in September, the request of A.I. Akulova was satisfied in full, however, with a touch of mockery: he became the head of the 43rd Infantry Division ... of the Southern Front." On July 13, 1919, a new blow against the head of the military department followed: Republic (Sklyansky, Lenin's protege Gusev and Gusev's protege Kamenev), it was decided to consider decisions

mi RVSR >". At this meeting of the RVSR (Trotsky's supporters were a minority - | against 3; in addition, Rykov was present) of the head of the Field Staff M.D. Bonch-Bruевич was replaced by P.P. Lebedev "5, Gusev also became the military commissar of the Field Headquarters \* - we note that it is unlikely that, knowing about the "conspiracy", Trotsky would have proposed his candidacy in May 1919. The Chairman of the RVSR was driven out and



therefore, he did not immediately stand up for his subordinates. Trotsky came to the aid of...excessive activity of the Chekists: according to Ya.Yu. Tinchenco, in the summer of 1919, about 80 of Teodori's classmates were arrested." True, not in one case, but in a whole series of unrelated cases. Only on July 25, having received Dzerzhinsky's demand for the arrest of two more "conspirators" (General Staff officers G.Ya. Kutyrev and N.A. Semashko), Trotsky, without honoring the chairman of the Cheka with a personal answer, handed over to Sklyansky for the Central Committee: "Taking into account a number of arbitrary arrests who bring severe disorganization, only by direct order of the Central Committee. Sklyansky sent Trotsky's telegram to Lenin, Stasova and Smilga. On August 6, 1919, the Polit- and Orgburo at a joint meeting considered the issue of the arrest of G.Ya. Kutyrev, as a result of which he decided to "request Pavlunovsky." And on August 15, Trotsky expressed "extreme regret" in a telegram about the unlawful arrest of Kutyrev and Semashko from the 12th Army ("disgrace"). As follows from the order for the Field Headquarters, G.Ya. On August 16, Kutyrev went to the 12th Army, where he was appointed head of the headquarters. Probably, Trotsky's demands were not ignored this time. The Chekists dispersed so much that the deputy chairman of the Special Department of the Cheka, I.P. Pavlunovsky On August 14, 1919, Trotsky, having learned about the plans of the next arrests (this time the commander of the Afonsky brigade), called "a mentally unstable person", to whom it is "impossible" to "issue ... honored workers on the basis of his suspicions". The chairman of the RVSR proposed by telegram to the Politburo of the Central Committee to replace the head of the NGO VChK with "a responsible person who inspires confidence in the ability to understand the matter and people." Afonsky's accusation was based on the fabrication of "certificates with false seals" four months ago. On August 15, Sklyansky reported this to Trotsky. On August 18, Trotsky replied that Sklyansky should decide the issue in terms of relations with the OO VChK?'. Probably, Efraim Markovich could not agree with Pavlunovsky, although he was counting on this

the leadership of the military department, of course, had: on August 16, P.P. Lebedev, K.Kh. Danishevsky and the head of the Administrative and Accounting Department, General Staff Officer A.N. Vinogradov, the order of the "General Staff to Comrade G.Ya. Kutyrev ... after receiving this, go to the place of his former service. On the same day, the Politburo, having considered Trotsky's telegram. refused to release Afonsky: "From the documents submitted by the Special Department, it turned out that Afonsky was being attracted by the Revolutionary Tribunal of the 6th Army and that there were very serious charges against him." The Politburo took the current situation seriously: "It was decided to entrust the analysis of this case to a commission consisting of: Comrades. Rakovsky, Pyatakov and Peters. The Central Committee attaches special importance to this case in view of the seriousness of the evidence, and asks that the case be urgently considered and submitted to the Central Committee for conclusion. Concerning Pavlunovsky, "the Central Committee finds that there are no data for adherence to Trotsky's opinion." Felix Dzerzhinsky, who was present at the meeting, probably played a decisive role: the military department was represented by Ephraim Sklyansky, who had no weight in the party. Yes, and a member of the Board of the Cheka Peters - a well-known executioner - had to defend Pavlunovsky's position. In fact, the decision of the Politburo was a tacit legalization of the policy of the Special Department to terrorize employees of Trotsky's department.

In the autumn of 1919, the Council of People's Commissars provoked the RVSR to defend the rights of the Field Headquarters. As you know, party workers did not at all share the need for material support for the employees of the "Red Headquarters", equal to the Red Army soldiers at the front. On July 25, the Council of People's Commissars canceled its resolution of September 30, 1918, which provided Red Army rations to PS employees. On October 13, the Council of People's Commissars heeded the request of the military department and reversed its decision?°. In fact, all party workers familiar with the decision of the Council of People's Commissars should have understood how Trotsky bakes in his Black and White Stavka.

On August 20, Trotsky began working on an appeal to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) regarding the July purge of the Field Headquarters. He wanted to insist on an actual change in the personnel of the RVSR (sending to the front of I.T. Smilga and S.I. Gusev), removal of S.I. Gusev from the post of commissioner of PSh; clarification by S.S. Kamenev that he was not subordinate to the Central Committee of the Party, but to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. But most importantly, Trotsky insisted that the Central Committee should lead in-

a military department only through the chairman of the RVSR (that is, through himself). If the Central Committee had adopted such a resolution, all the efforts of V.I. Lenin to carry out his policy in the military department through the group of S.I. Gusev would go to waste. Most likely, Grotsky himself understood that. by sending a "message" to the Central Committee with such a set of rowing, he risks losing his influence completely: Lenin would have done everything to make Grotsky's demands remain a voice crying in the desert. And Trotsky, after the second ignored statement (the first about the decision "with a hint of mischief"), would finally turn into a political corpse, which, judging by Lenin's unknown documents published in 1997, was not beneficial even to the "leader of the world the proletariat."

Trotsky began to change his demands to the Central Committee. In fact, according to the results of the very first revision, everything came down to the abolition of the "Tsaritsyn" plan and putting in place the presumptuous with the support of S.I. Gusev Chief Commander S.S. Kamenev? But the chairman of the RVSR did not dare to send a report to the Central Committee even with such a minimal set of requirements.

S.S. Kamenev later recalled that Sklyansky warned him: Trotsky was against his appointment, but he would reconcile himself in the future. Such a reaction of the chairman of the RVSR of the new Commander-in-Chief "very, very seriously" disturbed. "Exceptional, invaluable support" was given to him, of course, by S.I. Gusev, who brought Kamenev up to speed "most completely", spared "very many surprises, not forgetting to acquaint him with every little thing that plays one role or another in the atmosphere of great work. Trotsky's self-removal from the leadership of the RVSR (emphasis mine. - S.V.) in connection with the relocation of the headquarters of the High Command (Field Headquarters. - S.V.) to Moscow, in my opinion, had little effect on the work of the command. This is wrong!

As a result of personnel changes, Lenin "for what he fought for, he ran into": on September 16, 1919, he expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the work of the RVSR, expressing the suspicion that he was "in command", not being interested in or not being able to follow the execution"? \*. It is noteworthy that the addressee of Lenin's Philippic was S.I. Gusev: it was he who was supposed to carry out Lenin's line in the Revolutionary Military Council. On September 19, did the RVSR state that a large number of members of the RVSR and invited heads of the main departments were late for meetings of the council? - probably, it was incl. a consequence of "catching up", received from V.I. Lenin. We have calculated the intensity of participation of RVSR members in meetings of this

military-political center from June 16 (the first day of Gusev's participation in the work of the RVSR - as a member) until September 18, 1919. A total of 52 meetings took place during this time, while E.M. Sklyansky was present at all (100% turnout); Vatsetis by 3, Kamenev by 49 (94.2%, in general, the Commanders-in-Chief also have a 100% turnout), Gusev appeared a little less often - 44 (84.6%); the rest rarely appeared: Rykov in dealing with issues of the military industry - 21 (40.4%), Trotsky - 10 (19.2%), Smilga only 7 (13.5%); Akulov, who was released from membership in the RVSR on July 8, managed to participate in only one meeting. The field headquarters was such an important structure of the central military apparatus that its new chief, P.P. Lebedev attended 36 (69.2%) council meetings; Prominent party organizers M.M. Lashevich, L.P. Serebryakov, M.V. Frunze".

Trotsky, as a rule, presided over meetings of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, when important military-political issues were discussed. So, on August 22, Sklyansky reported on the Central Muslim Military Collegium (it was supposed to decide the issue of the spread of Soviet power in the Muslim world"; its chairman M.Kh. subjugation), Trotsky himself - about the surrender "without any resistance" of the Tambov fortified area? On August 23, the question of "aid to Afghanistan" was decided, also about the world revolution. S.I. also tried to invade this sphere. Gusev, who reported on August 25 "on the study of Turkestan, Persia, Afghanistan and the Caucasus militarily and temporary representation in these areas", but unsuccessfully: the Revolutionary Military Council recognized the issue of Turkestan as "highly important" and put it "on the agenda of the next meeting" - at which, of course, the issue was not considered. As in the well-known play "Revenge of the Queen, or Novellas of Margaret of Navarre" —

"having become sympathetic, I suggested that the issue be considered at a special meeting of the State Council ... which will never take place."

Ephraim Sklyansky conducted all organizational work according to the tradition established in the military department. According to a more than mild remark by M.V. Frunze, Sklyansky "did not have a strong enough party authority", and therefore was controlled. In 1924

Kliment Voroshilov will declare at a meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) that "Trotsky does not pay enough attention to the work of military science. He almost completely entrusted his duties as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and People's Commissar of War to Comrade Sklyansky. Even Stalin then called Sklyansky "the actual political leader of the army" (Pavel Lebedev - "technical leader of the army"). This was the situation in 1919. Sergei Gusev, being a politician, like Leon Trotsky, did not delve into a huge mass of military organizational issues.

In the summer of 1919, the most important military-political issues began to be resolved by the Politburo of the Central Committee, created back in March. By autumn, it had already finally turned into the highest appeal instance for military workers - the Bolsheviks (the leaders of the party - Stalin, Zinoviev - happened to pointedly appeal the decisions of the Commander-in-Chief to the Politburo, making it clear that these decisions did not concern them: formally, it was not the PB who stood above the Commander-in-Chief, a RVSR); imposed its will on L.D. Trotsky and, naturally, intruded into the competence of the RVSR, appointing in a number of cases party workers to key military posts? 7. The Politburo even developed guidelines for the high command; Later, on September 22, 1920, at the IX All-Russian Conference of the RCP(b), Lenin admitted that "during the Civil War, the Politburo had to deal with purely strategic issues." Was Stalin once again made a counterbalance to Trotsky in the PB? The Chairman of the RVSR, although it was supposed to be so, regularly undertook to carry out the decisions of the PB in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and monitor their implementation."

S.I. Gusev began to restrain in the military department and I.V. Stalin, accustomed to go against the line of the RVSR: in the fall of 1919, a conflict broke out between the Bureau of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (S.I. Gusev, S.S. Kamenev) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front (I.V. Stalin, L.P. Serebryakov and commander A.I. Egorov) ?". On November 12, Stalin and Serebryakov, in order to eliminate the conflict, offered the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) 3 options to choose from: change the bureau of the RVSR, change the RVS of the Southern Front (i.e., remove them themselves), change Gusev as "the main skirmisher against the Southern Front" ° .

In September 1919, the situation on the Southern Front began to change. On September 6, Trotsky, Serebryakov, and even Lashevich, a supporter of Zinoviev, suggested that "certain changes" be made to the operational plan. The Politburo, composed of members Lenin, Kamenev, and Krestinsky, decided in the presence of Smilga: "Approve the draft reply of the Commander-in-Chief and report by telegraph that the Politburo is surprised at the new initiation of this question?"

Having captured the warehouses of the front with a huge amount of military supplies, the 4th Don Cavalry Corps of General K.K. Mamantov, according to S.V. Karpenko. "immediately overgrown with long convoys with "acquired" goods and could not conduct military operations, its number decreased from 7 to 2 thousand". According to A.I. Denikin, this became the decisive factor in the defeat of the Whites at the front. In October, the already difficult relations between the High Command of the All-Union Socialist Republic and the Kuban Cossacks escalated, and some of the latter began to fall apart". On the other hand, from October 11 to 16, Yudenich's troops approached Petrograd - these days S.S. Kamenev later called the "most alarming" days: the enemy offensive continued, and the forces assembled for the counterattack "only concentrated on the starting areas. Reports from the fronts were received almost hourly. The most important decisions had to be taken in the shortest possible time... I don't remember a more difficult situation during the entire period of the Civil War." Sklyansky worked as a signalman for Lenin and Kamenev. In fact, Leon Trotsky's attitude to the need to recognize the "Petrograd" front as paramount proved its worth, which was immediately reflected in

on the alignment of forces in the Politburo of the Central Committee and, in particular, on the position of head of the military department. On October 14, the Politburo meets. Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev and Krestinsky "in view of the serious situation and the need to take a number of important decisions" decide to appoint a meeting for the next day "with the obligatory summoning of Comrades. Stalin, Zinoviev and Serebryakov"? On October 15, all these persons and the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Kalinin, are present. Decision taken on the situation on the fronts:

"Recognizing the presence of the most formidable military danger, to achieve the actual transformation of Soviet Russia into a military

camp for what.

a) Conduct a head-to-head count of all Party members, Soviet workers and workers of trade unions through Party and trade union organizations and classify them from the point of view of their military fitness;

6) Remove from all-Soviet work (with the exception of the People's Commissariat of Transport, the People's Commissariat for Food and the Cheka) in the center and in the localities the maximum number of communists and sympathizers. For a detailed development of the implementation of this measure and to take into account territorial differences in its implementation, elect a Commission consisting of TT. Lenin. Trotsky, Kamenev and Krestinsky;

c) To instruct the same commission to prepare a draft decree on the simplification of civil administration in order to release the largest number of persons fit for military work;

d) Instruct the same commission to urgently draw up a plan for the mobilization of volunteers (communists) for the defense of Tula;

e) Take vigorous measures to improve the political work in the 5 divisions being formed in the Moscow sector through political business trips [from] Moscow for the best workers and speakers." As we can see, Leon Trotsky was included in this important commission and Joseph Stalin was not included?

Between October 18 and 20, 1919, Trotsky decided to openly speak out against the strategic line imposed by the Politburo: he compiled the final version of the text of the so-called memorandum, in which the Central Committee of the RCP (b) directly stated that "strategy is completely confused with politics and is the subject of a wide discussion and circle struggle. The arrest of the Commander-in-Chief and other General Staff officers and the "changes in the military department" connected with it, according to the chairman of the RVSR, not only did not lead to the creation of a "Stavka in which there would be no place for espionage and betrayal", but, on the contrary, the enemy under the new "Stavka" (i.e., under the new leadership of the Field Headquarters) received "the most central sources

information."

Calling one of the important reasons for the "changes made" the situation on the Western Front, Trotsky noted: in 2 months it "enough became clear" that the failures at the front were primarily due to the lack of reserves, and not to the organization of command and control of the Western Front. . According to the People's Commissar, even the accusation of betrayal of N.N. Domozhirov (one of "the most important points of support

ry in organizational changes not only on the Western Front, but in the Headquarters") turned out to be absolutely untenable, because. the General Staff officer did not report anything about the Headquarters, which Trotsky himself, K.Kh. Danishevsky, S.I. Arals would not have known before.

Partially rehabilitated colleagues arrested in July. Trotsky criticized S.S. Kamenev and - taking it above - the grouping of I.V. Stalin (the latter's name was not directly mentioned in the document, but the document has a clear anti-Stalinist orientation). The change of personnel in the high command did not suit Trotsky so much that the people's commissar even allowed himself to criticize the members of the Politburo who supported Stalin: "the operational plan from a temporary and conditional working program of the command turned into the banner of a group of influential

in some sense a matter of honor. The majority of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee (2 or 3 comrades) found it even possible to link the authority of the Central Committee of the Party not only with the indicated general operational plan, but also with its individual changes. This led to a situation where the command felt itself and found itself forced to persist in steps that were clearly and obviously inexpedient, sometimes senseless and downright criminal."

Most of all, Trotsky was not satisfied with the fact that S.S. Kamenev will pursue the line of the "Tsaritsy" (i.e., I.V. Stalin); The chairman of the RVSR even insisted that the Central Committee explain to the Commander-in-Chief that his operational decisions in themselves cannot have the support of the Central Committee, which only sets certain tasks for him in a certain order. At this stage, Trotsky needed support in his offspring - the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. To strengthen the influence of Stalin's opponents in the RVSR, Trotsky asked to include G.Ya. Sokolnikov?\*

Not later than October 23, 1919, Trotsky sent a telephone message to the Field Headquarters with a demonstrative order to keep the translated | October, on the basis of the decision of the RVTR (!) to the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army F.V. Kostyaev "rations prescribed for employees of the Field Headquarters of the RVSR"?@. In fact, in relation to Kostyaev, the usual method of retaining employees during the Civil War was applied: the Academy became a common place of disgrace - in October 1918 Teodori was "exiled" there, a year later Kostyaev, in 1920, for example, V.I. Chapaev.

In September 1919, Trotsky managed to weaken the "opposition" in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic: on September 21, he asked the Central Committee to approve the decision of the RVSR adopted on that day. Trotsky reported: "Due to the situation, the sector south of Moscow is turning into a fortified area, which is divided into 2 lanes: the northern part is subordinated to the Headquarters through Gusev, who was appointed commander of the troops of this sector. This candidacy was put forward because the position of "commander" in this case has an organizational-Soviet character: it is necessary to visit the executive committees and party committees, establish revolutionary committees, encourage the formation of cavalry, give instructions about reconnaissance. reports, communications and REE". The new appointment of Gusev allowed Grotsky to solve 2 questions at once: about the defense of Moscow and the removal from the RVSR to S.I. Gusev.

By the end of October, Trotsky's positions in the Politburo were strengthening\*\*\*, but the chairman of the RVSR was able to partially get rid of Gusev only in November 1919. : "In view of the exceptional importance of the transfer of divisions from the Western Front to the Southern Front, you must immediately go to the Western Front on a 2-week trip, so that the removal from the front, the loading and dispatch of the following divisions will take place under your direct supervision. About all the difficulties and obstacles. ... it is necessary to notify the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic by direct wire (The basis for the above is the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party) ". The same decision assigned the duties of the PSh commissar to D. I. Kursky. In fact, Gusev's departure gave Trotsky certain apparatus opportunities: in In a telegram to his supporter I. I. Yurenev, Trotsky expressed the hope that "with a strict distribution of labor and joint resolution of issues of common policy, it would be possible to eliminate all conflicts within the RVS"?.

, Gusev did not supervise the Field Headquarters very actively: according to data from December 4, 1919, he was on official trips and business trips from July 19 to 30, from September 12 to 15; from 9 to 16, from 13 to 16, from 20 to 22 October; from October 31 to November 5; from b to 15, from 18 to 23, from 26 to 28 November 1919\*. Thus, he did not oversee the Stavka

56 days out of 131 (42.7%).

In the autumn of 1919, the threat to Moscow passed - the headquarters of the troops of the Moscow defense sector headed by Gusev was subject to liquidation: on December 5, Sergei Ivanovich completely resigned his powers - on December 4, by order of the RVSR, he became a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Eastern Front.

This time, Lenin was convinced that Trotsky had no alternative as head of the military department: Gusev could not become a worthy replacement for the "Demon of the Revolution" in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

No. 6.1

From the minutes of the Moscow City Conference of the RCP (b) - a record of the report of S.I. Gusev "About military-political situation"

July 12, 1919.

Minutes of the citywide conference of the RCP dated 12 / January 1919 2. "

There are 200 delegates with casting votes.

Comrade presides. [L.B.] Kamenev

[...] Report of comrade. Gusev about martial law. [...] It should be noted that a month ago the situation at the front was much worse than now: then there was [a] serious threat to Petrograd. Denikin was advancing in the South, but in the East our offensive was just beginning, and there were disputes among us whether to advance there or to transfer forces to the South. Life has shown that the tactics of the new Commander-in-Chief, who insisted on the offensive, [are correct]. Now we are gaining ground on the Southern Front. Our parts are in order. They are already beginning to launch counterattacks, and soon the Southern Front will be stable. [...] Over the past month, our situation as a whole has greatly improved, but there are other victories besides military victories. A conspiracy in St. Petersburg is revealed. There was not a [real] organization operating here, but rather a bunch of spy organizations operating in a artisanal way. They did not have a single center and even hostile competition between individual organizations was observed. The liquidation of this conspiracy is as serious as the blow to Kolchak. K | July [1919] was expected to strike the Entente; The disclosure of the conspiracy thwarted this plan, and the offensive had to be postponed. The practice of this organization is characterized by the following: they sought to seize

\* Title of the document.

in their hands the entire administration of the Army. Our political commissars are largely to blame for this: they are not vigilant enough in relation to our military experts. This means that our tactics towards them must change, but vigilance is necessary, now the talk and explanations have been put to an end and a [complete purge; and last victory. what we have achieved is a victory over ourselves in the form of a reorganization of military administration. The Center was created, but this center, as uniting all military work, turned out to be a fiction. He even [often interfered with the army in their organizational work. There were Revolutionary Military Councils of individual fronts, but there was no one center. [...] Now the Revolutionary Military Council has been created, in whose hands all work will be concentrated and there will no longer be a multi-center; we hope that with the arrival of people from the front in the center, we will be able to introduce a new, fresh stream - and this is a great victory.

Some comrades rebelled against the abolition of the Revolutionary Military Council[s], sitting at the top. It seemed to them that everything was going well, but something else was felt on the periphery, the need to create a healthy center was visible, and the only way to make it so is to involve people of practice with organizational experience. [...]

CAOPIM. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 199. L. 64, 75-77. Typewritten copy.

No. 6.2 Memorandum of L.D. Trotsky in the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with summing up the results of the "conspiracy" in the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic

Not earlier than September 1, 1919." Top secret

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RKP It seems absolutely necessary to sum up the results of those changes in the military department that were made more than two months ago. 1. One of the tasks was to create a headquarters in which there would be no place for espionage and betrayal.

\* So dated by content. Judging by the location of the drafts of the document in the file from the fund of the secretariat of the chairman of the RVSR (RGVA. F. 33987), no earlier than October 18 - no later than October 20, 1919.

Never before have steps and intentions been known to the enemy with such detail as now, with a new rate. It has been established that he uses the most central sources of information."

Reason: apart from possible random personal circumstances, the main reason is the fact that strategy is completely confused with politics and is the subject of wide discussion and circle struggle.

2. One of the important reasons for the changes made was the situation on the Western Front. Since that time, it has become sufficiently clear that the failures on the Western Front were determined not by the organization of the command and control of the Western Front, but by the lack of reserves." Even accusing Domozhirov of betrayal, which was one of the most important points of support in organizational changes not only on the Western Front, but also in the Headquarters, turned out to be completely untenable. Domozhirov did not report a single line about the Headquarters, which would be comrade. Danishevsky, Aralov and I would not have known before.

3. A particularly difficult situation has arisen, however, in relation to the Southern Front. The general strategic plan was false from the very beginning. We missed the main forces in the most remote, most difficult and most extended direction. It is now perfectly clear that the same and even much smaller forces, thrown in a timely manner on the Kuryansk-Kharkov direction, would have given incomparably greater results. Ukraine would not by now be Denikin's main springboard, we would have kept Kursk, Tula would not have been threatened by direct

danger.

But even worse: those amendments that could and should have been introduced by the course of events, even if with some loss of pace, were not introduced even when their need became obvious. The reason for this is that the operational plan has turned from a temporary and conditional work program of the command into the banner of a group of influential comrades, has become for them, in a sense, a matter of honor. The majority of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee (2 or 3 comrades) found it even possible to link the authority of the Central Committee of the Party not only with the indicated general operational plan, but also with its individual changes. This led to a situation where the command felt

\* For the entire paragraph in L.D. Trotsky marked his visa with a blue pencil: "T". \*\* Kuryansk, Kharkov region. - Voronezh.

and it turned out to be forced to persist in steps that were clearly and obviously inexpedient, sometimes senseless and downright criminal. Such was the last episode with the transfer of Budyonny's corps to the site of Shorin's group at the same time as the whole situation. all operating data. all logical considerations clearly demanded the concentration of forces in the Kursk direction. Even more unacceptable was the transfer of regiments of the 21st division from Tula to Novokhopersk and the final clearing of the threatened Kursk-Tula-Moscow road.

Necessary actions":

1. Release of the Commander-in-Chief from obligations in relation to the "Tsaritsyn" plan;
2. Explanation to the Commander-in-Chief, in one form or another, that his operational decisions in themselves cannot have the support of the Central Committee, which only puts him in a certain order certain tasks;

3. Inclusion in the composition of the RVSR Sokolnikov.

From the case "Secret outgoing papers from September 18 [November] 1919 to May 12, 1920, part 2, pp. 251-252.

RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 480. L. 20-21.

Certified typewritten copy.

RGVA. F. 33987. He. 2. D. 32. L. 459-460. Draft No. 1 — typewritten text with notes by L.D. Trotsky in black ink and blue pencil.

RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 457-458. Draft No. 2 — typewritten text with notes by L.D. Trotsky in blue pencil.

It is printed according to the text of a certified copy with comments on draft No. 2.

\* Litter in draft No. 2 L.D. Trotsky in blue pencil in the margin in a rectangle: "Commander-in-Chief? Selivachev.

\*\* In draft No. 2 L.D. Trotsky entered the 3rd paragraph in blue pencil.

#### Afterword

The assessment of Lev Grotzky made by the "moderate anti-Semite" German representative in the RSFSR Karl von Botmer (as part of the German delegation he had an audience with Trotsky in the People's Commissariat of War on June 25, 1918) is curious: "a typical representative of his nation, with a mane of hair; in the eyes - intelligence, determination and cunning, "After the wounding of the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars on September 2, with the support of one of the leaders of the RCP (b) and chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Ya.M. Sverdlov, an alternative center of power was created by the Council of People's Commissars - the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, headed by Leon Trotsky. In response, Vladimir Lenin replenished the composition of the RVSR with his own creatures and created on November 30 a new military-political center - the Defense Council, which stood over the Revolutionary Military Council, which had sunk in a sea of military organizational issues. According to the memoirs of Joseph Stalin, at the June 1937 meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense, during the creation of the STO, Lenin encouraged the Bolsheviks of the military department to appeal to the Central Committee and the solution of military issues bypassing Trotsky by party bodies. The US Congress of the RCP(b) dotted all the "1s". And after the congress, Lenin continued to actively intervene in military matters.

In 1917-1919. the Bolsheviks had difficulty holding state power in their hands, the country was on the verge of a systemic crisis. In 1919 the leaders of the RCP(b) were seriously preparing for emigration. Military affairs, as you know, are nothing but a specific branch of politics. Any wrong personnel decision in the military department is fraught with a coup, and consequently, the loss of power, if not the life of those at the helm of the party-state machine. The decision to purge the Field Headquarters freed the Bolsheviks from the dangerous group that had been raised in the General Staff Academy with the light hand of A.F. Kerensky, but at the same time deprived the Red Headquarters of experienced workers. With the help of the Cheka, Lenin was able to impose his strategic line on the top of the Red Army - putting the people he needed in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and its Field Headquarters.

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The disclosure of the "conspiracy" in the "Red Headquarters" raised the authority of both the Special Department and the Cheka as a whole. very weakened following the results of almost a six-month crisis.

The unwinding of the "conspiracy" case in the Field Headquarters, at least:

1) led to the "renewal" of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. as a result of which in the RVSR there were more proteges of Lenin than Trotsky: moreover, the share in the party of two new members of the RVSR (S.I. Gusev, I.T. Smilga) turned out to be comparable with the share of the chairman of the council?



2) led to the appointment of a new Commander-in-Chief, who had a strategic plan different from Trotsky's, and to the destruction of a group of accelerated release general staff officers who dared to present an ultimatum to Lenin;

3) shook the military throne of Leon Trotsky.

Trotsky understood that it was impossible to build an army without repressions, and considered the Special Department to be really necessary for the destruction of the enemy's reconnaissance and subversive activities in the army (and not only in it) body. On December 18, 1919 — Felix Dzerzhinsky was already at the head of the Special Department — Trotsky telegraphed to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP(b): "From the reports of the Special Department it is clear that, using party mobilization, the counterrevolutionary elements are trying to penetrate and are actually penetrating into party ranks in order to use the party title for counter-revolutionary purposes. It is necessary to draw up an appropriate circular to the local Party organizations and draw their attention to this fact and oblige them to tirelessly carry out further checks on all newly admitted members of the Party (profession, past, community or family ties, etc., etc.). What really did not suit the head of the military department in the summer of 1919 was the independence of the Special Department of the Cheka from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and its chairman. On June 23, while criticizing the Special Department of the Southern Front, Trotsky "attacked" the then head of the OO, Mikhail Kedrov. The chairman of the RVSR drew the attention of the Central Committee through his deputy E.M. Sklyansky (he was supposed to convey a message to members of the Central Committee V.I. Lenin, L.P. Serebryakov and E.D. Stasova) "to the complete and unconditional worthlessness and even harmfulness of the special [s] departments in the current composition. They are headed by unqualified persons. Doubtful people appear as agents.

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nye elements, careerists, loafers, ignoramuses. Inasmuch as the Special Department considers itself independent of such authoritative bodies as the Revolutionary Military Councils (*italics mine.—SV*), the Special Departments fall into opposition and engage in petty intrigues. I am not aware of cases of disclosure of traitors, spies, conspirators by special departments, but they are engaged in increased surveillance of members of the Revolutionary Military Council. old party workers""®.

The case of a conspiracy in the Field Headquarters could not but cause an extremely negative reaction from Trotsky - in fact, he was accused of it. that he slammed the contra in his own department. An attempt made in July to defend his employees was unsuccessful, the "battles" in the Politburo forced Trotsky to temporarily reconcile. The repeated statement about the inexpediency of arrests, made immediately after the first one, put the head of the military department in front of the threat of turning into a "political corpse". Therefore, Trotsky was waiting for a second time to stand up for his subordinates - already with trump cards in his hands.

At least until September 1919, Trotsky could have been replaced at any moment by his longtime foe Sergei Gusev—if he had succeeded in leading the military department successfully, Lenin would probably have convened another party congress, at which would not save his political opponent.

Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Joseph Stalin, once called gratitude a "dog's disease." For all his unscrupulousness and cruelty, Lenin was subject to this "ailment": when acquaintances asked him to intercede for some arrested by the provincial Cheka, he honestly tried to help. The case of Joachim Vatsetis was no exception: Lenin needed to remove him from his post at all costs and appoint a Commander-in-Chief who, having support in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, would carry out the military line of the head of the "workers' and peasants' government". However, the punishment that overtook the near Commander-in-Chief, sincerely confident that the army was "out of politics", was minimal - he got off with a short imprisonment with the opportunity to write memoirs. Arrested and soon released under an "amnesty", the General Staff officers were simply scattered to different places in order to avoid revenge. Worst of all was George Teodori, who was dangerous in his quest for the Great General Staff. For this fixed idea, he was engaged in military history work in prison until January 1921.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Transcripts of meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b). 1923-1938. T.2. 1926--1927 / Editorial board of the volume: Astakhova M.S., Vatlin A.Yu., Gorskaya G.V. M., 2007. S. 594.

<sup>2</sup> See: Tinchenco Ya.Yu. Calvary of Russian officers in the USSR: 1930-1951. M., 2000. S. 68 and track.

<sup>5</sup> RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 940. L. 1.

\*RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 304. L. 365 et seq. And General Staff Officer V.G. Ziverta, as established by A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov, was arrested by the MChK in the 20th of September 1919 (Kolpakidi A., Prokhorov D. Imperiya GRU. M., 2000, p. 88). A small clarification: in fact, Sievert had already been removed from leadership work: on September 19, 1919, by order of the PS, "Vladimir Genrikhovich Sievert, who is at the disposal of the Field Headquarters ... of the General Staff, is seconded to the intelligence department while maintaining the content he receives by position of consultant of the Registration Department of the RVSR "(RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 418).

<sup>5</sup> Koliakidi A., Prokhorov D. Decree. op. S. 84.

IN AND. Lenin and the Cheka: Sat. doc. (1917-1922). M., 1987. S. 192-193.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. S. 184 (comment.).

\$ Archive of the Cheka: Sat. doc. M., 2007. S. 124-134.

There. S. 128.

<sup>9</sup> See: A. G. Kavtaradze: "The Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Government... Recognized as Necessary the Establishment... of a Higher Military Educational Institution" // VIZH. 2002. No. 10. S. 34.

and Archive of the Cheka. S. 127.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. S. 131.

h Ibid. S. 129.

<sup>4</sup> Kirmel N.S. White guard special services in the Civil War 1918-1922. M., 2008. S. 20.

<sup>5</sup> See also: Zdanovich A.A. Was there a conspiracy at the Field Headquarters? //

Motherland. 2009. No. 5. P. 92.

<sup>5</sup> Minakov S.T. Military elite of the 20-30s of the XX century. M., 2006. S. 213-214.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. S. 212.

x Deutscher I. Trotsky: Armed Prophet. M., 2006. S. 441 - 442.

<sup>9</sup> Trotsky LD. My life. M.. 2001. P. 389. "Vatsetis was enterprising, active, resourceful [...] Unlike other military academics, he did not get lost in revolutionary chaos, but cheerfully floundered in it, blowing bubbles. called, encouraged and gave orders, even when there was no hope of their execution. While other "specialists" were most afraid to cross the line of their rights, Vatsetis, on the contrary, issued decrees in moments of inspiration, forgetting about the existence of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee."

% RGASPI. F. 86. Op. 1. D. 38. L. 99. If it was impossible to eliminate the conflict in Serpukhov, Trotsky was ordered not to make "any decisions" and to leave for Moscow.

2 RGVA. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 892-893.

2 Deutscher I. Decree. op. S. 441; RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3 (PB). D. 24. L. 1. Minutes of the meeting of the PB and OB of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of September 3, 1919

2 Deutscher I. Decree. op. P. 439. The researcher found out that Stalin insisted on the replacement of Vatsetis on July 3, 1919 by his protege S.S. Kamenev.

\* Trotsky L.D. Decree. op. pp. 389-390.

5 See: Tinchenco Ya.Yu. Decree. op. S. 68 et seq. In June-July 1919, the Red Army suffered defeats on the Southern Front, and Petrograd was in danger of being captured by Yudenich.

% "Is it true". 1922. July 5.

2 See more about this: How L.D. Trotsky and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic "lost" counterintelligence / publ. A.A. Zdanovich // VIZH. 1996. No. 3. S. 65-73.

2 Alekseev M. How the GRU was created // Secret dossier. 1998. No. 2. P. 44. M. Alekseev carefully pointed out that the involvement of officers in the conspiracy was: "in a number of cases real, and often imaginary."

» Kolpakidi A., Prokhorov D. Decree. op. pp. 86-87.

% Pavlyuchenkov S.A. "Order of the Sword". M., 2008. S. 32.

"See more: Molodtsygin M.A. Red Army. M., 1997. S. 164.

7 See, for example: Pavlyuchenkov S.A. Decree. op. S. 179.

3 See: Tinchenco Ya.Yu. Decree. op.; Minakov S.T. Decree. op.

2 RGVA. F. 33221. Op. 2. D. 216. L. 26.

5 As L.D. Trotsky and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic "lost" counterintelligence. No. 5. P. 79. |

» Dating justification: the reorganization of the department of military control in the NGO VChK could not: 1) precede the meeting held in the last days of January 1919; Teodori became famous after his trip to Lithuania and Lagvia to inspect the setting up of undercover affairs on the ground (the General Staff officer left in the first days of March 1919).

7 Krasnov V.G., Daines V.O. Unknown Trotsky. M., 2000. S. 191. |

\* See: Ibid. pp. 5, 6, 78, 422, 433, 457 and more. others

Ganin A.V. "Comrade Sklyansky - intercede ..." // Motherland. 2009. No. 1. S. 79.

9 Ibid. S. 81.

" There. S. 81.

2 Ibid. S. 82.

h Ibid. S. 81.

9 See: Novoselov D.S. The crisis of the Cheka in late 1918 - early 1919 // Patriotic history. 2005. No. 6. S. 66-77; "Proceed immediately to the liquidation of the Cheka ..." / Publ. D.S. Novoselova // VIZH. 2006. No. 12. S. 51-55.

5 A number of interesting facts appeared in the article by A.V. Ganin was misinterpreted - that there is an "unprecedented case: by the decision of the Council of Defense of December 3, 1918, 2 party representatives of the special investigation and acceleration of the case on members of the General Staff were introduced into the control and audit department of the Cheka" (Ganin A. V. Decree op. P. 81), if not yet another evidence of the control of the Cheka by the Leninist Council of Defense?

4 Zdanovich A.A. Was there a conspiracy at the Field Headquarters? pp. 91-95.

h So, for example, analyzing the report of F.E. Dzerzhinsky and I.P. Pavlunovsky V.I. Lenin (July 1919) according to the copy of Leon Trotsky (RGVA), A.A. Zdanovich writes: "In an abbreviated form, but with the same conclusions, the report was sent to V. Lenin" (ibid., p. 95). In fact, in the collection "V.I. Lenin and the Cheka", to which the researcher refers, only a part of a similar report to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars was published.

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9 Ibid.

9 RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 12317. L. 1.

5 See, for example: Vasiliev I.I. Creation of the Soviet military counterintelligence (October 1917 - February 1919). M., 1973.

" See, for example: How L.D. Trotsky and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic "lost" counterintelligence // VIZH. 1996. No. 3. S. 66-67; No. 5, pp. 75-82; Zdanovich A.A. Domestic counterintelligence. M., 2004; He is. Organization and formation of the special services of the Russian fleet // pir://uum., Y.gi/sti/agys1e/2dapou12.yyti.

5 See, for example: Leonov S.V. State Security of the Soviet Republic during the October Revolution and the Civil War (1917-1922) // State Security of Russia: History and Modernity. M., 2007. Cited. Quoted from: yytyr://uum.syekyy.gi/apys1e/1942.

5 See, for example: Novoselov D.S. Crisis of the Cheka in late 1918 - early 1919. pp. 66--77; "Proceed immediately to the liquidation of the Cheka ...". pp. 51-55.

5 Bonch-Bruevich M.D. Belarus. 1919-1920 // The Legend of the Civil. M., 1987. S. 161.

5 Gusev S.I. Our disagreements in military affairs // Gusev S.I. Civil War and the Red Army. M.; L., 1925.

% Danishevsky K.Kh., Kamenev S.S. Memories of Lenin: Lenin and the Civil War. Sat. 1. M., 1934.

7 Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. M., 1997.

% See the analysis of the publication: Lolikarpov V.D. Military counterrevolution in Russia. M., 1990. S. 45.

9 Bolshevik leadership. Correspondence. T. 1. M., 1996; Revolutionary Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. 1918-1919 / Comp. T.F. Karyaveva et al. M., 1997; F.E. Dzerzhinsky: Chairman of the Cheka - OGPU. 1917-1926 / Comp. A.A. Plekhanov, A.M. Plekhanov. M., 2007; Archive of the Cheka: Sat. doc. / Comp.: V. Vinogradov, N. Peremyshnikova. M., 2007; Transcripts of meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b). T. 2.

6 RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 61. L. 5.

e See further: RGVA. F. 24830. Op. 7. D. 125. L. 44.

See other: Ibid. L. 44.

5 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

5 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 15 isl.

6 Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 173.

5 RGVA.F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 136. On May 6, the procedure for receiving Red Army rations by sick employees was established: for the entire time they were in the 1st Therapeutic Hospital of the Red Cross, all products for the patient had to be received through the hospital (ibid. L. 180 ). |

\* There. L. 219.

6 Ibid. L. 572.

" See: Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Republic I.I. Vatsietis (Vatsetis): Sat. documents. Riga, 1978.

" Navep M. So1iaieg yn ye Rgovapap Yuÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ. M. Jork, 1990. R. 4.

Senin A.S. Kornilov's alternative // Historians answer questions: Sat. Issue. 2. S. 214.

h Ibid. S. 215.

\*See: Ibid. S. 220 et seq.

5 Ibid. S. 219.

\* See: Krushelnitsky A.V. Elimination of counter-revolutionary sabotage in the Military Ministry in the first months of Soviet power // Historical experience of Great October. M., 1986. S. 162-171.

" See, for example: Rabinovich A. Dossier of Shchastnoy // Domestic History. 2001. No. 1.S. 61-82.

\* Voitikov S.S. Development of the views of the top leadership of Soviet Russia on military development in November 1917 - March 1918 // Questions of history. 2007. No. 10. P. 4.

Trotsky L.D. My life. M., 2001. S. 342.

8 See: Minutes of the meetings of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. M., 2006. S. 31-32, 41-42.

5 Major General of the old army M.D. Bonch-Bruevich.

e RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 2424. L. 24.

5 See: Lenin. unknown documents. M., 1999. P. 229, Molodtsygin M.A. 120 days of the People's Commissariat of War // Military History Journal. 1989. No. 8, 10; Voitikov S.S. How did the history of the Red Army begin? pp. 129, 131; He is. Development of the views of the top leadership of Soviet Russia on military development in November 1917 - March 1918 // Questions of history. 2007. No. 10. S. 4 ff.

9 Cit. by: Danishevsky K.Kh. Meetings with Lenin during the Civil War (1918-1921) // Memories of V.I. Lenin. T. 3.

M., 1969. S. 450.

5 Minutes of the meetings of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. S. 132.

% Trotsky L.D. How the revolution was armed (hereinafter - CWR). T. 1. M., 1923. S. 26.

See, for example: Lenin V.I. Report on the revision of the program and the change in the name of the party (not later than March 8, 1918) // Lenin V.N. Full coll. op. T. 36. M., 1969. S. 48; Lenin V.I. Immediate tasks of Soviet power // Ibid. S. 195.

"RGVA. F. 1. Ol. 1. D. 466. L. 100. The document is dated according to the content.

Here and throughout the text italics are mine. — S.V.

% Trotsky L.D. KVR. T. 1. S. 99 isl.

" There. S. 36.

? There. P. 42. 9 Ibid. S. 52. 5 Ibid. S. 62. % Ibid. S. 70. % Ibid. pp. 71-72.

" There. S. 67.

5 RGVA. F. 4. Op. 1. D. 1520. L. 148. Trotsky stated that among the old military specialists, he "found many more valuable elements than expected ... They spoke about the reconstruction of the army and in the language that we, representatives of the Soviet regime, listened to as the language of genuine representatives of a democratic revolutionary country".

9 Trotsky L.D. KVR. T. 1. S. 100.

"0 Lenin V.I. Floor. coll. op. T. 36. S. 608 (comm.).

1 Ibid. S. 325.

12 See: Trotsky LD. KVR. T. 1. S. 317-318.

15 Ibid. S. 307.

and "Volkogonov D.A. Trotsky. T. 2. M., 1997. S. 223.

, 5Here and further in the chapter, the underline marks the edit made by L.D. Trotsky. — S.V.

9 RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 18. L. 154.

07 Trotsky L.D. KVR. T. 2. S. 13.

8 See: Krasnov V.G., Daines V.O. Unknown Trotsky. M., 2000. S. 74.

9 Sverdlov Ya.M. Fav. works. T. 3. M., 1960. S. 262.

Fanny Kaplan, or Who shot Lenin. Kazan, 1995. S. 26.

Ying! There. S. 25.

52 Ibid. S. 26.

75 Ibid. S. 27.

"Krasnov V.G., Daines V.O. Decree. Op. P. 74.

SERGVA. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 104.

\$ Ibid. L. 107.

'7 Exact fragment of the speech: "Procurement needs to be centralized. This work has already been headed by such an energetic and knowledgeable comrade, L.B. Krasin. He must be given the broadest powers and all the material means necessary to raise our military supplies to the proper level. Everything must be placed at the disposal of the organizers of supply." It is worth noting that the Extraordinary Commission for the Supply of the Red Army (Chrezkomsnab) Krasin was subordinate to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Judging by the drafts of the "Regulations on the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic", Trotsky wanted to subordinate the Chrezkomsnab to himself.

Trotsky had sympathized with Krasin since the time of the Second Congress of the RSDLP: the latter was then a conciliatory Bolshevik. L.D. Trotsky recalled: "This brought us even closer, in view of my position at the time." (Quoted from: Volkogonov D.A. Decree. cit. T. 1. P. 67.)

and RGVA. F, 33987. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 108. Publ. with changes: Before the capture of Kazan: Speech at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on September 2, 1918 // Trotsky L.D. KVR. T. 1. S. 320-324. The text is verified with the transcript.

Further, Trotsky touched upon 3 issues that had been on the agenda since March 1918: party political work; attracting military specialists to the Red Army; political supervision over them (commissars).

"9 Decrees of Soviet power. T. 3. M., 1964. S. 267.

21 Ibid. P. 268. |

2! Molodtzygin M.A. Red Army. M., 1997. S. 143.

22 See: Gimpelson E.G. Formation and evolution of the Soviet government. M., 2003. S. 81.

15 Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 39-40.

4 RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 18. L.

25 Decrees of the Soviet power. T. 3. S. 372-373.

126 Ibid. S. 373.

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22 Fifth convocation of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of R., K., K. and K. deputies. M.: Publishing House of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, 1919. S. 22; See: Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 16.

~ Tarkhova N.S. Grotsky's train - the flying apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Defense // The State Apparatus of Russia during the Revolution and the Civil War: Mater. Vseros. conf. December 22, 1997 1. M., 1998. S. 129.

:5 There. S. 130.

^0 See: Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 6, 7, 10 Isl.

! Red Army in the 1920s. M., 2007. S. 76.

5 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. June 1-4, 1937: Documents and materials. M., 2008. S. 138.

35 Lenin. unknown documents. pp. 283--284. Draft resolution on the report of G.E. Zinoviev was compiled on March 26 by members of the Central Committee Lenin, Krestinsky, Stalin, Kamenev (RGASPI. F. 2. Op. I. D. 8681. L. 1).

5 Lenin. unknown documents. S. 164.

5 Molodtsygin M.A. Decree. op. S. 162.

36 Pavlyuchenkov S.A. Peasant Brest, or the Prehistory of the Bolshevik NEP. M., 1996. S. 28.

57 See: Topolyansky, V. Mysterious Spaniard // New time. 2000. No. 4 S. 36 et seq.

<sup>1</sup> Transcripts of meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b). T. 2. M., 2007. S. 593.

<sup>o</sup> See: Molodtsygin M.A. Red Army. S. 162 and others.

<sup>4</sup> The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, RVSR) was established on September 6, 1918, as a collegiate body of supreme military power. The composition of the RVSR included: chairman, deputy. Chairman, Commander-in-Chief, members (their number changed). The chairman of the RVSR, according to the Regulations approved on September 30, 1918, was the people's commissar for military and naval affairs, a member of the RCP (b), approved by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The Deputy Chairman (the position was established in October 1918) led the central and local military apparatus, coordinated its activities with the work of the High Command, and was a speaker on military issues in party and government bodies. The second deputy (the position was established in 1924) was in charge of the combat training of the troops. For maintenance of the chairman of the RVSR and his replacement

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A number of units were formed in the staff of the Field Headquarters, and then the Department of Affairs of the RVSR, the names and functions of which subsequently changed. On August 28, 1923, the RVSR was transformed into the RVS of the USSR. By the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of June 20, 1934, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR was abolished. (See also: Guide to TsGASA. T. 1. Mineapolis, 1991. P. 42.)

The position of Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Republic (Commander-in-Chief) was established by a published decree. In its actions, the Commander-in-Chief was accountable to the Chairman of the RVSR. For the direct service of the Commander-in-Chief, a special staff was formed, which was part of the organizational structure of the Field Headquarters of the RVSR (in August 1921 it received the name of the Secretariat of the Commander-in-Chief). On October 15, 1918, the post of Commander of all naval forces (comorsi) was established, to whom all river and lake fleets were also subordinated. August 27, 1921] the post of Komorsi was renamed the position of Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief for Maritime Affairs. To unite the military administration of Siberia, on April 20, 1920, the post of assistant to the Commander-in-Chief for Siberia was established, to which all field troops, military districts and fortified areas located in Siberia were subordinate. The Reserve Army of the Republic was directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief. (See also: Guide to TsGASA. T. 1. Mineapolis, 1991. S. 54-55.)

On November 27, 1918, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic sent General Staff Officer V.V. Yurshevsky to participate in resolving issues: "timely and correct supply of food to the Red Army units, replenishment of food bases and the formation of food supplies for the Red Army."

The General Staff Officer was entrusted with comprehensive information to the Field Headquarters "on all issues of supplying the Red Army", for which he also had to maintain constant contact with the central state and military institutions: the People's Commissariat for Food, the Chief Supply Chief, the Main Military Economic Directorate, the Central Directorate military communications, the Extraordinary Commission chaired by L.B. Krasin, as well as with the commanders of the fronts and military districts. To get acquainted with



By the provision of the food question, Yurshevsky had the right to travel "to cities located both on the active fronts and in the rear districts." Constant-

"23

The main location of the General Staff officer was to be the department of grain fodder of the People's Commissariat for Food. All military units, government and public organizations and institutions were asked to provide Ya.Ya. Yurshevsky "full assistance in the fulfillment of the task assigned to him" (RGVA. F. 6. Op. 2. D. 1. L. 189.--189 rev. Certified typewritten copy of the mandate).

November 5530, 1918 was created under the chairmanship of V.I. Lenin, the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense (Council of Defense) is the highest military-political body of the RSFSR, which had full authority in the matter of mobilizing forces and means. In April 1920 it was reorganized into the Council of Labor and Defense.

"5 All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars (Vsebyurvoenkom) was created on the basis of the Bureau of Commissars of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs on April 8, 1918 to manage the activities of commissars throughout the army. On April 28, 1919, it was reorganized into the political department of the RVSR, renamed on May 15, 1919 into the Political Directorate of the RVSR (See also: Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Protocols. T. 1. P. 51. Note.)

chz M.A. was a member of the Central Committee of the Party of Left Socialist Revolutionaries. Spiridonov.

4 RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 14.

17 ur://muumu.rgugag.gi/regsops/regsops.ýt1?14=926.

"This was done very actively in Soviet historiography - at least after the publication in the 1960s. Directives of the Main and front command of the Red Army --- under the leadership of the founder of the archeographic school of TsGASA T.F. Karyaeva.

19 From the collection of protocols of the RVSR it follows that only disciplined Latvians attended all meetings of the council - I.I. Vatsetis and his eternal commissar K.Kh. Danishevsky.

59 So, he stood up for the convicted General S.I. Odintsov and even offered to release him and appoint him to a meaningless commission to develop new military legislation. RGVA. F. 6. Op. 5. D. 67. L. 69. On February 12, 1919, the Council of the Higher School of Staff petitioned the leadership of the Field Headquarters "for early release from punishment of the former expert of the Peace Delegation in Ukraine [General] S.I. Odintsov, convicted on January 15 of this year. verdict of the Moscow Revolutionary Tribunal. F.V. Kostyaev reported on February 19, 1919 to L.D. Trotsky for agreement with the petition of the Heads

coma I.I. Vatsetis, who expressed in his resolution the wish to appoint Odintsov to the Commission for the development of charters and for the revision of the Code of military regulations, and the accession (paradoxical as it may seem) to this resolution by A.I. Akulova.

'RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 14. L. 42.

52 Ibid. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 47.

5 Ibid. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 239.

There. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 14. L. 90.

55 Ibid. F. 33221. Op. 2. D. 216. L. 22v.

56 The Russian Army in the Great War: Project file // Vir://uumuu.ogugag.gi/regsops/regsops.ýtý?  
14=2590&ýý5ý5510=862163444 116s6013 10ýýý793ýý8ý1ý2.

The country is dying today: Memoirs. M., 1991. S. 63.

'5\* RGVA. F. 40307. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 5 rev. File - "Lists of officers who graduated from the preparatory courses of the military academy for 1917-1919."

59 Op. Quoted from: Tinchenco Ya.Yu. Calvary of Russian officers in the USSR. M., 2000. S. 322.

% Ibid. pp. 329-330.

6! Kavtaradze A.G. "The Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Government ... Recognized as Necessary the Establishment ... of a Higher Military Educational Institution" // VIZH. 2002. No. 10. P. 33.

19 Ibid. S. 34.

63 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 3. L. 204.

Well RGVA. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 178-179.

15 RGVA. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 142. L. 27.

166 Ibid. L. 17.

167 Ibid. L. 50.

158 Ibid. L. 49, 56, 57. 19 Ibid. L. 75 about.

9 Ibid. L. 82. -

7: Same place. L. 90, 92.

72 Ibid. L. 25, 34.

h Ibid. L. 31.

p There. L. 121.

"h Ibid. L. 148. "5 Kavtaradze A.G. Military specialists in the service of the Republic

Soviets. M., 1988. S. 199.

"  
There. F. 59348. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 179.

5 Ibid. L. 583.

"  
There. F. 4. Op. 14. D. 2. L. 255.

'  
Military history of the Civil War 1918--- 1920 in Ros

these. M., 2004. S. 261.

"5 Bolshevik leadership. Correspondence. T. I. S. 87.

\* So in the text. That's right: "saboteurs".

5 RGVA. F. 4. Op. 14. D. 2. L. 254 with ob--255.

in the same place. F. 37976. He. 1. D. 23 (Personal file of A.A. Svechin). L.

. Autobiography (autograph in blue ink).

85 RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 2. D. 58. L. 15-15v. '9% RGVA F. 6. Op. 1. D.3. L. 10 sob. Etc. according to PS No. 9 of September 30

1918

187 Ibid. L. 11.

in the same place. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 148. L. 152.

89 So in the text. This refers to the Field Headquarters of the RVSR.

9% RGVA. F. 6. Op. 2. D. 1. L. 19-20. October 24 on behalf of Rev

of the military council, head of communications of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (subsequently - the Field Headquarters), General Staff Officer A.P. Medvedev asked Trotsky's secretary M.S. Glazman to repeat the reply telegram of the chairman of the RVSR (there was a "mistake" in the telegram). (Ibid. L. 21.)

91 air://mguuuu guuag.gi/regvop5/regvop5.ÿ11111214::920.

92 RGVA, F. 33221. Op. 2. D. 216. L. 22v.

15 Ibid. F. 11. Op. 1. D. 78. L. 214v.

9 Ibid. F. 24380. Op. 7. D. 25. L. 98, 102.

15 Ibid. F. 11. Op. 1. D. 78. L. 214-214v.

196 Ibid. F. 33221. Op. 2. D. 216. L. 22v.

97 Ibid. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 27. L. Telegram from the head of Kanzel

rii PSH S.S. Kharitonov in DISTLM dated May 13, 1919

55 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 4. D. 48. L. 106 - 106 rev.

99 Ibid. L. 107 with ob-108.

20 Ibid. L. 105—105 vol.

2!! See: RGVA. F. 24380. Op. 7. D. 25. L. 3 isl.

22 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 4. D. 48. L. 180.

25 Ibid. L. 181-182.

24 The maximum allowance per family was found to be 4 rations. 205 Ibid. L. 181.

26 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 14. L. 189-190v.

27 Ibid. F. 33221. He. 2. D. 216. L. 22v.

25 Ibid. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 64. Pr. according to PSh No. 42 of November 1, 1918

39 Ibid. L. 80.

39 Ibid. F. 24380. Op. 7. D. 25. L. 100 rev.

25 Ibid. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 14. L. 78.

22 Ibid. L. 93.

25 Ibid. L. 130.

1“ Ibid. F. 4. Op. 3. D. 1562. L. 6 with ob-7.

5 Ibid. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 18.

256 Ibid. L. 17.

27 Ibid. Op. 10. D.3. L. 163.

g5 GA RF. F. 130. Op. 2. D. 1120. L. 232.

29 RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10446. L. 3, 5; There. F. 17. Op. 4. D. 48. L. 181, 183.

2 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 4. D. 48. L. 180.

23 Ibid. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10446. L. 3.

2: Right there. F. 17. Op. 4. D. 48. L. 179.

25 Ibid. L. 178-179.

223 Ibid. L. 178.

25 Ibid. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10446. L. 4.

25 G.I. Teodori.

22 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 23 (edited by F.V. Kostyaev).

2 Ibid. L. 96.

t9 there. F. 33221. Op. 2. D. 216. L. 1. The time of the execution of Troitskaya has not been precisely established. Probably no later than March 12, 1919 (dated from the time of G.I. Teodori's arrest). But since Teodori received information "from the outside", he could find out about the execution of the typist even after the arrest.

239 V.I. Lenin and the Cheka. S. 100.

231 Ibid. S. 110.

232 Ibid. S. 114.

28 Ganin A.V. Decree. op. S. 81.

285 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 3. L. 157-158, 164; D. 14. L. 59, 61.

25 Ibid. D. 14. L. 73.

25 Ibid. D. 14. L. 190.

27 Ibid. D. 36. L. 39-39 rev.

28 Ibid. D. 11.L. 10.

29 Ibid. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 43.

20 Ibid. L. 50 et seq.

25 Ibid. L. 67.

22 Ibid. L. 68.

\* Raupakh R.R., background. The face of the dying. SPb.. 2007. S. 120.

25 RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10446. L. 2. V.I. Lenin (This is evidenced by his notes on the report of V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko).

25 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 4. D. 48. L. 184.

245 Ibid. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10446. L. 2, 4.

21 Ibid. L. 1.

248 Ibid. L. 3.

29 RGVA. F. 33221. Op. 2. D. 216. L. 1 et seq.

29 Cited by: Zdanovich A.A. Was there a conspiracy at the Field Headquarters? P. 93. |

25 RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 9325. L. 1.

22 Bolshevik leadership. Correspondence. T. 1. S. 86, 88.

25 Ibid. pp. 85-86.

254 RGVA. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 234-236.

25 Bolshevik leadership. Correspondence. T. |. pp. 97-98.

2% RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 9691. L. 5v.

27 Ibid. L. 6.

28. So in the text. That's right: "The best [power], not rich in numbers."

29 So in the text. More correctly: "operational".

% RGVA. F. 6. Op. 12. D. 8. L. 13 isl.

%! There. Op. 5. D. 70. L. 147-147v.

22 [ŷir://uuuuuu.rguŷag.gi/retsops/regsops.ŷt1?11=889](http://uuuuuu.rguŷag.gi/retsops/regsops.ŷt1?11=889). July 5, 1919 V.A. Afanasiev will become the head of Vost. front.

26 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 5. D. 70. L. 145-146v.

24 Ibid. L. 148.

25 Ibid. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 199-199v.

25 Ibid. L. 403.

27 Ibid. L. 404.

28 See: Ibid. L. 405 et seq.

259 Note dated December 7, 1919: "I inform you that, in accordance with the resolution, I remembered Comrade [N.G.] Khvoshinsky in correspondence

about the clerk of the maritime department N.I. Grishinskaya, seconded to serve in my office, the latter must quickly learn to write on a typewriter. and since she still works well in an insufficient degree, she was temporarily relieved of duty in the journal department until she studied to work (as in the text, correctly "work." - S.V.) on a typewriter. Head of Operations Department Shaposhnikov. military commissariat [under signature ]. (Gam same. L. 463.)

"9 Ibid. /[, 423-423 rev.

7! K.Kh. Danishevsky was appointed assistant chief of the PS on June 13, 1919, by a resolution of the RVSR (RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 312).

22 RGVA F. 6. Op. 10. D. 14. L. 209.

215 So in the text. That's right: officers.

245 CAOPI. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 117. L. 31, 34.

25 See, for example: Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. T. 7. S. 76 and others.

26 Karpenko S.V. Essays on the history of the White movement in the South of Russia. M., 2003. S. 174.

27 RGVA, F. 6. Op. 5. D. 67. L. 68-68 00.

7x Only with | On August 1919, 49 employees were dismissed from the headquarters as a result of the dissolution of the PS printing house and the reduction of the staff serving at home in Serpukhov (RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1, D. 36. L. 333-333 00.)

29 If at the beginning of 1919 there were just over 20 communists in the entire PS, now there were still 12 in just one administration.

\* About 12 junior employees - communists of the Administrative and Accounting Department of the PSh RVSR - were still "in the pen" and felt "not at ease" (RGVA. F. 6. Op. 12. D. 21. L.20v). In addition, even after the arrests, they successfully continued to attach relatives to work (see: Ibid. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 472, etc.), although sometimes this phenomenon was remembered and began to "fight" with it. — not very successful. (Ibid. L. 537v., etc.)

2 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 5. D. 70. L. 563-563v. M.M. was particularly irritated. Arzhanov (and not only him!) of the actions of the VVI: "it is necessary to create a more or less strong apparatus first, and then inspect its work."

\*2 GUVUZ - Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions.

28 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 5. D. 67. L. 215-215v.

\* There. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 466-466v. In addition, S.S. Kharitonov to the head of the Administrative and Accounting Department, "in the Soviet institutions of the city of Moscow, there is a complete absence of writing materials and the Field Headquarters is in danger of being left without paper, pencils, ribbons and other items in a month." (Ibid. L. 520.)

® RGVA. F. 6. Op. 12. D. 21. L. 20v.

°See: Pravda. 1919. July 10.

\* When the Supreme Military Council was created in March 1918 and the All-Russian General Staff in May, the Directorates of Military Communications were formed in their composition. On July 30, 1918, they were merged into one Directorate of Military Communications under the Supreme Military Council (UPVOSO under the VVSR), and from September 1918 under the RVSR. On December 17, 1918, the UPVOSO was transformed into the Central Directorate of Military Communications under the RVSR (TsUPVOSO, TSUVS). On him

were assigned: the use for the needs of the military department, the external protection of all types of means of communication, armored trains, the construction and operation of field railways, the preparation of the rear for military operations, the organization and arrangement of the railway service of automobile parts, the organization of postal, telegraph and telephone services. TsUPVOSO was directly subordinate to the head of the RVSR Field Headquarters. On April 15, 1920, the Headquarters of the Railway Troops was included in the TsUPVOSO as a department. With the formation on February 10, 1921, the Headquarters of the Red Army became part of it. (See also: Guide to TsGASA. T. 1. Minneapolis, 1991. S. 87 -88.)

\* In fact, Anderson asked for the transfer of acquaintances from the front to the rear.

29 It is noteworthy that in the extract sent on January 26, 1919 to the Special Department of the Cheka, only the situation with the arrest due to "fussiness" and the situation in the common cell of the MCHC (RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. L. 106).

29 February 12, 1919 A.M. Arnoldov sent S.I. A telephone message to Aralov, in which he reported: "the working day" in the Central Directorate of Military Communications lasts from 10 am to 5 pm, and "... lunch starts at 3 pm. Such a distribution of the working day is not normal, since in the period from 3 to 5 pm, diners practically do not work in the canteen, spending this time in lunch, getting ready for it, going to Nikitskaya and waiting for it. Recipients

the same products on hand work all the time from 10 to 17 hours. In order to make work more productive and uniform, it would be desirable for all the employees of the CCVS to have the following distribution of the working day: work from 10 am to 4 pm and lunch from 4 pm to 5 pm. I am waiting for instructions or confirmation" (RGVA. F. 6. On. 2. D. 19. L. 56. Typewritten text of the decoded telephone message).

SE. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

3? The document omitted a fragment in which the military commissar of the TsUPVOSO took away the presented to the head of the Department M.M. Arzhanov, head of the UVOSO of the Eastern Front V.A. Zhygmunt accusations. V.V. Fominov reported that Zhigmund:

"In his activities, he did not take into account the inevitability of the subordination of lower instances to higher ones, with leadership from the center, and, relying only on his party membership, he confused all instances, appealed unnecessarily directly to Comrade Trotsky, from which the business suffered. Meanwhile, he has been a member of the RCP for only 8-9 months. V.A. Zhygmunt left the front without any permission or even notification from the head[of] the TsUVS and came to Moscow, as he defined it, "on party business."

Meeting with M.M. Arzhanov at the NKPS, at the invitation of Arzhanov to go to the TsUPVOSO for a report on the state of affairs of V.A. Zygmunt answered [in] the presence of several witnesses: "I don't want to deal with crooks, I don't recognize the TsUPVOSO, and there is no TsUPVOSO." (Ibid. L. 12v.)

CV V.V. Fominova: "V.A. Zygmunt turned out to be a completely insolvent administrator. The apparatus of military communications on the Eastern Front is in a completely chaotic state. (Ibid. L. 12.)

In addition, V.V. Fominov reported on the parallelism of the work of the TsUPVOSO and the NKPS (according to Fominov, the People's Commissariat was to blame); lack of proper protection of bridges and frequent sabotage. (Ibid. L. 11.)

23 Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b). Meeting agendas. T. 1. M., 2000. S. 32.

25 See: RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 13.

25 Trotsky L.D. Decree. op. S. 351.

25 See: RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10076. L. | and sl.

"17

27 See: Bolshevik leadership. Correspondence. T. |. S. 68 et seq.

2» Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. |. pp. 248--249.

29 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. 247.

X9 Ibid. L. 198 about.

x: RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. L. 66.

%: RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. L. 234. 246 with ob. — 247.

x3 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 5. D. 66. L. 349v.

x: Right there. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. L. 241.

%\* See also: Novoselov D.S. Crisis of the Cheka in late 1918 - early 1919. pp. 66-77; "Proceed immediately to the liquidation of the Cheka ...". pp. 51-55.

heh Archive of the Cheka. P. 97. And this despite the fact that Skrypnik subsequently headed the secret political department, through which the Red Terror was carried out during the Civil War.

37 See also: Novoselov D.S. The crisis of the Cheka in late 1918 - early 1919. pp. 66-77.

58 CAOPI. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 148. L. 62-62v.

x9 Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) - VKP(b). Meeting agendas. T. 1. S. 34.

Mo Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 248 - -249.

11 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 14. L. 103. As a commentary on the relationship between Aralov and Kostyaev, one can probably cite the petition of a member of the board of the NKID Aralov to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated December 30, 1925 for the appointment of a pension to two young sons of the general who died on September 27. In it, Aralov described Kostyaev as "an unconditionally devoted and honest military worker" (RGVA. F. 37976. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 2).

12 See for example: Bolshevik Leadership. T. 1. S. 59-60.

33 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 14. L. 103. The main question of the telegram is about the return to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front S.S. Kamenev (instead of A.A. Samoilo). Trotsky gave Lenin his consent. The postscript of the document is of interest: "Kuzmin, Orekhov, Naumov, Vetoshkin had the same opinion about Samoilo as Lashevich, Gusev, Smilga about Kamenev, like Aralov about Kostyaev. These front-line attachments are our common misfortune.

34 RGVA. F. 33988. Op. 3. D. 7. L. 111.

35 Lenin. unknown documents. S. 291.

316 Ibid. S. 290.

"7 CAOPI. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 101. L. 3 rev.

38 Efremov M.P. Memorable meetings with V.I. Lenin // Memories of V.I. Lenin. T. 3. M., 1969. S. 38--39.

"9 Kashirin V. Scouts of military espionage // Motherland. 2008. No. 12. P. 31.



50 RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 2412. L. 2.

5: Deutscher I. Decree. op. M., 2006. S. 412.

322 Molodtsygin M.A. Red Army. S. 140.

% Ibid.

25 M.D. Bonch-Bruevich about the first meeting with Podvoisky (February 23, 1918): "... a tall and very thin party member in a cloth tunic and the same clumsy trousers, somewhat reminiscent of Don Quixote" (Bonch-Bruevich M. D. Acquaintance with Lenin // Memories of V. I. Lenin, vol. 3. M., 1969. P. 188).

355 RGVA. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 78. L. 249-249v.

3% See, for example: Ibid. D. 88. L. 149-149v., 152-152v.

327 This, in particular, is evidenced by the fact that when on August 10, 1918 it was necessary to immediately transfer "the largest part of the troops" from the Western Front to the Eastern Front, E.M. Sklyansky, having written the corresponding order, signed it with V.I. Lenin. By this document, by the way, General Bonch-Bruevich undertook to report "on delays" directly to Lenin (Lenin V.I. Full. sobr. soch. T. 50. P. 140).

RGVA. F. 10. Op. 1. D. 904. L. 56. Transcript of the general meeting of the commission for the study of the activities of the central institutions of the military department.

39 Bonch-Bruevich M.D. All power to the Soviets. M., 1957. S. 345-346.

59 Report by V.I. Lenin on the situation on the Southern Front and the purge of the Field Headquarters of June 24, 1919 // Sat. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. S. 128.

3! Bonch-Bruevich M.D. Belarus. S. 160.

332 See also: RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 919. L. 7 et seq.

333 Lenin. unknown documents. S. 249.

xn Bonch-Bruevich M.D. Belarus. S. 159.

335 Ibid. pp. 159-160.

e Krasnov V.G., Daines V.O. Decree. op. S. 187.

337 Bonch-Bruevich M.D. Belarus. pp. 160 - 161.

38 See: RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 245, 303.

339 Ibid. L. 264.

3% Ibid. L. 298.

for Bonch-Bruevich M.D. Belarus. S. 161.

ÿ2 The fact that the resolution is issued by order of the RVSR should not be embarrassing: it has 3 signatures under it. and under the previous 4 - a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council. on which the text printed on June 22 was adopted, was to take place between June 17 and 23, 1919 (Compare: Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Protocols. Vol. 1, p. 248. 252). |

% RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 304. Decree on the establishment of a single Moscow time in the entire active army; military administrations, institutions and establishments.

3" CAOPI. F. 3. Op. 1. D. P7. L. 24.

355 Ibid. D. 100. L. 100.

3 Wed: Sat. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. pp. 124-124; Archive of the Cheka. pp. 324-326.

357 Compare: Archive of the Cheka. S. 326; CO. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. S. 124.

m8 Archive of the Cheka. S. 325.

3 CO. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. S. 123.

3% Archive of the Cheka. pp. 324-326; CO. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. pp. 123-124.

5 See: Topolyansky V. Mysterious Spaniard.

3% Archive of the Cheka. S. 325.

33 Lenin V.I. Floor. Sobr. op. T. 38. M., 1974. S. 399.

3" Archive of the Cheka. S. 637.

355 Sat. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. S. 117.

356 Stalin I.V. Op. T.4.M., 1947. S. 263.

57 Leonov S.V. State Security of the Soviet Republic during the October Revolution and the Civil War // State Security of Russia: History and Modernity. M., 2004. S. 355.

358 Archive of the Cheka. S. 133.

59 SO. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. pp. 127-128.

59 RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 12317. L. 7.

% Ibid. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 61. L. 3-6 rev. Testimony of N.N. Domozhirova.

52 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 4. D. 48. L. 179.

55 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 234.

364 Ibid. L. 251 about.

%5 There. L. 282.

% Ibid. F. 24380. Op. 7. D. 76. L. 3, 13v. February 6, 1919 Chairman of the Petrograd Labor Commune G.E. Zinoviev informed E.M. Sklyansky that on January 28 he received an unencrypted telegram of a top secret nature about the order of the Commander-in-Chief I.I. Vatsetis to mine all the bridges in the Petrograd region "to blow them up if necessary." Domozhikov was accused of "being the chief of staff of the Northern Front, obliged to distribute the order of sending and the secret nature of telegrams ... allowed. that the telegram ... was sent to its intended destination without its direct indication of its secret nature, i.e. [in] negligence in the service."

ÿ There. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 14. L. 191.

8 See also: Ibid. F. 24830. Op. 7. D. 125. L. 44.

59 RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10446. L. 1: F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 12.

e Krasnov V.G., Daines V.O. Decree. op. S. 192.

" CAOPI. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 101. L. 1, 3 about.

3? Khitrovo does not appear on the lists of the General Staff officers. Probably, this is how V.V. is erroneously referred to in the text. Khrulev.

373 Only Major General B.I. Polyakov, who graduated from the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff in 1906. Theodor in the documents we have identified for 1918 and 1920 never mentions him; from the generals, Teodor spoke respectfully only about F.V. Kostyaev. It is unlikely that the general staff officers indicated by Pavlunovsky could be members of the organization headed by this "old" general staff officer.

ya RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 12317. L. 8-9.

55 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 14. L. 116.

"6 CO. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. S. 126.

377 Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b). Meeting agendas. T. 1. S. 36.

e5 RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10317. L. 1 et seq.

79 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 319.

zo rir://ugugu/, yogugag.gi/reg5op5/regvop.ŷ1214::4 18

eh! RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 351 rev.

2 Ibid. L. 360.

#3 Zdanovich A.A. Was there a conspiracy at the Field Headquarters? S. 94.

3% RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10446. L. 1.

55 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 12. D. 8. L. 36. Covering note by K.Kh. Danishevsky I.P. Pavlunovsky dated August 5, 1919.

"357

%6 RGASPI. F. 17. Or. 2. D. 22. L. 1.

\*7 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 380 rev.

\* The Central Committee instructed "Orgburo to find employees for the Special Department" (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 22. L. 2).

No. There. L. 2.

9% CAOPI. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 117. L. 26v.

%: See: Voitkov S.S. The idea of a military dictatorship... S. 56-65.

92 Deutscher I. Decree. op. S. 439.

% Tto(6Ku" \$ pareg. T. 1. 1917-1919. 1.; R, 1964. P. 578.

yue Deutscher I. Decree. op. S. 439.

95 Lenin. unknown documents. S. 291.

% Ibid. pp. 292-293.

37 Trotsky L.D. Decree. op. S. 456.

95 Lenin. unknown documents. pp. 294-295. Exact text: "Knowing the strict nature of Comrade Trotsky's order, I am so convinced, absolutely convinced, of the correctness, expediency and necessity for the good of the cause given by Comrade. Trotsky orders that I support this order entirely "(RGVA. F. 33988. Op. 2. D. 118. L. 179).

399 Danishevsky K.Kh., Kamenev S.S. Decree. op. S. 25.

"9 Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 256.

% Danishevsky K.Kh., Kamenev S.S. Decree. op. S. 31.

42 Ibid.

45 Op. Quoted from: Zdanovich A.A. Was there a conspiracy at the Field Headquarters? pp. 94-95.

44 RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 61. L. 1.

45 Ibid. L. 2.

\* GA RF. F. 130. Op. 3. D. 52. L. 53.

47 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 22. L. 5 rev.

aw there. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 940. L. 1.

"There. It is possible that the fact that I.I. Vatsetis sometimes allowed Lenin's incompetence in certain military matters to be openly admitted. (See: Ibid. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 14. L. 77v.) |

49 Kolpakidi A., Prokhorov D. Decree. op. P. 88. |

h! RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 940. L. 1. In Theodori's "tears" and Vatsetis' appeal to Lenin, only truthful facts could be cited, because, if desired, recipients could easily check

received information.

32 Polikarpov V.D. Decree. op. S. 44.

55 RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 940. L. 1.

"5 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 7. M.. 1976. S. 362.

> RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10076. L. 2---2v.

°See: RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 312 et seq. In addition, we should not forget that a number of departments were generally cleared of specialists - for example, the Registration Department of the PIC.

57 V.I. Lenin and the Cheka. S. 184 et seq.

n5 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 98. Vacation.

39 Ibid. L. 100. Vacation.

e there. L. 113. Vacation.

5! There. Op. 5. D. 67. L. 49.

322 The text of the document is erroneous - "Malyshov".

82 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 331.

85 Ibid. F. 1. Op. 3. D. 68. L. 22. Telegram L.D. Trotsky Ya.M. Sverdlov with a petition to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on awarding the 5th Zemgalsky Regiment with a special honorary banner dated August 19, 1918.

55 Truth. 1919. July 10.

\* CO. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. pp. 130-131.

47 See: CAOPIM. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 199. L. 75--77.

45 RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 89. L. 37-44.

89 Covering note by K.Kh. Danishevsky I.P. Pavlunovsky to the report of V.A. Antonov Ovseenko and the list of persons appointed to command positions by I.I. Vatsetis dated August 5, 1919 (Outgoing 3 and 5, Moscow). In the Special Department Comrade. PAVLUNOVSKY. At the same time, a copy of the report of comrade. ANTONOV with LENIN's resolution: "Send[s] the Cheka to the investigation of the Headquarters"; and a list of persons appointed to command positions by order of the Commander-in-Chief VATSETIS. APPENDICES: A copy of the report and a list "(RGVA. F. 6. Op. 12. D. 8. L. 36. Vacation - typewritten text with marks in iron gall ink).

\*0 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 10. D. 11. L. 336. The list includes: Ya.E. Shebranov (infantry inspector, telegram to I.I. Vatsetis), I.I. Lerche (at the disposal of the commander, by resolution of I.I. Vatsetis), Aven (assistant commander, by order of I.I. Vatsetis); Bukhman, Myakhkonky, Bilkin, Matuzel, Chistyakov (at the disposal of the 14th ar

MII). "377

3! RGVA. F. 6. Op., 10. D. 14. L. 214.

\*? There. L. 220.

33 Red Book of the Cheka. T.2

+ RGVA. F. 6. Op. 12. D. 8.

55 Ibid. L. 38.

56 So in the text. Obviously. I mean "betrayal".

3' RGVA. F. 6. Op. 12. D. 8. L. 47.

h3\* Ibid. L. 47 about.

49 Ibid. F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 304. L. 23v.

"About "They don't change horses in the crossing" (See the American film "Wag" / "Wag the Dog").

"! Authorship has not been clearly established. The tentative author of the document was S.I. Gusev: the theses undoubtedly belong to one of the top leaders of the Soviet military department, the clause about "little experience in the Field Headquarters" points to this particular member of the RVSR. Theses are dated according to: Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 7. S. 328.

"2 The Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was stationed in Serpukhov.

45 There were no prerequisites for relying on the regiment during the military coup in the regiment. From the intelligence report of the Special Department of the IBSC on the 5th Latvian Rifle Regiment No. 17 dated July 5: "There are 149 communists in the regiment. No counter-revolutionary agitation was noticed. There is no friction with the commanding staff, only the Red Army men are dissatisfied with the increase in the salaries of the commanding staff. Only one deserted, as he was seen stealing money" (TsAOPI. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 117. L. 21-21 rev. Typewritten copy). And later there was no need to doubt the loyalty of the Latvian units. So, on August 13, 1919, the mood of the soldiers was characterized by the Special Department of the MChK as "good", the work was "satisfactory"; the number of communists decreased to 154 people and 8 candidates for members of the RCP(b) (ibid. L. 63v.), although it is possible that in the summary of July 5, members of the party cell and candidates for party members were counted together.

"\* Graduates of the 3-month courses of the Imperial Nikolaev Military Academy in 1918

45 See: Bolshevik leadership. Correspondence. T. 1. S. 87.

46 See, for example: Zdanovich A.A. Domestic counterintelligence. S. 212

. M., 1989. S. 468. L. 39.

49 Trotsky L.D. My life. M., 2001. S. 439-440.

"8 Civil war and military intervention in the USSR. M., 1983. S. 281.

"3 Trotsky L.D. Decree. op. S. 343.

20 Gusev S.I. Decree. op. S. 210.

5 Danishevsky K.Kh., Kamenev S.S. Decree. op. S. 52.

5! Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. T.7. S. 221.

55 The nearest resolution of the RVSR is dated May 25, 1919, signed by Sklyansky, Vatsetis and Aralov (Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Protocols. Vol. 1. P. 240). |

"4 Krasnov V.G., Daines V.O. Unknown Trotsky. M., 2000. S. 188.

See also: Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 248-249.

56 Danishevsky K.Kh., Kamenev S.S. Decree. op. S. 53.

57 Gusev S.I. Decree. op. pp. 210-211. |

55 See: RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 940. L. 3 et seq.

5 Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b). Meeting agendas. T. 1. M., 2000. S. 35.

46) RGVA. F. 33988. Op. 3. D. 7. L. 126.

% Ibid. L. 124.

42 Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 247.

43 Lenin V.I. Floor. coll. op. T. 38. S. 402.

% RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 14.

45 Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 247.

56 Ibid. pp. 247---248.

67 RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 14; Danishevsky K.Kh., Kamenev S.S. Decree. op. S. 32.

\* Krasnov V.G., Daines V.O. Decree. op. S. 189.

49 Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 248; RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 14.

49 Krasnov V.G., Daines V.O. Decree. op. S. 190.

\*! Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 248.

422 RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 11173. L. 4.

45 Deutscher I. Decree. op. S. 439.

45 RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 10076. L. 1.

45 Krasnov V.G., Daines V.O. Decree. op. S. 192.

"6 Danishevsky K.Kh., Kamenev S.S. Decree. op. pp. 31-32.

77 Ibid. S. 32.

7 Ibid. S. 33.

"9 True. 1919. July 10.

es Krasnov V.G. Daines V.O. Decree. op. S. 194.

x: See, for example: RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 48--49.

h2 Krasnov V.G. Daines V.O. Decree. op. S. 204.

\* There. pp. 204--205.

\* There. S. 208.

45 See: Krasnov V.G., Daines V.O. Decree. op. S. 216 et seq.

% cit. Quoted from: Serebryakova Z.L. My father is L.P. Serebryakov // News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 12. P. 129.

\*7 Ibid. S. 130.

\*\* RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 18. L. 1.

49 Ibid. D. 20. L. 1. The PB meeting was attended by Lenin, Kamenev, Kalinin, Beloborodov, Stasova and Dzerzhinsky.

90 RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 48-49.

9! Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51.M., 1982. S. 382. Note.

92 Ibid. S. 35.

495 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 23. L. 1.

494 Ibid. Op. 163. D. 6. L. 1.

45 Serebryakova 3.L. Decree. op. S. 130.

4 RGVA. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 49-50.

There. L. 52.

48 Ibid. L. 43-44.

\* There. L. 45-46.

50 The published document is a response to a telegram from V.I. Lenin dated May 20, 1919

Members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front S.I. Gusev, M.M. Lashevich and I.I. Yurenev in a telegram to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) objected to the replacement of S.S. Kamenev as commander of the Eastern Front A.A. Samoylo. The telegram said that the head of the Field Staff F.V. Kostyaev carries out unreasonable replacements of commanders in the army, and a member of the RVSR and the commissar of headquarters S.I. Aralov seals them with his signature (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 50. M., 1982. S. 486. Note). After reviewing the telegram of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front, Lenin proposed to appoint S.S. Kamenev as commander of the Eastern Front, to replace the head of the Field Staff F.V. Kostyaeva, S.I. Aralova for

change M.M. Lashevich as commissar of the Field Headquarters (ibid., p. 316.)

"5 From the autobiography of Lieutenant General A.A. Samoilov - about the relationship in the leadership of the military department with the leadership of the RVS of the Eastern Front (no later than April 24, 1934):

"1, Formal side:

In the last days of April 1919, i.e. at the moment of the most dangerous advance of Kolchak to the Volga, I, as the commander of the 6th separate army in the North, was called to a direct wire by the chief of staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Vatsetis, Kostyaev, who conveyed to me the offer of the Commander-in-Chief to take command of the armies of the Eastern Front, in view of the removal from command S.S. Kamenev. To change the commander of the front at such a critical moment in military operations and to appoint as a deputy a person completely unfamiliar with the theater of operations, neither with the situation, nor with the troops, seemed to me such a blatant absurdity that I refused the offer.

My decision became all the more correct for me when, following this, my comrade P.P. called me to the apparatus. Lebedev, who at that time was the chief of staff of the Eastern Front, and shed light on the situation at the front. According to LEBEDEV, members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front rebelled against the replacement of Kamenev, Gusev and Lashevich so abruptly that they decided to leave the Revolutionary Military Council if a new commander was appointed. However, despite my two subsequent refusals, I had already received an order from Vatsetis to immediately go to Simbirsk and take command of the front.

My work has developed in conditions that are harder to imagine. Kamenev continued to live in Simbirsk, in the same apartment as Gusev, and through the latter he continued to influence all the decisions I made. It happened more than once that Gusev, agreeing with me on some questions in the morning, in the afternoon, returning from dinner and having a talk with Kamenev, renounced his decisions - all my orders were discredited. The situation was aggravated by the acute conflict that had taken place between me and Tukhachevsky, in which Gusev and Lashevich took the side of Tukhachevsky. On my action appeal



Tukhachevsky before the Commander-in-Chief, I received permission to remove him from command of the army, which, of course, I refused due to the combat situation.

The struggle of the members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front against Trotsky and Vatsetis because of my appointment was upset by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. after which Kamenev was reinstated in command, and I was returned to my former position - commander of the 6th separate army (Northern Front). As I found out later. One of the arguments in the fight against Trotsky was my characterization presented by Gusev and Lashevich to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a few days before my stay at the front, as a protege of Trotsky, an incapable person who only brought confusion to the matter.

Such is the formal side of the situation that ended with this characterization of mine. which I leave on the conscience of Gusev and Lashevich.

## 2. Lighting the situation on the merits [... ]

In the general situation that has developed for me as a commander of the "front", I naturally made decisions, perhaps erroneous for today, if you look at them from the height of 20 past years, but then they seemed to me imperatively dictated by the situation. The assessment of the latter also revealed a disagreement between M.V. Frunze and me, which ended my stay on the Eastern Front.

In 1935, Tukhachevsky, recalling the events on the Eastern Front, placed in the central newspapers my characterization, sent by Gusev and Lashevich to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and did not at all appreciate the situation in which I had to act. In my private letter to Klimenty Efremovich Voroshilov, I then asked for instructions on how I should respond to this characterization discrediting me in the eyes of the whole public, and in the Red Army in the first place, and from the command of the district I received instructions to look at this issue as a historical episode and continue to serve as he has served until now. [...]" (RGVA. F. 37976. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 10 06-12. Certified typewritten copy).

52 L.D. Trotsky wanted M.D. Bonch-Bruевич became the head of the RVSR Field Headquarters.

59) On May 20, 1919, Lenin proposed to Trotsky to reappoint Kamenev as commander of the Eastern Front, and on May 29 he telegraphed S.I. Gusev, M.M. Lashevich and I.I. Yurenev to Simbirsk on the appointment of S.S. Kamenev (Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biographical chronicle.

T. 7. S. 210, 241).

+ The commander of the 2nd Army was V.I. Shorin.

55 Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army. Vol. 2, pp. 292–298 (Note by V.G. Krasnov and V.O. Daines).

x" Note by Secretary Gusev M.N. Burakova V.I. Lenin:

"Tov. Stasov's proposal to comrade. Smilgi [and] gov. Gusev [a] supports and asks comrade. Sokolnikov appoint a member[om | Revolutionary] council | eta | Western[ny] front[on], and the call of comrade. Trotsky in the center for some time is highly desirable.

Secretary M. Burakova" (RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 160. L. 47. Autotraf in blue ink).

57 RGVA, F. 33987. Op. 1. D. 196. L. 57.

5 Ibid. L. 245.

59 Zdanovich A.A. Was there a conspiracy at the Field Headquarters? S. 94.

519 Ibid. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 306.

51 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3 (PB). D. 24. L. 1.

52 Ibid. D. 36. L. 5. In the comments to the collection "V.I. Lenin and the Cheka" states that N.N. Domozhirova and E.I. Isaev was amnestied on November 7, 1919 and sent to the disposal of the Field Headquarters (V.I. Lenin and the Cheka, p. 184); B.I. Kuznetsov and A.K. Malyshev - was released on a subscription to return to his duty station; Yu.I. Grigoriev - amnestied (ibid., p. 193).

239 Kolpakidi A., Prokhorov D. Decree. op. S. 86.

514 RGVA. F. 33221. Op. 2. D. 216. L. 8a.

5:5 Kolpakidi A., Prokhorov D. Decree. op. S. 89.

516 RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 940. L. 4. Vatsetis wrote to Lenin that "such a characterization is as much a surprise for me as it is for anyone who knows me well." |

57 Ibid. L. 1-2.

515 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 384.

59 Ibid. L. 385.

520 See: Ibid. Op. 5. D. 67. L. 191 isl.

5231 Ibid. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 537 rev.

52 Ibid. L. 459 about.

55 Ibid. L. 479 about.

524 Ibid. L. 480 (Order No. 299 of November 6, 1919).

525 Ibid. L. 463 about. (Order on PSh No. 295 of October 24, 1919).

526 Ibid. L. 501, 503.

327 Ibid. L. 530 about. (Order No. 309 of December 1, 1919).

\*\* Ibid. L. 528.

59 Ibid. L. 576 rev. (Order No. 326 of December 30, 1919).

The same order dismissed the employee of the Republic of Uzbekistan P.B. Ozolin.

\* There. L. 548.

52 Ibid. L. 556.

533 Ibid. L. 564.

m there. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 302. .

55 This refers to the events of July 6–7, 1918, known in Soviet historiography as the "anti-Soviet revolt of the left socialist revolutionaries."

5% "Muravyovshina" is an attempt at a military coup undertaken by the first Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front, the Left Social Revolutionary M.A. Muravyov in July 1918

37 Here G.I. Theodori is disingenuous: S.I. Aralov tried all the time to shift responsibility for the work of the Operod of the People's Commissariat of War to him.

58 See materials: RGVA. F. 1. Op. 3. D. 6.

59 Kolpakidi A., Prokhorov D. Decree. op. S. 86.

me RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1237. L. 1.

54 Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 618, 638.

5° Ibid. S. 256.

Mz there. pp. 258-259.

54 Ibid. S. 603.

% As amended - in various cases (Tinchenko Ya.Yu. Decree. Op. P. 68 et seq.).

55 RGASPI. F. 17. He. 109. D. 14. L. 130.

57 Ibid. Op. 5. D. 18. L.2.

\*\* RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 153.

59 Ibid. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 391.

50 Ibid. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 318.

eg Right there. L. 330.

52 Ibid. F. 6. Op. 5. D. 70. L. 310.

55 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 21. L. 1. The punctuation of the original has been preserved.

59 Ibid. L. 2. The meeting was attended by Lenin, Dzerzhinsky, Kalinin, Kamenev, Beloborodov, Stasova, Peters, Sklyansky, Chicherin.

55 RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 474v. — 475.

55 Ibid. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 459-460.

57 Danishevsky K.Kh., Kamenev S.S. Decree. op. S. 58.

55 Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 51. M., 1970. S. 49--. -50.

“9 Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 393.

“ There. pp. 248-390.

\*: An alternative to the bureau was created in November 1918: as a department of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), the Central Bureau of Muslim Organizations of the RCP(b) was established, which disseminated “communist ideas among the working Muslims”. In March 1919, the status of this body increased, as evidenced by its renaming into the Central Bank of the Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1989, No. 7, p. 163).

582. Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 331-332.

55 Ibid. S. 338.

564 Ibid. S. 343.

55 Red Army in the 1920s. S. 73.

56 Ibid. pp. 78-79.

567 See: News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 5. S. 156-157; No. 8. S. 197.

% Minutes of the PB meeting of October 15, 1919 // Ibid. No. 4. S. 165.

% And he added: "So purely strategic questions that we looked at each other with a smile, how did we turn into strategists" (Lenin, Unknown documents, pp. 381-382).

59 See: News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 5. S. 156--157.

" There. P. 163. On November 13, 1919, the PB decided to inform I.V. Stalin that the Politburo considers it absolutely unacceptable to back up their business demands with ultimatums and resignations."

57? There. No. 8. S. 190.

553 Ibid. No. 5. S. 157, 161; 1990. No. 4. S. 166.

54 Accordingly, Kamenev, after being appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief, ceased to be guided by Stalin's instructions.

55 Bolshevik leadership. T. 1. S. 110.

55 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 7. L. 6.

57 See also: Karpenko S.V. Decree. op. pp. 252-253.

53 Ibid. S. 260.

99 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 11. L. 1.

50 Ibid. D. 12. L. 1.

5! RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 480. L. 20-21.

ÿ RGVA. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 432 (Order on PSH dated October 3, 1919 No. 286); L. 460 about. (Order on PSH dated October 23, 1919 No. 294).

\* RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 426---427.

55 RGASII. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 15. L. 3 rev. This is indicated by the fact that the request of G.E. Zinoviev on the introduction of the 7th Army M.M. Lashevich and N.N. Kuzmin On October 30, the Politburo decided to discuss L.D. Trotsky.

x RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 519.

% Ibid. L. 520.

5 Ibid. L. 521.

eh there. F. 6. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 537.

i9 there. L. 544.

50 Ibid. L. 546 rev.

59:11 May 1919 F.E. Dzerzhinsky instructed the head of the Special Department of the Cheka, M.S. Kedrov "to pay special attention to the state of the army on the Lithuanian-Belarusian front." Kedrov was supposed to organize a special department in the armies of the Western Front, where, according to Dzerzhinsky, "complete laxity and signs of treason" were observed. (Sat. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. S. 118-119.)

52 Report of the leadership of the Cheka (Chairman F.E. Dzerzhinsky and Deputy Head of the Special Department I.P. Pavlunovsky) to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on the investigation of the case of the White Guard organization at the headquarters of the Western Front dated July 8, 1919.

"The events in the fortified area of the Kronstadt fortress and the investigation of the activities of the organization of military specialists that prepared such events led to the establishment of a connection between the Kronstadt White Guard organization and the White Guard organization of the headquarters of the Western Front. Interrogation of the main member of the organization of the Western Front of the Nashtazap Front and the commander of the 15th | | N.N. DOMOZHIROVA made it possible to uncover a central organization coordinating the activities of all fronts, with the exception of the Eastern one, and preparing to seize the Red Army command and control apparatus into the hands of its own people-specialists. This central organization is located at the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Tasks and goals of the organization: through its people appointed to responsible positions c. army, it was supposed to seize the military apparatus in their hands and with the help of this apparatus to carry out a military coup and mouth

establish a military dictatorship. Facts: in Serpukhov, the organization relies, according to them, on the 5th Latvian Rifle Regiment. In Moscow, through the teacher of the Academy of the General Staff GRIGORYEV, who has connections with the Moscow White Guard organizations, to part of the regiments stationed in Moscow. For the same purpose, the national army was appointed army commander of the 15th, and Ernest VATSETIS was appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the same army. DOMOZHIROV and E. VATSETIS were supposed to organize and lead the uprising of the 15th Latvian Army, where Commander-in-Chief VATSETIS was allegedly very popular. Commander-in-Chief VATSETIS was supposed to lead the rebel units and, in his words, "shake Moscow." In addition, the organization of the Field Headquarters has ties with Kolchak and Denikin and Paris, where this organization transmitted information of a military and political nature.

The Chekas of its Special Department arrested the Commander-in-Chief I.I. Vatsetis and acting Chief of Staff F.V. Kostyaeva - "for failure to inform about the existence of an organization preparing an uprising and espionage in the Field Headquarters", E.I. Isaeva, B.I. Kuznetsova, A.K. Malysheva, Yu.I. Grigorieva, E.I. Vatsetisa, S.S. Dylana, A.V. Remer and A.A. Stadler (F.E. Dzerzhinsky - Chairman of the Cheka - OGPU. 1917-1926. M., 2007. S. 131-132; RGASPI. F. 76. Oi. 3. D. 61. L. 1---2. The original is a typewritten text on the letterhead of the Directorate of the Special Department of the Cheka with autographs).

593 Bothmer K., background. With Count Mirbach in Moscow. M., 1996. S. 71.

54 Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. protocols. T. 1. S. 261.

55 RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 547.

56 RGASPI. 17. Op. 109. D. 14. L. 116.

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